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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the specificities of Late-industrialisation, focussing on 
Korea and Brazil. The growth and development experience of both economies between 
the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s is explained in terms of their pattern of integration 
into the international division of labour. Challenging conventional accounts, the thesis 
does not consider these patterns as resulting simply from economic policies and 
institutions, but rather determined by global economy developments and their 
interaction with local structural factors that affect the conditions of valorisation of 
capital in different productive sectors.  
This thesis argues that the Brazilian process of capitalist development revolved 
around the appropriation of land rent – i.e. extraordinary profits available due to the 
monopoly of an irreproducible means of production, land. Industrial capital was able to 
maximise profits despite producing for domestic markets at relatively small scale. 
Capital compensated for its high production costs by appropriating a portion of the 
abundant land rent. Since the late-1960s, industrial capital in Korea maximised profits 
through the production for world markets, taking advantage of relatively cheap and 
disciplined labour. Due to skill-replacing technological changes associated with 
computerisation and electronics-based automation, and its own historical origins and 
characteristics, Korean labour became particularly productive when performing 
simplified, though increasingly complex, activities as an appendage of machinery or in 
the manual assembly of components. 
The analysis and findings are supported by a three-pronged methodology. First, 
a model that measures intersectoral income transfers and assesses the value of land rent 
that supported the process of capital accumulation in each country. Secondly, an 
analysis of the global steel, motor-vehicles and semiconductors industries, and their 
development in Korea and Brazil. Thirdly, an appraisal of the historical development of 
social and political processes in the two countries and their role in shaping the evolution 
of economic, welfare and labour policies and political institutions. The research shows 
the intrinsic unity of these three factors, revealing specific transformations in Korea and 
Brazil as part of the realisation of the global process of capitalist development. 
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Introduction 
 
   
 When in 1979 the second oil shock was followed by a sharp increase in 
international interest rates, the Korean and Brazilian economies shared several 
characteristics. First, both had been growing substantially during the previous 15 years. 
Secondly, in contrast with their earlier experiences, post-1964 growth was characterised 
by a sharp expansion of non-traditional exports. Thirdly, both had experienced a 
significant state-led development of the heavy industry sector during the 1970s. 
Fourthly, both were highly dependent on imported oil and external finance to the point 
that, by 1979, they were two of the three most indebted economies in the ‗developing 
world‘. Such were the similarities that authors as diverse as Balassa (1979), Warren 
(1980) and Fröbel et al. (1980) did not hesitate to highlight them. Brazil and the 
Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) were usually included among the most successful 
Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs). More than three decades later, there is no doubt 
that the differences between the Korean and Brazilian economies were then much larger 
than their apparent similarities. Their post-1980 experience is more than clear in this 
respect: unlike Brazil, Korea suffered neither the ‗debt crisis‘ nor ‗lost‘ the decade of 
the 1980s and, though it faced, as Brazil, a severe financial crisis during 1997-98, Korea 
came back on track more rapidly than the latter. Moreover, while Korea has become a 
global industrial power, Brazil has endured a process of deindustrialisation.  
 Though several explanations have been advanced to account for the performance 
difference between the two countries, the debate has recently centred on the analysis of 
national economic policies, and the political/cultural institutions that shape them. Some 
of the explanations are focused in these two countries. In others, the contrast between 
Korea and Brazil falls within a broader interregional comparative analysis. On the one 
side, ‗neo-liberal‘ authors, such as Balassa (1988, 1990), Krueger (1979, 1990), World 
Bank (1993) and Ranis (1990, 1995), attribute remarkable Korean economic growth to 
the ‗free trade‘ or ‗market-friendly‘ policies allegedly implemented since the 1960s. 
These policies, it is suggested, ‗got the prices right‘ and promoted an ‗export-led‘ 
growth strategy, which contrasted with the previous model of development based on 
import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), and allowed Korea to maximize its latent 
comparative advantage in productions intensively using its abundant ‗hard-working‘ 
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and allegedly relatively skilled labour. The non-implementation of this policy shift was, 
for these authors, the main cause of Brazil‘s underperformance relative to Korea. On the 
other side, ‗statist‘ authors, such as Amsden (1989), Mesquita Moreira (1995), Evans 
(1995) and Kolhi (2004) argue that, on the contrary, Korea‘s fast economic growth was 
based on the creation of a strong, autonomous ‗developmental state‘ which ‗disciplined‘ 
not only labour but also capital, and solved a number of ‗market failures‘ and 
‗coordination problems‘ by deliberately ‗getting the prices wrong‘ and by 
conspicuously but selectively intervening in economic processes. For these authors, the 
poor or inefficient implementation of these same policies in Brazil caused its 
underperformance relative to Korea. 
 The goal of the present thesis is to advance an alternative analysis, by revisiting 
ideas first developed by such authors as Fröbel et al. (1980), Gereffi (1995) and Iñigo 
Carrera (2008) to re-evaluate recent nation-centred ‗market friendly‘ and ‗statist‘ 
approaches. For this purpose, the thesis is structured as follows. The next section of this 
introductory chapter critically surveys the aforementioned debate between ‗neo-liberal‘ 
and ‗statist‘ authors. This literature survey is followed by the presentation of the general 
guidelines of an alternative approach to the transformations in the world economy 
leading, since the late 1960s, to the formation of a New International Division of 
Labour (NIDL). This is done through the reconstruction of the approach‘s origins in the 
above-mentioned pre-existing literature. The last part of this introduction details the 
main hypotheses and aims of the thesis, namely, the re-evaluation of the comparative 
analysis of the processes of economic development and industrialisation in Korea and 
Brazil between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s from the standpoint of a revised NIDL 
framework. The rest of the thesis presents the methodology, sources, and quantitative, 
qualitative and historical analyses supporting the main hypotheses. 
 
Nation-centred accounts: Neoliberals v Statists   
 
 Original formulations of the neo-liberal account of the East Asian NICs‘ fast 
economic growth vis-à-vis other developing countries usually focused on the study of 
specific national experiences, notably the cases of Korea and Taiwan. The elimination 
of restrictions previously imposed on external trade (e.g. exchange rate reform and 
reduction of domestic markets protection) was regarded in these studies as the key 
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growth-promoting policy.
1
 This strategy supposedly allowed these countries to gain 
from their specialisation in production intensively using their most abundant factor of 
production, labour. Neo-liberal authors contrasted this experience with Latin America‘s, 
notably Brazil‘s, stubborn support for domestic-market-oriented industrialisation 
programmes intensively using their least abundant factor of production, capital. The 
shift to more capital-intensive heavy and, later on, durable-consumer goods and high-
tech industries taking place in Korea, and to lesser extent Taiwan, since the 1970s and 
1980s, respectively, however, partially undermined these orthodox interpretations. 
These changes required more interventionist state policies than those ‗free-trade‘ ones 
previously implemented, and still in place in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Southeast 
Asian NICs (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand), where light industry and services 
remained the core of their integration in world markets. Since then, neo-liberal 
accounts, as those reviewed below, began to be structured in the form of interregional 
comparative analysis (i.e. the East Asian NICs‘ performance and policy-making are 
compared with that of NICs in other regions of the ‗developing world‘, in most of the 
cases in Latin America).  
‗Statist‘ or ‗institutionalist‘ authors have always focused mainly on the analysis 
of those East Asian countries which have pursued a more interventionist set of policies 
and political institutions: Korea and Taiwan. They have contrasted these cases with 
those Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, which have 
followed seemingly similar patterns of industrial promotion but have developed 
different institutional settings. Nevertheless, some studies also stress the importance of 
the state in the promotion of growth and development in supposedly ‗free market‘ 
Singapore and Hong Kong, thus also giving to this argument a regional perspective.
2
 
Statist authors thus contest the neoliberal comparison between export- and domestic-
market oriented processes of industrialisation. Conversely, they claim that countries in 
each region, notably Korea and Brazil, pursued both types of trade policies. They thus 
explain differences in their growth and developmental outcomes by pointing to the 
institutional background or context under which policies came through and were finally 
put into practice.       
 Interestingly, when faced with the task of explaining the deep financial and 
economic crisis Korea suffered in 1997/8 ‗neoliberal‘ and ‗statist‘ authors look in the 
                                                 
1
 See Fei and Ranis (1975); Frank et al. (1975); and Krueger (1979).  
2
 See e.g. Castells (1992). 
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opposite direction. ‗Statist‘ authors point at the formerly unnoticed liberalisation 
programme initiated in the early 1980s and deepened through the 1990s;
3
 their 
neoliberal counterparts blame the strong (and allegedly distorting) intervention of the 
state in the financial and banking sector they had previously ignored.
4
  
The next two sub-sections review in more detail the controversy between ‗neo-
liberal‘ and ‗statist‘ explanations of the differential paths of development and growth 
experienced by Korea and Brazil since the 1960s. The review is followed by the 
presentation of several critical comments.   
 
Neoliberal approaches 
 
 Orthodox neo-liberal accounts of the so-called first tier Asian NICs‘ (i.e. Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) ‗economic miracle‘, as presented by Balassa (1988, 
1990) and others such as Fei and Ranis (1975), argue that ‗neutral‘ trade policies 
implemented since the 1960s were the key factor promoting economic growth in the 
region. According to the authors, these policies, consisted in the implementation of a 
uniform (i.e. non-selective) and stable system of incentives which, by simply avoiding 
discriminations against exports, enhanced the export orientation of these economies. 
Moreover, in these authors‘ view, this policy was complemented by the reduction or 
even elimination of import tariffs, the liberalisation of capital markets, the 
‗flexibilisation‘ of labour markets, the development of an efficient and ‗export-oriented‘ 
bureaucracy, and the reduction of state participation in economic activities apart from 
the provision of ‗public goods‘. Hence, production for world, rather than domestic, 
markets resulted in the allocation of resources according to these countries‘ comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive production. This permitted the exploitation of economies 
of scale and ensured full capacity utilisation by expanding the size of the market, and 
stimulated competitive behaviour leading to the implementation of technological 
changes and innovations. All these allegedly enhanced productivity and therefore 
economic growth in the region.
5
 
 These kinds of policies contrasted markedly, it was suggested, with the import-
substituting industrialisation strategy pursued in the region before the 1960s, and in 
                                                 
3
 See Chang (1999); Wade and Veneroso (1998). 
4
 See Pomerleano (1998).  
5
 See Frank et al. (1975) for an earlier version of these arguments based on the Korean case. 
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Latin America during most of the post Second World War (WWII) era. This strategy of 
industrialisation and development, the argument goes, discriminated against exports by 
combining an overvalued currency with domestic market protection. In this sense, 
Brazil‘s incapacity, despite its efforts during the late 1960s and early 1970s, to carry out 
fully the policy shift from import-substituting to export-oriented industrialisation 
explains its post-1980 underperformance relative to Korea.
6
 
 Despite its supposedly theoretical consistency, authors within this school of 
thought soon realised, however, that their interpretation of policy-making in the East 
Asian NICs, especially in Korea and Taiwan, was rather simplistic. Krueger (1990), for 
instance, suggests that other kinds of policies were implemented in these countries apart 
from those strictly prescribed by orthodox neoclassical theory (i.e. the provision of 
‗public goods‘ and market liberalisation). These included ‗moderate‘ restrictions on 
international trade and interventions in the financial and capital markets when 
necessary. That was particularly noticeable in the case of Korea. Unlike in Latin 
America, however, this type of policy was successful, according to this author, because 
the outward orientation of the East Asian economies imposed the necessary discipline to 
make them effective, by reducing the space for the expansion of rent-seeking in both 
private and public sectors, and gave their government the necessary flexibility to 
liberalise markets when the costs of those interventions (i.e. restrictions to free trade) 
became higher than their benefits.  
 The wide range of criticisms that these orthodox neo-liberal positions received 
(see below), led some authors sharing the overall perspective to modify specific aspects 
of their account of the East Asian ‗success‘ vis-à-vis other developing countries, such as 
those in Latin America. For instance, in ‗The East Asian Miracle‘, the World Bank 
(1993) recognises that in several fast growing East Asian countries (notably Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan), governments intervened much more in the economy than was 
previously accepted within this school of thought. Nevertheless, it argues that these 
interventions, unlike in Latin America and elsewhere in the ‗developing world‘, were 
circumscribed to particular sectors, subjected to strict performance conditions and, 
above all, ‗market-conforming‘. Moreover, ‗The East Asian Miracle‘ contends that 
policy interventions only worked (when they did) because of the existence of ‗strong‘ 
fundamentals (i.e. stable macroeconomic variables) and ‗healthy‘ institutions (i.e. stable 
                                                 
6
 See e.g. Balassa (1990). 
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governments and corruption–free bureaucracies able to impose contest-like practices 
when granting subsidies). 
 According to this account, East Asian countries succeeded in achieving high and 
sustained rates of economic growth because governments kept price distortions within 
reasonable bounds and because, despite the different concrete policies implemented in 
each East Asian country, all government interventions shared a common approach that 
constituted the key element for economic success: public polices in those countries were 
directed towards creating a ‗market friendly‘ environment. They achieved this, the 
argument goes on, not only by opening their economies to international trade, foreign 
capital and technology, but also by means of pursuing investments in ‗human capital‘ 
(mainly primary and secondary education), increasing national savings through different 
means (e.g. high real interest rates and the strengthening of the banking system), 
creating a ‗competitive‘ climate for businesses by ‗freeing‘ labour markets from trade 
unions and wage regulations, and providing a stable political and macroeconomic 
environment thanks to their centralised governmental structures and orthodox budget 
management. This so-called ‗market-friendly‘ approach to public policies materialised 
in a common set of measures, producing high rates of private physical and ‗human‘ 
capital formation which were, it is argued, the engines of the substantial growth 
achieved in the region. The non-implementation of this ‗market-friendly‘ approach 
elsewhere was, implicitly or explicitly, considered by this position as the cause of other 
‗developing‘ countries‘ relatively weaker and less steady growth processes.  
 Later works within this theoretical current, sometimes by the same authors, 
evidence a further shift to more moderated and less dogmatic positions which share 
several points with the explanations reviewed in the next section. Ranis (1989, 1995), 
for instance, argues that the key factors explaining East Asian ‗success‘, in particular in 
Taiwan and Korea, vis-à-vis other ‗developing‘ countries were the flexibility and 
pragmatism of governments to put forward those policies which allowed the private 
sector to develop by following changing market signals. These policies included not 
only investments in ‗human capital‘ and technological development but also targeted 
interventions in specific industrial sectors to speed up learning processes. The key 
difference between Taiwan and, to lesser extent, Korea and the Latin American NICs 
was, according to this author, that the former never followed a doctrinaire approach to 
policy-making. For instance, Ranis (1995) suggests, in sharp contrast with other 
‗developing‘ countries, notably those in Latin America, both Taiwan and Korea 
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implemented only a ‗mild‘ import-substitution strategy before the 1960s and managed 
macroeconomic fundamentals in a relatively orthodox manner throughout the post-
1960s period. Finally, Stiglitz (1996, 2001), who took part in the World Bank (1993) 
study, goes further still in recognising the significance of specific industrial policies 
(e.g. subsidies) solving coordination failures and of cooperation enhancing measures 
dealing with problems of imperfect information (e.g. deliberation councils in Japan and 
Korea) in promoting growth in East Asia. Nevertheless, all these state interventions, 
Stiglitz (1996) argues, improved, complemented or created, rather than replaced, 
markets, and, together with a stable macroeconomic and political environment (gained 
through equity improving policies), were the key behind the East Asian ‗miracle‘.7 
 Neo-liberal authors in general do not find any singularity in the Korean case vis-
à-vis its regional counterparts. What was singular of Korea – the state-led development 
of the heavy and automobile industries during the 1970s and 1980s, respectively – is 
understood by most of these authors as a ‗temporal‘ erroneous deviation from a more 
‗free market‘ approach to policy making.8 
 
Statist approaches  
 
 In contrast to the neo-liberal position, ‗statist‘ authors have argued that the 
difference in the performance of the Korean and Brazilian economies after the mid-to-
late 1970s cannot be simply attributed to the ‗market friendly‘ or outward-oriented 
policies implemented in the former as opposed to more interventionist or inward-
oriented ones implemented in the latter during most of the period. In his comparative 
study of the two economies, Mesquita Moreira (1995), for instance, argues that the key 
difference between Korean and Brazilian policy-making has not been that the former‘s 
state has pursued ‗hands-off‘ or ‗market-friendly‘ policies while the latter‘s has heavily 
intervened in the economy. Rather, the state intervened significantly in the economy in 
both countries. The difference, for this author, and for most of those reviewed in this 
section, springs therefore from the quality of state interventions in the field of industrial 
policy rather than in macroeconomic management. For Mesquita Moreira (1995), the 
Korean state was simply more efficient than the Brazilian in solving a number of 
                                                 
7
 A relatively similar position is advanced by Kuznets (1994) to account for the Korean developmental 
and growth experience. 
8
 See World Bank (1993:129, 145); Kuznets (1994: 146); Ranis (1995: 531). 
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‗market failures‘. These included ‗factor‘ market failures, like the lack of long-term 
credit for industrial projects, and ‗product‘ market failures, like the existence of 
technological externalities and potential economies of scale, that typically characterise 
developing country economies and block growth and development. In Korea, Mesquita 
Moreira (1995) suggests that a combination of selective state interventions designed to 
solve the existing ‗failures‘ in factor and product markets, and an outward-oriented 
strategy, resulted in strong long-term economic growth. Selective but strict industrial 
policy permitted the maximisation of the export-oriented trade policy, while, as Krueger 
(1990) argues, the outward-oriented strategy imposed some discipline over state‘s 
interventions in the economy since ‗mistakes‘ were penalised by failures in the world 
market. Interventions in product markets included trade policies that aimed to promote 
exports and protect ‗infant‘ industry, and industrial policies that fostered the 
development of large locally-owned industrial groups (chaebols) and limited the 
extension of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Interventions in factor markets included 
the control of the banking sector and policies to promote ‗human‘ capital accumulation 
and investments in the development of a domestic scientific and technological base. For 
Mesquita Moreira (1995), all these interventions succeeded because they were in 
concordance not only with Korea‘s static comparative advantage, as argued by orthodox 
neo-liberal authors, but also with its dynamic ones. In Brazil, on the contrary, heavy 
and generalised (i.e. unselective) state support together with the excessive inward-
looking orientation of the economy resulted in the development of an inefficient 
industrial structure and in the massive misallocation of resources. Moreover, Mesquita 
Moreira (1995) argues that the inadequate supply of financial resources for domestically 
owned industrial companies and the lack of investments in education and science and 
technology blocked the development of an internationally competitive nationally-owned 
manufacturing sector, as in Korea. Though sometimes addressed (e.g. partly during the 
‗miracle‘ of 1968-73 and partly during the Second National Development Plan of 1975-
79), these deficiencies were never completely corrected in Brazil. Furthermore, 
according to Mesquita Moreira (1995) these problems were enhanced by the heavy 
reliance, unlike in Korea, on foreign industrial capital which crowded the domestic 
markets and inhibited the attainment of minimum efficient scales of production. In 
summary, Mesquita Moreira (1995) concludes that it was not the excess of interventions 
that caused failure in Brazil but their relatively low quality. This was further evidenced, 
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according to this author, by the fact that, in contrast to the Korean case, industrial policy 
was never in concordance with Brazil‘s static and dynamic comparative advantages. 
 This position is to a large extent shared by Rodrik (1994), through his order of 
explanation is slightly different. For Rodrik, the cause of Korean (and Taiwanese) 
economic success is to be found in the efficacy of government‘s interventions in solving 
several ‗coordination failures‘ springing from the imperfect tradability of key inputs and 
technologies and from the existence of scale economies. These ‗coordination failures‘ 
had been allegedly blocking the potentially high returns on investments using the 
available skilled labour. According to Rodrik (1994), state interventions, like 
investments subsidies, tax incentives and administrative guidance managed to produce 
coordinated private investments in different industrial sectors, improved productive 
efficiency and thus international competitiveness. This virtuous cycle led to the 
acceleration of the growth process.
9
   
From a more heterodox perspective, Amsden (1989) reinforces these points by 
claiming that state interventions in the economy to promote industrialisation have been 
common to all ‗late-industrialisers‘, including Korea and Brazil. Governments in these 
countries strongly subsidised domestic industry and even created public enterprises in 
the branches of production where private capital did not enter. Moreover, in the Korean 
case, Amsden (1989: 79-81) argues, the state went even further and performed the role 
of entrepreneur, deciding, planning and actively promoting, by means of subsidies, 
market protection and output quotas, the development of specific industrial sectors, 
products, firms and markets.
10
 ―Therefore, it may be said that growth has been faster in 
Korea not because markets have been allowed to operate more freely but because the 
subsidisation process has been qualitatively superior: reciprocal in Korea, unidirectional 
in most other cases. […]. This does not simply mean close cooperation, which is 
sometimes the way business-government relations in Korea and Japan are simplistically 
depicted. Nor does it simply mean that sometimes the government wields the carrot and 
at other, unrelated times, the stick. It means that in direct exchange for subsidies, the 
state exacts certain performance standards from firms. The more reciprocity that 
                                                 
9
 Though this account seems plausible for the ‗big push‘ of the 1970s, it is in clear contradiction to the 
pre-1970s experience when labour-intensive light industries predominated. First, equipment and inputs 
for these industries was largely tradable internationally. Backward links were thus not necessary for their 
profitable emergence. Thirdly, these industries did not enjoy large returns to scale. See Michell (1988: 
125-33).   
10
 In the words of Wade (1990), the state in Korea and Taiwan ‗governed‘, rather than supplemented, the 
market. 
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characterizes state-firm relations in these countries, the higher the speed of economic 
growth‖.11 Korea‘s particularly strong performance then, Amsden (1989) claims, was 
owed to fact that there the state managed to discipline capital, not only labour, through 
the imposition of performance standards in exchange for the subsidies and protection 
granted to it. 
 This perspective is shared by other authors such as Chang (1993), Evans (1995), 
and Kohli (2004). In sharp opposition to the authors reviewed in the previous sections, 
Chang, for instance, suggests that macroeconomic policy in Korea was far from 
prudentially managed and was completely subordinated to, and sometimes sacrificed 
by, an industrial policy aimed at promoting technological development. For his part, 
Kohli (2004), in a comparative study of Korea, Brazil, India and Nigeria, puts forward 
an interpretation which runs similar to that of Amsden (1989). In contrast to the neo-
liberal accounts reviewed above that oppose Latin American import-substituting to East 
Asian export-oriented industrialisation; Kohli (2004: 390) argues that ―[b]oth Korea and 
Brazil simultaneously pursued both import substitution and export promotion, with the 
state intervening to provide a variety of subsidies for both sets of activities.‖ The 
difference in these countries‘ economic performance, Kohli stresses, has been due to the 
effectiveness with which these policies have been pursued. The Korean state has been 
simply more effective than the Brazilian in implementing, rather than in designing, 
those growth promoting policies. 
 Finally, in modified versions of the ‗statist‘ approach, Kay (2002) and others 
have included another dimension to the debate by arguing that agrarian policies were as 
important as trade and industrial strategies in promoting growth and development in 
Korea and Taiwan vis-à-vis their Latin American counterparts. According to Kay, 
agrarian policies, including widespread land reforms at the beginning of the process of 
industrialisation, not only removed the bases of landowners‘ political power, thus 
reducing their opposition to industrialisation, but also expanded the domestic markets 
and allowed the implementation of productivity enhancing programmes in the rural 
sector which increased the mass of resources transferable to the urban sector without 
worsening the living conditions in the countryside. In contrast Latin American 
countries, Brazil included, despite several efforts to solve the ‗agrarian problem‘, did 
not reform fully their land tenure systems and consequently suffered from landowner 
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 Amsden (1989: 145-6) 
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opposition to the process of industrialisation, tight domestic markets and the long-term 
underperformance of the agrarian sector. Interestingly, this position is also shared by 
Weeks (1998: 18) who, from a Marxist perspective, suggests that the agrarian reforms 
implemented in East Asia before the beginning of the process of industrialisation helped 
to remove completely pre-capitalist social relations of production in those countries and 
thus allowed a full capitalist development there. In Latin America, on the contrary, the 
remaining pre-capitalist social relations prevailing in the rural sector kept blocking the 
normal development of these capitalist economies. 
 
Some criticisms 
  
 However precise in their analysis of particular economic policies and state 
institutions, the approaches reviewed above have several limitations. First, it is apparent 
that policies included in both the ‗market-friendly‘ and ‗interventionist‘ approaches 
were implemented simultaneously in Korea and Brazil though with different degrees of 
intensity across the period. Secondly, it is also evident that, despite the relatively 
extensive intervention of the state, Korea followed an overall export-oriented pattern of 
industrialisation, a developmental path, and integration in the world economy 
qualitatively similar to that of other Asian Tigers (e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore) and 
Southeast Asian NICs (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) which implemented 
much less interventionist policies,
12
 and did not purse land reform programmes despite 
having large agrarian sectors. Notwithstanding the much heated debates, the main 
problem with these accounts lies not in their inability to discover the exact mix of 
policies and institutions that facilitated and promoted growth in Korea (East Asia) and 
hindered it in Brazil (Latin America) but, conversely, in exclusively basing their 
explanations of the differential national economic performances in these factors. 
 Effectively, when trying to account for the cause behind particular policy-
making, all the limits of these approaches become evident. Some authors, such as 
Balassa (1988), Krueger (1990), World Bank (1993), and Mesquita Moreira (1995), 
seem to believe that economic policies are simply the product of enlightened (or 
confused) government bureaucrats. The problem is that these authors assume what 
should be explained: why bureaucrats in Korea and Brazil have implemented different 
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 See e.g. World Bank (1993); Perkins (1994). 
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policies. Indeed, it is nowadays widely recognised, even by those who previously made 
the opposite a core part of their argument, that Korean state officials were as corrupt as 
the Brazilian ones throughout the period under study.
13
 Unsurprisingly, in a less naïve 
manner, most of the above-mentioned scholars tend to explain the specificity of public 
policies, the degree of success in their implementation, and their outcome, in both 
countries by pointing to the societal, institutional and political background prevailing in 
each country. 
 Amsden (1989), for instance, argues that state autonomy due to historical and 
political circumstances, such as WWII and the Korean War, the elimination of 
landowners through an extensive land reform, and the ‗reciprocal‘ nature of 
state/business relations due to cultural values, explain the particular success in 
promoting growth of public policies in Korea. Rodrik (1994) suggests that special (i.e. 
singular) initial conditions, like the high level of average education and the egalitarian 
distribution of income, reduced rent-seeking and thus increased the effectiveness of 
government interventions there. Chang (1993), in turn, points to the ‗corporatist‘ 
ideology predominant among a military leadership educated in Japanese-style 
institutions as the main determinant of Korean ‗strong‘ state and growth-promoting 
policy-making. In a similar manner, Kohli (2004) signals the Japanese colonial legacy 
as the main factor in the development of a ‗cohesive‘, extended and far reaching state 
apparatus in Korea, with the capacity to design, implement and fully enforce growth-
oriented policies. Evans (1995), for his part, suggests that the ‗embedded autonomy‘ of 
the Korean bureaucracy - i.e. a relationship with the business leadership close enough to 
learn about its necessities but relative autonomous in the final decision-making not to 
follow vested interests - allowed it to do so. For Ranis (1989), the secularism (i.e. the 
pre-eminence of material over spiritual values), egalitarianism (i.e. the value given to 
‗even‘ opportunities), and ‗organic‘ nationalism (i.e. the subordination of individuals to 
the state‘s authority and to the ‗common good‘) embedded in the Korean and Taiwanese 
societies are the key institutional factors behind their flexible, pragmatic and therefore 
successful policy-making vis-à-vis other developing countries, notably the Latin 
American. Kay (2002), finally, points at the poor natural endowments as the main 
reason behind the low rent-seeking prevailing in Korea‘s public and private sector and 
behind the emergence of an autonomous and efficiently-run state with the capacity to 
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 See Kang (2002a, 2002b). 
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implement welfare maximising policies. All these authors signal the lack, weak or 
sporadic development of these factors in Brazil as the key to its underperformance after 
the mid-1970s.  
Besides the questionable historical accuracy of some of these formulations (e.g. 
the existence of low levels of rent-seeking, high educational attainments and even 
income distribution in Korea),
14
 the key question that remains to be answered is why 
Korean cultural and political institutions became a stimulus for growth only after the 
mid-1960s, given that most of these factors were stressed by authors like Rostow (1958) 
during the late 1950s as the cause of Asian poor economic performance vis-à-vis Latin 
America.
15
 Or, why a ‗corporatist‘ military leadership could gain control of the Korean 
state and impose its particular type of growth-promoting programme over the rest of the 
society while failing to do so consistently in Brazil. As Chibber (1999: 324-7) argues, 
during the first years of military government in Korea (i.e. 1961-64), economic policy 
did not differ greatly from the previous period, despite the ‗corporatist‘ ideology of its 
leadership. Moreover, these accounts can neither explain why it was only by the mid-
1970s that Brazilian cultural and political institutions became an obstacle to growth. Or, 
why policies maximising Korea‘s comparative advantage in production intensively 
using relatively cheap and disciplined labour began to be implemented only around the 
mid-1960s. 
Indeed, these explanatory gaps become critically evident in Kohli‘s detailed and 
exhaustive historical analysis of Korean and Brazilian development experiences. 
Despite all his efforts, this author is unable to explain fully why, in Korea, the allegedly 
efficient and ‗cohesive‘ (i.e. developmental) state inherited from the Japanese fell pray 
of the corrupt and incompetent Rhee regime, and was only restored twenty years after 
the end of the colonial period. Equally, Kolhi struggles when accounting for the much 
more volatile capabilities of the Brazilian state: from being ‗cohesive‘ during the 
corporatist 1933-45 Estado Novo to ‗non-cohesive‘ during the populist 1945-64 period, 
back to ‗cohesive‘ during 1964-1973, and back again to ‗non-cohesive‘ thereafter. It 
seems that every time that there is period of fast industrial growth accompanied with 
political closure, the ideal features of cohesiveness are found in the Korean and 
Brazilian states, and vice versa, in a typical cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. What is 
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 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and Part II. 
15
 See also Chang (1993: 150-1) on this. Moreover, Chibber (1999) convincingly suggests that, in Korea, 
improvements in the quality of state institutions, like the bureaucracy, were usually contemporary with, 
rather than predated, the post-mid-1960s transformations. 
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still missing is the presentation of the objective factors that made the state change in 
both directions. 
 
Towards an alternative approach 
 
 After reviewing different accounts on Korean (or East Asian) and Brazilian (or 
Latin American) comparative development, two related conclusions can be put forward. 
First, it can be argued that, despite their valuable contributions, all the approaches 
reviewed thus far have somehow failed to give a solid and complete explanation of the 
reasons behind the dissimilar growth performances enjoyed by the Korean and Brazilian 
economy since the late 1970s. The reason for this failure lies in that these approaches 
are one-sided; they take particular manifestations of these national processes of 
capitalist development as if they were the cause of their own specificity.
16
 Secondly, it 
can be argued that they all suffer from this explanatory problem because, despite their 
many differences, all the accounts reviewed above share one theoretical perspective: 
they all regard the process of capitalist development (i.e. capital accumulation) as being 
nationally based. In the best of the cases, the global economy appears as the context or 
environment to which national strategies adapt, react or integrate with more or less 
degrees of autonomy. They all thus signal the specific economic policies implemented 
by national states or the political/cultural institutions that shape them as the ultimate 
cause behind economic performance. The problem with these approaches is that, on the 
contrary, the process of capitalist development is essentially global and national only in 
its form of realisation; and the subject of this worldwide process is capital rather than 
the state.
17
 
In capitalism the state is not an autonomous entity existing side-by-side with the 
market and interacting with it under different forms determined by their circumstantial 
relative strength.
18
 On the contrary, the state and its institutions are forms of realisation, 
mediations, of the process of autonomous regulation of social human life through the 
exchange of commodities, namely, the process of capital accumulation. The role of the 
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 No matter how accurately a real existent form (e.g. an economic policy or a political institution) is 
described; if it is taken abstracted from its own determination, our knowledge of it will always be 
incomplete and appear as unilateral. See Marx (1973: 100-07). 
17
 See Fröbel et al. (1980: 8); Burnham (1994: 226-9); Iñigo Carrera (2008: 148-64).  
18
 See Fine and Rustomjee (1996) on this point with reference to statist accounts of the South Korean 
‗economic miracle‘. 
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state in capitalism, therefore, is not to maximise ‗social welfare‘.19 The state in 
capitalism is the political representative of society‘s total capital (i.e. social capital), the 
subject of the contemporary process of social production and consumption. 
 The historical specificity of capitalism resides in that the production of goods 
and services useful for human life is organised not through direct relations among 
individual members of society, but indirectly through the exchange of the products of 
labour processes performed privately and independently of each other.
20
 When 
producing for the market, then, ‗economic agents‘ produce not only goods which are 
potentially useful for others, they also produce their own general social relationship; 
they produce goods that are exchangeable, commodities (Marx, 1972; Iñigo Carrera, 
2008). The exchange of commodities thus resolves the allocation of society‘s labour 
capacities to satisfy society‘s consumption needs; organises the contemporary process 
of human life. In this process, individual members of society enter into relations with 
each other, and thus exist for one another, as ―persons whose will resides in these 
objects, . . . as representatives of, and, therefore, as owners of, commodities‖ (Marx, 
1972: 84–5). Because of its impersonal character, this form of organisation of human 
life, in contrast to its historical predecessors, can and must be universal or global.  
The production of goods with the capacity to attract one another in the market 
— the production of value — thus becomes itself the object of the production process, 
and the participation of each individual private independent producer in the 
appropriation of society‘s total production, thus its individual process of metabolism, is 
limited by the amount of value he produces. The valorisation of value — the production 
of surplus-value — is the most potent form of expanding that participation and therefore 
of expanding the reproduction of human life in capitalism. The objectified general 
social relationship, the value-form, thus becomes the immediate automatic subject of 
the production and consumption processes, a self-expanding mass of value; it becomes 
capital.  
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 Also see Clarke (1992) for a critique of this naïve conceptualisation of the state as an ideological form 
of existence of the capitalist state. 
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 ―The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, present itself as ‗an 
immense accumulation of commodities,‘ its unit being a single commodity.‖ (Marx 1972: 35). ―Only such 
products can become commodities with regard to each other, as result from different kinds of labour, each 
kind being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals.‖ (Marx 1972: 42). See 
Iñigo Carrera (2008) for the identification in the work of Marx of the private character of social labour in 
capitalism as the source of the exchangeability of use-values, that is, as the historical specificity of 
commodities. 
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Nation-state policies, however extensive and universal their reach, are direct 
forms of organising the process of social metabolism. They resolve the allocation of a 
limited amount of resources (notably from the perspective of the world market) directly, 
through the ‗conscious‘ and ‗voluntary‘ actions of individuals who, though collectively-
organised as members of antagonistic social classes, are, nevertheless, themselves 
representatives, personifications of the commodities they own (i.e. through the political 
actions of collective personifications of commodities). Nation-state policies are, 
therefore, forms of realisation of the general indirect, self-regulating way of organising 
the allocation of resources through the exchange of commodities — the process of 
valorisation of value on an expanded scale. Ultimately, to produce self-sustained 
outcomes, state policies have to be validated by markets; they have to allow capital‘s 
normal valorisation. In other words, they are concrete forms of realisation, 
manifestations, of the process of human life through capital accumulation.
21
 Nation-
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 It is regarding the conditions for the use and normal reproduction of labour-power (the commodity that 
determines the specificity of the capitalist mode of production) that Marx discovers state policies as forms 
of realisation, mediations, of economic determinations. ―[T]he value of the labour-power includes the 
value of the commodities necessary for the reproduction of the worker, or for the keeping up of the 
working-class. If then the unnatural extension of the working-day, that capital necessarily strives after in 
its unmeasured passion for self-expansion, shortens the length of life of the individual labourer, and 
therefore the duration of his labour-power, the forces used up have to be replaced at a more rapid rate and 
the sum of the expenses for the reproduction of labour-power will be greater; just as in a machine the part 
of its value to be reproduced every day is greater the more rapidly the machine is worn out. It would seem 
therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working-day.‖ (Marx, 1972: 
266). ―Capital that has such good reasons for denying the sufferings of the legions of workers that 
surround it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of coming degradation and final 
depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun. […] But looking at 
things as a whole, all this does not, indeed, depend on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free 
competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws 
having power over every individual capitalist.‖ (Marx, 1972: 269-70). ―The changes in the material mode 
of production, and the corresponding changes in the social relations of the producers gave rise first to an 
extravagance beyond all bounds, and then the opposition to this called forth a control on the part of 
Society which legally limits, regulates, and makes uniform the working-day and its pauses.‖ (Marx, 1972: 
298-9). Moreover, Marx also discovers here that the necessity of capital to impose a normal working-day 
through legislation (i.e. state regulation) cannot take other form of realisation than the struggle between 
the class of individuals who sell their labour-power (and personify this commodity) in exchange of a 
wage and the class of individuals who buy it (personifying capital). In other words, he discovers the 
determination of, and struggle between, social classes in capitalism as being a form of realisation (i.e. 
determined by) the autonomously regulated process of capital accumulation. ―The history of the 
regulation of the working-day in certain branches of production, and the struggle still going on in others 
in regard to this regulation, prove conclusively that the isolated labourer, the labourer as ‗free‘ vendor of 
his labour-power, when capitalist production has once attained a certain stage, succumbs without any 
power of resistance. The creation of a normal working-day is, therefore, the product of protracted civil 
war, more or less dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working-class.‖ (Marx, 1972: 299). 
Based on this analysis, Iñigo Carrera (2008) develops his account of the state as the political 
representative of social capital. This approach to the relationship between capital accumulation (or the 
market) and the state is followed in the present thesis. See also Clarke (1992) for a similar approach 
which, however, identifies the capital-labour antagonistic relationship as the underlying determining 
factor (or subject) of the process of social reproduction in capitalism.  
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state policies and institutions, then, are not ‗independent variables‘ that autonomously 
shape and determine national economic performances. On the contrary, they mediate the 
integration of the world market and the formation of the IDL — the global unity of the 
process of capitalist development — through the specific determination of each national 
portion of world capital.  
When observed from the perspective of national processes of capital 
accumulation, policies and institutions may seem to be the main determinant behind 
their development. When looked at from a global perspective, the importance of 
national factors is largely diminished. In fact, parallel to the accounts reviewed before, 
another group of authors have attempted to explain the differentiated developmental and 
growth experiences among developing countries, and implicitly the cases of Korea and 
Brazil, by taking a different starting-point, namely, the analysis of the dynamics of the 
global process of capitalist development. Most, but not all, of these authors have 
worked within, or relatively close to, the world-system approach. As the following 
review will make evident, however, even some of the authors working within this 
tradition have been slowly shifting towards nation-centred explanation of developing 
countries comparative development, abandoning, in that way, the rational kernel of the 
original formulations. While Fröbel et al. (1980) in the original theory on the New 
International Division of Labour centred fully on the dynamics of global capital 
accumulation, the evolution of Gereffi‘s Global Commodity Chains approach, though 
initially working within the same theoretical benchmark, expressed a move from a 
world-market to nation-centred explanations. The rest of this section will critically 
review these two approaches and, subsequently, introduce an alternative account on 
contemporary transformations and developments in the global economy put forward by 
Iñigo Carrera (2008) that complements as well as supersedes them. This latter approach 
will frame the comparative analysis of Brazilian and Korean long-term development 
pursued in the thesis.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
It should be stressed here that this is not to argue, as mainstream economists do, that an autonomously 
and abstractly determined state intervenes in the economy to solve the ‗failure‘ of markets (i.e. their 
deviance from a theoretically constructed type of market structure which only seems to exist in economics 
textbooks) due to their allegedly inherent, or circumstantial depending on the case, imperfections or 
under-development. On the contrary, the previous analysis argues that the general autonomous regulation 
of the processes social production and consumption through the market (i.e. through the exchange of 
commodities) realises, comes about, through its opposite, the direct regulation through the emergence and 
development of specific political and cultural institutions, including the state and its policies. 
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The New International Division of Labour and Third World Industrialisation 
  
 By the mid-1970s, it was evident not only that industrial production was viable 
in the ‗developing‘ world but also that, in some parts of it, notably East Asia, industrial 
exports were rapidly becoming the main form of integration into the global economy. 
Several explanations emerged then to account for this phenomenon which marked a 
departure from the previously prevailing ‗classical‘, international division of labour 
inherited from the colonial system. Among these new explanations was the theory on 
the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) developed by Fröbel et al. (1980). 
According to Fröbel et al. (1980), the fast post-1960s expansion of manufactured 
exports from the ‗Third World‘ was not simply a consequence of nation-state economic 
policies trying to promote them or the design of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
attempting to costs-cut through off-shoring or subcontracting, as often argued. Rather, it 
was the result of changing objective conditions in the process of valorisation of 
industrial capital on a global scale. First, there were significant improvements in 
communications and transport methods leading to strong reductions in transportation 
costs. Secondly, there was a simplification of several manual labour processes in 
manufacturing production, as a result of the intensification in the technical division of 
labour, which could then be performed by unskilled workers. Thirdly, there were large 
industrial reserve armies (i.e. surplus populations) in the ‗periphery‘ as a consequence 
of technological developments in the primary sector, such as the Green Revolution, and 
rapid population growth –the so-called demographic explosion. According to these 
authors, these ‗new‘ objective conditions allowed industrial capital to relocate several 
production processes to the ‗periphery‘ and take advantage of the low-cost labour-
power available there by establishing ‗world-market factories‘. Contrary to what is 
usually claimed by some of their critics (see, e.g., Schoenberger, 1988), MNCs were 
considered by these authors (Fröbel et al., 1980: 46) as the institutional mediation of the 
process rather than the subject of these changes which, by affecting the geographical 
location of productive units and the direction of trade flows, were leading to the 
emergence of a new type of IDL. 
 The fast growth of manufacturing production and exports, and of national 
incomes, in the East Asian NICs is understood by these authors as a result of those 
processes. Yet, though the vast pool of relatively cheap and unskilled labour-force 
existing in East Asia, especially in Korea, made the region particularly suitable for the 
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development of ‗world-market factories‘, Fröbel et al. (1980) did not think that these 
processes were specific to that region. These authors argued, ‗world-market factories‘ 
were, by the mid-1970s, being established in most of the ‗periphery‘, including Brazil 
among other Latin American countries. 
 These hypotheses were at the forefront of the discussions on the contemporary 
process of internationalisation of capital until the late 1980s, yet have been abandoned 
after receiving a wide range of criticisms on both theoretical and empirical grounds. In 
the first place, as critics, like Jenkins (1984), have rightly highlighted, the initial 
formulations of the NIDL theory contained untenable sweeping generalisations which 
could not account for national or regional developmental differences. Contrary to the 
predictions emerging from their analysis of the global economy, the development of 
world-market-oriented industrial sectors did not spread evenly across the ‗Third World‘. 
Moreover, especially during the period covered by their study, late-1960s to late 1970s, 
while the East Asian NICs were becoming major producers of garments and electronic 
goods for the world markets, South American industrial sectors remained practically 
unaffected by these changes and continued producing mainly for domestic consumers, 
even if Brazil and other countries in the region also hosted some ‗world-markets 
factories‘ in Export Processing Zones as was noted. In the second place, also contrary to 
the predictions of Fröbel et al. (1980), some of those countries which developed world-
markets-oriented industrial sectors experienced continuous industrial upgrading and fast 
and steady increases in real wages. In this sense, the impressive developmental and 
growth record of the first generation of East Asian NICs, especially Korea, seems to 
undermine a theory which made export-oriented industrialisation based on low wages in 
unskilled-labour-intensive industries the centre of its argument. In the third place, the 
development of industrial production for world markets based on the use of a relatively 
cheap and low-skilled workforce to perform simplified labour-processes was not 
exclusive of the post-late-1960s. Japan‘s pre-1960s industrialisation had been similarly 
based.
22
 What was new, however, by the late 1960s, was the replacement in several 
industrial productions of the, increasingly expensive, Japanese labour-force by that of 
some of its poorer neighbouring countries, such as the former colonies of Taiwan and 
Korea. Above all, what was then new were the rapid advances in the automation of 
industrial productions and the computerisation of the calibration of the machinery for 
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repetitive processes which, directly or indirectly, multiplied the extent of those three 
‗conditions‘, in particular the quantity of simplified labour processes that could be 
performed by a relatively cheaper and less skilful workforce. 
 Though it has never been mentioned by their critics, the main problem with 
Fröbel et al.‘s (1980) approach to the NIDL, and the cause of their inability to grasp 
fully the transformations at stake, including the interregional differentiation just 
mentioned, was that they failed to locate their origin in the increased mechanisation of 
large-scale industry and its impact upon the differentiation of the skills of the different 
parts of the industrial labour-force rather than in the intensification of the manual 
division of labour. The mechanisation of large-scale industry, rather than the technical 
division of manual labour, is the most potent and developed form of increasing labour 
productivity and therefore the rate of valorisation of industrial capital.
23
 As will be seen 
below, the post-1960s intensification of the manual (i.e. manufacturing) division of 
labour has been a consequence of the development of labour productivity through the 
mechanisation of large-scale industry – often referred to as the system of 
machinofacture.
24
 
 
Global Commodity Chains and the NIDL 
 
 Like Fröbel et al. (1980), Gereffi (1995, 1998) claims that the economic 
development of developing countries since the 1970s, notably the emergence of export-
oriented industrialisation processes, has been affected, and determined, by the changes 
taking place in the global economy. Since then, Gereffi (1995: 100) argues, ―the world 
economy has undergone a fundamental shift toward an integrated and coordinated 
global division of labor in production and trade.‖ In this process, according to Gereffi 
(1995: 105), a new global division of labour replaced ―[t]he classic core-periphery 
relationship in which the developing nations supplied primary commodities to the 
industrialised countries in exchange for manufactured goods.‖ This transformation, 
according to him, has been led by MNCs‘ necessity to minimise costs at every stage in 
the production process and has manifested itself in the location of several industrial 
activities in developing countries, something that became possible, as Fröbel et al. 
(1980) suggested, due to technological developments in the communications, transport 
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and production methods. However, in contrast to the position presented by Fröbel et al. 
(1980), based on Kaplinsky (1989), Gereffi claims (1995) that technological advances 
in production processes were not centred on the intensification of the technical division 
of manual labour but on development of ‗flexible‘ automation systems which reduced 
the size of industrial plants and of ‗entry barriers‘ in various manufacturing sectors, thus 
permitting their relocation out of industrially advanced countries. 
 According to Gereffi (1995), the NIDL has manifested itself in the emergence 
and consolidation of a global manufacturing system in which MNCs follow broadly two 
commercial strategies. They can directly control different stages in the production of a 
good/commodity, its ‗value chain‘, by offshoring specific parts of industrial labour-
processes to NICs or by subcontracting them to firms there, thus developing ‗producer-
driven‘ commodity chains. Alternatively, MNCs can control the design and marketing 
of goods whose integral production is subcontracted to lower-cost NIC firms, thus 
developing ‗buyer-driven‘ commodity chains. Irrespective of the ‗governance‘ structure 
of the commodity chain (i.e. whether is producer or buyer driven), countries thus 
connect to them in one or several of the, increasingly more complex and value-adding, 
following forms: as producers of raw materials; as assemblers of parts in unskilled-
labour-intensive industries; as producers of parts and components; as producers of 
finished consumer goods for contracting MNCs; as producers of finished consumer 
goods under own brands. In this context, the fast economic growth of East Asian NICs 
in the last three decades, vis-à-vis other developing countries, is understood to have 
been the result of the region‘s especial capacity to upgrade continuously industrial 
structures and move up the value-added ladder within Global Commodity Chains 
(GCCs). 
 Though Gereffi‘s explanation of the evolution of the global economy contributes 
to the understanding of the different business ‗models‘ taken by the NIDL and thus of 
the nature and forms of the international fragmentation of industrial labour-processes, it 
is not without problems. Indeed, the limits of the GCCs approach become evident when 
trying to account for the reason behind countries‘ specific insertion in each section of a 
commodity value chain, especially East Asian NICs‘ successful industrial upgrading 
and South American inability to follow suit. Gereffi‘s inability to resolve adequately 
these questions is manifest in his recurrent emphasis on local political or cultural factors 
as the main determinants of countries‘ or regions‘ specific integration in the GCCs. 
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 While in his original formulation of this analysis, Gereffi (1989: 530) points at 
the unspecific and ambiguous ―differences in government policies, economic 
organisation and social structure‖ as the most ―important determinants of how NICs 
have responded to opportunities and constraints in the world economy‖, in later works 
he concretised that ―[t]he key factor [explaining East Asian ‗success‘] probably lies with 
an abundant supply of local entrepreneurs‖ (Gereffi 1995: 129). The latter is allegedly 
manifest in their capacity to increase productivity through adaptive innovations and to 
develop efficient networks of suppliers, both necessary to succeed in world markets and 
to increase the value-added content of their exports. The question that remains to be 
answered is why it was only after the mid-to-late-1960s that East Asian entrepreneurs 
became ‗innovation-friendly‘. It should be mentioned here that though the existence of 
networks reducing ‗transaction costs‘ can explain the division of labour within the East 
Asian countries/region, it cannot explain the region‘s form of integration in the global 
division of labour vis-à-vis other developing countries. Probably taking notice of these 
problems, in later versions Gereffi returns to more unspecific assertions and concludes 
that ―[w]hile government policies have been facilitative in many cases, the 
developmental state per se can only be given secondary credit for East Asia‘s ability to 
benefit from, rather than being exploited by, global commodity chains. The reasons for 
this must be sought at a structurally deeper level in the institutions and culture of these 
nations –factors which are clearly ‗more than the market, more than the state‘.‖ (Gereffi 
1998: 58-9). 
 Undoubtedly, Gereffi‘s account supersedes the nation-centred explanations 
reviewed in the first section of this introduction. It is clear that for this author, East 
Asian institutions are not growth-promoting per se but only under the current form of 
the international division of labour. The explanation, however, remains incomplete 
since it does not elucidate in what form these political and cultural institutions have 
helped the East Asian NICs to ‗benefit from, rather than be exploited by, modern 
GCCs‘. In many respects, this position also constitutes an advance with respect to 
Fröbel et al.‘s account of the origins of the NIDL. Unlike these authors, Gereffi (1995) 
recognises the development of ‗flexible‘ automation as being at the centre of the 
technological changes at stake in the formation of the NIDL. However, though 
promising, this is exactly where the cause of Gereffi‘s explanatory problems lays. 
Indeed, Gereffi exclusively focuses on the impact that technological changes in 
production processes (i.e. ‗flexible‘ automation) have allegedly had on plant sizes and 
 31 
not on the effect they have had on industrial labour-force skills requirements. For this 
reason, Gereffi is unable to discover which specific East Asian institutional factors 
allowed the region‘s ‗successful‘ integration into the modern GCCs. Moreover, 
empirical studies have convincingly shown that the development of ‗flexible‘ 
automation only reduced production scales at product level (mainly by reducing the 
time setting and calibrating the systems of machinery) but not at plant and firm level 
(see, e.g., Alcorta 1999). These developments therefore have not resulted in the 
reduction of minimum efficient scales or minimum investment requirements, as 
suggested by Kaplinsky (1989) and Gereffi (1995) when explaining the expansion of 
the production of industrial goods for the world markets from developing countries in 
the last three decades or so. 
 
Development of the system of machinery of large-scale industry and the NIDL  
 
 In order to overcome the limitations of the accounts on the development of the 
global economy reviewed in the previous two sub-sections, another approach to the 
NIDL was advanced by Iñigo Carrera (2008). In the first place, like Fröbel et al. (1980) 
and Gereffi (1995), this approach considers the process of capitalist development, the 
contemporary form of reproduction of human society, as being essentially global. In 
other words, the world market is not regarded as the ‗context‘ in which national markets 
develop or simply the sum total of national economies interconnected through external 
trade and capital flows. National economies are seen as ―organic elements of one all-
embracing system, namely a world economy which is in fact a single world-wide 
capitalist system‖.25 In the second place, and also in agreement with Fröbel et al. 
(1980), Iñigo Carrera (2008) considers nation-state policies not as autonomous forces 
that determine the specific structure of national markets and, therefore, of national 
processes of capital accumulation, but as mediations of the global unity of the process 
of capitalist development. It is here where Iñigo Carrera parts company with these 
authors. Unlike them, he locates the origin of the NIDL in the transformations in the 
production of relative surplus-value on a global scale.  
Following Marx (1990), Iñigo Carrera (2008) sustains that in capitalism the 
development of labour productivity, the most potent lever of the process of capital 
                                                 
25
 See Fröbel et al. (1980: 8). As Marx (1990: 702) put it, ‗[…] the world market, whose integral parts are 
the individual countries.‘ 
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accumulation, takes its most advanced form in the mechanisation of large-scale 
industry, a process which reproduces in a differentiated form the characteristics of the 
labour-force as an active subject in the productive process. First, this process expands, 
as a condition for its own continuous development, the productive characteristics of the 
portion of the labour-force involved in scientific and technological development (i.e. 
directly or indirectly involved in the production of the increasingly mechanised means 
of production) and in charge of the technical organisation of the progressively more 
complex (and scientifically based) production processes. Secondly, it increasingly 
reduces, at the same time, the skills required to operate the machinery or to work as an 
appendage of the mechanised systems, and in the manual assembly of inputs and parts. 
Thirdly, it progressively transforms into a surplus for the needs of the process of capital 
accumulation, the portion of the labour-force replaced by the increasingly mechanised 
systems of machinery and not reabsorbed by the expansion of the scale of production. It 
is believed that this process of skills differentiation within the modern industrial labour-
force has been on the basis of the recent differentiation of national processes of 
capitalist development. 
 Iñigo Carrera (2008) argues that though these processes are inherent to the 
development of labour productivity through the mechanisation of large-scale industry, 
their extension has been multiplied by the material form of technological developments 
taking place in the global capitalist economy since the mid-1960s and, crucially, after 
the mid-1970s ‗microelectronics revolution‘. Technological developments began then to 
be centred on the automation of the systems of machinery and the computerisation of 
their calibration for serial repetitive production.
26
 These developments have accelerated 
codification of tacit knowledge, previously embodied in the manual industrial worker 
and largely acquired through lengthy on-the-job learning-by-doing processes, and its 
objectification as an attribute of the machinery.
27
 Their effect on the structure of skills 
of the industrial labour-force has been twofold. First, they have accelerated the process 
of skills differentiation between those performing the most complex productive tasks 
and those performing the simplest ones, notably through the simplification of the 
operation of machines and the transformation of its operator into a controller or 
watcher.
28
 Though this has been most notable in the ‗continuous flow‘ or ‗process‘ 
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 See Hoffman and Kaplinsky (1989); Alcorta (1999), for a synthetic introduction to these developments. 
27
 See Balconi (2002). 
28
 See Alcorta (1999: 164). 
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industries, like steel and petrochemicals, it has also been important in the serial 
mechanical industries, like motor-vehicles and white-goods.
29
 Secondly, the new 
technological base has generated, as its own condition of existence, a multitude of 
production processes subjected to the intervention of low-skilled manual labourers, like 
the assembly of electronic appliances and microelectronic components. These have been 
at the base of the production of automated, robotised and computer-aided systems of 
machinery. 
 According to Iñigo Carrera (2008), then, these technological developments, and 
the revolution on the communications (e.g. telecommunications) and transportation 
methods (e.g. containerisation, larger ocean-going ships) to which they have given 
place, explain why industrial capital has been increasingly able to relocate 
internationally the different parts of labour processes where the relative price and 
characteristics of the different national labour forces (through their impact upon labour 
productivity and thus unit labour costs) best satisfies profit maximising requirements. 
This, for Iñigo Carrera, represents the specific characteristic of the NIDL. It does not 
mean that MNCs have been the single subject of this process as is sometimes argued by 
such authors as Schoenenberg (1988), Gereffi (1995) and Sklair (2001), among others. 
Irrespective of the ‗nationality‘ of industrial capitals, this process, directly or indirectly, 
minimises total production costs and thus increases the rate of valorisation of global 
total capital, the real subject of the process of accumulation.
30
 MNCs, the so-called 
‗national champions‘, the recently emerging ‗global suppliers‘ and the ‗production 
networks‘ established amongst them have constituted institutional mediations of the 
NIDL.
31
 
 Although entailing a leap forward in the internationalisation of productive 
activities and trade flows as Gereffi (1995) argues, these transformations, however, have 
not eliminated, according to Iñigo Carrera (2008), the importance of national economies 
and states. On the contrary, he claims that this process has been riding on the continued 
existence and reinforcement of the role of that national mediation as the basis on which 
capital has been able to internationally fragment the labour-force according to the 
different costs and characteristics of its members. In the first place, the relocation of 
simplified manual labour processes has been guided by the search for national labour-
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 See Aglietta (1979: 122-30); Balconi (2002; 2007) for the general trend. See ILO (1963) for the steel 
and Watanabe (1987) for the automobile industries. 
30
 See Fröbel et al. (1980: 46); Iñigo Carrera (2008: 65-8). 
31
 See Starosta (2010). 
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forces whose attributes include not only relatively low wages but, in addition, the 
disciplined subordination to central and hierarchically organised collective (i.e. large-
scale) work processes and the habituation to labour-intensive activities, such as the wet-
rice cultivating Asian societies.
32
 The latter, Iñigo Carrera (2008) argues, has been the 
main East Asian institutional singularity explaining the nature of the region‘s insertion 
in the NIDL. These features have particularly increased the productivity of East Asian 
labour when functioning as an auxiliary of the increasingly automated systems of 
machinery or in the manual assembly of electronic parts and components needed for 
their production.
33
 In the second place, Iñigo Carrera suggests that this process has 
come about through the emergence and consolidation of particular national public 
policies and political/ideological institutions, such as those signalled by ‗neoliberal‘ and 
‗statist‘ authors reviewed above. In those countries that, by the mid-1960s, began to act 
as sources of relatively cheap and disciplined labour-power to perform the simplest 
parts of the industrial labour processes (i.e. East Asian countries), state actions 
concentrated in the creation and later conservation of the necessary conditions to 
produce under that specific base. These included the promotion of exports, liberalisation 
of imports of inputs used in export activities, political repression of trade unions and, 
when necessary, the forced centralisation of private industrial capital or its 
concentration under public ownership (e.g. in Japan, Korea and Taiwan). In fact, the 
development of industrial productions using cheap and disciplined labour of rural origin 
to perform manual simple labour processes had already begun in Japan with the textile, 
clothing and footwear industries well before the advanced automation and robotisation 
of large-scale industry multiplied the bases for its expansion – as the ‗industrious‘ 
revolution metaphor reveals.
34
 
 Furthermore, Iñigo Carrera (2008) claims that these processes have not been 
static as Fröbel et al. (1980) suggested in their original theorisation on the NIDL. On the 
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 Wet-rice cultivation has, among others, the following two characteristics. First, it is highly labour-
intensive, notably during implantation and harvest periods. Secondly, whatever their extent and 
complexity and, consequently, degree of centralisation, all irrigation systems have required the 
‗cooperation at various levels between the farmers in a single water control unit‘ (Bray 1986: 67). 
33
 It should be noticed here that this explanation contrasts with the already classical Lewis ‗model‘ in that 
the latter assumes that low-cost surplus peasant labour can be transformed into internationally competitive 
industrial labour-forces under any circumstance. In other words, it assumes that low wages can always 
compensate for low productivity. For the Lewis ‗model‘, see Lewis (1954).  
34
 In effect, the emergence of the Japanese textile industry as a global leader in the early decades of the 
20th century already resulted from the previous replacement of mule-spinning machinery with ring-
spinning machinery. The latter made possible the replacement of male semiskilled workers with young 
female unskilled workers of rural origin. See Silver (2003: 87-9). 
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contrary, they have taken shape in a wide and constantly changing range of 
combinations of relative cost and characteristics/productivity of the national labour 
forces. The aforementioned technological transformations have involved an ever wider 
range of industrial sectors, including relatively advanced ones, such as the steel and 
automobile industries. Moreover, the local peasant surplus populations in certain East 
Asian NICs (in Japan first and then in Korea and Taiwan) were sooner or later 
exhausted and the domestic labour-forces began to be reproduced under new conditions 
which, in turn, have enabled them to perform increasingly more complex labour 
processes. Productions in specific industrial branches, then, expanded in some countries 
while contracting in others where new and more advanced sectors developed, following 
a rhythm determined by the evolution of those factors – i.e. the technological changes 
and the relative cost and productivity of national labour-forces within the region.
35
 
 The NIDL, Iñigo Carrera (2008) concludes, superseded the ‗classical‘ 
international division of labour based on the determination of some countries as 
producers of raw materials for the world market (whether or not accompanied by an 
incipient development of industrial productions for the domestic markets) and the 
concentration of advanced industrial productions in others. The presence of distinctive 
natural conditions, enhancing the productivity of labour in primary productions or 
simply permitting them in the former group of countries, played a crucial role in their 
form of integration into the capitalist world division of labour. The NIDL has tended to 
revolve around the international fragmentation of the different segments of large-scale 
industry workforce. Some countries have tended to concentrate within their boundaries 
the great bulk of the skilled labour-force and therefore of the most complex labour-
processes (mainly the USA and the European Union but also partly in Japan lately). 
Other countries have been mainly transformed into sources of relatively cheap and 
disciplined labour for simplified, though increasingly complex, productions (e.g. East 
and then Southeast Asia).
36
 Yet, a third group of countries has remained integrated into 
the international division of labour as producers of raw materials and therefore as 
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 The ‗flying geese‘ theory reflects only the second of these factors. See Kasahara (2004). Moreover, this 
theory does neither explain why industrial production for world markets using a relatively cheap and 
disciplined unskilled of labour force could develop in Japan in the first instance. 
36
 This does not mean that the first group of countries has exclusively concentrated skilled workers. On 
one hand, immigration from ‗Third World‘ countries has helped satisfy the local demand for a great part 
of the unskilled labour force. See Sassen (1988) on this point. On the other hand, the dismantling of the 
‗welfare state‘ and the introduction of neo-liberal policies there since the 1980s has also played its part in 
the increase in the local supply of this type of labour. See Iñigo Carrera (2008: 72-6). 
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sources of appropriation of the extraordinary profits available there in the form of land 
rent.
37
 At the same time, countries in this third group have been increasingly 
transformed into reservoirs of surplus-population (for instance, most of Africa and parts 
of Asia and South America),
38
 and, in some cases, have eventually became new sources 
of cheap and disciplined labour-power (e.g. recently parts of South Asia, North Africa 
and the Caribbean Basin). 
 
Aims of the thesis 
 
 This thesis will investigate the Korean and Brazilian developmental and growth 
experiences between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s through the approach to the 
NIDL and the global economy introduced in the previous sub-section. The thesis will 
propose that the distinctive integration of these two countries into the evolving 
international division of labour explains their different developmental patterns since the 
mid-1960s and their dissimilar economic growth performance since the late 1970s. It 
also accounts for their specifically different political institutions. This thesis will argue 
that the inability of the Brazilian economy to transcend its narrow integration into the 
world division of labour as a supplier of raw or semi-processed materials has not been 
due merely to inconsistent or poorly implemented economic policies and institutions. It 
has resulted from the possibility for industrial capital there to maximise its profits 
producing in an internationally small scale for domestic markets and compensating the 
resultant high production costs through the appropriation of a portion of the abundant 
agrarian and mining land rents. These have been particularly large in Brazil not only 
due to its massive territorial area but also due to the relatively favourable natural 
conditions prevailing there for the production of several raw materials.
39
 This thesis will 
also show that the Korean economy developed under the same specific base than the 
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 See Appendix A for an explanation of the determination of land rent in capitalism. 
38
 The expulsion of the labour-force from the process of production and its transformation into surplus-
population resulting from the increase in social labour‘s productivity not necessarily takes place where 
the ‗labour saving‘ technical change is generated or implemented. When the technical change and the 
consequent increase in labour productivity are not evenly spread across national processes of 
accumulation, commodities produced under the new conditions in those countries where the technical 
change is generalised will, ceteris paribus, displace those produced under the old, obsolete conditions in 
those countries where the technical change is not implemented. The increase in the technical composition 
of capital and the consequent relative decrease in the demand for labour will then result in the increase, or 
relatively small decrease, in the demand for labour in the former, and the decrease in the demand for 
labour in the latter. 
39
 See Iñigo Carrera (2006, 2007) for the original discovery of this specific form of capital accumulation 
in the analysis of the Argentinian experience. 
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Brazilian before the mid-1960s, complementing the limited land rent available for 
appropriation by industrial capital with the massive inflow of foreign aid and a portion 
of the profits normally freed by small agrarian capital. Subsequently world-wide 
technological changes associated with the computerisation and automation of industrial 
machinery changed Korea‘s ‗competitive advantages‘ as they manifested themselves in 
sharp advances in the codification of technical knowledge and, thus, in the reduction of 
the tacit know-how and skills necessary to perform several industrial labour processes. 
This meant that industrial capital there began, by the early 1970s, to maximise its profits 
through the production of certain goods for world markets, taking advantage of the large 
local availability of relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour-power. Due to these 
(skill-replacing) technological changes and its own historical origin and productive 
characteristics, the Korean industrial workforce has become particularly productive 
when performing several simplified, though increasingly more complex, labour-
processes as an appendage of the automated systems of machinery or in the manual 
assembly of components and parts. 
 The thesis will reconstruct the singularities of the processes of capitalist 
development in Korea and Brazil between the mid-1950s and the early 2000s in order to 
provide evidence in support of these hypotheses. In doing so, the thesis will also aim to 
support (both analytically and empirically) the general hypotheses about the functioning 
of the global economy presented above. The thesis will not only advance an alternative 
account of the limits of capitalist development in Brazil vis-à-vis Korea, but also 
explain the weaknesses of the process of economic growth and development in the latter 
as manifested in the severe 1997-98 economic crisis. 
 In order to test and support the hypotheses put forward above, the thesis is 
structured in two parts. The first part consists of four chapters, the first of which will 
present and describe the main characteristics and transformations of the economic, 
political and ideological forms taken by the process of capitalist development in Brazil 
and Korea from the mid-1950s to the mid-2000s. The second chapter of the first part 
will present key quantitative evidence supporting the analysis introduced in the 
preceding chapter. This quantitative analysis includes the measurement of land rent and 
the course of its appropriation by landowners and other social subjects. Evidence 
supporting the hypothesis regarding the specificity of capital accumulation in Brazil and 
Korea will come from the measurement of the magnitude of land rent appropriated by 
capital and from the assessment of its importance in supporting the process of 
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valorisation of capital. This chapter will also measure the size of net inflows of foreign 
credit and aid in both countries and assess their importance in supporting capital‘s rate 
profitability vis-à-vis the land rent. For these purposes, Chapter 2 revises pre-existing 
studies on these topics and advances an original model to pursue the relevant 
measurements. Appendix B and C at the end of thesis present the methodology and 
sources to estimate and reconstruct the time-series used in these measurements. 
 The third chapter of the first part will put forward some qualitative and 
quantitative evidence in support of the above mentioned hypotheses. The chapter 
summarises the main trends in the post-1950s processes of technological development 
on a global scale and their impact upon the structure of skills required from the 
industrial labour force. It also examines the specific cases of the global steel, 
automobile and semiconductors industries and traces their development in Korea and 
Brazil since the 1950s, analysing and comparing the bases for the valorisation of 
individual capital there. These sectors were selected because their development jointly 
expresses the main characteristics of the Korean and Brazilian processes of capitalist 
accumulation. The appendix attached to the chapter presents the methodology and 
sources used for the measurement of the determinants of the profitability of 
representative individual capital invested in these sectors in both countries. The 
quantitative and qualitative analyses presented in this chapter will show that Korea‘s 
competitive edge in world markets since the mid-1960s has sprung from the 
combination of relatively low wages and high labour productivity, in turn resulting from 
contemporary advances in industrial equipment automation and the characteristics of the 
local labour-force. They will also show how the specific characteristics of the Brazilian 
process of capitalist development have manifested themselves in a particularly limited 
type of industrialisation centred on the appropriation of a portion of land rent. 
 The last chapter of the first part, the fourth, puts forward a group of time-series 
expressing different aspects of the transformations in the process of capital 
accumulation in Brazil and Korea throughout the period under study. These time-series 
include measures of economic growth and industrial development, variables that show 
the type of integration of these economies in world markets, and others that reveal the 
evolution of the cost and quality of industrial labour-power. These time-series compare 
the evolution of these variables in Korea, Brazil and the USA. The chapter also includes 
a brief discussion of the structure and evolution of labour market institutions as 
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mediations of the conditions of purchase, consumption and reproduction of the labour-
force, and thus of the specific forms of capitalist development, in these three countries.  
 In light of the findings and empirical evidence presented in the first part, the 
second part of the thesis puts forward a detailed political economy analysis of the 
historical development of Korean and Brazilian capitalism. This part analyses social and 
political processes, and their role in moulding the evolution of economic, welfare and 
labour policies and political/state institutions. It shows their intrinsic unity mediating 
the transformations in the specificity of the Korean and Brazilian processes of capitalist 
development as forms of realising the global integration of capitalism. The second part 
of the thesis is divided in five chapters each covering a period of approximately ten 
years: from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s; from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s; 
from the early 1970s to the early 1980s; from the early 1980s to the early 1990s; and 
from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. 
 The thesis ends with a chapter that synthesises the findings and offers some 
conclusions concerning the specific development of the processes of capital 
accumulation in Brazil and Korea, and on their long-term limits and potentialities.  
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Part I 
The Specificity of the Brazilian and Korean Processes of Capitalist 
Development   
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Chapter 1 
The State and Capital Accumulation in Brazil and Korea: An overview 
 
 The introductory chapter argued that national capitalisms are modes of existence 
of an underlying global process of capital accumulation. It also claimed that nation-state 
policies and institutions are manifestations (i.e. forms of realisation) of the process of 
capital accumulation and, therefore, mediate the global integration of capitalism through 
the specific determination of each national portion of world total capital. 
 This chapter will present a highly schematic analysis of the main specific 
economic and political characteristics of the Brazilian and Korean processes of 
capitalist development between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s. This analysis intends 
to narrow down the general hypotheses regarding these countries‘ developmental 
experiences advanced above by providing a broad, highly stylised account of the 
trajectory of both societies during the fifty years under study. In doing so, this chapter 
will advance the main ideas developed in more detail throughout the thesis. The 
analysis pursued in the present chapter will also put forward some further elements in 
support of one of the main general theoretical argument advanced in the introduction to 
this thesis, namely, that political, institutional and ideological developments in both 
countries have realised the transformations in their economic formations and thus 
mediated the global integration and unity of capitalism.  
 
1.1) Capital accumulation and the Brazilian state 
 
By the end of WWII, the Brazilian state began to take an active role in the 
promotion of industrialisation. The methods it used did not differ qualitatively from 
those then implemented by other developing country states, including the Korean, trying 
to promote the local production for the domestic market of previously imported 
manufactured goods. The subsidisation of local industrial productions was the key 
method pursued by developing country states to achieve their developmental goals. 
Subsidies were allegedly used to compensate for the lower productivity of industrial 
labour due to the ‗late-comer‘ status of these countries‘ industries and to speed-up the 
learning and catch-up process.
1
 Subsidisation means, however, that resources from other 
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 See e.g. Amsden (1989); Kohli (2004). 
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sectors of the national economy or from outside it are transferred to a specific branch, in 
this case the industrial sector, to promote its growth and long-term development. Two 
issues arise when analysing the Brazilian experience, namely, the origin of the resources 
used to subsidise industrial capital and the duration of the subsidisation process. 
It is sometimes argued that low wages were originally the main factor 
compensating for the low level of labour productivity and thus assuring industrial 
capital‘s normal valorisation in Brazil.2 But, had low wages been enough, 
manufacturing firms would have produced for world markets instead of the protected 
domestic ones.
3
 Inflows of interest-bearing capital (i.e. external credit), though re-
established in the mid-1940s, were not quantitatively significant before the late 1960s 
strong expansion of the Eurodollar market. The idea that resources used to subsidise the 
industrial sector came from the agrarian sector, on the contrary, has received more 
widespread support. 
It is generally agreed among specialists that economic policies in effect in Brazil 
between the end of WWII and the mid-1960s entailed a strong transfer of resources 
from the primary to other sectors of the economy to promote industrialisation. It is also 
frequently suggested that these transfers continued during the late 1960s and the 1970s, 
although with less intensity.
4
 Much less support has been received for the argument that, 
though they were not important quantitatively during most of the 1980s, substantial 
transfers were effected during the post-1990, neoliberal period as is being argued in this 
thesis.
5
 Strong differences arise, however, regarding the specific qualitative essence of 
these transfers of primary sector resources. Yet, the correct identification of the origin 
of these portions of social wealth is required not only to measure their quantity 
accurately but also to understand fully the underlying characteristics of the process, 
including its temporal extension. 
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 See e.g. Anglade (1985: 55-6).  
3
 See Salama (1978: 270-4); Jenkins (1984: 34). The almost constant expansion of local industrial 
productions and the continuous inflow of foreign investments in the manufacturing sector throughout 
most of the period under study rule out the possibility of persistent lower than normal profits in that 
branch of the Brazilian economy. Effectively, Newfarmer and Muller (1975: 144) showed that ―Brazilian 
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 See e.g. Syvrud (1974: 216-9); Oliveira (1986: 91-109; Graham, et al. (1987: 2-3); Carvalho and 
Brandão (1991a). 
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 Some authors recognise, however, the continuation of a ‗policy-bias‘ against agriculture during the 
implementation of the Plan Real (1994-98). See e.g. Homen de Melo (1999). 
 43 
Orthodox (i.e. neoliberal) authors, for instance, have argued that resources 
transferred to the industrial sector originated in ‗agriculturalist‘s wealth‘.6 This opinion 
has been shared by some structuralist scholars who referred to it as the agrarian 
‗surpluses‘.7 That, however, could hardly be the case if those terms referred to a portion 
of the normal profits of agrarian capital. This, as any other productive capital, would 
have, on average, withdrawn from that sector of the economy, or contracted its scale of 
production, if it was not able to realise a portion of its normal profits and was thus not 
normally valorising there.
8
 Given their magnitude, neither could those resources 
normally and solely come from the particularly low rural wages, notably before the 
promulgation of the 1963 Rural Worker Statute when they were around one-half of 
those paid in the manufacturing sector.
9
 On the contrary, those resources could normally 
come from the remaining portion of the price of agrarian and mining goods, the land 
rent. Only the extraordinary profits (i.e. rents) available in the primary sector due to the 
monopoly over an irreproducible means of production, land, could be transferred to the 
rest of the economy without affecting the normal long-term reproduction of the primary 
sector. In Brazil, these rents have been particularly large due to the size of the country 
and the relatively favourable natural conditions for the production of raw materials 
prevailing in vast areas. Landowners, unlike agrarian capitalists, have had no choice but 
to ‗accept‘, though not without resistance, the loss of a portion of the land rent as a 
condition to unproductively consume the rest of it. In the case of publicly-owned 
mining lands and water resources for electricity generation, the landowning state, could 
transfer the land rent to the rest of the economy without any political conflict 
whatsoever.
10
 
                                                 
6
 See e.g. Gudin (1969). 
7
 See e.g. Bacha (1978). 
8
 On the contrary, agrarian production expanded continuously during those years. See Graham, et al. 
(1987: 8). Indeed, as Bacha (1978: 144) noticed, the fast expansion of coffee production during the period 
of high ‗taxation‘ (i.e. 1947-54) is an indication that normal profitability was not being affected. 
9
 Wage differentials between agricultural and industrial workers do not necessarily imply the payment of 
the rural labour-force below its value. Urban wages are normally higher than rural wages for, at least, two 
reasons. First, the cost of reproduction of the urban labour-force is higher than that of the rural labour-
force because the productive attributes (skills) of former are more complex than those of the latter. 
Secondly, rural workers need, ceteris paribus, to consume comparatively less use values than their urban 
counterparts since they tend to have lower expenditures in transport, clothing, housing, etc. See Grinberg 
and Starosta (2009). 
10
 The ‗partnership‘ between landed property and industrial capital for the appropriation of land rent has 
been inherently problematic. Not only have they fought politically over the appropriation of the available 
rent. By lowering domestic prices of primary goods, the forms of land rent appropriation by capital have 
limited the intensive and extensive application of capital to land, and thus lifted a barrier to the growth of 
primary production and of the total rent available for appropriation. In other words, they have transformed 
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In Brazil, the process of ‗subsidisation‘ of industrial capital‘s valorisation with a 
portion of land rent cannot be considered a form of ‗infant industry‘ promotion, notably 
when the largest beneficiaries of that ‗support‘ have been MNCs, and when it has 
extended well beyond the early stages of industrialisation. This process has constituted 
the essential characteristic of Brazilian capitalist development. 
The accumulation of capital through the appropriation of a portion of land rent to 
complement normal surplus-value has come about through specific, though periodically 
changing, public policies as well as a wide range of economic and political institutions. 
These have mediated the transfer of primary sector surpluses to the rest of the economy 
and also the creation of the conditions necessary to allow their appropriation, mainly by 
industrial capital. In general terms, two types of mechanisms, indissolubly united, have 
given form to that process. Some policies have interrupted the turnover cycle of agrarian 
capital and separated from it a portion of land rent. These have included exchange rate 
overvaluation, taxes on commodity exports and state control over their domestic and 
international trade. All of these policies have transferred a portion of land rent to 
privately-owned industrial capitals, by setting domestic prices of raw materials below 
their international levels and, in the case of the overvaluation of the currency, by 
reducing the local price of foreign exchange for specific imports and profits 
repatriation.
11
 These policies have also transferred a portion of land rent to the state not 
only directly (through the monopoly/control of foreign exchange markets and 
commodity trade or the taxation of raw material exports) but also indirectly (through the 
payment of relatively high import taxes and other duties with an overvalued currency). 
Simultaneously, other policies have allowed the appropriation of the separated portion 
of land rent by industrial capital either through ‗market mechanisms‘ or direct state 
actions.
12
 These have included the calibrated protection of domestic markets (stronger 
for final goods than for inputs and machinery), the provision of services, industrial 
inputs and credit at subsidised rates by state-owned companies and banks, and the 
regulated expansion of domestic markets through their activities (i.e. the purchase of 
locally produced goods at inflated prices and an oversized workforce). Though most of 
these mechanisms of land rent appropriation remained in effect during the entire period 
                                                                                                                                               
into marginal portions of capital that, extensively or intensively applied on land, would have earned 
normal profits had rent-transferring policies not been implemented by the Brazilian state. 
11
 Competitive pressures have passed the ‗discount‘ from exporters to agrarian capitalists and from these 
onto landowners; and from internationally to domestically-traded commodities. 
12
 What is said here for industrial capital holds, mutatis mutandis, also for its junior partners, namely, 
commercial and service capital. 
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discussed in this thesis, the specific policies and institutions involved in the process 
have varied significantly, expressing and mediating the objective conditions for the 
valorisation of capital prevailing in the Brazilian economy. 
  
1.1.1) State-led process of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) 
 
 Although several of the features that characterised the Brazilian political 
economy during the post-WWII era had been present before (e.g. the combination of an 
overvalued currency and selected market protection), it was only throughout the 1940s, 
with the withdrawal of most foreign capital invested in public utilities, that industrial 
capital became landowners‘ main partner in the appropriation of the land rent and that 
sate-owned enterprises (SOEs) began to play an active role in the process. Together, 
these policies and institutions promoted the full-scale process of ISI as a form of 
realising the appropriation of land rent by social actors (i.e. ‗economic agents‘) other 
than landowners, notably industrial capital. 
 In effect, ISI policies and the populist regimes originally associated with them, 
both in their nationalist and developmentalist variants, did not constitute a ‗model of 
development‘ implemented to solve an ‗external restriction‘ (i.e. the decline in the terms 
of trade of Brazil‘s exports and the scarcity of external credit), to employ rural masses 
migrating to urban centres, or as a response to the emerging power of the industrial 
bourgeoisie and the urban working-class, as argued elsewhere.
13
 Neither policies nor 
institutions introduced by the military regime after it took power in the mid-1960s 
entailed any structural departure from the previously implemented ‗model‘ of 
accumulation. Both types of regimes (i.e. democratic/populist and 
military/authoritarian) expressed and mediated politically and ideologically the 
reproduction of a process of capitalist development based on the appropriation by 
industrial capital of a portion of the land rent. 
 
The Populist Stage (1946-1964) 
  
                                                 
13
 See Tavares (1977), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) and Kaufman and Stallings (1989), respectively. The 
so-called ‗external restriction‘ sprung from this specific form of capitalist development rather the 
engendered it. The ISI process began in Brazil in the late nineteen century; well before the ‗external 
restriction‘ manifested itself. See Fishlow (1971). 
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As had been the case since at least the final part of the nineteenth century, 
between the end of WWII and the mid-1950s, the process of capital accumulation based 
on the appropriation of land rent gave place to the fast proliferation of small (by world 
market norms) nationally-owned industrial firms. In contrast to the pre-WWII 
experience, it also manifested itself in the creation of a large number of SOEs and 
developmental banks, in some cases through the nationalisation of foreign-owned 
companies in the public utilities and transport sectors. Though both types of capitals 
would subsequently support the valorisation processes of MNC subsidiaries, this stage 
in the development of Brazilian capitalism came about through the consolidation of a 
populist nationalistic regime, notably during the ‗commodities boom‘ associated with 
the Korean War, when the land rent available to support the process of capital 
accumulation through industrialisation expanded strongly.
14
 In the first place, the strong 
expansion of small nationally-owned firms and state-owned enterprises and banks 
needed to be represented ideologically and politically as first steps in the genesis of a 
process of economic development allegedly based on national autonomy and self-
determination.
15
 Moreover, wage increases and public welfare provision were also 
needed to upgrade industrial worker skills and make effective the enlargement of 
domestic markets for the expanding consumer goods output.
16
 These developments, 
which were necessary for the reproduction of the process of capital accumulation under 
its specific form, realised through the consolidation of the so-called ‗populist alliance‘ 
between the national bourgeoisie and the urban working-class.
17
 
Through the mid-1950s, however, some of the features of Brazilian capitalism 
started to change when large flows of foreign capital began to arrive, attracted by the 
substantial growth of the domestic market that the enlarged land rent had allowed.
18
 
Unlike the previous period, which had created the conditions for the arrival of MNCs, 
this stage in Brazilian capitalist development could not be represented politically by a 
nationalistic government with an increasingly anti-foreign-capital rhetoric as the one in 
power in the first half of the decade. The ‗populist alliance‘ thus became 
developmentalist.
19
 To ‗entice‘ MNCs, special concessions were then added to the 
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 See graph 1.1 at the end of this chapter for the evolution of international commodity prices. See also 
Radetzki (2006) for the analysis of post-WWII ‗commodity booms‘. 
15
 See Skidmore (1986: 88-90) on the ideological positions associated with the populist nationalistic state. 
16
 See Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 127-43); Wells (1983: 323-6). 
17
 See Skidmore (1986, 54-62); Fausto (1999, 230-1). 
18
 See Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 157-8). 
19
 See Anglade (1985: 56-7); Skidmore (1986: 146-9). 
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previously implemented forms of land rent appropriation (e.g. exchange rate 
overvaluation, market protection and state sector activities). The Targets Plan (1956-60) 
launched to improve state provision of infrastructure and develop durable-consumer and 
capital goods industries provided the framework for this policy-shift.
20
 
The establishment of MNCs producing durable-consumer, and later on, capital 
goods did not change the structure and underlying specific characteristics of the 
economy. Effectively, in sharp contrast to the strategies followed in their countries of 
origin or in other regions where they were then establishing (e.g. Canada, Western 
Europe and, later on, USA), MNCs did not open productive facilities in Brazil with the 
technical conditions needed for competition in world markets.
21
 MNC factories had 
technical scales of production limited to the magnitude of the internationally small 
domestic market.
22
 Newly established MNC subsidiaries compensated the extraordinary 
costs arising from their sub-optimal scale (for world market standards) by 
complementing their normal surpluses with a portion of the available land rent and of 
small-capital profits.
23
 
                                                 
20
 See Kolhi (2004: 183) for an overview of the special treatment received by incoming MNCs. 
21
 Until the 1980s, MNCs almost never exported a significant part of the production. For instance, in 
1974, US MNCs in Brazil exported only 5.5% of their total output. On the contrary, US MNCs in Canada 
and Europe were, in 1970, exporting 19-23% of their production. See Avelãs Nunes (1990: 478-9). See 
also Salama (1978: 261-3). 
22
 See Moran (2005: 284-6). The low average purchasing power of its relatively large population (60, 70 
and 93 million in 1955, 1960 and 1970, respectively) limited the size of the Brazilian domestic market. 
The extremely high concentration of wealth made possible, however, the formation of a domestic market 
which during the mid-1960s amounted approximately to 10 million consumers with a consuming capacity 
similar to that of Western European inhabitants, alongside with 30 million consumers of significantly 
lower purchasing power. See Bacha (1986) who coined the term Belindia to refer to this situation. 
Though a market of that size could have been large enough to produce certain non-durable consumer 
goods, it was definitely not for durable consumer and capital goods. Indeed, by then, even national 
markets of around 40-50 million inhabitants of relatively high purchasing capacity were becoming small 
to accommodate minimum efficient scales of production, forcing Western European countries to merge 
their domestic markets. Moreover, Brazil was also characterised by having surprisingly low levels of 
concentration in the industrial sector. See Fajnzylber (1971: 285-7). 
23
 ―The valorisation of small capitals is not determined by the general rate of profit that governs the 
valorisation of normal ones, that is, those which have the scale to use the most advanced methods of 
production. Instead, it is governed either by the rate of interest that small capitals could yield if they 
closed down business and were turned into interest-bearing capitals (i.e. by the interest rate on the 
liquidation value of their productive assets, which is normally lower than the general rate of profit); or, 
ultimately, by the wage rate at which their owners would be paid if employed elsewhere. Now, if for 
whatever circumstances the price at which small capitals sell their product is below the price of 
production of normal capitals and above the price which regulates their own valorisation, small capitals 
could potentially appropriate an extraordinary profit. Their competition over its appropriation, however, 
would expand production and thus lower the commercial price of the product. The extraordinary profit 
would then be freed by small capitals and appropriated by those normal capitals with which they 
exchange on the market. In the case of small agrarian capitals selling their product directly, the surplus-
value materialised in the extraordinary profits would be passed on to the consumers in the form of lower 
prices and would thus be ultimately appropriated by industrial capital in general under the form of lower 
wages for the same quality of labour-power.‖ Grinberg and Starosta (2009: 766-7). See Marx (1981: 938-
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 However profitable for industrial capital, especially of foreign origin, since it 
could valorise using obsolete equipment, which in some cases was already amortised, 
and without investing in risky vanguard technological development, the reproduction of 
the Brazilian process of capital accumulation became structurally dependent on the 
evolution of the magnitude of land rent available for appropriation. This became 
necessary to compensate for the difference between local and world markets production 
costs, in turn resulting from the difference between local and world markets scales of 
production and their impact upon the technologies respectively used. Policies 
maximising the appropriation of land rent by industrial capital, the combination of an 
overvalued currency and market protection, precluded the production of manufactured 
goods for world markets. Moreover, by producing for domestic consumers, MNC 
subsidiaries became also able to valorise normally without competing with their parent 
houses and branches elsewhere. 
 
The Military Regime Stage (1964-85) 
 
By the mid-1960s, the political and ideological forms of realisation of the 
Brazilian mode of capitalist development would change again, this time more 
extensively. In 1964, a military coup d‘état opened a new period in Brazilian politics, 
which lasted until early 1985. Nevertheless, despite the shared absence of democratic 
institutions, this period was far from uniform. In terms of economic and social policy 
patterns, as well as developmental and growth outcomes, it could be divided into four 
sub-periods the last of which marked the crisis of the ‗state-led‘ process of ISI. 
During 1963-66, the land rent available for appropriation in the Brazilian 
economy stagnated as a result of the fall in international commodity prices and two 
consecutive coffee harvest failures. At the same time, loan capital inflows became 
negative. Since the late 1950s, these had been incipiently complementing the land rent 
in sustaining the process of capital accumulation through ISI. The contraction of these 
sources of extraordinary social wealth manifested itself in the partial or total reversion 
of most of the policies and institutions that had been mediating their appropriation by 
capital. This policy-shift, which included exchange rate devaluation and a reduction in 
public sector employment, real wages and the amount of subsidies directly granted to 
                                                                                                                                               
50, for the original discovery of this determination based on the analysis of small agrarian capitals; and 
Iñigo Carrera (2008: 121-136), for the generalisation to all productive capitals. 
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industrial capital, could not be administered by a government heavily supported by trade 
unions and some sectors of the local industrial bourgeoisie, as the one in power in the 
first part of the 1960s. A repressive military government with an orthodox economic 
policy-making team and an anti-populist ideology was far more suitable for that job. 
Inevitably, without those resources to support industrial sector‘s profitability and 
domestic demand, economic growth stagnated and unemployment mounted during the 
first years of military rule (1964-66).
24
 
 The second stage of the military regime (from mid-1967 to 1973) was marked, 
first, by a contraction and, subsequently, by a sharp expansion of the land rent available 
for appropriation, as the agricultural frontier expanded to the western part of the country 
and international commodity prices began to increase in the build-up to the 1973-74 
‗commodities boom‘. Crucially, it was also marked by a substantial increase in the mass 
of external credits available to fund capital goods imports and SOE activities as 
Eurodollar markets boomed and large financial resources became available for Brazil.
25
 
As both sources of extraordinary social wealth expanded, some of the previously 
dismantled policies channelling these resources to industrial capital were reinstated. A 
period of fast growth (the so-called ‗economic miracle‘) ensued.26 The economic 
recovery, nevertheless, could not manifest itself in the re-establishment of democratic 
institutions. The land rent, now largely appropriated by capital through export taxes and 
state activities, contracted until 1971 and was thus partly complemented by a third 
source of extraordinary surplus-value: that arising from the squeeze of manual worker 
wages.
27
 This development could hardly be supported by the ‗popular sectors‘ of the 
Brazilian society. The ‗hardliners‘ within the military thus took hold of the state 
apparatus while professional technocrats with developmentalist inclinations were in 
charge of economic policy-making. Fast economic growth was this time combined with 
strong political repression and the further strengthening of MNCs participation in the 
industrial sector. These elements solidified the emerging ‗Triple Alliance‘ between 
domestic, foreign and state capital, which replaced the previous populist 
arrangements.
28
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 For an overview of the policies implemented during 1964-67, see Serra (1982); Lara Resende (1990). 
25
 See Frieden (1987: 99).  
26
 On the policies implemented during 1968-1973, see Anglade (1985). 
27
 See Bacha (1977: 52-3); Zurron Ocio (1986: 8-11) on industrial wages evolution. 
28
 See Cardoso and Faletto (1979); Evans (1979) for the analysis of these institutional developments. 
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 The third stage of the military regime (1974-79) was marked by a sharp, though 
irregular, increase of the masses of land rent and interest-bearing capital inflows in the 
form credit available to sustain the process of capital accumulation. In general terms, 
these movements resulted from the early 1970s ‗commodities boom‘ and the expansion 
of global credit supply to which the recycling of ‗petrodollars‘ contributed.29 With these 
resources in sharp expansion, the state-led developmental approach to policy-making 
received a strong revival through the implementation of the Second National 
Development Plan (1975-79), designed to deepen the ISI process by increasing the local 
production of industrial inputs and capital goods as well as the provision of 
infrastructure.
30
 The exchange rate became again overvalued to complement export 
taxes as main forms of appropriation of the land rent by capital directly or through state 
intermediation. Subsidies to industrial exports increased sharply, this time focusing on 
durable-consumer goods like automobiles.
31
 Economic growth proceeded strongly, 
though more erratically than during the previous, ‗miraculous‘ period. As before, 
changes in the economic conditions manifested themselves in political and institutional 
transformations. A process of political ‗distension‘ ensued and labour militancy 
increased, leading to a strong recovery of industrial wages across-the-board, crucially 
during 1976-80.
32
 For the process of accumulation through the appropriation of land 
rent by industrial capital, universal wage increases were necessary not only to reproduce 
a labour-force undertaking increasingly complex and intensive activities, but also to 
expand the domestic markets for durable-consumer goods output. 
 The last stage of the military regime (from 1980 to 1984) marked the beginning 
of the crisis of ‗state-led‘ ISI process. The second ‗oil shock‘ was followed by a sharp 
rise in international interest rates and the concomitant reduction of the supply of credit 
to ‗developing‘ countries. Crucially, it also initiated a period of long-term decline in 
non-oil commodity prices (only reversed partly after 2005).
33
 With both the land rent in 
contraction and loan capital inflows in sharp retraction, most of the policies that had 
transferred these resources to industrial capital would be either reduced in their scope or 
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 See graph 1.1 for the evolution of international commodity prices. See Ruiz and Vilarubis (2007) for 
the recycling of ‗petrodollars‘ and Kaminsky (2005) for the flows of capital to developing countries since 
the 1970s.  
30
 See Batista (1992: 18-22). 
31
 See Anglade (1985: 93). 
32
 On the 1978-79 spike of working-class mobilisation, see Anglade (1985: 99-100); Skidmore (1985: 
212-5). 
33
 See graph 1.1 below. For the long-term evolution of commodity prices, see also Radetzky (2006); 
Ocampo and Parra-Lancourt (2010). 
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removed altogether during this period. The economy thus entered into its deepest crisis 
since the end of WWII. The previous process of political ‗opening‘ came to a halt and 
trade union activism was increasingly matched with fierce political repression. In 1981-
82, industrial wages thus started a process of strong contraction that partly compensated 
for the effect of the fall of state subsidies on capital‘s profits.34 
 
1.1.2) Neoliberal stage of the ISI process 
 
The early 1980s marked the beginning of a new orientation in public policy-
making, namely, that associated with neoliberal structural reforms. However, despite the 
many changes in public policies, political institutions and their ideological 
representation thereafter, there was no structural departure from the earlier specific form 
of capitalist development. In other words, neoliberal economic and social policies, 
increasingly, though irregularly, implemented since the early 1980s, entailed a change 
in the form of reproduction of the Brazilian process of capitalist development not in its 
essential characteristics. 
 In general terms, with the combined mass of land rent and net interest-bearing 
capital (i.e. credit) inflows stagnating or growing more slowly than their requirement by 
capital, the previous scale of industrial production could not be sustained any longer. 
Policies that had been transferring these resources to industrial capital, thus sustaining 
its profitability, then slowly reversed into neoliberal programmes inspired by the so-
called Washington Consensus. Import tariffs were sharply, though not universally, 
reduced while several SOEs were privatised (or closed altogether) and public sector 
employment and welfare expenditures were ‗rationalised‘, thus eliminating some of the 
main forms of land rent transfer to, and appropriation by, industrial capital.
35
 State 
policies supporting the process of ISI (e.g. the combination of an overvalued currency 
and market protection, subsidised state-bank loans, tax credits) became thereafter 
increasingly selective and limited.
36
 Industrial capital remained, nevertheless, largely 
domestic-markets-oriented and, after the 1990s large-scale privatisation programme, 
began to compete, in the appropriation of the land rent, with capital invested in 
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 See Anglade (1985: 104-5). 
35
 Neoliberal policies also realised, as in the industrially advanced countries, the acceleration in the 
process of differentiation of the productive attributes of the distinct portions of the Brazilian workforce. 
36
 See Baumann and Paiva Franco (2002) for the importing-substitution experience during 1995-2000; 
Bonelli and Veiga (2003) for an analysis of sectoral policy during the neoliberal 1990s. 
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previously state-provided public utility services. Inevitably, without the necessary 
resources to compensate for the permanently growing productivity gap, industrial value-
added, and to a lesser extend GDP, stagnated during large parts of the post-1980 period. 
The realisation of these trends depended on the evolution of the extraordinary 
social wealth available for appropriation relative to its requirement by capital.
37
 As the 
land rent contracted and capital outflows enlarged, the 1980s witnessed the ‗terminal‘ 
crisis of the extended, ‗state-led‘ ISI process through which capital accumulation had 
come about since the end of WWII. Conversely, during the middle part of the 1990s, as 
the land rent expanded again, thanks to commodity price and output increases, and 
interest-bearing capital flows to developing country economies like Brazil were re-
established, the reproduction of the process of capital accumulation through limited, 
‗neoliberal‘ ISI enjoyed a mild recovery. The exchange rate then became, again, 
strongly overvalued and some forms of domestic-market protection and industrial 
capital subsidisation were enhanced while others reintroduced. This recovery, however, 
was sustained on increasingly weakened bases. The extended reliance on foreign loans 
and state-asset sales, as well as a sharp wage squeeze, were now necessary to 
supplement the land rent in sustaining capital‘s valorisation and the limited process of 
accumulation through ISI. Yet, these trends, which worsen during the global slowdown 
of 1999-2002, were partly reversed after 2004. Since then, the sharp expansion of the 
land rent associated with a new global-market ‗commodities boom‘ and, to a lesser 
extent, the renewed inflow of external credits have given place to a strong surge in 
process of capital accumulation. 
 The long-term contraction of the combined masses of extraordinary social 
wealth, relative to capital‘s need of them to valorise normally, also resulted in a change 
in political institutions. Democratic institutions of government were reintroduced during 
the short-lived economic recovery of the mid-1980s. The sharp expansion of the 
industrial reserve army thereafter, however, made any return to politically-expensive 
authoritarian regimes unnecessary to force real wages down when the economic 
conditions worsened sharply (e.g. in 1988-92 and 1998-2003). Moreover, the military‘s 
nationalistic ideology made them relatively unsuitable to sell indiscriminately state-
owned assets to foreign investors and, crucially, remove most forms of domestic market 
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protection. Both of these policy measures were key parts of the reproduction of the 
process of capital accumulation through a limited ISI. Yet, despite sharing an overall 
neoliberal approach to economic and social policies, there have also been significant 
variations in the political constitution and orientation of post-mid-1980s democratically-
elected governments. In general terms, more openly neoliberal governments have been 
in power during periods of relatively slow growth of the land rent (i.e. the 1990s) while 
pre-1964-style populist arrangements have governed during periods of relatively strong 
growth of the land rent (i.e. most of the 2000s).
38
 
  
1.2) Capital accumulation and the Korean state 
 
 Despite their many differences, most scholars specialised in the political 
economy of Korea usually agree with the following claims. First, that before the late 
1960s a significant transfer of resources from the agrarian sector to the rest of the 
economy, notably manufacturing, took place, supporting a ‗mild‘ or ‗easy‘ ISI process. 
Second, that through the 1960s the economy experienced a structural transformation 
moving from a mainly import-substituting to a largely, but not exclusively, export-
oriented type of industrialisation. Third, that, as this transformation began to occur, the 
state became ‗developmental‘, however this is defined.39 
  
1.2.1) ‘Mild’ ISI process 
 
 During the second part of the 1940s, and for most of the 1950s, Korean society 
was either recovering from a military conflict or fighting one. Nevertheless, both during 
recovery periods – i.e. 1945-1950 and 1954-59 – and, arguably, also during the first half 
of the 1960s, the structure of the local economy did not differ qualitatively from its 
Brazilian counterpart, where capital was accumulating through the appropriation of a 
portion of primary sector surpluses. As in Brazil, this process came about through the 
implementation of a set of policies ‗promoting‘ import-substituting industrialisation.40 
However, with a significantly smaller land rent available for appropriation than in 
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 For the evolution of public policies during the neoliberal era, see Novelli and Galvaio (2001-2); Saad-
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 See authors reviewed above. See also Moon and Kang (1991a) on intersectoral income transfers. 
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 On Korean ISI during this period, see Westphal and Kim (1977: 1-2); Krueger (1979: chapter II); 
Hamilton (1986: 33-5).   
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Brazil, when accumulating under that specific form, capital was incapable of sustaining 
in Korea a process of industrialisation of similar extension and complexity as the 
Brazilian. Not even when land rent was complemented with a portion of small agrarian 
capital profits and massive US aid inflows. Effectively, the agrarian reform pursued in 
Korea in the ten years following the end of WWII transferred land ownership to the 
rural worker but did not end with the appropriation of a portion of agrarian wealth (the 
land rent and even a portion of small agrarian profits or of the value of labour-power) by 
other economic sectors. It just got rid of the old landowning class.
41
 
 The ISI process in Korea presented many of the features that characterised the 
Brazilian experience. The overvaluation of the national currency became a key method 
for channelling primary sector surpluses and foreign aid to industrial capital and its 
junior partners. A combination of import taxes and, crucially, quotas protected domestic 
productions of non-durable consumer goods and thus allowed industrial capital to effect 
the appropriation of primary sector surpluses and foreign aid.
42
 The transfer of resources 
from the primary sector to the rest of the economy in Korea during this period also took 
some forms which were not then present in Brazil, like state partial or full control over 
the domestic trade of rice, barley and fertilizers. Through its influence over the price of 
these goods, the state could either supplement the overvaluation of the currency as a 
form of appropriation of agrarian surpluses by industrial capital, or compensate for its 
negative effects on small capital profits and accumulation capacities. The portion of 
these resources appropriated by the state were used to provide subsidised credit to 
industrial capital, to enlarge the domestic markets through public sector employment 
and to finance investments in SOEs and infrastructure, thus constituting a further form 
of resource transfer to industrial capital.
43
 
 In contrast to the Brazilian experience most industrial capital in Korea during 
this period was domestically-owned. Given the small size of the land rent, and thus of 
the domestic market, investments by industrial MNCs in productions for local 
consumers remained relatively low by developing world standards, despite state efforts 
to promote them.
44
 Moreover, the conditions to produce in Korea industrial goods for 
world markets, using the internationally cheap and highly disciplined local labour-force, 
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 See Grinberg and Starosta (2009). On Korean land reform, see Ban et al. (1980: 283-97); Hamilton 
(1986: 29-31); Jeon and Kim (2000).  
42
 See Frank et al. (1975: 36-8); Westphal and Kim (1977: 2). 
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 See Hamilton (1986: 34); Kolhi (2004: 77).          
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 See Westphal and Kim (1977: 8).   
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were not yet fully present. Hence, the limited development of industrial productions for 
the domestic market, its alleged ‗mild‘ ISI process, did not result from the ‗balance‘ and 
‗non-dogmatism‘ of policy-makers, the abstractly determined size of the domestic 
market, or the ‗non-purposiveness‘ of the government, as argued elsewhere.45 This 
limited ISI process resulted from the relatively small magnitude of the masses of 
extraordinary social wealth available to support it. 
 The ‗state-led‘ emergence and consolidation of the local industrial and 
commercial bourgeoisie during the immediate post-WWII period came about in Korea 
through the ideological form of being in the interest of national autonomy goals, 
including, in this case, the fight against the northern ‗communist‘ threat. Moreover, this 
was exacerbated, vis-à-vis the Brazilian experience, by, and was needed to offset 
politically, the country‘s heavy reliance on foreign aid inflows to fund state activities, 
and to thus complement the limited land rent. Conversely, the relatively insignificant 
role played by MNCs in the Korean economy meant that this type of state ideology 
remained unchallenged throughout the ISI period. Finally, the shallow development of 
the industrial sector and the availability of a large surplus population, the Korean 
process of capitalist development through its ISI stage made increases in industrial 
wages unnecessary for its normal reproduction. In Korea, there was no economic need 
for a Brazilian-style ‗populist alliance‘. 
 
1.2.2) Export-oriented industrialisation (EOI)  
 
Through the mid-1960s, the structure of the Korean process of capitalist 
development began to experience a profound transformation. The emergence of the 
New International Division of Labour was creating the possibility to produce in Korea 
industrial goods for world markets, taking advantage of the vast availability of relatively 
cheap and disciplined labour-power which was particularly suitable to perform 
production tasks as an appendage of the machine or in the manual assembly of 
components and parts. Moreover, given the relatively small size of primary sector 
surpluses and the post-late-1950s continuous reduction of foreign aid inflows, as US 
balance-of-payments problems became permanent, the mass of extraordinary social 
wealth available to sustain capital accumulation through ISI stagnated and the process 
                                                 
45
 See Ranis (1995), Balassa (1988) and Kohli (2004), respectively. 
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of economic growth was already reaching its limit. The political forms of realisation of 
the Korean process of capitalist development began then to change, mediating the 
transformations in its economic forms. 
Before the early 1970s, changes occurring in the Korean economy resulted 
largely from the increase in the price of Japanese industrial labour-power, as the global 
process of capital accumulation began to create the conditions for the transformation of 
Japanese capital into a producer of certain consumer-durable goods, industrial inputs 
and equipment for world markets.
46
 The Japanese labour-force began then to be 
replaced by new sources of relatively cheap and disciplined labour-power available in 
East Asia to perform simple manual labour-processes like those in the textile and 
apparel industries.
47
 The skill-replacing technological changes permitting the 
flourishing of these industries in this region were already in place for several decades. 
Since the early 1970s, however, the transformations experienced by the Korean 
economy have largely resulted from the direct impact of contemporary processes of 
skill-replacing technological change and the concomitant consolidation of the NIDL. 
 Three types of policies and institutions began to mediate the structural 
transformation and long-term reproduction of the Korean process of capitalist 
development. Some of these policies and institutions facilitated the export orientation of 
local industrial capital. Others accelerated the concentration of industrial capital in the 
masses required for world-markets-oriented productions. Finally, another set policies 
and institutions helped reproduce the local workforce with the characteristics needed for 
those activities. 
 
The ‘Developmental state’ stage of EOI (1965-1979) 
 
 As noted, the transformation of the specific characteristic of the Korean process 
of capitalist development came about through changes in state institutions, policies and 
their ideological forms of realisation. In effect, during the second part of the 1960s, 
trade policies began to change in order to make possible an increase in the volume of 
exports to off-set the reduction in aid inflows. The exchange rate was devalued, tariffs 
on imports used in export productions were largely scrapped, subsidies on exports were 
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 See Kolhi (2004: 106). 
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increased and supporting organisations strengthened.
48
 Moreover, when foreign capital 
inflows recovered during the latter part of the decade, this time under the form of 
private commercial loans, resources were not used to complement the land rent in 
sustaining an internationally uncompetitive domestic-markets-oriented industrial 
capital, as occurred in Brazil. Taking advantage of the large local availability of cheap 
and highly disciplined labour-power, external credits were transformed into industrial 
capital producing consumer non-durable goods for world markets. Export-oriented 
industrial productions expanded strongly and economic growth accelerated thereafter.
49
 
 The new economic formation of Korean society was based on the availability of 
large pools of relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour-power of peasant origin 
that was suitable for unskilled labour-intensive productions. State policies thus also 
concentrated on the conservation and enhancement of these conditions. During this 
initial stage (i.e. 1965-69), the transfer of resources from the agrarian to the industrial 
sector continued and food prices, and thus wages, remained low and contained.
50
 
Moreover, under ‗national security‘ arguments, independent trade unions and liberal 
political organisations were banned and their members persecuted while democratic 
institutions were severely limited, thus removing any resistance to the relatively slow 
growth of real wages and the imposition of long working-days under hazardous and 
harsh conditions, notably to female and unskilled workers. These repressive institutions, 
like their predecessors during the Japanese colonisation, reinforced aspects of Korean 
society and history (including the authoritarian colonial experience) that enhanced 
worker discipline and favoured the consolidation of ‗segmented‘ labour markets, 
namely, its highly hierarchical and patriarchal structure and the habituation to harsh 
working conditions.
51
 
 By the early 1970s, however, the automation and computerisation of industrial 
equipment had already extensively affected large-scale heavy and chemical industries 
(HCIs), and the Korean economy began to be directly affected by these transformations. 
Not only had the Japanese workforce continued its process of upgrading and 
appreciation while being used to perform increasingly complex labour-process. 
Technological advances had further simplified several industrial activities, notably in 
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 See Brown (1973: 137-8; 148-9); Frank et al. (1975: 47-9); Michell (1988: 61-8); Haggard et al. (1991: 
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 See Choi (1989: 22-3, 60-4); Bello and Rosenfeld (1992: 25-8); You (1995: 123); Koo (2001: 46-54). 
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process or continuous flow HCIs, thus allowing the use of a less skilful and 
experienced, and thus cheaper, workforce to perform them. The Korean economy had 
access to a large surplus population that not only commanded very low wages by 
international standards but, as the Japanese, was also highly disciplined, used to endure 
harsh working conditions during long hours and easily trainable. 
The ‗deepening‘ of the industrial base, resulting from the possibilities created by 
the NDIL and the characteristics of the local workforce, emerged through a major 
transformation in the political forms of realisation of the Korean process of capitalist 
development. Unlike in the light industries, the development of world-markets-oriented 
HCIs required not only protection during their implantation and maturation stages, but 
also, and crucially, the concentration of capital on relatively large scales, notably for the 
size of the local economy. The rapid creation and development of individual capitals in 
these sectors thus required more extensive forms of state intervention than hitherto. To 
develop some sectors, the state centralised capital under its ownership. In other cases, 
the state forced the centralisation of privately-owned capitals, thus avoiding 
‗unnecessary‘ competition. In all cases, state-run banks supplied individual firms with 
subsidised capital in the quantities (i.e. degree of concentration) necessary for 
competition in world markets through the introduction of vanguard technologies. Led 
by the strong expansion of HCI production and exports, Korean economic growth 
remained strong during the ‗big push‘ of the 1970s.52 
These transformations in public policy orientation came about through the 
further concentration of political power in the executive branch of government, and the 
formation of an authoritarian, ‗developmental‘ state. A new Constitution and several ad-
hoc laws were then sanctioned, giving dictatorial powers to the President, crucially to 
decide economic policy and to control any form of labour unrest.
53
 Moreover, a state-
orchestrated campaign of mass indoctrination and disciplining was launched to 
complement the massively attended programmes of technical education in reproducing 
an industrial workforce with the productive characteristics required to work as an 
appendage of the machine or in large-scale assembly operations.
54
 
 
The Neo-liberal stage of EOI (since 1980) 
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The 1979-82 increase in international interest rates and concomitant global 
economy recession affected the Korean economy as much as the Brazilian. However, in 
contrast to the Brazilian experience, the strong expansion of high value-added industrial 
exports, resulting from large increases in labour productivity, allowed the Korean 
economy to grow robustly during most of 1980s while reducing sharply its large 
external debts. 
 As occurred in many other developing countries, the early 1980s global 
economy recession triggered in Korea a process of financial and trade liberalisation.
55
 
This process, however, did not express, as in Brazil, the unsustainability of a highly 
diversified, domestic-markets-oriented industrial sector. On the contrary, liberalising 
reforms in Korea resulted largely from the ‗maturation‘ of its industrial sector, which no 
longer required extended market protection and state support for its normal valorisation. 
As in most reform processes, the international-cum-local crisis precipitated and 
accelerated these ‗free-market‘ reforms. The fact that many of them were deepened 
rather reversed when the context improved shows, however, that their necessity for the 
process of capital accumulation transcended the immediateness of the crisis that 
triggered them. Nevertheless, ‗nascent‘ industrial branches (e.g. electronics and motor-
vehicles) remained strongly supported
56
 while developing the capacity to compete in 
world markets under the same specific base as the HCIs, namely, the use of a relatively 
cheap and highly disciplined labour-force.
57
 Effectively, like the HCIs before, the 
emergence of durable-consumer good production for world markets resulted from the 
further increase in the cost of the Japanese labour-force, contemporary advances in the 
automation and computerisation of large-scale manufacturing associated with the 
‗microelectronics revolution‘ as well as the previous improvements in the quality of the 
local workforce. 
Neoliberal reforms in Korea also contrasted with the contemporary experiences 
in the industrially advanced countries where they mainly realised the acceleration of the 
process of differentiation in the conditions of reproduction of the industrial labour-force 
within these societies. During most of the 1980s, wage differentials among industrial 
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workers declined, albeit from highly unequal bases.
58
 Manual worker wages increased 
strongly across-the-board as the industrial base ‗deepened‘ and with it the demand for 
more skilled labour-power which could no longer reproduce normally with payment 
conditions corresponding to its peasant origin (i.e. with wages which were sufficient to 
reproduce a surplus peasant population at subsistence levels but well below the cost of 
reproducing a semiskilled industrial workforce). This process of wage realignments 
came about through the end of open political repression, the restoration of democratic 
institutions and the subsequent sharp increase in working-class activism. Labour‘s 
involvement in party politics, however, has remained limited thereafter.
59
  
 During the 1990s, the Korean economy continued its growth process and its 
‗upgrading‘ path to high-technology industries as a form of realising the global unity of 
the process of capitalist development through the NIDL. As had been the case during its 
earlier industrial development, the emergence of these sectors resulted not only from 
previous improvements in the quality of the local labour-force, as often claimed, but 
also, and crucially, from its low cost (relative to established producers) and high 
productivity, partly ensuing from the further automation of production processes and the 
consequent simplification, standardisation and routinisation of factory work.
60
 
Moreover, new developments then further reduced the overall degree of state 
intervention in the Korean economy. Not only the maturation of most industrial sectors 
and the existence of highly concentrated private capital meant that both the average 
level of protection and of state‘s direct involvement in industrial production could be 
reduced further. Capital account liberalisation became also necessary to capture a 
portion of the expanding global credit supply; vital to fund the rapid growth of Korean 
industrial firms in light of the emerging competition in world markets posed by firms 
located in countries with large supplies of cheaper and, arguably, equally disciplined 
labour-power (e.g. China and Southeast Asia). Indeed, when these resources contracted 
sharply in 1997-98, as international credit markets tightened, the Korean economy 
entered into its most severe crisis since the end of the 1950-53 Civil War. Yet, by 1999 
the economy was already in the path of a new export-led recovery. The bases for this 
growth, however, have been weaker than ever before. Unlike the previous periods, the 
post-crisis expansion of industrial exports has been sustained with a strongly 
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undervalued currency and increasing, rather than decreasing, labour market 
precariousness.
61
 
 
1.3) Summary and conclusions 
 
 The introductory chapter argued that in order to grasp fully the Brazilian and 
Korean developmental and growth experiences, it is first necessary to account for the 
dynamics of global capitalism and the resultant transformations in the international 
division of labour. These, together with local factors that particularly affect the 
conditions for the valorisation of capital in different branches of production, explain the 
specific characteristics of capitalism in each country. The chapter has also argued that, 
in capitalism, nation-state policies and institutions mediate the integration of the global 
economy through the specific determination of national processes of capitalist 
development. 
 With these main claims in mind, the present chapter reviewed the main 
economic, political and ideological features of the processes of capitalist development 
in Brazil and Korea between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s, and proposed four main 
arguments. First, the chapter proposed that the process of capital accumulation in Brazil 
has revolved, throughout the entire period, around the appropriation of a portion of the 
land rent available in the economy. Secondly, the chapter claimed that while, before the 
mid-1960s, capital accumulated in Korea under the same specific base as in Brazil 
(though the land rent was complemented there with a portion of small agrarian capital 
profits and foreign aid), afterwards its accumulation began to revolve around the 
production of specific industrial goods for world markets using the relatively cheap and 
disciplined labour-force available in the country. Thirdly, the chapter argued that these 
distinctive specific characteristics explain their different patterns of development and 
integration into the global economy since the mid-1960s and their divergent post-1980 
growth records, as well as their distinct political and economic institutions. Finally, the 
chapter suggested that both specific forms of capital accumulation have, through their 
transformations, realised the global unity of the process of capitalist development 
through the evolving IDL. 
                                                 
61
 See Aizenman and Glick (2008) on exchange rate policy. See Chang and Chae (2004) on labour market 
developments. 
 62 
 The next three chapters will provide analytical and empirical evidence 
substantiating and supporting the main arguments schematically advanced in this 
chapter. In light of the findings presented in the first part, the second part of the thesis 
will put forward an analysis of the historical development of social and political 
processes in Korea and Brazil, and their role in shaping the evolution of economic, 
welfare and labour policies and political/state institutions. This historical analysis will 
develop in detail the main lines presented in this chapter and will show the intrinsic 
unity of these processes, revealing specific transformations in both countries as part of 
the realisation of the globally integrated process of capitalist development. 
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Appendix A1 
 
 
Source: Table C.20 in Appendix C.  
 
  
Source: Tables C.3 and C.36 in Appendix C; IMF International Financial Statistics for 
Fed Funds rate  
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Chapter 2 
Measuring land rent and intersectoral income transfers in Brazil and 
Korea 
 
The present chapter focuses on the measurement of the magnitude of the 
resources transferred from the primary sector, notably land rent, to the rest of the 
economy, the industrial sector in particular, and of their relevance (i.e. relative 
importance) in supporting the processes of capital valorisation and accumulation in both 
countries throughout the period studied. This quantitative analysis will provide support 
for two of the claims made in the previous chapter. First, that the processes of 
valorisation of industrial capital in Brazil during the entire period and in Korea before 
the late 1960s were heavily reliant on the appropriation of a portion of primary sector 
surpluses. Secondly, that as the Korean economy undertook its structural transformation 
throughout the second part of the 1960s, the transfer of resources reversed and the 
primary sector became a net recipient of income from the rest of the economy. The 
chapter also presents the methodology to measure the absolute magnitude of land rent in 
each country. The chapter closes with a comparison of the magnitude of primary sector 
surpluses appropriated outside this branch of the economy with that of the other main 
source of extraordinary social wealth available to support the process of capital 
accumulation, namely, the inflow of foreign financial resources in the form of aid and 
credit. For these purposes, the methodology developed by Iñigo Carrera (2007) based 
on the Argentinian experience will be adapted for the Brazilian and Korean cases. 
 
2.1) Intersectoral transfer of resources in the Brazilian and Korean economies 
  
 Appraising the magnitude of primary sector surpluses involves the measurement 
of several variables. First, it involves the measurement of the magnitude of the primary, 
notably agrarian, sector surpluses transferred to other branches of the economy. This is 
done in section one, following the effect of each of the specific economic policies under 
which that transfer has come about in each country. Secondly, it involves the 
measurement of the magnitude of capital, both fixed and circulating, yearly advanced 
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for valorisation economy-wide, and in the industrial and agrarian sectors.
1
 Thirdly, it 
involves the measurement of the magnitude of net surpluses (i.e. profits or surplus- 
value) accruing to total capital of society (i.e. social capital) and to its industrial and 
agrarian portions. These, done in sections two and three, respectively, will make 
possible the measurement of annual rates of profits of social, industrial and agrarian 
capitals, and an assessment of the relevance of the transferred land rent in sustaining 
their respective processes of valorisation, pursued in sections four and five. 
Furthermore, these variables are also necessary to measure the portion of land rent 
appropriated by landowners and thus the total magnitude of land rents in both countries.  
 
2.1.1) Measuring the portion of primary sector surpluses (land rent and small agrarian 
capital profits) appropriated by social actors other than landowners and small capitalists 
 
 The transfer of income from the primary sector and its appropriation by 
industrial capital in Brazil and Korea during the period under study came about through 
the implementation of specific economic policies. It was seen in the previous chapter 
that the overvaluation of the national currency and the taxation of commodity exports 
have been the main forms of transfer of resources out of the primary sector in Brazil. In 
Korea, the former policy, combined with state control over the domestic trade of rice, 
barley and fertilizers were the main methods of ‗taxation‘ of the existing agrarian 
surpluses before 1970 and of the subsidisation of the sector thereafter. 
 Several attempts have been made to measure the magnitude of the resources 
transferred from the agrarian sector to the rest of the society in Brazil and Korea. One of 
the most widely consulted is a cross-country study coordinated by the Schiff and Valdes 
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 The computation presented in this chapter will strictu sensu measure the agrarian land rents in Brazil 
and Korea, both the portion appropriated by landowners and by others, and will add to that the portion of 
the mining land rent materialised in exported goods, in both countries, and in the local consumption of 
iron ore, in Brazil. This is so for various reasons. First, the estimation of the stock of capital invested in 
mining production in these countries, which is required to measure the land rent appropriated by 
landowners, is beyond the scope and possibilities of this thesis. Secondly, mining productions were in 
both countries largely under state control during most of the period under study. It is highly probable that 
the land rent appropriated by the landowning state was not significant during these periods, as it was 
transferred to capital through low output prices, overstaffing and highly-priced purchases of inputs. 
Thirdly, for the purpose of the analysis pursued in this thesis, the most relevant part of the land rent is that 
appropriated by other economic actors than landowners. Fourthly, not including the mining land rent 
materialised in exported goods and, in Brazil, domestically-consumed iron ore would have 
underestimated the computation, in Korea before the mid-1960s and in Brazil after the mid-1970s. 
Fifthly, the land rent materialised in domestically-consumed mining goods in Korea is not included in the 
measurement because almost all mining production was exported there during the relevant period (i.e. 
1955-64).      
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(1991) for the World Bank, ‗The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy‘. 
This major project covered the experiences of several countries in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America during 1960-84, including the two countries under study. The 
methodology used in these studies is not radically different from the one pursued here. 
Effectively, in the cases of Korea and Brazil, the World Bank study analyses the effect 
of each individual policy on the flow of income from and to the agrarian sector. Two 
key methodological differences prevail, however, between these studies and the present 
thesis. First, and crucially, there is the question of the correct identification of the object 
to be measured. As said, the World Bank study proceeds by measuring every single 
flow of resources in and out of the agrarian sector in order to obtain the net movement. 
In so doing, it misses the main point at stake, namely, the measurement of the 
movement of one specific type of social wealth (i.e. income), land rent. In effect, the 
issue is not about measuring every type of intersectoral income transfer but the effect of 
state policies on the appropriation of the extraordinary profits earned in the primary 
sector due to the monopoly of an irreproducible means of production, land. Thus the 
World Bank study includes in the equation every kind of tax, explicitly or implicitly, 
paid and subsidy received by the primary sector, yet ignores the fact that the tax system 
mediates the equalisation of the rate of profit among different portions of social capital 
and thus the unity of the national processes of capital accumulation. In a nutshell, the 
goal is to identify those taxes that fall on specific portions of social capital and to 
analyse whether or not they affect their normal valorisation - i.e. whether they fall on 
normal or supernormal profits. Secondly, the World Bank study also presents problems 
related to specific instruments of measurement. Among the most important, the 
following can be identified. In the Brazilian case, the Bank study grossly underestimates 
the overvaluation of the national currency throughout the period 1960-1980 and, thus, 
the magnitude of primary sector wealth appropriated in other sectors of the economy. In 
order to measure the degree of overvaluation of national currencies, the World Bank 
uses the so-called ‗free-trade equilibrium exchange rate‘. The problem with this practice 
is that it suffers from a problem of circularity. Indeed, the ‗free-trade‘ equilibrium 
exchange rate is calculated as the exchange rate that would balance the trade account of 
the balance-of-payments if no distortions had been imposed on external trade. In other 
words, it attempts to measure the overvaluation of the currency using variables, such as 
the supply and demand for foreign currency and their respective elasticities, whose 
magnitudes are determined by the degree of overvaluation itself. Moreover, in the 
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Bank‘s study, the effects of export taxes and the overvaluation of the currency on 
domestic prices are not taken into account. Neither is it effect of the high prices of 
agrarian machinery in Brazil. For these reasons, the thesis attempts a new measurement 
of the magnitude of land rent taxed out of the primary sector and appropriated by the 
rest of society (i.e. capital) in Brazil and Korea between the mid-1950s and the mid-
2000s. 
 As mentioned before, the measurement of the amount of resources (i.e. income) 
transferred from the primary sector to other parts of the economy is done through the 
measurement of the magnitude transferred through each of the individual economic 
policies that have made this process effective.  
 
2.1.1.1) Primary sector surpluses appropriated through the overvaluation of the currency 
 
The overvaluation of the exchange rate has been a central state policy effecting 
the appropriation of land rent by industrial capital. Through this mechanism, exporters 
are forced to sell the foreign exchange earned in global markets below its value, thus 
losing a fraction of export price. For this policy to be sustainable in the long-run, the 
price of exported goods must contain a surplus profit, land rent in the case of primary 
commodities. In effect, when a national currency is overvalued, exports of goods that do 
not bear land rent can only be sustained, beyond the short run, through the provision of 
subsides that compensate for this. In the absence of such subsidies, as in the case of 
commodity exports in Brazil throughout the period studied and in Korea before the mid-
1960s, the overvaluation of the exchange rate currency acts as a ‗tax‘ on exported 
commodities that falls on the land rent. Competitive pressures pass this ‗discount‘ from 
exporters to agrarian capitalists and from these onto landowners.  
A large portion of that value ‗retained‘ in this way in the foreign exchange 
market is directly appropriated by industrial capital when purchasing foreign exchange 
to import machinery and inputs or, in the case of foreign investors, to repatriate profits. 
This lowers industrial capital‘s production costs in general and multiplies foreign-
invested capital‘s profits in particular, respectively. Moreover, the overvaluation of the 
currency also reduces domestic commodity prices, either because commodities are 
exported, and competition lowers their local prices, or because they can usually be 
imported with an overvalued exchange rate without paying compensatory tariffs. This 
not only grants industrial capital the possibility to purchase raw materials below their 
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international prices, but also reduces the local cost of several wage-goods and thus of 
labour-power. On both sides, it allows industrial capital to appropriate another portion 
of the land rent and thus further reduces its production costs and increases its 
profitability. In order to measure the magnitude of resources transferred out of the 
primary sector through the overvaluation of the currency in Brazil and Korea, it is first 
necessary to ascertain the degree of overvaluation of their currencies.  
A currency is said to be overvalued when its purchasing capacity is greater 
outside the national economy (i.e. in the foreign exchange market) than inside it. The 
measurement of the degree of overvaluation of a national currency consists then on 
measuring these deviations. The first step in the procedure consists of the identification 
of a base year or period when the rate at which a national currency exchanges for 
foreign currencies expresses the same magnitude of value (i.e. purchasing capacity) in 
the foreign and domestic markets, that is, represents the real purchasing power of that 
national currency. The periods 1968-1988 and 1985-1996 were chosen as a base to 
measure the degree of over/undervaluation of the Brazilian and Korean currencies, 
respectively. The analysis of the concrete economic history of these countries indicates 
that during those periods the conditions for the over/undervaluation of these national 
currencies were, on average, absent.
2
 
The second step consist of the construction of a complete ‗theoretical‘ time-
series that would have kept the purchasing power of the national currency constant at 
the level of the base period, as the method of relative purchasing power parity (PPP) 
prescribes.
3
 For that purpose, an index of the evolution of domestic prices relative to 
                                                 
2
 In the case of Brazil, 1968-88 was, as will be seen in Part II, a period when other forms of appropriation 
of land rent (e.g. export taxes) were relatively important, unlike the precedent and subsequent periods, 
and therefore the bases for the overvaluation of the currency were reduced. Furthermore, this period 
includes times of both high (1970s) and low (1980s) international commodity prices and inflows of 
foreign credit, resulting in average conditions. In the case of Korea, the selected period, 1985-95, 
excludes periods when the bases for a strong overvaluation existed (i.e. the continuous inflows of foreign 
credit before 1985) and periods when the bases for an undervaluation (see below) were present (after 
1996). 
3
 The method of absolute PPP used by the World Bank, the Eurostat and the OECD is not suitable to 
measure the degree of overvaluation of a national currency. By comparing the amount of national and 
foreign currency needed to buy the same basket of goods in domestic and world markets and using that 
relationship to estimate the exchange rates of PPP, it misses the point that the prices of the baskets are 
affected themselves by the very same factor that is trying to capture through them, namely, the 
over/undervaluation of the currency. This method, on the contrary, is useful to produce international 
comparison of the real purchasing power of national wages. Black market exchange rates are also 
problematic as a measure of the degree of overvaluation of a national currency. This is particularly the 
case when systems of multiple exchange rates are in use, as in Brazil before the early 1960s and during 
most of the 1980s, or when the currency is pegged to a foreign currency and its commercial parity 
supported by massive foreign exchange reserves, as in Brazil during the 1994-98 Real Plan. See Bacha 
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world market prices and another of the evolution of domestic labour productivity 
relative to world markets levels are used here to construct the PPP exchange rates. The 
first index, frequently used alone for this purpose, is not able to measure accurately the 
evolution of the capacity of a national currency to represent value (i.e. social wealth) 
vis-à-vis other currencies circulating in the world market. The movement of price 
indices expresses the changes of two variables with opposite effects over the evolution 
of the purchasing capacity of a national currency: the relationship between the amount 
of money in circulation and the demand for it, and the development of labour 
productivity. An increase in the former reduces capacity of a national currency to 
represent value and therefore its purchasing capacity in the world market. An increase 
of the latter has the opposite effect. Their movement, however, counterbalances in the 
evolution of prices. 
Consumer prices indexes (CPIs) are used here to reflect the evolution of prices 
of goods and services in the domestic and world markets. CPIs are affected relatively 
less by the effect of the over/undervaluation of national currencies than wholesale price 
indices, which include a larger portion of tradable goods. Ideally, the evolution of the 
productivity of labour processes involved in the production of those goods and services 
included in the basket used to calculate the CPI should be used to calculate relative PPP 
exchange rates. Two different criteria are used here for Brazil and Korea as a proxy. 
The evolution of economy-wide average labour productivity is used for the Korean case 
while the evolution of manual industrial labour productivity is used for Brazil. The 
reasons for this particular treatment in the Brazilian case are the following. First, 
industrial employment is more sensitive to changes in output than economy-wide 
employment. Hence, labour productivity in the industrial sector shows a less volatile 
evolution than economy-wide labour productivity. In a case like the Brazilian, with 
sudden and marked changes in the level of economic activity, the use of economy-wide 
indexes of labour productivity slightly distorts the measurement of the PPP exchange 
rate.
4
 Secondly, by considering only the evolution of manual workers, the methodology 
used here minimises the impact of the recent increase of non-productive office work, 
like administrative, sales and marketing activities. The evolution of the respective 
                                                                                                                                               
and Taylor (1971); Taylor and Taylor (2004); Iñigo Carrera (2007) for a discussion of the merits and 
pitfalls of the different methods used to estimate the ‗equilibrium‘ or parity exchange rates. 
4
 The distortion is largely unimportant throughout most of the post-WWII period. It is the largest during 
1994-98 when the currency appears to be 10% more overvalued when using the economy-wide indices of 
labour productivity than when using industrial labour productivity. 
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indices in the USA, the largest national economy, is used to represent world market 
norms. The evolution of the respective indices in the USA, the largest national 
economy, is used to represent the world markets. The following formula synthesises the 
procedure to compute the exchange rate of PPP. 
  
            [(           )  (                 )]
 [(               )  (         )] 
 
Where, 
PPPi is the PPP exchange rate for the year i. 
CPIi is the CPI in the domestic market in the year i. 
CPIusai is the CPI in the USA in the year i. 
LPi is the labour productivity index in the domestic market in the year i. 
LPusai is the labour productivity index in the USA in the year i. 
  
The third, final step in the procedure of measuring the degree of 
over/undervaluation of a national currency involves the comparison of the PPP 
exchange rate in each year with the relevant nominal exchange rate prevailing in the 
market during that year, using the following formula. 
  
            *100 
 
Where, 
OVi is the degree of overvaluation of the nominal exchange rate in the year i. 
ERi is the nominal commercial exchange rate in the year i. 
 
If the value is greater than one hundred, the nominal exchange rate is said to be 
overvalued and vice-versa. The following two graphs plot the degree of 
over/undervaluation of the Brazilian and Korean national currencies between 1955 and 
2005. These are compared with alternative measures of the degree of overvaluation of 
the currency using purchasing power parity exchange rates presented in Moon and Kang 
(1989), for Korea, and black market rates, for Brazil. 
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Source: Tables C.1,  C.17 and C.28 
Note: NG = compares the evolution of market exchange rates with PPP exchange rates 
(100) calculated in this thesis; NG* = uses total economy labour productivity; Black 
Market = compares the evolution of market exhancge rates with ‗black‘ market values. 
 
 
Source: Tables C.1,  C.17 and C.28 
Note: Exports = compares the evolution of market exchange rates for exports with PPP 
exchange rates (100) calculated in this thesis; Official = compares the evolution of 
official exchange rates with PPP exchange rates (100) calculated in this thesis; WB = 
compares the evolution of official exchange rates for exports with PPP exchange rates 
(100) calculated in World Bank (1991) 
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  Thus the magnitude of primary sector surpluses appropriated out of the primary 
sector through the effect of the overvaluation of the national currency on exports and on 
domestic prices of primary goods is measured using the following formula. 
 
    [   (  
   
    
)]  ∑    (  
   
    
)]
 
 
 
 
  
Where, 
Xi are the primary and semi-processed exports in US$ in the year i. 
Cyi is the domestic consumption of good y valued at the Free on Board (FOB) export 
prices in US$ in the year i. 
 
2.1.1.2) Primary sector surpluses appropriated through export taxes 
 
 Taxes on primary exports retain in the public treasury a portion of the price of 
exported commodities and proportionally reduce, through competition, the domestic 
price of taxed commodities. As in the case of the overvaluation of the currency, the tax 
on exported and locally consumed commodities cannot normally fall on other portion of 
the price than the land rent (and eventually small agrarian capital profits). Both effects 
should be accounted for when measuring the amount of income transferred out of the 
primary sector through this policy. The following formula is used to measure both 
effects. 
 
           ∑      
 
 
 
 
Where, 
ti is the average export tax rate prevailing during the year i. 
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The amount of land rent appropriated in Brazil through ‗contribution quotas‘ 
levied on exports of coffee and cocoa are added independently without computing the 
effect upon the internal consumption of these two commodities.  
 
2.1.1.3) Surpluses appropriated by the state through specific taxes primary sector 
production 
 
 Taxes falling specifically on primary sector profits allow the state to appropriate 
a portion of extraordinary surpluses in the form of land rent. Only the existence of 
surplus profits like land rent allows capital invested in the sector to pay these types of 
taxes and valorise normally. In Brazil, two such fiscal contributions have been levied on 
the mining industry since the late 1980s. First, mining companies have paid a Financial 
Compensation for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources (CFEM), ranging from 2% to 
3% of their net sales. For iron ore, the most important mining commodity extracted in 
Brazil and the only one considered here, the rate has been 2%. Secondly, a 
Landownership Royalty equal to 50% of the CFEM has been paid by mining companies 
that do not own the land where natural resources are located.
5
 The following formula is 
used to measure the land rent appropriated by the state in these forms.  
 
    ∑   
 
 
 
 
Where, 
Tji is the amount of tax j collected on the year i. 
 
2.1.1.4) Primary sector surpluses appropriated through state regulations on commodities 
domestic and international trade and maximum prices 
 
 The imposition of maximum prices or the prohibition to export a portion or the 
whole of national production of a specific commodity artificially expands its domestic 
supply and thus reduces, ceteris paribus, its domestic price vis-à-vis international levels. 
The measurement of the effect of these policies in transferring a portion of income out 
                                                 
5
 See National Department of Mining Production (2011).  
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of the primary sector is done through the comparison of export and import (i.e. Free on 
Board – FOB - and Cost, Insurance and Freight - CIF) prices converted into local 
currency using commercial exchange rates
6
 and their equivalents in the domestic 
markets (i.e. Free Alongside Ship - FAS). Theoretical FAS prices are constructed by 
adding the costs of transport (to port) and administrative expenses (at the port) to the 
farm-gate price received by local producers. Transport and port costs need to be added 
to compare prices of the same level of aggregation. The following formula measures the 
magnitude of resources transferred out of the primary sector through these polices. 
  
    ∑[(                 )]     
 
 
 
 
Where,  
Pfobyi is the FOB price in local currency (at the commercial exchange rate) of the good 
y in the year i; 
Pfasyi is the FAS price in local currency of the goods y in the year i; 
 
2.1.1.5) Primary sector surpluses appropriated through the domestic circulation, above 
their international prices, of non-agrarian means of production used in agrarian 
productions  
 
 The circulation of agrarian inputs, like fertilizers, fuel-oil and machinery, in the 
domestic markets at prices above their international values are a form of transferring 
resources (i.e. land rent) out of the primary sector. This holds both in those situations 
where the state exercises the monopoly over their distribution, such as the case of 
fertilizers in Korea, or when, due to the lack of domestic market protection for its 
output, agrarian capital is unable to pass, like industrial capital, the extra costs onto 
consumers, as was the case of fertilizers, fuel-oil and machinery in Brazil during much 
of the period under study. Conversely, when these goods circulate in the domestic 
markets below their international prices, the primary sector recovers, through their 
                                                 
6
 The PPP exchange rate needs not to be used here as the effect of the overvaluation of the exchange rate 
was already accounted for above. 
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consumption, a portion of its surpluses or, eventually, receives a subsidy from the rest 
of the economy. 
The measurement of the magnitude of these resources is done by comparing the 
domestic price of the input in question with its international price converted into local 
currency using the PPP exchange rate and multiplying the difference between both by 
the amount of domestic consumption of the input. It was computed for tractors of 60-80 
HP, fuel-oil and fertilizers (nitrogen, phosphate and potash) in Brazil and, for a matter 
of relative importance, the latter only in Korea. The following formula measures the 
magnitude of resources transferred out of the primary sector through those polices. 
 
    ∑[(    
 
 
     )      ]      
 
Where, 
DPhi is the domestic price of input h in the year i; 
IPhi is the international price of input h in the year i; 
Qhi is the quantity of input h consumed in the year i. 
 
2.1.1.6) Primary sector surpluses appropriated through state monopoly of commodity 
trade 
 
State monopoly over the international trade of a specific commodity, as was the 
case in Brazil with sugar until 1990, allows the state to appropriate a portion of land rent 
by purchasing domestic productions below international prices. The measurement of the 
magnitude of these resources is done by comparing the domestic price of the 
commodity in question with its international price converted in local currency at the 
going exports exchange rate and multiplying the difference between both by the amount 
of domestic production purchased by the state. 
 
    ∑(    
 
 
     )      
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Where, 
DPyi is the domestic price of good y in the year i; 
IPyi is the international price of good y in the year i; 
Qyi is the quantity of good y consumed in the year i. 
 
2.1.1.7) Primary sector surpluses appropriated out, or recovered by, landowners through 
the provision of rural credit under differential conditions  
 
 The provision of credit for agrarian productions at subsidised rates and 
favourable repayment conditions has been a common practice in Brazil and Korea 
during large parts of the period under study. Nevertheless, this practice only constitutes 
a recovery of a portion, or the whole, of the previously appropriated surpluses if the 
conditions at which agrarian capital gains access to credit are particularly favourable 
vis-à-vis those at which industrial capital does. Only under these circumstances do they 
constitute a source of extraordinary profits for agrarian capital. The competition to 
appropriate these extraordinary profits increases the demand for land and thus its rental 
and sale prices.
7
 They are then transformed into land rent appropriated by landowners. 
If the interest subsidy granted to agrarian capital is of equal magnitude to that granted to 
industrial capital, it would be appropriated by both types of productive capital and 
would not constitute a recovery of a portion of land-rent by landowners; it would simply 
be transformed into a portion of normal profits. This seems to have been the case in 
Korea throughout the period under study and in Brazil during the entire period except 
for the years 1969-1982. 
 Lacking information on the average rate of interest and repayment conditions on 
similar loans granted to industrial capital, the estimation made by Helfand (1994) of the 
magnitude of the subsidy implicit in the provision of rural credit for working-capital 
(RCSwk) and marketing (RCSmk) in Brazil is used here. Industrial capital there had also 
access during that period to heavily subsidised loans for fixed capital investments 
provided by state-owned banks.
8
 The following formula measures the annual amount of 
land rent recovered by landowners through subsidised rural credit. 
 
                                                 
7
 See Rezende (1981). 
8
 See Najberg (1984). 
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2.1.1.8) Primary sector surpluses recovered by landowners through the implementation 
of programmes in support of domestic commodity prices 
 
State programmes implemented to purchase primary goods at above market 
prices allow landowners to recover a portion of land rent. For most commodities 
analysed in this thesis, resources recovered in this way were measured above when 
comparing FOB and FAS prices. The case of coffee in Brazil was not included in that 
analysis.  
During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Brazilian state implemented a number 
of programmes in support of coffee growers. The most important was the purchase of 
surplus productions in order to stop the price of coffee from falling. When the output 
bought was destroyed or when purchases were done at prices above those at which the 
product was later sold, these interventions resulted in a subsidy to agrarian capital. This 
subsidy constituted an extraordinary profit for the latter which competition transformed 
into land rent. This policy thus resulted in the recovery of a portion of land rent by 
landowners. The annual magnitude of land rent recovered in this way is equal to the net 
result of the operations of the Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC). This is calculated by 
subtracting the value of purchases and administrative expenses from the value of coffee 
sales by the IBC as shown in the following formula. 
 
                 
 
Where, 
IBCyi is the income from coffee sales in the year i; 
IBCei are the expenditures of the IBC in the year i. 
 
2.1.1.9) Total magnitude of primary sector surpluses appropriated by economic actors 
others than landowners in Brazil and Korea during 1955-2005 
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The total magnitude of primary sector surpluses appropriated in other parts of 
the economy is measured with the following formula which adds up resources 
appropriated through the different policies reviewed above.
9
 
 
                                   (    ) 
 
Graphs 2.3 and 2.4 below plot the annual magnitude of primary sector surpluses 
(largely land rent) appropriated by other economic actors than landowners, or recovered 
by the latter, in Brazil and Korea between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s through 
each of the state policies analysed above. 
 
 
Source: Table C.18 
   
                                                 
9
 The last term of the equation is in parenthesis because it only applies to the Brazilian case.  
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Source: Table C.19 
 
 
It can be observed in graph 2.3 above that the existence of large intersectoral 
income transfers is a constant feature of the Brazilian economy throughout most of the 
period under study. In terms of resources transferred, the overvaluation of the exchange 
rate was the main form of land rent appropriation by others than landowners, though 
export taxes were also important during 1967-1993. Moreover, it can also be seen in the 
graph that the magnitude of land rent appropriated by others than landowners grew 
strongly during the three ‗commodities booms‘ of the post-WWII period (i.e. 1950-54, 
1973-74, 2006-07) and fell markedly during periods of relatively low commodity prices 
(i.e. 1960s, 1980s). 
Graph 2.4 shows that the Korean experience differed from the Brazilian. In 
Korea, the transfer of resources out of the primary sector ended around 1970, when the 
transformation on the specificity of the local process of capital accumulation was under 
way and the agrarian sector became a net recipient of resources from the rest of the 
economy. It can also be observed in graph 2.4 that, as in Brazil, the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate was the most important form of appropriation of primary sector surpluses 
by economic agents in other branches of the economy during the pre-1970 period. In 
general terms, state-set minimum prices partly compensated for the negative impact of 
exchange rate overvaluation on agrarian sector income. 
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2.2) Capital yearly advanced for valorisation in the economy and in the industrial 
and agrarian sectors 
 
 The estimation of capital‘s rate of profit is not only needed to analyse the course 
of process of accumulation in general but also to measure the portion of land rent 
appropriated by landowners. The latter is computed as a residual after deducting 
agrarian capital profits from the net surplus-value available for appropriation in the 
primary sector.
10
 In order to compute capital‘s rate of profit, it is first necessary to 
measure the amount of capital advanced for valorisation (K). This magnitude will then 
be compared with the mass of surplus-value appropriated by capital. Regardless the 
sector of investment, the latter is composed of two parts: fixed (FK) and circulating 
(‗working‘) portions (CK). From the point of view of macroeconomic accounting, FK 
includes all means of production with a turnover period greater than one year –i.e. those 
whose use value is consumed through more than one year. This includes buildings, 
machinery, equipment, and transport material. The circulating portion of capital 
includes all means of production with a turnover period shorter than one year, such as 
raw and auxiliary materials, and labour-power. Turnover period refers here to the time 
that takes a specific portion of capital to fully return to the money-form in which was 
originally advanced.
11
 The following formula synthetises the composition of capital 
according to the turn-over period of its different material elements: 
 
           
 
 The magnitude of fixed capital yearly advanced for valorisation is equal to the 
addition of the value of the different instruments of production (fk), as defined in the 
following formula. 
 
    ∑    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 As explained above, the land rent appropriated by mining landowners will not be measured here. 
11
 See Marx (1992: 236-61) for the analysis of the process of turn-over of industrial capital. 
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 The magnitude of circulating capital advanced for valorisation every year is 
equal to the addition of the mass of capital in the form of direct wages and other indirect 
forms of compensation of the labour-force (W), raw and auxiliary materials (M) divided 
by the number of times (v) their value turns, on average, over during one year.  
 
    (     )     
 
 The next two graphs plot the evolution of the amount of capital advanced for 
valorisation in different sectors of the Brazilian and Korean economies. 
 
  
Source: Tables C.2 and C.7.  
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Source: Tables C.2 and C.8.  
 
 Several comments can be made from comparison of graphs 2.5 and 2.6. First, it 
can be seen that the amount of capital advanced for valorisation in the industrial sector 
in Brazil grew strongly until around 1980, crucially during the ‗big push‘ of the 1970s, 
and stagnated thereafter. Secondly, a relatively similar trend is observed in the agrarian 
sector. Thirdly, though the break is not that clear-cut, the process of accumulation of 
capital economy-wide in Brazil also slowed since the early 1980s. Fourthly, an opposite 
trend can be observed in Korea. There, the rate of growth of the amount of capital 
advanced for valorisation accelerated in most branches of the economy after the early 
1980s. 
 
2.3) Valorisation of social, industrial and agrarian capitals  
 
 In order to measure the rate of profit, the mass of surplus-value (i.e. surpluses) 
appropriated by capital needs to be compared with the capital advanced to obtain them. 
The mass of surpluses appropriated by capital in each branch of production is equal to 
the value added in that sector minus the consumption of fixed capital and the cost of 
labour-power (i.e. total wages plus total employer contributions) used in the production 
process.
12
 
  
                                                 
12
 This is irrespective of how these profits are divided according to capital‘s ownership. 
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Where, 
∏yi are total surplus-value appropriated in the sector y the year i; 
VAyi is the value added in the sector y the year i; 
CFKyi is the fixed capital consumed in the sector y the year i; 
Wyi is the cost of labour-power in the sector y the year i; 
 
 Accordingly, surpluses yearly appropriated by social capital are equal to the total 
value added in the economy minus the total consumption of fixed capital and the cost of 
labour-power. Alternative, total surpluses can be divided into those appropriated in the 
rural (R∏) and urban (U∏) sectors. Thus the former is equal to the addition of the latter 
two. 
 
           
 
Graphs 2.7 and 2.8 below plot the evolution of the mass of surpluses 
appropriated by capital in the different sectors of the Brazilian and Korean economies, 
respectively. 
 
  
Source: Tables C.10, C.11 and C.12 
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Source: Tables C.13, C.14 and C.15 
 
From the observation of graph 2.7, it can be gathered that surpluses (i.e. surplus-
value) appropriated in Brazil economy-wide, as well as in the industrial and agrarian 
sectors, grew strongly until the late 1970s; stagnated during much of the 1980s; 
collapsed during the latter part of the 1980s and the early 1990; and recovered strongly 
thereafter. The mass of surplus-value appropriated in the industrial sector, however, did 
not return to pre-mid-1980s levels.  
A different trend is observed in Korea. As graph 2.8 above show, surpluses 
appropriated economy-wide, as well as in the industrial and agrarian sectors, grew 
significantly until the late 1970s; fell during the global 1979-82 recession; and 
recovered strongly during much of the 1980s. It can also be seen in the graph that, 
during much of the 1990s, and crucially the first part of the 2000s, the magnitude of 
surplus-value appropriated by industrial capital continued growing while the amount of 
surpluses appropriated by capital in the rest of the economy contracted. As capital 
advanced to obtain them kept growing (see graph 2.6 above), this might indicate that, 
since the 1990s, the profitability of industrial capital began to be supported at the 
expense of other portions of total social capital (e.g. commercial and service capital).  
    
2.4) Rate of valorisation or rate of profit of social, industrial and agrarian capital 
 
 The rate of profit, that is the rate of valorisation of capital, is obtained by 
dividing the sum of surpluses (i.e. profits) annually appropriated in the economy, or a 
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specific branch, by the total amount of capital (i.e. fixed plus circulating) advanced to 
obtain them. Thus the formulas to measure sectoral and economy-wide rates of profit 
are the following.   
 
            
         
 
Where, 
gyi is the average rate of profit in the sector y the year i; 
Gyi is the rate of valorisation of social capital in the year i. 
 
 Table 2.1 below presents the evolution of the pre-tax annual rates of profits of 
social, industrial and agrarian capitals in Brazil and Korea. In graph 2.9, rates of profit 
of industrial capital in these countries are compared with the rate of profit of industrial 
in the USA. It should be noticed that, as land rent is included in agrarian profits (i.e. net 
surpluses), the rate of profit of agrarian and social capital appears artificially increased 
in the first approximation.  
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Table 2.1       
Profit Rates      
       
 Brazil  Korea  
 Social Industrial Agrarian Social Industrial Agrarian 
1955 35.4 19.0 38.5  23.8  
1956 32.7 18.2 34.9 23.9 25.3 13.6 
1957 32.7 17.1 35.2 24.6 20.1 14.6 
1958 31.7 19.9 32.9 21.6 20.0 5.0 
1959 34.5 24.5 28.4 19.4 22.8 -8.7 
1960 34.0 24.2 30.5 24.7 24.3 1.9 
1961 31.1 27.3 29.5 26.5 26.6 11.4 
1962 28.9 21.5 29.2 26.8 30.3 9.8 
1963 25.8 17.1 26.2 31.6 36.4 29.2 
1964 27.3 16.9 24.1 37.8 44.9 47.1 
1965 29.4 15.4 26.4 31.4 42.6 30.8 
1966 31.1 14.3 25.1 36.7 41.2 30.4 
1967 28.5 11.5 26.0 36.4 30.7 25.9 
1968 29.5 14.6 25.3 36.1 25.2 29.3 
1969 29.6 14.4 26.2 35.7 22.6 35.6 
1970 33.9 17.6 28.2 33.6 19.5 34.6 
1971 34.1 19.1 29.8 31.2 16.2 34.1 
1972 36.4 19.9 31.2 37.4 23.6 38.2 
1973 39.4 26.1 32.6 40.5 26.8 44.0 
1974 37.2 25.5 31.5 45.3 22.7 61.5 
1975 31.5 25.6 34.0 44.7 22.9 67.5 
1976 37.1 23.5 37.6 46.2 23.1 67.2 
1977 34.1 18.9 42.8 46.2 20.8 67.7 
1978 29.6 16.9 33.8 46.3 18.7 64.0 
1979 27.0 15.2 27.9 35.7 14.4 55.7 
1980 26.9 18.5 28.5 23.8 9.3 32.2 
1981 19.5 13.8 28.9 22.3 10.4 40.0 
1982 18.1 14.6 26.8 23.3 10.6 39.3 
1983 17.3 13.4 28.9 25.1 12.5 27.0 
1984 18.7 15.3 30.9 25.0 15.0 29.9 
1985 17.4 14.8 31.9 24.7 15.7 36.8 
1986 16.2 11.8 30.0 24.9 16.5 38.3 
1987 16.4 11.8 24.7 26.7 17.1 42.1 
1988 12.5 9.5 24.8 25.7 15.1 44.5 
1989 8.9 7.0 20.4 25.8 12.9 37.4 
1990 13.3 5.4 16.8 28.5 11.2 35.1 
1991 15.6 7.3 18.5 27.4 10.9 31.6 
1992 12.8 7.9 16.3 23.9 9.2 32.3 
1993 13.1 11.5 16.1 22.5 10.1 26.1 
1994 13.7 10.3 25.1 22.3 11.9 30.6 
1995 19.0 5.5 22.3 19.3 11.1 34.4 
1996 21.6 5.1 24.4 16.5 8.9 34.5 
1997 22.7 6.3 24.4 16.3 9.9 34.8 
1998 22.5 5.6 24.3 12.3 9.2 28.5 
1999 23.8 7.5 23.0 13.0 10.4 32.1 
2000 21.9 8.9 22.3 12.4 11.5 27.3 
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Table 2.1       
Profit Rates      
       
  Brazil  Korea  
  Social Industrial Agrarian Social Industrial Agrarian 
2001 20.7 10.1 23.2 11.6 9.8 25.0 
2002 20.0 12.0 24.8 11.5 10.1 27.0 
2003 20.7 16.5 26.1 10.7 10.0 10.0 
2004 21.0 18.0 24.3 8.8 12.2 12.0 
2005 21.0 15.6 21.5 6.8 10.7 6.9 
Average 25.1 15.1 27.4 26.6 18.6 32.1 
 
Source: Tables C.10, C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14 and C.15 
 
 
Source: Table 2.1 
 
Several observations can be made from the table and graph above. First, it can 
be seen there that the profitability of industrial capital in Brazil peaked during the 1956-
60 Targets Plan, the ‗miraculous‘ years of 1968-1973 and the early phase of the NDP II 
(1974-1976); fell from high levels during the slow-growth period of the early 1960s and 
during the latter part of the 1970s; remained around the long-term average of 15% 
during the first part of the 1980s; collapsed during the latter part of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s when the trade liberalisation programme began to be implemented; 
remained low and stable during most of the 1990s; and recovered strongly after 2002. 
Secondly, from table 2.1, it can be gathered that, due to the large magnitude of land 
rent, the rate of profit of social capital in Brazil, let alone that of agrarian capital, has 
been consistently above that of industrial capital. Thirdly, it can also be seen that the 
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profitability of industrial capital in Korean boomed during the first part of the 1960s and 
after the ‗transition‘ of the second half of the decade its evolution became closely tied to 
that of industrial capital in the USA, its most important market for much of the period. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of the rate of profit of industrial capital in Korea departed 
from that in the USA during the crisis of 1979-82, when the latter increased, and 
crucially during the 1990s when, despite growth returned to Korea, industrial capital 
profitability remained weak for historical standards. In effect, after peaking in 1987, the 
rate of profit of industrial capital in Korea fell significantly and remained relatively low 
thereafter as industrial wages entered a period of strong growth. Finally, it can also be 
observed in table 2.1 that up to the late 1960s agrarian capital‘s rate of profit in Korea 
was consistently lower than the rate of profit of industrial capital which means that not 
only small capitalists/landowners were unable to appropriate land rent but also that they 
were incapable of valorising their capital at the ‗normal‘ rate of profit. The reverse is 
true thereafter, as the agrarian sector became a net receptor of social wealth generated in 
other branches of the economy.  
 
2.5) Participation of primary sector surpluses appropriated by others than 
landowners in social and industrial capital profits 
 
 The share of appropriated primary sector surpluses, largely agrarian land rent, in 
social capital profits – i.e. their participation in supporting capital‘s profitability - is 
calculated dividing the former by the latter. In order to calculate the mass of primary 
surpluses appropriated by industrial capital in particular, the total mass of primary 
surpluses appropriated by others than landowners is proportionally divided among the 
different aliquot parts of total social capital. Thus the respective formulas are given by 
the following equations. 
 
              
           (      ) 
           
 
Where,  
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syi are primary sector surpluses appropriated in sector y during year i as a portion of 
profits appropriated by capital in sector y; 
Si are total primary sector surpluses appropriated by others than landowners during year 
i as a portion of total surplus-value appropriated economy-wide; 
ALRi is the total mass of primary sector surpluses appropriated by social actors other 
than landowners;  
ALRyi is the mass primary sector surpluses appropriated in the sector y during year i;  
Kyi is capital advanced for valorisation in sector y during year i; 
Ki is total capital advanced for valorisation in the economy during year i. 
 
 Table 2.2 below presents the share of land rent appropriated by others than 
landowners in total surplus-value economy-wide and in the industrial sector. The table 
also shows the participation of industrial capital in total social capital. 
 
Table 2.2       
Land rent appropriated by capital as a portion of profits  
       
 Total profits IK / TK  Industrial profits 
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea 
1953 0.65      
1954 0.46      
1955 0.42  0.25  0.79  
1956 0.39 0.38 0.26 0.10 0.70 0.36 
1957 0.35 0.40 0.26 0.10 0.67 0.49 
1958 0.17 0.48 0.26 0.12 0.27 0.52 
1959 0.13 0.49 0.27 0.13 0.18 0.42 
1960 0.10 0.29 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.30 
1961 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.11 
1962 0.07 0.25 0.29 0.14 0.09 0.22 
1963 0.16 0.07 0.30 0.14 0.24 0.06 
1964 0.13 0.06 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.05 
1965 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.16 0.37 0.12 
1966 0.22 0.14 0.30 0.18 0.48 0.13 
1967 0.26 0.19 0.31 0.19 0.65 0.22 
1968 0.18 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.37 0.16 
1969 0.14 0.08 0.31 0.21 0.28 0.13 
1970 0.10 0.08 0.32 0.21 0.20 0.13 
1971 0.08 -0.01 0.32 0.22 0.14 -0.01 
1972 0.08 -0.03 0.34 0.23 0.14 -0.04 
1973 0.16 0.03 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.05 
1974 0.23 0.07 0.37 0.27 0.34 0.13 
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Table 2.2       
Land rent appropriated by capital as a portion of profits  
       
 Total profits IK / TK  Industrial profits 
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea 
1975 0.18 0.00 0.37 0.27 0.22 0.01 
1976 0.10 -0.01 0.39 0.28 0.16 -0.01 
1977 0.10 -0.03 0.40 0.30 0.18 -0.07 
1978 0.09 -0.02 0.41 0.32 0.15 -0.05 
1979 0.05 -0.03 0.42 0.33 0.09 -0.08 
1980 0.04 -0.01 0.42 0.33 0.05 -0.03 
1981 0.05 -0.02 0.39 0.32 0.08 -0.04 
1982 0.02 -0.03 0.37 0.32 0.02 -0.06 
1983 0.00 -0.03 0.38 0.32 0.00 -0.05 
1984 -0.02 -0.03 0.37 0.31 -0.03 -0.04 
1985 -0.05 -0.03 0.39 0.30 -0.06 -0.05 
1986 -0.05 -0.04 0.39 0.31 -0.07 -0.05 
1987 0.00 -0.03 0.39 0.32 0.00 -0.04 
1988 0.03 -0.03 0.37 0.34 0.04 -0.05 
1989 0.12 -0.02 0.35 0.35 0.15 -0.04 
1990 0.09 -0.02 0.34 0.37 0.23 -0.06 
1991 0.05 -0.02 0.32 0.38 0.11 -0.05 
1992 0.05 -0.02 0.31 0.38 0.09 -0.05 
1993 0.05 -0.02 0.30 0.37 0.06 -0.04 
1994 0.10 -0.02 0.28 0.35 0.13 -0.03 
1995 0.11 -0.02 0.27 0.34 0.37 -0.03 
1996 0.08 -0.02 0.27 0.34 0.34 -0.04 
1997 0.06 -0.02 0.27 0.33 0.23 -0.04 
1998 0.05 -0.03 0.27 0.34 0.21 -0.04 
1999 0.01 -0.03 0.26 0.35 0.02 -0.03 
2000 0.01 -0.03 0.23 0.34 0.02 -0.03 
2001 -0.01 -0.03 0.21 0.32 -0.02 -0.03 
2002 -0.02 -0.02 0.19 0.30 -0.04 -0.02 
2003 -0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.29 -0.02 -0.02 
2004 0.00 -0.02 0.18 0.28 0.01 -0.02 
2005 0.05 -0.02 0.18 0.29 0.06 -0.01 
 
Source: Tables C.11, C.12, C.14, C.15, C.18 and C.19. 
Note: IK = Industrial capital; TK = Total capital 
 
Three main observations can put forward from the analysis of table 2.2. First, it 
can be seen that primary sector surpluses appropriated by social and industrial capital in 
Brazil were substantial, averaging 13% and 21% of their respective profits between 
1955 and 2005, 23% and 35% during 1955-1980 and 4% and 6.5% during 1981-2005. 
Yet, despite the post-1980 decline, the portion of land rent appropriated by sectors other 
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than landowners was equal to approximately 4.2% and 6% of GDP in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. Secondly, that between 1956 and 1970, the mass of primary sector 
surpluses (i.e. a portion of land rent and small capital profits) appropriated by others 
than landowners in Korea contributed to 23% and 29% of social and industrial capital 
profits, respectively, while they averaged 24% and 38%, respectively, in Brazil the same 
period. Thirdly, that since 1970 that trend reversed and the agrarian sector became net 
receptor of resources from the rest of the economy. In Brazil, on the contrary, the 
transference of primary sector surpluses to the rest of the economy, notably the 
industrial sector, remained in effect. 
 
2.6) Magnitude of the land rent 
 
Land rent is a form of surplus-value potentially appropriable by landowners due 
to their monopoly over an irreproducible means of production, land. It was argued 
before that, in Brazil throughout the period understudy and in Korea before 1970, a 
portion of land rent was appropriated by social subjects (economic actors) other than 
landowners. The magnitude of these portions is dependent, ceteris paribus, on the total 
size of the land rent. The larger the magnitude of the land rent, the larger can potentially 
be the size of the portion appropriated by others than landowners themselves. The 
measurement of the total magnitude of land rent is indispensable for the political-
economy analysis of long-term development of any society were capital accumulation 
revolves around its appropriation. 
In economies where state policies allow capital to appropriate (recover) a 
portion of it, land rent is made of two parts: that appropriated by social subjects other 
than landowners and that appropriated by landowners themselves. The long-term 
evolution of the first part was already measured in Section 1 of this chapter. The 
estimation of the portion effectively appropriated by landowners (LR) should be now 
pursued. This magnitude is calculated as a residual equal to value added in the agrarian 
sector minus the consumption of fixed capital, the cost of the labour-force used for 
productive purposes and the profits normally corresponding to agrarian capital.
13
 The 
latter are calculated using the rate of profit of industrial capital estimated above and the 
                                                 
13
 The portion of land rent appropriated by others than landowners is already deducted from the sector‘s 
value added account in the form of policy-induced lower prices of primary sector output or higher prices 
of its inputs. 
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amount of capital (fixed and circulating) advanced in the agrarian sector. On average, 
competition should make both profits rates (agrarian and industrial) approximately 
equal. The rate of profit calculated above for agrarian capital, which relates total 
agrarian surplus to agrarian capital advanced for valorisation, contains the land rent 
effectively appropriated by landowners. A caveat should be made here, however. For 
reasons associated to the material characteristics of agrarian productions, small capitals 
tend to be more common in this branch of the economy than in the industrial sector. The 
normal rate of profit of agrarian capital thus tends to be, ceteris paribus, lower than that 
in the industrial sector. Using the average rates of profits in the latter as a proxy for the 
former thus underestimates the magnitude of the land rent effectively appropriated by 
landowners. In Korea, this circumstance is particularly enhanced. Due to the extremely 
small scale of post-land reform agrarian production, the rate of profit of agrarian capital 
there has been regulated by the income that the small capitalist would get if employed 
as a wage-labourer in similar productive activities. The following formula thus 
measures the annual land rent appropriated by landowners. 
 
                    
                
 
Where, 
VAi is the value added in the agrarian sector during year i; 
Wi is the cost of the rural labour-force during year i; 
CFKi is the consumption of fixed capital during year i; 
∏i is the mass of agrarian profits during year i; 
gindi is the rate of profit of industrial capital during year i; 
Kagri is the amount of capital advanced in the agrarian sector during year i.  
 
 The magnitude of the total land rent is then measured by the following equation. 
 
              
 
 Graphs 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 plot the evolution of land rent in Brazil and Korea 
between the mid-1950s and mid-2000s. 
 93 
 
   
Source: Tables C.10 and C.18 
 
Graph 2.10 plots the evolution of the total mass of primary (largely agrarian) 
sector land rent in Brazil between 1955 and 2005. It can be observed there that the land 
rent contracted during the second half of the 1950s, after picking up during the 
‗commodities boom‘ associated with the Korean War; it recovered during the first half 
of the 1960s but stagnated during the latter part of the decade; it expanded strongly 
during the 1970s as output grew while new agrarian regions were brought into 
production and international commodity prices spiked; it collapsed during the 1980s and 
early 1990s as international commodity prices fell strongly; it recovered during 1988-90 
and 1994-1998 as prices increased mildly and agrarian output expanded; collapsed 
during 1999-2003 as commodity prices fell again sharply; and, expanded strongly after 
2004 as international commodity prices of raw materials and, crucially, primary sector 
production increased. 
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Source: Tables C.10 and C.18 
 
Graph 2.11 shows the evolution of the land rent appropriated by landowners and 
by other social subjects in Brazil. The graph combines information presented in graphs 
2.3 and 2.10. It can be observed there that the land rent appropriated by landowners 
remained practically stagnant between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, though it 
contracted briefly during 1958-60 as the total land rent dropped strongly. The portion of 
the rent appropriated by landowners expanded during the 1970s, as commodity prices 
and, thus, the total land rent increased, and during the 1980s, despite the opposite 
occurred. As seen in graph 2.3 above, the undervaluation of the national currency during 
much of the 1980s channelled resources (i.e. surplus-value) from capital (capitalists) to 
landed property (landowners). Graph 2.11 also shows that the opposite trend took place 
thereafter, with the exception of 2000-03 when the total land rent contracted strongly as 
international commodity prices reached historically low levels. 
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Source: Tables C.13 and C.19 
 
Graph 2.12 above plots the evolution of the Korean land rent between 1955 and 
2005 according to the courses of its appropriation. It can be appreciated that, as 
mentioned before, during the pre-1970 period, petty capitalists/landowners were unable 
to appropriate a portion of ‗their‘ surpluses and, possibly, land rent. These surpluses 
were appropriated in other sectors of the economy. Furthermore, it can also be observed 
that after that date the rent appropriated by petty capitalists/landowners, much of which 
was made of the subsidy granted by the rest of society, became positive and grew 
exponentially. In effect, a subsidy specific to the agrarian sector, whose appropriation is 
connected to the use of land, such as those granted to food producers since the early 
1970s, transforms into a rent for landowners. If the land is not directly used 
productively by its owner, competition by individual capitals to appropriate the subsidy 
pushes up rental prices. 
 
2.7) Net inflows of foreign aid and interest-bearing capital (credit) 
 
During large periods of Brazilian and Korean post-WWII history, the inflow of 
foreign financial resources, in the form of credit or aid, constituted an important source 
of capital for accumulation. In the Brazilian case, this extraordinary source of social 
wealth was used to complement, as a ‗junior partner‘, the land rent in supporting 
capital‘s normal profitability. In Korea, large inflows of aid received from international 
donors, notably the USA, during the 1950s and 1960s were also used to complement the 
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mass of primary sector surpluses (rent plus small capital profits) transferred to the 
industrial sector.
14
 However, when aid inflows were replaced by commercial credits in 
the late 1960s, the Korean process of capital accumulation was already undertaking its 
specific structural transformation. The large inflow of credit began then to be used, 
unlike in Brazil, to engender an industrial capital with the degree of concentration 
necessary to compete in world markets using the relative cheap and disciplined labour-
power available there. 
The annual net inflow of foreign interest-bearing (loan) capital is measured by 
adding up the mass of credits and aid received during the corresponding year and 
deducting, from that total, capital and interest payments during the same period. Inflows 
can be measured in two ways, which in principle should yield identical results. First, the 
yearly inflows and outflows could be compared to find the value of net inflows. Second, 
the net variation of the stock of external debt in a particular year can be compared with 
the outflow in the form of interest payments to get the value of net inflows. In order to 
compare the magnitude of resources received by a national economy in the form of net 
loan capital and aid inflows with the magnitude of domestic profits available (i.e. their 
contribution in supporting the process of capital accumulation), it is first necessary to 
express the former in national currency. For that purpose, the PPP exchange rates 
calculated above are used. The use of the official or commercial exchange rates would 
underestimate the weight of the net inflow of foreign wealth when the national currency 
is overvalued and vice-versa. Graphs 2.13, 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16 below show the net 
annual and accumulated inflows of interest-bearing capital and aid to the Brazilian and 
Korean economies since the mid-1950s.  
 
                                                 
14
 Note that this contrasts with the conventional view that in Korea, unlike in Taiwan, foreign aid rather 
than agrarian surpluses were used to finance the processes of import-substituting industrialisation during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. 
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Source: Table C.31 
 
 
Source: Table C.31 
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Source: Table C.32 
 
 
Source: Table C.32 
 
Several observations can be made from comparison of the four graphs presented 
above. First, the net inflow of interest-bearing capital in the form of credit in Brazil was 
substantial during 1968-1980, 1994-1997/8 and after 2004. Secondly, net outflows from 
Brazil were massive during the 1980s, the early 1990s and 1999-2003/4. It should be 
noted, however, that during the 1980s, outflows of interest-bearing capital appear larger 
when measured using annual flows rather than net increases in stock of debts.
15
 This can 
                                                 
15
 This could mean that the stock of external debt grew more than what was registered in the balance-of-
payments account or that some of the outflows were registered but did not actually take place. 
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
 -
 10,000
 20,000
 30,000
 40,000
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
Graph 2.15 
Korea: Net inflow of aid and credit capital in million 2004 US$  
Aid Net borrowing
 -
 50,000
 100,000
 150,000
 200,000
 250,000
 300,000
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
Graph 2.16 
Korea: Accumulated credit and aid inflows and stock of 
external debts in million 2004 US$ 
Net accumulated inflow External debt
 99 
be better seen in graph 2.14, plotting the accumulated net inflow of this type of social 
wealth. Thirdly, the inflow of foreign aid to Korea was substantial before 1965. 
Thereafter, when the local economy began its structural transformation, it was largely 
replaced with commercial loans. Fourthly, inflows of interest-bearing capital remained 
substantial in Korea during the entire period up to the early 1980s and during the 1993-
97 global expansion of credit supply. Fifthly, outflows or net payments (i.e. 
cancellations) of external debts were large during most of the 1980s, the early 1990s 
and the 1997/8 financial crisis. Sixthly, as graphs 2.14 and 2.16 show, when net capital 
inflows became negative, as was the case during most of the 1980s, net accumulated 
inflows fell strongly in both countries. The stock of external debts, however, fell only in 
Korea. Seventhly, in contrast to the previous point, during the global recession of 1998-
2002, interest-bearing capital outflows and, consequently, the reduction of both the 
accumulated inflow and the stock of external debts were much larger in Brazil than in 
Korea. As global credit markets recovered, inflows of interest-bearing capital became 
larger than outflows already (presumably) around 2000/01 in Korea but only around 
2006 in Brazil.     
 
 
Source: Tables C.12, C.15, C.31 and C.32 
 
The relative importance of the net inflow of foreign interest-bearing capital and 
aid for the process of capital accumulation in Brazil and Korea between 1955 and 2007 
(1998 for Korea) is illustrated in graph 2.17 above. It can be observed there that 
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between 1955 and 1980 the contribution of ‗external savings‘ to the process of capital 
accumulation was substantially larger in Korea than in Brazil, equalling 38% and 3% of 
all profits appropriated in these economies, respectively. Moreover, during 1956-1965 
foreign aid inflows to Korea were equivalent to 60% of net surpluses (i.e. profits). It can 
also be seen in graph 2.17 that, as net interest-bearing capital inflows became negative 
in both countries, during the 1980s a portion of local surpluses funded capital outflows. 
Net inflows of loan capital resumed during 1994-97/8, equalling 9% and 4% of total 
profits in Korea and Brazil, respectively. During 1999-2005 outflows of interest-bearing 
capital from Brazil took around 6% of surpluses available for appropriation in the 
economy. Data availability does not allow similar calculations for Korea. 
  
2.8) Combined mass of land rent appropriated by others than landowners and net 
inflows of foreign interest-bearing capital (credit) and aid as a portion of total 
surpluses 
 
Land rent and inflows of capital in the form of credit and aid have been 
complementing normal surpluses available for appropriation in the two economies 
under study and thus sustaining the process of capital accumulation there. In order to 
grasp the importance of these sources of extraordinary social wealth in supporting the 
process of capitalist development in Brazil and Korea, graph 2.18 below plots the 
relationship between the combined mass of land rent appropriated by others than 
landowners (i.e. by capital) and net capital inflows in the form of aid and loans as a 
portion of all surpluses appropriated in the Brazilian and Korean economies.  
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Source: C.12, C.18, C.15, C.19, C.31 and C.32  
 
Graph 2.18 shows that the combined mass of both extraordinary sources of social 
wealth contributed substantially to the process of capital valorisation and accumulation 
in both countries before the early 1980s and during most of the 1990s. They amounted 
to 19% and 50% of total profits in Korea and Brazil, respectively, between the mid-
1950s and 1980 and 12% and 7% during 1994-97/8. A similar process has been taking 
place in the more recent period, after 1999/2000 in Korea and after 2005 in Brazil. As 
can been seen in graphs 2.13 and 2.14 net credit inflows enlarged recently in both 
countries. Moreover, as shown in graphs 2.3 and 2.10, the Brazilian economy also saw 
the strong expansion of land rent available for appropriation and actually appropriated 
by capital. The composition of these sources of extraordinary wealth, however, has been 
different in both countries. While loan capital inflows complemented, as junior partner, 
the land rent in Brazil, they were the only source of extraordinary wealth sustaining the 
process of capital accumulation in Korea after around 1970. During the 1980s, the late 
1990s and the early 2000s, the reverse was true. In Korea, normal surpluses produced in 
the economy followed their course to cancel part of previously contracted external 
debts. In Brazil, these surpluses, in some occasions complemented with a portion of 
land rent, also followed their way out of the economy. 
 
2.9) Summary and conclusions 
 
 (0.40)
 (0.20)
 -
 0.20
 0.40
 0.60
 0.80
 1.00
 1.20
 1.40
 1.60
 1.80
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
Graph 2.18  
Extraordinary social wealth as a portion of surpluses 
Brazil Korea
 102 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, that the mass of 
primary sector surpluses appropriated by social actors other than landowners, notably 
by industrial capital, were significant both in absolute terms and relative to capital‘s 
profits in Brazil during the entire period under study, with the sole exception of the 
1980s, and in Korea before 1970. Secondly, that the mass of extraordinary profits in the 
form of land rent available for appropriation in the Brazilian economy contracted during 
the second half of the 1950s, albeit from historically high levels, as the Korean War 
‗commodities boom‘ ended; expanded moderately during the 1960s; grew strongly 
during the 1970s, as the oil shock was followed by a new ‗commodities boom‘; 
contracted sharply during the first half of the 1980s, as commodity prices collapsed; 
recovered during 1994-1998, as these prices recovered; contracted again during 1999-
2003, as prices fell sharply; and, expanded strongly after 2004 as a new ‗commodities 
boom‘ was beginning to take place. Thirdly, in general, periods of high or growing 
levels of land rent corresponded in Brazil with moments when the portion appropriated 
by industrial capital was also growing, and when the profitability of the latter was, 
consequently, sustained at relatively high levels. By contrast, periods when the land rent 
contracted corresponded with periods of relatively low profitability in the industrial 
sector. Nevertheless, this was not always the case. Though both the 1970s and 1990s 
were periods of land rent expansion (and of large inflows of foreign credit), only the 
first one correlated with high levels of profitability of industrial production. The land 
rent has been used in Brazil to compensate for the productivity gap. The evolution of 
the latter is thus a key variable explaining industrial capital profitability. Fourthly, it 
was seen that the inflow of aid in Korea during 1956-65 was substantial, equivalent to 
as much as 60% of net surpluses (profits) appropriated in the economy. Fifthly, net 
inflows of credit in both countries were largely positive and significant between the late 
1960s and early 1980s and during 1994-98, and largely negative during the 1980s and 
between 1998 and 2002/3. These movements, it should be noted, corresponded with the 
evolution of credit supply in the global financial markets.
16
 Sixthly, the rate of profit of 
industrial capital in Korea since the late 1960s, when its export orientation began, 
moved together with that of the USA. Between 1968 and 1992, the rate of profit of 
industrial capital in Korea mimicked the evolution of the rate of profit of industrial 
capital in the USA, with the exception of the period 1979-82 when the sharp increase of 
                                                 
16
 See graph 1.2 in Chapter 1 and Kaminsky (2005). 
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interest rates in world financial markets particularly affected developing countries. 
During the 1990s, however, this trend ended; the rate of profit of industrial capital in 
Korea could not recover from the 1988-92 drop as was the case in the USA. In 
summary, the present chapter showed that the Brazilian and Korean processes of capital 
accumulation have been heavily dependent for their normal reproduction on the land 
rent and other sources of extraordinary social wealth, like the inflow of foreign loans 
and aid. The size and combination of these was, however, different in each country. 
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Chapter 3 
Determinants of the Valorisation Capacity of Industrial Capital in 
Brazil and Korea: the Steel, Automobile and Semiconductors Sectors 
 
The previous chapter advanced evidence in support of the claim that the process 
of capital accumulation in Brazil, during the whole period studied, and in Korea, until 
the late-1960s, were heavily dependent for their normal reproduction and development 
on the appropriation of a portion of primary sector surpluses, notably the extraordinary 
profits available there in the form of land rent, and their complementary sources of 
extraordinary social wealth (i.e. external credits and aid inflows).  
The goal of this chapter is to provide support for the hypothesis that 
technological changes leading to the development of the NIDL and the characteristics of 
these countries‘ workforces explain both Korea‘s emergence through the 1970s and 
1980s as a major producer of increasingly complex and sophisticated manufactured 
goods for world markets, and Brazil‘s inability to follow suit despite having originally 
developed a broader and deeper industrial base. For this purpose, the chapter briefly 
reviews the most important technological changes taking place in large-scale industrial 
sectors since the 1960s, in particular in the steel, automobile and semiconductors 
industries, and examines how they affected Korean and Brazilian productions in these 
branches of manufacturing. These three sectors were selected not only because they are 
among the most important in both countries‘ industries in terms of value-added and 
employment, but also because they jointly express the most salient aspects of major 
trends in technological transformations taking place in the global economy since the 
1960s, crucially in terms of their impact upon the structure of skills required from the 
industrial workforce. Hence, the evolution of these sectors jointly reveals the specific 
characteristics of both national processes of capitalist development. The appendices 
present quantitative evidence supporting the arguments advanced throughout the 
chapter, including different methodologies used to measure the rate of profit of specific 
representative industrial capitals and its main determinants. 
 
3.1) Development of automated systems of machinery and the structure of skills in 
large-scale industrial productions 
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 The development of labour productivity is the most powerful form of increasing 
the rate of capital of valorisation. In the short run, before competitive pressures 
generalise the conditions that allow the gains, productivity improvements reduce 
production costs and thus increase the rate of profit of those capitals that first obtain 
them. In the long run, as new technical conditions became the norm and competition 
forces the cost of producing goods and services to fall, productivity gains directly or 
indirectly reduce the cost of reproducing the labour-force and thus expand the mass of 
net surpluses (i.e. surplus-value) available for the valorisation of total social capital. The 
development of labour productivity is thus the most powerful lever of the process of 
capital accumulation. The development of the system of machinery of large-scale 
industry is, in turn, the most potent way of increasing labour productivity in the 
capitalist mode of producing human life. This process is centred on the advance of 
scientific knowledge over natural forces and their control through the technological 
application of science, that is, their objectification in the instruments of production.
1
 
 The development of the system of machinery – i.e. the transformation of tools 
used for the productive consumption of raw materials into mechanical implements - 
does not simply increase the average or normal productivity of labour. As a 
consequence of, and condition for, its own continual development, it also constantly 
revolutionises the productive characteristics of the industrial labour-force. This impact, 
however, is not uniform but differentiated, continuously changing the structure of skills 
required from the collective (i.e. combined) worker of large-scale industry. On the one 
hand, the process of mechanisation transforms productive attributes of human labour 
into attributes of the machine. Each advance thus tends to reduce the skills necessary to 
operate machine-tools and, therefore, to intervene directly in the transformation of raw 
materials in the shop-floor.
2
 Moreover, technological advances also tend to deprive the 
need for any necessary skill whatsoever, and transform it into a surplus for the process 
of accumulation, the portion of the labour-force expulsed from the immediate process of 
production and not reabsorbed through the absolute expansion of the scale of 
accumulation.
3
 On the other hand, each advance in the systems of machinery increases 
their complexity, and thus the skills and knowledge required to develop them further 
and to organise production processes based on them, especially as the optimal scale of 
                                                 
1
 See Marx (1990: 508-17); Iñigo Carrera (2008: 15-23). 
2
 See Marx (1990: 544-53); Aglietta (1979: 113).  
3
 See Marx (1990: 553-75). 
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production tends to increase with their development. Though these trends are inherent to 
the development of labour productivity in capitalism, their extent has expanded strongly 
in the last forty years or so.
4
 
 Starting in the last part of the 1950s, the development of large-scale industries 
evolved in two separated lines that finally converged during the 1980s to give place to 
the current robotised and largely automated industrial facilities. On the one hand, 
industries based on serial, repetitive production methods, where the transformation of 
raw materials is done sequentially, witnessed technological improvements that centred 
on the automation of machine-tools and the computerisation of their calibration and 
control. On the other hand, in continuous flow or ‗process‘ industries, where raw 
materials are subjected to a series of physicochemical transformations, technological 
improvements began to be centred on the informatisation of the monitoring of 
production processes and, subsequently, the automation of their control.
5
 
In general terms, two lines of technological transformations took place in the 
first group of industries around the late 1950s. In mass mechanical production sectors, 
like the automobile and white-goods industries, the complex general-purpose machine-
tools were simplified and transformed into special-purpose ones. These were then 
automated using already available hydraulic, pneumatic and electromechanical devises. 
Though this type of limited automated machinery was already emerging during the first 
part of the twentieth century, it is only in the 1950s that its use became predominant. 
Furthermore, only then were different machines integrated into one mechanical system 
through the use of motorised ‗transfer lines‘, thus giving place to the first fixed 
automation systems of production (the so-called ‗Detroit automation‘).6 The singularity 
of these systems was that along the production line for parts and components there were 
now machines rather than manual workers. Consequently, worker dexterity and tacit 
knowledge over tools and materials were no longer productive attributes needed for the 
operation of machine-tools and the transformation of inputs into a desired output. 
Assembly and fitting operations remained, however, manual, though subjected to the 
rhythm of work given by the semi-automatic assembly line. On the contrary, in batch 
production sectors, like capital-goods industries, machine-tools remained complex and 
                                                 
4
 See Iñigo Carrera (2008: 56-9) for the original identification of the three-folded differentiation. 
5
 See Coriat (1992: 38-50). 
6
 They were considered fixed in the sense that once the production line was set up, it was only useful for 
one specific product line with few variations. These systems, consequently, could only be used profitably 
for large-scale operations. See Coriat (1992: 73-5); Hounshell (2000: 128-34). 
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able to perform sophisticated and precise operations. Technological advances 
introduced to improve their performance and precision centred on the simplification of 
their calibration through the use of numerical control. The emerging Numerically 
Controlled (NC) machine-tools were simply the old ones with ‗computing‘ systems 
attached to them (e.g. punch cards, magnetic tapes). The latter were capable of 
breaking-up and measuring accurately every single movement performed by the 
machine-tool and, consequently, of programming their optimum sequence to transform 
an input into a desired output, thus no longer relying on the specific craft-like tacit 
knowledge and adroitness of the operator.
7
 
While in serial (discrete) production industries ‗incremental‘ improvements 
continued thereafter on these new bases, starting in the 1960s, in continuous flow 
industries, like the petrochemical and, to a large extent, the metallurgical ones, key 
innovations were centred on the computerisation of the conduction and control of the 
physicochemical processes required to transform raw materials in the desired direction. 
On the one hand, through the use of sensors and computers, information about the state 
and progress of the material transformations at stake was obtained and transformed into 
simple readable signs displayed in screens, instrumental panels or other visual systems. 
Though, at first instance, the necessary adjustments in the productive processes were 
still done ‗manually‘, and therefore required some kind of tacit knowledge to perform 
them, those technological advances already made certain specific skills no longer 
necessary. These tasks had been performed by manual skilled workers directly using 
their sensory capacities and accumulated know-how acquired through lengthy on-the-
job learning-by-doing processes. On the other hand, later on, through the use of central 
computers and electromechanically-controlled devices, the adjustment of operations 
was also automated. Experienced manual workers were then further detached from 
immediate production processes to become simple watchers and controllers, requiring a 
different set of productive characteristics and therefore of skills and training.
8
 
                                                 
7
 See Shaiken (1986: 66-70); Seering (1987: 31-8); Coriat (1992: 52-3). ―The best machine tool operator 
in a given shop is more likely to have had 20 years of experience than a college education. Machine tool 
operation is a craft; it is generally learned from a qualified practitioner and it takes a long time to master. 
[…]. It takes less skill to monitor and handle parts for an NC machine than it does to operate a standard 
machine. Thus, training periods for NC operators may be shorter. And shorter training periods lead to 
expansion of the pool of available workers and correspondingly to a reduction to a reduction in wage 
levels.‖ (Seering, 1987: 34, 38). 
8
 See ILO (1963, 1992); Coriat (1992: 188-92); Balconi (1999). 
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Since the early 1970s, several inter-connected technical advances can be 
observed. The miniaturisation of electronic components through the use of chemical 
elements with semiconducting capacities, and the so-called microelectronics revolution 
to which this gave place, resulted in reductions of the size and costs of computing and 
controlling devices, thereby increasing their power, reliability and precision. As a result, 
the complexity and outreach of automated and computerised technologies increased. 
Electronics-based automation enhanced exponentially the potentialities, and thus the 
trends springing from, machinery automation vis-à-vis the hitherto predominant, largely 
electromechanical technologies.  
In small batch (discontinuous) industrial processes, computing devices attached 
to machine-tools became smaller and more powerful, transforming, and thus further 
improving the attributes of, NC systems, thereafter known as computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machine-tools. This transformation in turn gave place to a further 
simplification in the tasks of the machine-tool operator turned controller. As small 
computers were attached to them, not only the calibration of NC machine-tools for 
different operations was simplified further. These could now self-calibrate the retooling 
necessary to undertake different types of transformative operations on the same piece, 
thus becoming proper ‗machining centres‘. In mass production, repetitive industries, 
microelectronic technologies further simplified the process of calibration of machine-
tools for serial runs and improved the coordination of different machines and the 
circulation of materials through them. Central computers, connected to microcomputers 
attached to individual machines, could regulate the speed of transfer lines and the flow 
of materials through them. In the continuous flow industries, the planning, control and 
adjustment of production processes were simplified further, becoming even less reliant 
on the tacit accumulated knowledge and sensory capacities of production workers. 
Conversely, in all types of industries, these transformations tended to increase the scale 
and, crucially, the complexity of production processes, enhancing the role of wage-
earners in charge of planning and management vis-à-vis shop-floor workers.
9
 
The development of microelectronic technologies also permitted the 
combination of informatics with hydraulic and electromechanical technologies, and 
gave place to the emergence of ‗intelligent‘ industrial robots. In contrast to previously 
developed specimens, such as simple manipulators and sequential robots, intelligent 
                                                 
9
 See Aglietta (1979: 125-30); Coriat (1992: 56-7); Balconi (1999: 48-50). 
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robots were capable of recognising materials and parts before them and of selecting and 
performing the proper operation from a previously programmed set of options. In this 
way, industrial robots could manipulate tools and perform fittings in the assembly line, 
thus further pushing the intervention of semiskilled manual labourers away from the 
production process. The integration, through computer-run programmes, of robots and 
CNC machine-tools greatly increased the degree of automation and flexibility of 
industrial facilities.
10
 Furthermore, the miniaturisation of computers and the consequent 
improvements of their capacities also gave place to the automation of design and 
conception activities as well as administrative office work, thus also simplifying some 
aspects and portions of these work processes. Both the automation of the shop-floor and 
the office combined greatly increased the systemic integration of productive facilities.
11
 
Though these technological developments have not followed a linear 
progression, the underlying trend has been towards an increased automation of large-
scale industrial facilities. The general effects of this pattern of technological 
transformations on the structure of skills required from the collective worker have been 
threefold. First, the emerging and consolidating technologies have tended to eliminate 
simple (unskilled) manual labour, as processes such as materials transport/handling and 
machine feeding have been progressively automated and robotised. Secondly, they have 
tended to expand the amount of ‗office‘ work by taking away from the shop-floor the 
programming of machine-tools and the planning of large-scale industrial productions 
based on them. These two effects have led to the relative decrease of blue-collar vis-à-
vis white-collar workers in industrial plants.
12
 Though ‗office‘ work has tended to 
require a more skilled and longer-trained workforce, these activities have also been 
affected by the continual introduction of automated, and thus work-simplifying, 
techniques in this section of large-scale industrial facilities. Thirdly, these technologies 
have also tended to transform the skills necessary to perform productive tasks on the 
shop-floor, notably those involving the operation and calibration of machine systems. 
While skills related to these activities as well as the practical knowledge of materials 
and processes gained through prolonged on-the-job experiences have been increasingly 
                                                 
10
 Unlike fixed automation systems, electronics-based automaton could be reprogrammed at relatively low 
cost. 
11
 See Coriat (1992: 57-9). 
12
 In this sense, automated and computerised technologies have been, as all forms of mechanisation, 
‗skill-biased‘. 
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dispensable,
13
 others acquired through formal technical education, like basic computer 
literacy and theoretical knowledge of the unity of manufacturing activities, have become 
relatively more important.
14
 In some cases, this resulted in an expansion of the 
intellectual content of work processes (i.e. ‗up-skilling‘), as these activities involved 
analysis of problems and decision-taking. In other cases, these activities rapidly became 
trivialised and routinised.
15
 Moreover, the new technological base has also generated, as 
its own condition of existence, a multitude of production processes still subjected to the 
manual intervention of low-skilled labourers, like the assembly, testing and packaging 
of electronic micro-components and electronic appliances which are at the base of the 
robotised and computer aided systems of machinery.  
In other words, the emerging technological base has substantially increased the 
differentiation of the productive attributes required to perform the different tasks 
involved in large-scale industrial productions. This has manifested itself in the increased 
differentiation in the costs of production and reproduction of the different portions of 
the collective worker of large-scale industry. To begin with, the technical and scientific 
knowledge necessary to perform the most skill-intensive work processes have expanded 
further. Moreover, the portion of the labour-force performing the most complex, skill-
intensive activities has been increasingly required to make productive and commercial 
decisions on behalf of capital (i.e. to ‗solve problems‘ and pursue ‗creative solutions‘). 
Both trends have resulted in the expansion of the educational periods necessary to 
produce the more skilled portion of the industrial labour-force, the increase in its 
consumption of goods and services that enhance the development and reproduction of 
the capacity to perform analytical and abstract thinking (e.g. artistic-cultural, leisure and 
recreational goods and services), and, as the intellectual intensity of these work 
activities increased, the continual shortening of the working-day. The opposite trend has 
tended to occur with respect to the less skilled segments of the labour-force. 
Furthermore, this differentiation has also expanded the necessity to enlarge the 
separation in the consumption patterns of both portions of the collective labourer of 
                                                 
13
 In this sense, computerised and automated technologies have been, as all forms of mechanisation, 
‗skill-replacing.‘ Though most often missed by mainstream economists, this aspect of the new 
technological base helps explain the reduction of wages paid to production workers in the USA and 
Europe since the 1970s. See Acemoglu (2002) for the acknowledgement of the explanatory vacuum. For 
an exception, see Autor et al. (2001). 
14
 See Balconi (1999: 17). 
15
 See Coriat (1992: 183-4, 203-5); Iñigo Carrera (2008: 56-9). 
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large-scale industry for a different reason. As the differentiation of productive attributes 
advances, the more the portion performing the most skill-intensive activities needs to 
perceive itself as not belonging to the same social class as the other portion, namely, the 
class of individuals who sell their labour-power (i.e. their capacity to work for a limited 
period of time) for a wage/salary, the working-class.
16
 
 
3.1.1) Transformations in the global steel industry 
 
Steel manufacturing is mostly a continuous process. In large-scale integrated 
mills, basic raw materials undergo a series of physicochemical transformations until 
they take the form of the desired final product, namely, different types of steel. As such, 
the steel industry has not been alien to the technological transformations described 
above. On the contrary, it has been at their centre.  
During the second half of 1950s and, especially, the 1960s, the steel industry 
witnessed two major ‗discrete‘ technological changes, notably in the large-scale fully 
integrated sector. First, the traditional Open Hearth Furnace (OHF) was replaced by the 
Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) for the production of pig iron. Secondly, ingots making 
was replaced by continuous casting (CC) technologies for the transformation of pig iron 
into steel. The BOF implied the substitution of atmospheric air for oxygen, in order to 
improve yields and output quality. CC entailed a sharp leap forward in the 
mechanisation/automation of the production of steel, allowing the casting of steel into 
basic shapes directly from the blast furnace –i.e. without the need to cool the material 
down in the shape of ingots before transforming it into semi-finished steel products. 
This not only reduced the consumption of energy in steelmaking but also constituted a 
major step in the transformation of the production of steel into a fully continuous, 
uninterrupted process.
17
 
Apart from these two major discrete changes, several less noticeable, but crucial, 
advances in the automation of production processes also took place. These had mainly 
two focal points. First, they aimed at introducing automatic methods for the transport 
and charging of raw materials, and the automation of rolling mills for the transformation 
of semi-finished slabs into final products. Secondly, they were centred on the 
                                                 
16
 See Iñigo Carrera (2008: 56-9). 
17
 For a detailed account of these technological changes, see ILO (1963: 8-20); Barnett and Schorsch 
(1983: 152-60); D‘Costa (1999: 33-7) 
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informatisation and automation of control over the physical properties of the product 
along the different stages of its material transformation.
18
 These operations, as well as 
the process of ingot casting, had hitherto relied on the practical, tacit knowledge of 
experienced skilled manual workers.
19
  
Though most of these technological innovations took place in Europe during the 
second half of the 1950s, it was the Japanese steel industry that would adopt them at the 
fastest speed.
20
 Japanese steel mills rapidly incorporated state-of-the-art continuous-
process technology and transformed the industry from a traditional, batch-process heavy 
industry to a highly automated, continuous-process, materials industry.
21
 Moreover, 
Japanese mills were also the earliest and fastest to incorporate extended process control 
computing systems.
22
 This strategy of technological upgrading would allow Japanese 
capital to gain, by the late 1960s, a leading role in the global steel industry. Unlike their 
Japanese, and to lesser extent European, counterparts, US steel firms, hitherto the 
largest and most efficient, were relatively slow to adopt these new technologies and thus 
quickly lost ground in world markets.
23
  
Traditional explanations for the relative decline of the US steel industry, and of 
the successful rivalry by Japanese firms, have emphasised poor government 
planning/support and private sector conservatism, the existence of large sunk costs in 
traditional facilities and the availability of cheap sources of energy.
24
 Though important, 
these factors cannot fully explain the change in world steel hegemony. In effect, the 
                                                 
18
 See ILO (1963: 9-11); Coriat (1992: 48-50).  
19
 ―As until the end of the 1960s the instruments to measure the temperature of liquid steel (detectors) and 
to make rapid chemical analysis (electronic spectrometers) were not diffused, measurements were carried 
out by empirical methods based upon the association between some physical characteristic observable by 
sight and the value of the variables to be measured. Thus in order to know the temperature of liquid steel, 
a sample was taken out of the furnace, poured upon an iron plate and the temperature was deduced by 
observing the forming of the spot, its shape and the way it solidified and attached itself to the plate. The 
ability to recognize the temperature by sight was clearly tacit and acquired through a long practical 
experience. Moreover, in order ‗to analyse‘ the chemical content, a liquid steel sample was solidified in a 
mould and then extracted and beaten by a mall upon a V-shaped anvil. Depending on the carbon content, 
steel either broke or bent. When it broke, the shape of the fractures and of the grains revealed to the eyes 
of the expert the content of other elements, the ductility and other features of the metal, depending on 
which it could be decided what (and how much of) elements had to be added in the furnace. It is 
estimated that 5 years of experience or more were necessary to acquire the indispensable skills, while no 
formal school education was called for.‖ (Balconi, 1999: 15). See also ILO (1992: 38). 
20
 See Barnett and Schorsch (1983: 52-7). 
21
 See Florida and Kenney (1992: 152); Hasegawa (1996: 79-84). 
22
 See Hasegawa (1996: 85); D‘Costa (1999: 71-2). Japanese firms were also the fastest to introduce BOF 
technologies. This was necessary to increase the scale of blast furnaces and thus make the introduction of 
expensive continuous casters profitable. 
23
 See Ault (1973); Barnett and Crandall (1986: 36-55); D‘Costa (1999: 37-43). 
24
 See Maddala and Knight (1967); Mueller and Kawahito (1978: 5-6); Florida and Kenney (1992: 151-
2). 
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main problem with the first type of accounts is that they cannot explain why US firms 
and governments went from one kind of commercial attitude to another one (i.e. from 
‗rational‘ and innovations friendly to innovations resistant) in less than ten years.25 The 
main problem with the second type of explanation is that US firms lack competitiveness 
in the international markets would have remained even if continuous process automated 
technologies had been implemented as extensively as in Japan. It has been shown 
elsewhere that increases in labour productivity (and therefore cost reductions) due to the 
use of continuous casters in the USA were meagre in comparison with the 
improvements enjoyed in Japan and did not compensate for the massive costs of the 
new equipment.
26
 Indeed, both groups of criticisms fail to realise that the new 
technological conditions resulted in the simplification of several productive tasks and, 
as a consequence, produced a change in the composition of the workforce and its skills 
requirements.
27
 Simplification and standardisation of labour processes on the shop-floor 
meant that these tasks could be performed by a less skilled and cheaper labour-force as 
the Japanese, which was itself particularly productive due to its historical origins and 
characteristics.
28
 Labour costs per unit of output thus became lower in Japan than in the 
USA as relative labour productivity changed in favour of the former. Moreover, 
Japanese companies could take advantage of particularly favourable labour laws, weak 
trade unions and ‗socially-accepted‘ hierarchically-organised labour relations These 
lowered labour costs further below international levels by allowing Japanese capital to 
make extensive use of less skilled and cheaper ‗temporary‘ or ‗outside‘ workers for the 
heavier and more standardised/simplified activities.
29
 These types of wage-earners did 
                                                 
25
 See Chen (1996). 
26
 See Barnett and Schorsch (1983: 111-32). 
27
 This was noticed by the Steel Industry Committee of the International Labour Organisation. Its 1963 
meeting evaluating the effects of the new technologies in the structure of skills and remuneration of the 
labour force concluded the following. ―The qualifications for which the need is reduced by mechanisation 
are the simpler ones, such as physical strength or manual dexterity. But the earlier techniques of 
production also required a good knowledge of the material and sometimes a complete understanding of 
the machine which, because of its relative simplicity, was not serviced to the same extent as modern 
equipment. 
Once the principles of automation come into play, even where this is present only to the extent of 
automatic gauges and other measuring devices, some of the technical knowledge of the workers is 
supplemented by the machine. What previously required the decision of an experienced worker on the 
basis of observation of a complex process is replaced by a much simpler reading. At a more advanced 
stage of automation, even this task is removed from the worker who more and more becomes a ‗watcher‘ 
over machines.‖ (ILO, 1963: 34-5). 
28
 See Hasegawa (1996: 111-27) on the impact of work simplifying automation on manual worker 
productive attributes and the structure of skills in the Japanese steel industry. 
29
 See Barnett and Schorsch (1983: 64-9, 95). 
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not benefit from ‗life employment‘ practices, received lower wages and had access to 
fewer company-provided benefits than their ‗permanent‘ or ‗inside‘ colleagues.30 
 The rapid growth of the Japanese industry and its transformation into a global 
leader in terms of volume and cost competitiveness in basic steel products, then, was 
not simply the result of strategic planning by an active ‗developmental‘ state, notably 
regarding the acquisition of foreign technology and the location of plants.
31
 On the 
contrary, Japan‘s lead was largely the result of the aforementioned technological 
changes and the availability there of a relatively cheap and disciplined workforce 
suitable to act as an appendage of the increasingly automated and computerised systems 
of machinery.
32
 These factors transformed Japan into a base for the profitable 
production of steel products for global markets. States policies accelerated the process 
of concentration of capital in the scale and conditions needed for international 
competition and thus mediated rather than caused the transformation. 
To the surprise of many contemporary observers it was Korea which during the 
second half of 1970s became Japan‘s fiercest competitor. Contrary to the opinion of 
many later commentators, Korean capital‘s incorporation in the world division of labour 
as a major producer of basic, low value-added, steel products was not simply the result 
of bold government action copying the ‗Japanese model‘ and creating a state-of-the-art 
state-owned industry.
33
 It mainly resulted from two other processes. First, the continual 
advances in the automation and computerisation of manufacturing facilities and its 
effects on the further simplification/standardisation of certain labour processes and, 
consequently, on the skills required to perform them competitively. Secondly, the 
increase in the cost of the Japanese industrial labour-force and the possibility to replace 
it, in the case of basic steel products, by another workforce with similar productive 
                                                 
30
 See Hasegawa (1996: 52-4, 103-11) on the ‗dual‘ structure of employment in the Japanese steel 
industry and its usefulness for capital to differentiate tasks as well as work and payment conditions. This 
author provides a comparison with the experience of British Steel Corporation.  
31
 See, for instance, D‘Costa (1999: 57-81). It has been argued that the coastal location of Japanese plants, 
reducing transport costs for both raw materials imports and exports of output, was the key source of their 
international competitiveness. This position, however, fails to acknowledge that British and French steel 
mills located in coastal areas were not as successful as their Japanese counterparts during the 1970s and 
1980s. See Hudson and Sadler (1989).     
32
 Indeed US steel industry only began to recover through the late 1980s with the advent of the mini-mills, 
establishing plants in the west and south of the country where labour-force was non-unionised and 
unskilled but easily trainable, and the greenfield and brownfield investments made by Japanese firms in 
the integrated sector. Mini mills, unlike integrated plants, produce steel from scarp using electric 
furnaces. They are significantly more automated and computer-controlled than integrated plants. They 
thus require less industry-specific tacit knowledge. On the main characteristics of mini-mills, see Barnett 
and Crandall (1986: 4-5, 27-8); Florida and Kenney (1992: 150).  
33
 See e.g. Amsden (1989) and D‘Costa (1999). 
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characteristics (i.e. skills and historically developed and politically reinforced 
discipline) such as the Korean.
34
 
 The inability of the Brazilian steel industry to perform the same spectacular 
development, despite its much longer history, was not simply the result of poor 
economic policies or entrepreneurship. Given the characteristics of the local industrial 
workforce (neither as cheap nor as disciplined as the Korean) and the availability in the 
local economy of a massive land rent, industrial capital continued maximising it profits 
in the Brazilian economy by producing for domestic markets. As in Korea, before the 
early 1990s, a largely state-owned steel industry was a key piece in the process of 
accumulation for private manufacturing firms, through the provision of steel products at 
subsidised prices. This was of particular importance for the durable-consumer and 
capital goods and construction industries. Unlike in Korea, however, Brazilian state-
owned steel mills also constituted a medium of land rent transference to the machine-
tool, heavy engineering and construction industries through their constant purchase of 
equipment and services at inflated prices.
35
 
  
The Korean steel industry 
 
 In the late 1960s, the Korean steel industry was practically non-existent. Private 
domestically-owned firms, utilising obsolete facilities and a large amount of imported 
pig iron or scrap steel, satisfied around one-third of domestic steel market needs.
36
 In 
1966, for instance, Korean self-sufficiency ratio was under 40% (for a total demand of 
about 0.5 million tons), well below the Brazilian level.
37
 There was not a single large-
scale integrated mill, let alone an internationally efficient plant and quality steel 
                                                 
34
 ―The point is that codification and automation have displaced many skills. The result is that they have 
even been lost, with the progressive disappearance of their human repositories, and that in many sectors 
knowledge barriers to entry have been greatly lowered, since no craftsman tradition is required to set up a 
factory. To a considerable extent the explosive growth of manufacturing in the Asian countries could not 
have been possible without this evolution. In fact the new manufacturing powerhouses do not comprise 
only assembling factories, which intensively employ low-cost unskilled labor, but also processing 
industries, like steel and textiles, that could be equipped with modern automated plants exported by the 
West, with no need for old type skilled workers, whose training would have been impossible without 
many years of experience on the job.‖ (Balconi et al. (2007: 20). 
35
 See D‘Costa (1999: 85-6).  
36
 See Watanabe (1978: 391); Cohen (1978: 422); Amsden (1989: 295); Hogan (2001: 39). 
37
 See D‘Costa (1994: 52). In mid-1960s Brazil, imports constituted around 10% of apparent consumption 
of steel. See Fisher (1988: 168). 
 116 
producers. There were three already in Brazil.
38
 A decade later this situation would have 
changed radically.  
In order to reverse the prevailing situation, in 1965, as part of the drafting of the 
Second Five-year Economic Development Plan (1967-71), the Korean government 
finally began to set the strategy for the construction of a fully integrated steel mill. 
Against the advice of foreign governments and international agencies, including the 
World Bank, and facing the refusal of foreign investors to take part in the project, the 
government pursued its old, and so far largely unsuccessful, ambition of having a large-
scale fully integrated steel mill in the country. That was allegedly necessary to help 
develop a ‗balanced‘ industrial base, including the military industry needed to protect 
the nation from the ‗threat‘ permanently posed by North Korea, crucially after the 
change in US security policy for East Asia.
39
 
The construction of a large-scale fully integrated steel mill in Korea was not, 
however, a straightforward project. To being with, it was an enterprise that required an 
amount of capital that no local private company could then hope to raise. Secondly, the 
local private sector was also unwilling to risk capital in an industry that, given its 
importance for the process of industrialisation and national defence, could easily fell 
under strong government regulations.
40
 Thirdly, despite the government‘s desires, 
foreign companies were similarly not prepared to undertake such a supposedly unviable 
project.
41
 Moreover, the small size of the Korean domestic market and the high 
minimum efficient scale of production militated against the construction of more than 
one integrated steel mill. A private company, whether nationally or foreign-owned, 
would have thus enjoyed a virtual monopoly.
42
 As in most other contemporary 
developing countries, and many developed ones, the state, the political representative of 
Korean social capital, thus took charge of the project and using its own (including part 
of Japanese war reparations) and externally borrowed resources created the Pohang Iron 
                                                 
38
 See the next section for the Brazilian steel industry. 
39
 See Amsden (1989: 295); Haggard (1994: 33-4); Clifford (1998: 67-71). 
40
 See Park (2003: 67-8). 
41
 Through the 1960s, the Korean government initiated contacts with foreign governments and companies 
in order to promote the establishment of a fully integrated steel mill in Korea. A consortium of firms from 
the USA, Germany, England, France and Italy was formed to undertake the project in partnership with the 
Korean government. Most of the funds would come from state agencies in these countries and the World 
Bank. By the late-1960s, however, the project was already failing to materialise as the main participants 
refused to build the large-scale fully integrated mill the Korean government was pushing for. The former 
argued that Korea could only hope to have a steel mill with the scale to cater its small domestic market. 
Indeed, a study produced by the World Bank claimed that anything larger than that would inevitably fail. 
See D‘Costa (1994: 56); Hogan (2002: 3-10). 
42
 See Park (2003: 47). 
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and Steel Company (POSCO) in 1968. A few years later, in 1973, the government 
launched the Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) Plan, strongly promoting, among 
other sectors, the steel industry. POSCO has been since then the main producer of (high 
value-added) flat products and until recently the only one in Korea with integrated 
facilities. All privately-owned mills have used electric arc furnaces to finish the raw 
steel mainly bought from POSCO.
43
 
 The construction of POSCO‘s first plant in the southeast coastal city of Pohang 
took place in five stages between 1970 and 1984. Following the Japanese example, 
POSCO‘s two plants would be located on the coast both to facilitate the importation of 
raw materials and to reduce the cost of export operations. Large domestic consumers of 
steel also located in southern coastal cities as they too have produced for world markets. 
For the construction of Pohang mill, POSCO contracted most technology and technical 
assistance, notably in plant designs, from global markets leader Nippon Steel of Japan, 
though it also sourced part of its equipment in Europe. The low cost of the local labour-
force and the semi-military discipline used in the building process, in turn, maintained 
construction costs at internationally low levels.
44
 These averaged around US$ 500 per 
ton of production capacity, even below the US$ 590 of an average plant in Japan, where 
the most efficient steel producers in the world then located.
45
 Production capacity in 
1985, when POSCO‘s first plant was finally completed after successive enlargements, 
reached 9.6 million tons per year, well above the ‗theoretical‘ minimum efficient scale 
of 3.5 and almost equal to the average of the Japanese industry.
46
 During the first stages 
of its history, POSCO concentrated in the production of heavy plates and hot-rolled 
coils, used in the shipbuilding, automobile and machinery industries. These were the 
branches of manufacturing that were then expanding under strong state support. Higher 
value-added products, like cold-rolled coils and specialty steels, were relatively 
unimportant at the initial stages of POSCO‘s development.47 
 POSCO‘s ascent was fast, even for Korean standards. It rapidly became a large 
producer and exporter of steel. By the early 1980s, within less than a decade of starting-
                                                 
43
 See D‘Costa (1999: 84).  
44
 See D‘Costa (1994: 58-60). 
45
 See Amsden (1989: 297); Auty (1991: 19-20); Hogan (2001: 15-25). 
46
 See Barnett and Schorsch (1983: 57-9) on scale economies and Japan‘s experience. 
47
 According to Park (1997: 14) valued-added per worker at POSCO was still in 1986 approximately a 
fourth, a third and a half of the Japanese, US and European average producer, respectively. Furthermore, 
as late as 1988, POSCO only produced 6.5% of specialty steel, a third of the average Japanese producer. 
See Park (1997: 16). 
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up, with the completion of the third expansion stage, the company was successfully 
competing in world markets for finished steel, at least in the less sophisticated and skill-
intensive products, with Japanese integrated mills, the contemporary lowest cost 
producers.
48
 During the 1970s and 1980s, the firm sold about half of its output in the 
world market and most of the rest to domestically located, export-oriented sectors such 
as the shipbuilding, machine-tools and automobile industries.
49
 Through the sale of steel 
products at subsidised prices in the domestic market, POSCO transferred, during most 
of its life, a portion of its profits to these privately-owned downstream industries 
helping them strengthen their international competitiveness.
50
 
 
Table 3.1   
Cost of producing hot-rolled coil  
US$ per ton of finished product in 1985 
   
 Japan Korea 
Major raw materials 94 84 
Labour costs 41 18 
Other raw materials 54 47 
Total operating costs 189 149 
 
Source: Grieves and Saul (1986: 3-7) 
Note: Administrative and financial costs are not 
included 
 
Table 3.2    
Operational cost of producing flat steel   
US$ per ton of finished product in 1985  
    
  Japan * Korea ** 
Hot-rolled coils   199.5 199.0 
Cold-rolled coils   232.8 260.5 
 
Source: Adapted from Barnett and Crandall (1986: 120-3) 
Note: Costs are based on 90% utilisation of capacity 
Administrative costs are not included 
* New Integrated Mill 
** Efficient Integrated Mill 
 
                                                 
48
 See Auty (1991: 20). 
49
 See Hogan (2001: 37-61). 
50
 See D‘Costa (1994: 69-70, 1999: 87); Park (2003: 55); Auty (1991: 24). It is interesting to note here 
that most authors, including D‘Costa (1994, 1999) and Park (2003: 68-9), argue that POSCO was, unlike 
state-owned companies in other developing countries, run as a private firm, at the same time that they 
comment on its provision of steel products at subsidised prices to downstream industries. Not recognising 
the contradiction in their claim, they find in this allegedly specific aspect of POSCO the source of its 
success vis-à-vis similar ventures in the developing world. 
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Table 3.3    
Cost of producing cold-rolled coil in an efficient integrated steel 
firm 
US$ per ton of finished product in 1985  
    
 Japan Korea Brazil 
Labour 63 25 26 
Iron ore 44 48 24 
Coal or coke 52 55 68 
Other energy 15 24 27 
Miscellaneous 112 118 129 
Total operating costs 286 270 274 
 
Source: Barnett and Crandall (1986: 46) 
Note: Costs are based on 90% utilisation of capacity 
 
As can be observed in tables 3.1 and 3.2 above, in 1985, when Pohang‘s plant 
was finally completed, POSCO‘s production costs excluding the consumption of fixed 
capital (i.e. depreciation costs) for hot-rolled coils were lower than the average Japanese 
producer and roughly the same as those of a state-of-the-art (100% CC) Japanese 
plant.
51
 POSCO then compensated the lower productivity of its workforce, largely due 
to its lower experience and the less efficient technology used for casting processes, with 
lower wages (see tables 3.4 and 3.5 below). Japanese leading firms retained, at least for 
a short period of time, a marginal cost advantage in more technology-intensive cold-
rolled coil production, though, as table 3.3 shows, this was no longer the case for less 
efficient producers. 
POSCO‘s competition in global markets led to large excess capacity in the 
Japanese steel sector, further increasing production costs there as fixed costs tended to 
be spread less thinly. While POSCO attained 99% capacity utilisation during the mid-
1980s, the largest Japanese steel companies averaged only 52%, partly as the 
consequence of POSCO‘s entrance into the market.52 This gave the latter an overall cost 
competitiveness (i.e. including depreciation costs), even using less efficient 
technologies in the final stages of production. POSCO‘s low construction costs 
reinforced the trend. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 The differences between the two estimations are largely due to the methodologies used. 
52
 See Park (1997: 14). 
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Table 3.4      
Cold-rolled coils production - Efficiency indicators - 1985   
      
 Korea Japan Japan # Brazil Brazil ## 
US$/Man hour 2.85 11.70 11.70 2.90 4.65 
Man hour/ton 8.20 5.35 3.45 9.00 9.00 
Unit labour costs 23.37 62.60 40.37 26.10 41.89 
      
Iron ore - US$/ton 25.00 24.25 24.25 12.50 20.06 
Coal - US$/ton 59.00 59.50 59.50 60.00 60.00 
Yield to finish products (%) 82.00 89.00 89.00 80.00 80.00 
Iron ore/ton of steel 1.92 1.81 1.81 1.92 1.92 
Iron ore - US$/ton of steel 48 44 44 24 39 
 
Source: Barnett and Crandall (1986: 46) 
Note: # = New Integrated Mills (100% CC); ## = at PPP exchange rate 
 
Table 3.5     
Continuous casting ratio (%)   
     
 Korea Japan Brazil USA 
1975 19.7 31.1 5.7 9.1 
1977 31.7 40.8 17.4 12.5 
1980 32.4 59.5 33.4 20.3 
1983 56.6 86.3 44.3 32.1 
1985 63.3 91.1 43.7 44.4 
1987 83.5 93.3 45.5 59.8 
1989 94.1 93.5 53.9 64.8 
1990 96.1 93.9 58.5 67.4 
1991 96.4 94.4 56.0 75.7 
1994 97.8 96.9 59.3 88.9 
1995 98.2 95.8 71.6 91.0 
1997 98.7 96.6 73.9 94.7 
1998 98.6 96.9 80.4 95.5 
1999 98.7 97.2 88.2 95.9 
2000 98.5 97.3 90.2 96.4 
2001 98.6 97.5 91.6 96.9 
2002 98.5 97.8 92.6 97.2 
2003 98.5 97.7 91.9 97.3 
2004 98.3 97.8 92.7 97.2 
2005 98.1 97.8 92.4 96.8 
 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
These changes in the structure of the global steel industry resulted in differences 
in the accumulation capacities of industrial capitals invested in large-scale integrated 
mills in both countries. While the rate of profit for a representative, average steel mill in 
1985 Japan was about 8.45%, POSCO‘s pre-tax rate of profit would have been around 
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20%, instead of the meagre 1.5%, had it not sold steel products in the domestic market 
at substantially subsidised prices. Conversely, the pre-tax rate of return on capital 
advanced for valorisation for a representative Japanese steel mill that year would have 
been around 26% had they worked at full capacity and thus spread fixed costs more 
thinly. On the other hand, POSCO‘s rate of profit (at export rather than domestic market 
prices) in 1985 would have been around -2.3% had it paid Japanese wages to its 
production workers, and it would have been around 9% if these workers were also as 
productive as the Japanese.
53
 
In other words, the emergence of POSCO‘s competition eroded some of 
Japanese firms‘ internal and, crucially, external markets in low-end steel products, 
leaving them with excess capacity, as had happened a decade earlier to their US 
counterparts, and consequently further increasing their total average production costs 
and affecting their long-run international competitiveness. This not only limited gains 
from scale but also increased depreciation costs per unit of output. 
 
Table 3.6    
Cost of producing cold-rolled coil in 1991   
US$ per ton of finished product  
    
 Japan Korea Brazil 
Labour 145 67 82 
Raw materials 141 153 150 
Other materials 189 156 186 
Total operational cost 475 376 418 
 
Source: Mendes de Paula (1993: 5), based on World Steel 
Dynamics (1992). 
Note: Costs are based on 90% utilisation of capacity 
 
However, as can be observed in table 3.6 above comparing production costs of 
cold-rolled coils, the above-mentioned slight advantage enjoyed by Japan‘s most 
efficient steel mills disappeared through the second half of the 1980s, when POSCO 
installed its third continuous caster at the Pohang works, attaining 100% CC, and built 
its state-of-the-art fully automated and computerised plant in southern coastal town of 
Gwangyang. The construction of latter had begun in 1981, before the Pohang plant was 
fully finished. The first stage of this second project was completed in 1987 and counted 
                                                 
53
 See Appendix 3.1 at the end of this chapter for the methodology and sources used to pursue the 
computation of the magnitude and determinants of the rate of profit of specific industrial capitals in the 
steel industry, and table A3.1.1 for a summary of measurement results. 
 122 
with the most modern technology available at the moment, including CC facilities to 
mill 100% of crude steel production.
54
 Since POSCO has, directly or indirectly, 
produced for world markets using a relatively low-priced and highly productive 
workforce, it has found profitable to implement ever since the most vanguard 
technologies. In effect, POSCO has, since its incorporation, pursued a policy of 
permanent technological upgrading, replacing worn out equipment with state-of-the-art, 
highly automated and computerised units. In this way, POSCO rapidly caught-up with 
world market standards set by its Japanese counterparts.
55
 Unlike in Brazil, and in 
contrast to World Bank‘s opinion, the size of the domestic market has not lifted in post-
1960s Korea any structural limitation to the introduction of vanguard technology in the 
steel industry. Nevertheless, despite being one of the largest and most efficient 
steelmaking companies in the world, POSCO has not been itself at the forefront of 
technological developments in the sector. On the contrary, the company has 
concentrated on the introduction of ‗incremental‘ rather than ‗radical‘ innovations‘.56 
Throughout the 1990s, POSCO began to out-compete even the most efficient 
Japanese producers in almost every sector of the market (see table 3.7 below for the 
case of cold-rolled coils). By then, labour productivity in Korea had reached Japanese 
levels while wages remained 60-70% lower.
57
 Moreover, even after the 1990s revival of 
the US steel industry led by the mini-mill sector, POSCO could, unlike most of its 
Japanese counterparts, continue competing successfully in world markets for non-
speciality steel.
58
 The company‘s implicit rate of profit (i.e. return on capital advanced 
for valorisation) remained strong at around 25% in 1995 despite the emergence of a new 
global ‗steel crisis‘. 
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 See Hogan (2001: 25-35). 
55
 See D‘Costa (1994: 60, 1999: 70-2); Park (2003: 66). 
56
 See Hogan (2001: 63-73); Park (2003: 56-64). 
57
 See Park (1997: 14). 
58
 See Park (2003: 53-4). 
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Table 3.7    
Cost of producing cold-rolled coil in 1996  
US$ per ton of finished product  
    
 Japan Korea Brazil 
Labour 167 89 70 
Raw materials 142 148 148 
Other materials 201 156 160 
Total operational cost 510 393 378 
 
Source: Pagano (1999: 133), based on World Steel 
Dynamics (1996). 
Note: Costs are based on 90% utilisation of capacity 
  
As POSCO‘s global leadership strengthened, the Korean government initiated, 
in the middle of an overall programme of economic liberalisation, its divestment from 
the company. However, unlike the privatisation of the Brazilian steel industry (see 
below), the sale of POSCO was a slow-motion process. It began in the late 1980s and 
ended more than a decade later, in 2001, when the Korean government sold its 
remaining 20-25% of the company‘s equity. By the mid-2000s at least two thirds of the 
company‘s shares were owned by foreign investors.59 
The privatisation of POSCO was not, however, simply driven by an ideological 
stance or budgetary necessity. Two other key factors drove and sustained state‘s 
divestment from the company. First, by the 1990s, POSCO had already attained an 
efficient scale of operation and had become one of the largest and lowest-cost steel 
producers in the world market. Secondly, by then downstream industries were no longer 
in need of heavily subsidised steel products as they had also improved their 
international competitiveness substantially. On both sides, there was no longer need for 
public ownership of the company. While the 1980s market liberalisation drive started 
the process, the economic crisis of 1997-98 accelerated it. The Korean state was then in 
the need of resources to fund its debt burden and cover its budget deficit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 See D‘Costa (1999: 101); Hogan (2001: 16). 
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Table 3.8         
Production costs - Cold-rolled coils in 2003       
          
 USA Japan Germany Korea Korea # Brazil Brazil # China 
Raw materials 117 113 122 124 124 105 123 145 
Other materials 161 149 154 137 137 114 133 155 
Total material costs 278 262 276 261 261 219 256 300 
Employment ($/hour) 39 37.5 44 15 27 10 12 1.75 
Man hour/ton 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.9 3.9 4.4 4.4 12.7 
Labour costs 137 116 136 59 106 44 52 22 
Total operating costs 415 378 412 320 367 263 308 322 
Total financial costs 35 55 49 40 40 60 60 45 
Total pre-tax costs 452 432 460 360 407 325 380 368 
 
Source: Jha, et al. (2006: 24), based on information available in World Steel Dynamics (2003).  
Note: # = at the PPP exchange rate (for Korea only labour costs, for Brazil also raw materials) 
 
During its post-1998, privately-run era, POSCO‘s cost competitiveness in global 
markets remained strong though not as comfortable as before. In 2003 operational costs 
for the production of cold-rolled coils at PPP exchange rates were still lower than in the 
industrially advanced countries but higher than in China and Brazil where, nevertheless, 
steel products are, arguably, of lower quality than in established producers like Korea.
60
 
At market exchange rates, POSCO‘s operational costs were lower than the Chinese and 
Brazilian only thanks to the undervaluation of the Korean currency (see table 3.8). As 
domestic prices of steel began to slowly converge with international, export values, 
POSCO‘s profitability improved after its privatisation. Nevertheless, as late as 2003, it 
was still slightly below the average of the industrial sector. 
In summary, the emergence and long-term growth of the Korean steel industry 
shows that the country‘s vigorous export-led growth process was neither simply a 
product of state design nor of its non-involvement in the allocation of resources. On the 
contrary, the emergence of Korean steel industry resulted from the development of the 
autonomously regulated process of global capitalist accumulation that realised (i.e. 
came about) through the actions of the Korean state mediating the allocation of 
resources. In effect, state‘s long-term efforts in the promotion of the sector would only 
begin to pay-off after the mid-1970s, when the development of the NIDL was creating 
the conditions for capital to take advantage of the large availability of relatively cheap 
and highly disciplined labour-power to produce profitably steel in Korea for world 
markets. Before then, state policies had been as ineffective in building an internationally 
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 It should be noted that the Chinese Yuan is also widely considered to have been strongly undervalued. 
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competitive steel industry as they were in Brazil and in many other developing 
countries. Contemporary automated and computerised technologies had by then 
simplified production processes significantly and thus made possible the use of less 
skilled workforces. Korea had originally access to a substantially cheaper and more 
disciplined labour-force than Brazil and most other ‗developing‘ countries.61 And, even 
if wage levels increased strongly after the late 1980s while Korea‘s steel industry 
moved into the higher end of the market, they remained lower, and the working-day 
longer, there than in most of its competitors (i.e. the US, European and Japanese steel 
industries). Moreover, the use of subcontracting was, as in Japan, more widespread than 
in its main competitors, thus reducing average labour costs further. Trade unions have 
also been less ‗confrontational‘ than elsewhere; non-existent before 1987 and relatively 
weak thereafter.
62
 
 
The Brazilian steel industry  
 
 Despite being frequently clustered together as two of the upcoming steel 
exporting NICs, the history and recent situation of the Brazilian steel industry differs 
sharply from that of its Korean counterpart. Unlike Korea, Brazil has a long history of 
large-scale integrated production of steel. Import-substituting efforts there began in the 
1930s and expanded significantly during the 1940s under active state promotion. In 
1941, after plans to promote a privately-run project with foreign capital participation 
failed, state-owned National Steel Company (CSN) was finally incorporated. Five years 
later, Brazil‘s (indeed Latin America‘s) first fully, coke based, integrated steel mill was 
finished in Volta Redonda (Rio de Janeiro state), close to both the country‘s major 
industrial areas and iron ore mines.
63
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State intervention in the steel industry increased thereafter with the creation, and 
subsequent expansion, of a number of other companies and mills located in different 
industrial regions. Though controlled and partly funded by regional governments, all of 
them, as CSN before, received substantial and increasing amounts of federal resources 
channelled through the National Development Bank (BNDE), then charged with 
funding public sector investments.
64
 Effectively, the BNDE financed around 45% of the 
steel industry‘s investments during the Targets Plan (1956-60), implemented for the 
promotion of the consumer-durable goods and heavy industries. During this period, 
steel production capacity increased by 50% and reached 1.8 million tons per year when 
the Plan ended, largely through the expansion of CSN and the creation of the São Paulo 
Steel Company (Cosipa) and the Steel Mills of Minas Gerais (Usiminas). The latter two 
companies were jointly owned by São Paulo and Minas Gerais states, respectively, as 
well as the Federal Treasury and the BNDE. Usiminas also incorporated the 
participation of Japan‘s Nippon Steel.65 
As in Korea, the declared goal of CNS and the other state-owned steel 
companies was not only to achieve self-sufficiency in such a key product for industrial 
development and national defence as steel, but also to support the growth of 
downstream industries, like machinery, motor-vehicles, shipbuilding, construction and 
railways; all of them key sectors in the ISI programme.
66
 The industry‘s strategic 
importance and its sheer size made it the largest recipient of state financial support. 
During the second half of the 1950s and first of the 1960s, it received around 70% of 
total lending carried out by the BNDE which financed approximately 70-75% of its 
investments, including funds used for the expansion of Usiminas and Cosipa.
67
 
Nevertheless, despite the rapid expansion of productive facilities, during 1963-65, steel 
production growth came to a halt as the Brazilian economy entered its deepest and 
longest recession since the end of WWII when the mass of extraordinary social wealth 
in the form of land rent and, incipiently, foreign credits available to support capital 
accumulation stagnated. Flat steel production, which was under complete control of 
state companies, was particularly affected. Flat steel is largely demanded by the white-
goods, automobile and shipbuilding industries, all suffering from decreasing state 
support and weakening domestic demand for their output. By 1966, however, the local 
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67
 See Amarante Andrade and Silva Cunha (2003: 5); Amann et al (2004: 10). 
 127 
demand for steel began to recover and, thus, to increase rapidly the utilisation of 
installed capacity. Two years later, the Consultative Council for the Steel Industry 
(CONSIDER) was formed to plan and coordinate the build-up of extra productive 
capacity. The Council included members of different ministries and representatives of 
the private sector.  
During the 1970s, the steel industry enjoyed substantial growth, as resources to 
fund state investments grew larger. In 1971, as the ‗economic miracle‘ gained 
momentum and the demand for steel enlarged dramatically, the National Steel Plan was 
finally launched following the guidelines set up by CONSIDER. The Plan aimed at 
increasing productive capacities from 8 million tons per year in 1970 to 20 million in 
1980. For that purpose, it projected the creation of a holding company to embrace all 
state-owned steel firms and to rationalise their productive activities and investments 
projects. It also projected the creation of the National Steel Fund to finance the sector‘s 
expansion, though this never fully materialised. The Plan also reaffirmed the division of 
labour between state and private sector firms by stipulating that flat and long steel 
productions would largely remain under their respective control. Finally, the Plan 
projected that 20% of local capacities would be used to produce steel for external 
markets.
68
 In 1974, as the land rent available for appropriation and credit inflows 
enlarged strongly in the aftermath of the first ‗oil shock‘, the steel sector received 
further substantial state support under the auspices of the Second National Development 
Plan (NDP II) for the 1975-79 period. This was aimed at promoting the further 
substitution of industrial inputs and capital goods imports. In 1975, all state-owned steel 
firms finally came under the control of the holding company Brazilian Steel 
(Sidebras).
69
 Massive investments in productive facilities were thereafter undertaken by 
both state-owned and private sector firms. A large part of these were financed through 
the BNDE and other state-controlled financial institution.
70
 In the state sector, the 1970s 
saw not only the further expansion of CSN, Usiminas and Cosipa, but also the 
establishment of two new large mills, Tubarão Steel Company (CST) and Açominas. 
CST was a joint venture development of the Brazilian state, Japan‘s Kawasaki Steel and 
Italy‘s Finsider. It was constructed, following the Japanese/Korean model, in the coastal 
city of Vitoria (Espiritu Santo) with the main purpose of exporting semi-finished 
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slabs.
71
 Açominas was meant to produce a mix output included finished and semi-
finished products for both domestic and export markets. Moreover, some small 
privately-owned firms manufacturing specialty products were also absorbed by Sidebras 
during this period. At the same time, several wholly privately-owned firms also 
emerged or expanded their operations. Unlike state-owned steel enterprises, most 
private firms operated electric arc furnaces; all of them specialised in long products, 
using low-cost raw steel produced by state-owned firms as their main input.
72
 
Though internationally small before the 1970s, the expansion of the industry 
under the auspices and massive funding received during the NDP II, allowed Brazilian 
state-owned steel mills to attain the lower end of the ‗theoretical‘ minimum efficient 
scale of production. In the mid-1980s, after investments done under the NDP II had 
already matured and when exports peaked to reach 30% of total output, Brazilian large 
integrated mills had an average scale of 3.5 million tons of steel production capacity per 
year. Yet, Japanese and Korean plants, by then the most efficient producers, averaged 
almost three times that capacity.
73
  
As can be observed in table 3.9 below, in 1985 average operational costs (i.e. 
excluding the consumption of fixed capital) for the production of steel in Brazil were 
slightly above those in Japan and Germany and lower than those in the USA, where 
they were then exporting. However, unlike their Korean counterparts, Brazilian 
producers‘ cost competitiveness was not based on low labour costs. At PPP exchange 
rates, these were substantially higher than those prevailing in Japan and Germany as 
lower wages did not, as in Korea, compensate for the lower level of labour productivity 
springing from the obsolete technology used (for international standards) and the 
overstaffing of state-owned firms.
74
 These practices, however, were necessary to 
enlarge the markets for equipment manufacturers, in particular, and industrial capital, in 
general, and thus allow capital to appropriate land rent. Indeed, partly because of their 
lower scale of production and partly due to their procurement strategies, Brazilian steel 
mills were well behind the technological frontier and, crucially, attained a much lower 
degree of automation than their Japanese and Korean counterparts.
75
 Brazilian steel 
producers‘ international competitiveness during the 1980s was thus largely based on the 
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low local cost of iron ore and electricity and, during 1984-87, the strong undervaluation 
of the exchange rate. Brazil, unlike Korea and Japan, is a major producer of low-cost, 
high quality iron ore, a key input for integrated mill production, and of low-cost 
hydroelectricity. During this period, both were supplied by state-owned companies at 
subsidised prices (i.e. below international levels). 
 
Table 3.9       
Cost structure in the steel industry      
US$ per ton of finished product in June 1985     
       
  Brazil Germany Japan USA Brazil # 
Labour costs   76 81 68 132 123 
Coal   67 73 60 59 67 
Iron ore   17 50 52 85 28 
Energy   13 34 43 76 21 
Ferro alloy & fluxes   17 21 22 22 28 
Miscellaneous   37 50 66 88 60 
Operational costs   227 309 311 462 326 
Depreciation   44 18 31 30 44 
Subtotal   271 327 342 492 439 
Financial expenses   160 12 28 15 160 
Total   431 339 370 507 599 
 
Source: Fisher (1988: 203). 
Note: # = at PPP exchange rate.  
 
Nevertheless, despite these relatively low operational costs, the rate of profit of 
Brazilian state-owned steel companies was extremely low, even negative at times. As 
Korea‘s POSCO, these firms were selling their output at subsidised prices to benefit 
steel consuming industries, like cars, white-goods, ships manufacturers and non-
integrated steel producers.
76
 However, unlike POSCO, they were also purchasing their 
equipment and contracting construction services from local companies at substantially 
inflated prices (for world market norms).
77
 During the late 1960s and, crucially, the 
1970s, the local supply of highly-priced industrial equipment increased substantially 
under the auspices of different programmes implemented to deepen the ISI process, 
including the market reserve granted to local manufacturers.
78
 Thus, while average 
construction costs per 1,000 tons of annual production capacity in POSCO‘s Pohang 
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plant were US$ 500, they totalled US$ 1,000 in Açominas and US$ 3,000 CST, both 
finished around 1985 as the former.
79
 Brazil‘s high depreciation and financial expenses 
in the tables presented above partly express these inflated costs of construction and 
production equipment. The combination of high fixed capital costs, overstaffing and 
low prices for their output affected the rates of profit of these state-owned integrated 
mills. In 1985, they were -3.5% for Açominas, producing a mixed output mainly for the 
domestic market, and -0.83% for CST producing slabs mainly for external consumers. 
Their annual rates of profit in the mid-1980s would have been around 16.3% and 6.8%, 
respectively, were these companies paying international prices for their fixed capital 
investments (i.e. equipment and facilities).
80
 
As in Korea, all Brazilian state-owned steel companies were privatised during 
the 1990s. In Brazil, however, this process was swift and took place at the very 
beginning of the decade, when the process of ‗state-led‘ ISI was undergoing its deepest 
crisis ever. Without enough resources (i.e. land rent and foreign credits) to sustain the 
operation of state firms as supporters of the process of valorisation of private industrial 
capital, the former began to be sold or were closed down altogether. Between 1991 and 
1993, all eight state-owned steel companies, then producing around 85% of Brazilian 
steel output, were sold for a total US$ 8.2 billion (including US$ 2.6 billion in the debt 
transfer).
81
  
The privatisation process resulted in the partial consolidation of the industry 
and, consequently, in the rationalisation of employment practices and the upgrading of 
most productive facilities.
82
 This alleged efficiency-seeking process, however, did not 
result in the transformation of the underlying characteristics of the Brazilian steel 
industry. Labour productivity in the sector, though strongly increased, remained well 
below world market norms, as most plants continued producing in the lower end of the 
‗theoretical‘ minimum efficient scale and substantially below POSCO‘s. Technological 
and organisational standards, though improved, still lagged behind the world‘s vanguard 
in the industry.
83
 Hence, although through the mid-1990s the Brazilian steel industry 
became a global low-cost producer of low technology-intensive hot-rolled steel, its 
                                                 
79
 See D‘Costa (1999: 99). 
80
 See Appendix 3.1, especially table A3.1.1. 
81
 See Silva Cunha, et al. (2001: 3). 
82
 See Amann Nixson (1999: 76-8); Amarante Andrade and Silva Cunha (2003: 16). 
83
 See McKinsey (1998); Amann Nixson (1999: 69-71). See also table 3.5 above. 
 131 
international competitiveness was based on the low cost of local iron ore, electricity and 
now labour-power.
84
 
Despite these gains in international competitiveness, during the 1990s, in 
contrast to the experience of the previous decade, the Brazilian steel industry became 
again increasingly oriented towards the domestic markets. After the early years of the 
decade, exports fell below 30% of total output, and became concentrated in semi-
finished products, like slabs produced by CST and Açominas, and/or directed to the 
protected regional market (i.e. Mercosur countries).
85
 The strong overvaluation of the 
currency prevailing during most of this period, notably during 1994-98, together with 
the high cost of local transport and port facilities,
86
 strongly hurt the profitability of 
exports of goods other than raw or semi-processed materials (i.e. land rent bearers).
87
 In 
the case of the steel industry, exports of high value-added products became possible 
provided that tax credits and BNDES subsidised loans, through the Bank‘s 
‗modernisation fund‘ for equipment acquisitions, compensated for the negative impact 
of the exchange rate overvaluation on local costs other than raw materials.
88
 The 
overvaluation of the exchange rate, nevertheless, reduced the domestic price of iron ore 
and imported equipment, largely possible after the 1990-94 trade opening reforms, and 
thus allowed steel producers to appropriate land rent when selling their output in the 
domestic market.
89
 
The sector‘s profitability improved significantly as firms became privately-
owned. To begin with, employment in the steel industry was reduced by as much as 
37.6% during the 1989-1994 process of privatisation and subsequent adjustment, and a 
further 35% by 2000, when it attained its lowest point. Secondly, state-owned steel 
companies were purchased at prices far below the real value of the assets involved.
90
 In 
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1995, the return on capital invested (i.e. the rate of profit) for Brazilian steel producers 
was 3.6%, 10.2% and 23.4% when calculated at ‗replacement cost‘, ‗current market 
value‘ and ‗privatisation values‘, respectively.91  
After the 1999-2002 global and local economies slowdown, the Brazilian steel 
industry went through another process of consolidation, which included the entrance of 
major global leaders like ArcelorMittal buying CST and other smaller plants and the 
fusion of domestically-owned firms (e.g. the consolidation of the Gerdau Group 
owning, among others, Açominas). This process resulted in significant investments in 
technological upgrading and the expansion of production capacities, both heavily 
supported by BNDES subsidised loans.
92
 Nevertheless, despite these developments, no 
plant in Brazil managed to achieve the scale of operations of the two owned by POSCO, 
namely, 9.5 million tons of annual production capacity. Furthermore, the post-2004 
increasing exchange rate overvaluation (necessary to allow industrial capital to 
appropriate a portion of the expanding land rent, including that materialised in the price 
of iron ore and hydroelectricity) significantly hurt exports growth, notably of high 
value-added products, maintaining the structural limitations to the expansion of the 
market and therefore to the introduction of vanguard technology. 
In summary, before they were privatised in the early 1990s, state-owned steel 
companies, controlling almost all integrated facilities and the manufacture of flat 
products, played a central role in the promotion of the process of import-substituting 
industrialisation (i.e. in the accumulation of capital through the appropriation of land 
rent). They did so by supplying steel products to their clients at subsidised values, by 
purchasing equipment and machinery from domestic producers at inflated prices 
(notably after the early 1970s) and by employing more personnel than would have been 
considered necessary on strictly commercial grounds. The resources used to provide 
these subsidies originated not only in the profits of these companies as it was the case in 
Korea. A large part of these resources were composed of the agrarian and mining land 
rents, and, after 1968, of foreign capital borrowed by the state. Rents were channelled 
through the contributions and subsidised loans provided by the public sector treasury 
and developmental banks, respectively, and the importation of machinery with an 
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overvalued currency. Rents were also channelled through the supply to steel companies 
of iron ore at below international prices. Foreign interest-bearing capital was channelled 
through the borrowing activities of steel firms either to fund investments, including 
equipment importation, or current expenditures. 
After state-owned steel companies were privatised in the early 1990s, these 
firms stopped channelling a portion of the agrarian land rent and external credits to their 
suppliers and clients. Nevertheless, when in effect, the overvaluation of the exchange 
rate, acting as an export tax, reduced the domestic price of steel products, thus 
channelling rent materialised in the price of iron ore and hydroelectricity from mining 
landowners, the former also under private control after 1998, to steel producers and 
consumers (i.e. industrial capital, notably the automobile and white-goods sectors). 
Moreover, capitals invested in integrated steel mills began themselves, as any other 
private capital in Brazil, to appropriate a portion of the land rent and its complementary 
sources of extraordinary social wealth (e.g. through the purchase of imported equipment 
and the repatriation of profits with an overvalued exchange rate). 
 
3.1.2) Transformations in the global automobile industry 
 
 The automobile is the world‘s largest serial, discrete-production mechanical 
industry. Hence, it is not surprising that, since the inception the industry at the end of 
the nineteenth century, it has been at the forefront of the development and introduction 
of technological and organisational advances. During the first couples of decades, the 
production of automobiles was essentially a craft-like activity. Production volumes were 
low and most workers involved in the manufacturing process were skilled craftsmen 
performing relatively complex tasks using general-purpose machine-tools. Only in the 
second decade of the twentieth century were mass production and organisational 
techniques introduced in the USA, first by Ford Motor Company and, later on, by its 
competitors.
93
 
Broadly, mass production methods emerged from the combination of 
organisational techniques developed by Frederick Winslow Taylor (the so-called 
‗scientific management‘ approach) and the moving assembly line introduced by Ford 
Motor Company around 1913. As most path-breaking technological changes, mass 
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production techniques transformed the set of skills required from the industrial 
workforce. The ‗scientific management‘ approach was centred in the exhaustive 
examination of productive tasks involved in a given manufacturing process and their 
decomposition into a multiplicity of simple movements, which could be then easily 
learnt and performed by semiskilled or unskilled manual workers specialised in one 
single (relatively simple) operation. The motorised and thus moving assembly line, in 
turn, took away from the manual worker the control over the pace of the labour process 
itself. Nevertheless, despite this simplification of manual industrial labour processes and 
the possibility for management (i.e. capital) to accelerate the rhythm of work, machine-
tools continued in the hand of manual workers and the success of each operation 
remained dependent on their abilities and dexterousness (i.e. the unity hand/eye/brain). 
Although in the machine shop, where parts and components are machined before being 
assembled, some operations were already being mechanised through the use of general-
purpose, and incipiently special-purpose, machine-tools and electromechanical motor 
devices, even in these cases, each machine remained being tendered by a specialised 
worker.
94
 
Mass production techniques combining a moving assembly line with simplified 
operations executed by largely semiskilled manual workers were first introduced in the 
US automobile industry where craft workers were relatively less abundant than in 
Europe, where the industry had been born. Nevertheless, they were afterwards slowly 
transplanted to Europe, either through direct investment by US automobile companies 
or, due to the ensuing competitive pressure, by local firms.
 95
 
Despite being subjected to a myriad of modifications and incremental 
improvements, production and organisational methods remained relatively unchanged 
until the 1950s. By then, the first fixed automation systems of production were 
introduced for repetitive, high-volume tasks in the production of parts, like engines, 
power trains and axles. These systems emerged from the combination of special-
purpose machine-tools and transfer machines. They were thereafter known as transfer 
lines.
96
 A decade later, NC machine-tools made an entrance in the machine shop to be 
used for low-volume prototype production, die-making and testing operations, and for 
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the calibration of machine-tools for high-volume, serial mechanical production. 
Assembly operations, on the contrary, remained largely manual.
97
 
The use of NC machine-tools and fixed automation systems resulted in 
important transformations in the optimum set and structure of skills required from the 
industry‘s workforce, and consequently in its geographical location. Combined, these 
technologies greatly reduced the requirements of skilled, experienced manual workers, 
notably in the machine shop. In effect, once machining operations were automated, a 
less skilled but cheaper worker could be brought into the shop-floor and even tender 
several ‗stations‘.98 Moreover, the use of NC machine-tools also reduced the need for 
highly skilled workers in such key areas of the production process as die- making. 
These tasks too could then also be performed by a less skilled but cheaper worker. 
As was the case in the steel industry, these technological changes manifested 
themselves in the reshaping of global automobile production. The rapid and widespread 
introduction of fixed automation systems and NC machine-tools by Japanese motor-
vehicle manufacturers since as early as the late 1950s allowed them to enjoy substantial 
increases in the levels of productivity of the labour-force they employed.
99
 The 
characteristics of Japanese labour, crucially its discipline and lower levels of craft skills, 
and the ‗dual‘ structure of Japan‘s labour market (with its relatively large supply of 
unskilled, low-paid manual workers) created material conditions which were 
particularly favourable for the introduction of the new technologies.
100
 Effectively, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, fixed automation systems and, crucially, NC machine-tools 
were introduced in the Japanese automobile industry faster than in that of any other of 
the major producing country. The greatly increased productivity of labour in Japan‘s 
auto industry, though on average lower than in the USA until the late-1970s-to-early-
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1980s, could then be compensated for with its much lower cost.
101
 On these bases, 
Japanese manufacturers rapidly caught up and even surpassed their US and European 
counterparts, notably in the lower-end of the market, namely, the production of compact 
passenger cars.
102
 
These technological bases, however, would not remain unchanged. In the second 
half of the 1970s, the automobile industry, as most serial production mechanical 
industries, speeded up the process of equipment automation through the computerisation 
of the calibration of machines and transfer lines, the use of CNC machine-tools in the 
machining process, and, later on, the introduction of robots in the assembly line.
103
 
Industrial robots have since been used for relatively complex processes, such as spot 
and arch welding (for chassis and parts assembly) and painting, and for relatively 
simple tasks, like material handling and machine feeding. Robots have been also 
increasingly used in the assembly of electronic components.
104
 The final fitting of 
components and parts, on the contrary, has remained largely a manual (i.e. non-
automated) process.
105
 NC machine-tools, originally used in low-volume productions, 
die making/changing, and for product testing, have been, increasingly used in 
machining and transfer operations for high-volume production of auto-parts.
106
 Such 
developments have greatly increased the ‗flexibility‘ of industrial facilities, as they 
reduced significantly the costs associated with setting up the machinery for serial 
mechanical production. They have also resulted in the further simplification of the job 
of machine-tool operation and control.
107
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had as a counterpart much lower levels of both in the parts and components sector. See Williams, et al. 
(1994: 55-63). 
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As had been the case with fixed automation, Japanese auto companies were also 
the most eager users of new flexible automation systems.
108
 The reasons behind this 
commercial strategy remained unchanged. Indeed, during the 1980s, when Japanese 
firms became global leaders thanks to their now absolutely higher levels of labour 
productivity, the difference in the use of automated technologies between them and their 
US and European competitors was not only quantitative but also qualitative. While auto 
firms in Japan largely focused in the introduction of robots performing the relatively 
skill-intensive tasks of welding and painting, for which there was still insufficient 
supply of qualified workers, companies in the USA and Europe also introduced them 
for simpler tasks such as material handling and parts assembly/fitting.
109
 
 In summary, the increasingly automated machinery systems used in the 
automobile industry not only allowed labour productivity gains. They have also tended 
to simplify the work of manual labourers in and outside the assembly line and, 
consequently, to make possible that these tasks were performed by less skilled and thus 
cheaper workers. The strongly differentiated structure of skills and payment conditions 
prevailing in the Japanese labour market were originally more suitable for the profitable 
introduction of automated technologies than that of its US and European counterparts. 
Unlike in Japan, skills and remunerations in the latter two were relatively even across 
the different members of the collective labourer of large-scale industry. In other words, 
given the characteristics and price of the Japanese industrial workforce, productivity 
increases and cost reductions related to the introduction of automated technologies were 
much larger in Japan then elsewhere. The use of relatively more expensive automated 
technologies was thus commercially more convenient there than in the USA and 
Europe. Indeed, it would take more than two decades of neoliberal policies in the latter 
regions, and the geographical relocation of some parts of the production processes 
within and outside them, to reproduce in their spaces of accumulation the structure of 
skills and remunerations corresponding to the ‗new‘ technological conditions.110 As 
investments by US companies in Europe led the way for the introduction of 
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technological changes in the 1920s, Japanese transplants in the US and Europe led it in 
the 1980s.
111
 
These technological transformations not only changed the types of skills 
required from, and thus the optimal composition of, the industry‘s workforce, resulting 
in its geographical restructuring. They also affected the structure of inter-firm relations 
and thus of the industry itself. For technical and commercial reasons, the process of 
automation has not spread evenly across the different parts of the industry‘s production 
process. As a result of the uneven introduction of automated and robotised systems of 
machinery, the scales of production and the skill-intensity of the various sub-sectors of 
the automotive industry have evolved differently, notably since the ‗microelectronics 
revolution‘. In general terms, automation proceeded faster in auto-parts manufacturing 
than in final assembly stages. This has implied that optimal scales of production in the 
former sub-sector became larger than in the latter. In effect, while minimum efficient 
scales for engine casting and power train machining have been around 750,000-
1,000,000 units per year, they have been only one quarter of these amounts in final 
assembly.
112
 In addition, as the production of parts and components became 
increasingly automated, they tended to require less skilled and thus cheaper production 
workers. In the USA, for instance, average wages in the auto-parts sector, which had 
been almost equal to those paid to assembly workers during 1958-1978, fell 23% in real 
terms between the late 1970s and 2000 while those paid in the assembly sector 
remained constant.
113
 
As a result of these transformations, since the second half of the 1980s, the 
automobile industry has been undergoing at the same time a process of vertical 
specialisation, on the part of assemblers, and of vertical integration, on the side of parts 
and components producers. The so-called first tier suppliers of auto-parts and 
components have become increasingly involved in the production of sub-assembled 
systems and modules, and, consequently, in the associated skill-intensive processes of 
research and development previously undertaken by assemblers.
114
 The large minimum 
efficient scale necessary for the development and manufacturing of these increasingly 
complex products implies that they have tended to become common to different models, 
                                                 
111
 See Hoffman and Kaplinsky (1989: 89-96); Sturgeon and Florida (2004: 57-8); Lansbury et al. (2007: 
12). 
112
 See Lucke (1987: 5-8); Husan (1997). Also see Hkust (2005: 8) citing Nolan (2001).  
113
 Sturgeon and Florida (2004: 53-5). 
114
 Sturgeon and Florida (2004: 69-74); Lansbury (2007: 16-7). 
 139 
platforms and, crucially, even brands of motor-vehicles. In some cases, these firms were 
created out of final assemblers from which they separated, such as Delphi and Visteon 
which spun-off from General Motors and Ford, respectively. In other cases, independent 
firms just grew larger an integrated backwards (e.g. Bosch, Magna and Continental). 
Irrespective of their commercial origins, the largest of these companies, have become 
suppliers with global presence.
115
 At the same time, automobile producers, on the 
contrary, have been increasingly transformed from integral manufactures to proper final 
assemblers, following the Japanese model developed by Toyota in the late 1950s. The 
resulting differences in terms of skill requirement in the distinct parts of the production 
of motor-vehicles have also created the incentive for US and European firms to relocate 
some of these activities to low-wage countries (e.g. Mexico and Eastern Europe, 
respectively) or, in some cases, to non-unionised regions within their countries (e.g. the 
US Midwest), thus reproducing within their regional spaces of accumulation the ‗dual‘ 
labour market conditions originally existing in Japan. Though a highly differentiated 
wage structure was characteristic of the Japanese auto industry since its origins, firms 
there have also ended up relocating the production of some parts to lower wage 
countries in Asia.
116
 
 The introduction of fixed automation systems (i.e. based on the combination of 
single-purpose machine-tools and electro-mechanical and hydraulic motor devices) and 
of NC machine-tools explains, together with the availability of relatively cheap and 
highly disciplined labour-power, the emergence, through the 1960s and 1970s, of 
Japanese auto firms as global producers. The development of industrial robots and CNC 
machine-tools, and the consequent emergence of flexible automation systems, accounts 
for their transformation, through the 1980s, in global-market leaders. It also explains, 
together with the productive characteristics and low price of the Korean labour-force, 
the transformation, in a period as short as ten years, of Korean assemblers into major 
players in world markets for low-end automobiles. It is not a coincidence that Korean 
firms were the fastest among developing country automobile manufacturers in 
introducing automated, notably robotised, technologies.
117
 These matched their ‗factor 
endowments‘. 
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 The Brazilian automotive industry, on the contrary, was much slower in 
introducing NC machines-tools, let alone CNC equipment and robots, despite having 
grown much faster and invested more heavily than its Korean counterparts in the pre-
mid-1980s period. Its international competitiveness has consequently been weaker and 
its growth more irregular. As it was mentioned above, the accumulation of capital 
through the appropriation of land rent have lifted a strong barrier to the development 
and application of technology in Brazil‘s industrial sector. First, it has circumscribed the 
production of industrial goods to the domestic market, thus limiting the scale of 
production and therefore the introduction of vanguard technologies. Secondly, it has 
allowed, and created the incentive for, MNC assemblers established there to valorise 
their capitals normally despite using obsolete (for world market norms) and sometimes 
already depreciated machinery and without competing (with their parent plants) in 
global markets. Finally, it has also limited the availability of advanced equipment in the 
domestic markets as part of the capital goods industry has been protected to foster 
import-substitution. Interestingly, Japanese automobile firms producing in Brazil for the 
domestic market were, by the mid-1980s, the slowest to introduce the most modern 
technologies, such as NC and CNC machine tools.
 118
 
 
The Korean automobile industry 
 
 The Korean automobile industry has its origins in the early 1960s, when the 
government passed the Automotive Protection Law as part of the implementation of the 
First Five-year Economic Development Plan (1962-66). In a classical effort to promote 
import-substitution, the Korean state banned the importation of finished cars, granted 
tax exemptions to local assemblers, and eliminated import tariffs on parts and 
components. Under these favourable conditions, modern assembly of semi knock-down 
(SKD) kits began in 1962 by Saenara Motors in partnership with Japan‘s Nissan. In an 
attempt to avoid ‗excessive‘ fragmentation in the industry, this was the only project 
allowed by the government to assemble small-size motor-vehicles. The venture, 
however, collapsed after only one year as the Korean economy faced a balance-of-
payments crisis and went into recession. In 1964, Shinjin Motors, in alliance with 
Mitsubishi and, afterwards, Toyota, was selected to enter the industry in replacement of 
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failed Saenara and became the only producer of the ‗mass-consumed‘ passenger cars 
segment. Nevertheless, in a reversal of policy, in 1967 Hyundai and Asia Motors were 
also allowed to enter the industry in partnership with Ford and Renault/Fiat, 
respectively. In a tie-up with Mazda, Kia followed in 1971.
119
  
 Despite the state support received by the sector, not qualitatively different from 
the type then granted to other ‗developing‘ country motor-vehicle industries, like the 
Brazilian, the production of automobiles in Korea remained not only anaemic 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s but also mainly confined to the assembly of SKD 
kits.
120
 Local content remained low (38% in 1970 and 50% in 1972), despite the 
different plans and promotional laws implemented to increase it. Already in the early 
1970s, less than 10,000 passenger cars were assembled per year in Korea.
121
 As noted 
above, primary sector surpluses and foreign aid resources were not large enough to 
sustain the production of complex durable-consumer goods, such as automobiles, for 
domestic consumers, as it was currently the case in Brazil and other South American 
countries.
122
 Moreover, contemporary technological conditions and the associated 
structure of the global auto industry were not yet allowing Korean firms to take 
advantage of the local availability of cheap and highly disciplined semiskilled labour-
power to produce motor-vehicles of acceptable quality at internationally competitive 
prices. Unsurprisingly, despite the above mentioned tie-ups, auto MNCs did not invest 
heavily in Korean, crucially for proper manufacturing activities, as they were doing in 
Brazil and other developing countries. 
 Continuing with the ISI efforts of the previous decade, in the early 1970s, the 
Korean automotive industry received a new stimulus when it was included in the heavy 
and chemical industries drive. Under the 1974 Automobile Industry Promotion Plan, the 
government granted further market protection and subsidised credit apart from cheap 
steel products from state-owned POSCO. The Plan was meant to move the local auto 
industry from assembly to manufacturing and from exclusive focus on domestic sales to 
exports. Under this umbrella and the requirements of the Plan, domestic assemblers, 
Hyundai, General Motors Korea (previously Shinjin and later on Daewoo Motors) and 
Kia, undertook substantial investments in modern plants, through the implementation of 
new alliances or joint ventures with Japanese or US firms and the licensing of the 
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necessary technology (i.e. product and process know-how) to produce ‗national‘ 
‗people‘s cars‘.123 To deal with the lack of an adequate domestic supply of highly 
skilled labour, like engineers and project managers, local firms even contracted foreign 
workers, most of them from Europe. Local production of automobiles proper began 
finally in Korea.
124
  
 Nevertheless, unlike steel and other heavy industrial goods, motor-vehicles 
production grew only moderately during the 1970s. It climbed from the insignificant 
28,819 units (most of them commercial vehicles) built in 1970 to almost 205,000 in 
1979, before falling back to 123,000 during the 1980 recession. The largest share of 
local output was, as in Brazil, still destined to the protected domestic markets.
125
 In 
contrast to the already largely automated continuous flow (i.e. process) industries, 
automobile manufacturing still required an important amount of tacit knowledge on the 
part of manual workers. Despite heavy investments in facilities, labour productivity 
remained low by international standards and local producers unable to compete in 
global markets. In effect, between 1975 and 1981, it took, on average, 8 times as much 
labour-time in auto-parts production and assembly work in Korea as in Japan to 
manufacture a motor-vehicle.
126
 With a productivity gap of that magnitude, unit labour 
costs in Korea were still higher than in Japan, even if wages were substantially lower.
127
 
Furthermore, most models ‗developed‘ and produced domestically were low-quality 
copies of old US, Japanese and European cars, thus making external sales even more 
difficult. Local content, though increasing, remained modest in comparison to the 
contemporary Brazilian experience, notably for key technologically complex parts and 
components.
128
 Korea‘s automotive industry only survived behind strong market 
                                                 
123
 See Lew (1992: 170-95). According to Ravenhill (2001: 7), ―Hyundai had already developed plans for 
a Korean car before the government announced its directive (raising the question of where the initiative 
for the ‗people‘s car‘ actually originated).‖ 
124
 See Green (1992: 414); Lansbury (2007: 57). 
125
 See Lansbury et al. (2007: 34). According to Noble (2005: 10) exports were made of ‗dated compacts 
of execrable quality dumped at below costs prices‘. 
126
 See Williams, et al. (1994: 61-3). This figure, computed by adding total hours of work in the parts and 
assembly sectors and dividing the sum by the number of motor-vehicles produced, underestimates the 
difference as the Korean automotive industry as a whole was then far less self-sufficient than the 
Japanese, needing to import a much greater portion of its inputs. 
127
 See table A3.3.1 and A3.3.2 in the Appendix 3.3 at the end of this chapter for the evolution of labour 
productivity and costs in different national automotive industries. 
128
 See Green (1992: 416); Lew (1992: 184-9). 
 143 
protection and state support. Exports were meagre and only possible due to state 
subsidies.
129
 
 Through the mid-1980s, however, the Korean motor-vehicles industry would 
finally begin to take-off strongly. Contemporary transformations in the global process 
of capitalist development were generating the conditions for capital to produce in Korea 
this type of durable-consumer goods for world markets. Yet, the structural 
transformation of the Korean automotive industry would not be a smooth process. In 
effect, it was only after the early 1980s crisis, when local production and exports fell 
sharply, that the motor-vehicle industry would emerge as an internationally competitive 
player at the lower end of the global market of passenger cars. After several failed 
government-sponsored attempts, the market led, through a severe economic and 
profitability crisis, to the reorganisation and consolidation of the sector.
130
 This market-
provoked reorganisation realised through the intervention, once the crisis took major 
proportions, of the Korean state ‗forcing‘ the centralisation of private capital and the 
‗rationalisation‘ of the industry. Still, despite government‘s strong intentions to retain 
only one auto producer under foreign control, two companies, Hyundai and Daewoo, 
were finally ‗selected‘ to manufacture passenger cars.131 A third, Kia, was ‗selected‘ to 
produce commercial vehicles and trucks, its original focus, but soon applied to re-enter 
the passenger cars sector and was allowed to do so in 1984, once market conditions had 
already improved.
132
 ―Once again, the government appeared to be following rather than 
leading the private sector in the automotive industry.‖133  
As the global economy recovered recover after 1983, local and overseas demand 
for automobiles improved. Motor-vehicles production in Korea thus began to expand 
again. Partly due to the previous consolidation of the sector and partly because of the 
increased demand for their output, Korean firms and plants then managed to get closer 
to the scale of production necessary to efficiently introduce vanguard technology in the 
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form of robots for welding and painting, the most skill-intensive portions of the 
assembly process, as well as CNC machine-tools for parts machining.
134
 In partnership 
with foreign firms, Korean automakers then embarked on a new wave of investments in 
state-of-the-art productive facilities, notably under the auspices of the 1986 Industrial 
Development Law designed to support the upgrading of ‗nascent‘ industries, like the 
automotive, and the restructuring of ‗declining‘ sectors.135 Labour productivity in the 
Korean automotive industry thus increased sharply as did rationalisation in the use of 
materials. Between 1981 and 1988, the amount of labour-time necessary to build a 
motor-vehicle in Korea went from 8.1 to only 2.7 times that in Japan.
136
 The much 
lower wages paid to manual production workers in Korea, notably after the post 1985 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen vis-à-vis the Won, were then capable of compensating 
for the differences in labour productivity.
137
 In effect, through the second part of the 
1980s, Korean companies were beginning to penetrate successfully the world markets 
of low-end automobiles, previously supplied by their Japanese counterparts, especially 
as these were ‗voluntarily‘ restricting their exports to the USA.138 
Under these conditions, motor-vehicle production in Korea expanded rapidly 
while the industry became increasingly export-oriented. Production jumped to 1.5 
million units by 1991, a more than tenfold increase in only one decade. Exports 
expanded sharply during 1985-88, a large portion of them to the highly competitive and 
lucrative North American market, to reach 26% of total output.
139
 During this period of 
rapid growth, the pre-tax rate of profit (i.e. return on assets) of Hyundai, Korea‘s 
leading automobile company, rocketed to an average of 20.5% per year.
140
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The strong expansion of the Korean automotive industry was most notable since, 
in sharp contrast to the experience of almost all other ‗developing‘ countries, including 
Brazil, production there was mostly controlled by a few domestically-owned firms, each 
specialising in relatively few products and models.
141
 This feature of the Korean auto 
industry, however, did not mean that it remained commercially independent from 
foreign influence, as it is frequently argued.
142
 First, almost all production equipment 
and the most skill and technology intensive parts and components used for automobile 
manufacturing (e.g. original car designs and engines, transmissions and electronic 
systems) remained sourced outside Korea.
143
 Secondly, during the 1980s restructuring, 
foreign companies were allowed to expand their presence in the industry through closer 
alliances with domestic firms, sometimes, notably in the case of GMK/Daewoo, 
involving the production in Korea under Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) 
arrangements.
144
 Furthermore, Hyundai‘s successful penetration of the North American 
markets during the second part of the decade was largely possible due to its partnership 
with Mitsubishi who, in exchange for 10% of the company‘s equity, provided the much 
needed engine, environmental and safety technologies.
145
 
Effectively, the relationship between Korean auto firms and their foreign 
counterparts was more diverse than frequently claimed. While Hyundai retained 
managerial control over its partnership with Mitsubishi and managed to undertake 
relatively independent Research and Development (R&D) and technology acquisition 
strategies, Daewoo was until the early 1990s under GM‘s virtual control from which it 
depended almost completely for technology provision. Kia continued with its tie-up 
with Mazda and pursued an intermediate strategy.
146
 Moreover, through the mid-1980s, 
the acquisition of foreign technology also began to take a new form, namely, the 
establishment of R&D and styling centres in the USA, Europe and Japan.
147
 Indeed, 
having access to an internationally cheap labour-force, Korean automobile 
manufacturers were concentrating in the relatively less skill-intensive stages of the 
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production process. On the contrary, the domestic supply of the labour-force required to 
undertake basic R&D activities was still highly limited.
148
 
 The strong 1986-88 expansion of exports, however, was short-lived. As global 
markets cooled, Japanese car manufacturers lowered the price of their compact models 
to regain space lost to their Korean counterparts at the lower end of the market. 
Nevertheless, domestic demand remained strong and, notably after 1992 when overseas 
markets recovered, the Korean motor-vehicle industry, especially the production of 
passenger cars, expanded massively. By the middle of the decade, Korea became the 
fourth largest motor-vehicles manufacturer, ahead of such countries as France, Italy and 
the UK, producing 2.8 million units in 1997, 46.6% of them for foreign markets.
149
 
Thanks to the continuous introduction of state-of-the-art automated production 
equipment, labour productivity kept increasing fast in the Korean automobile sector to 
reach about 60% of Japanese levels by the mid-1990s.
150
 Korean manufacturers could 
then comfortably compensate the lower level of labour productivity with lower wages 
and longer working-days. Furthermore, with lower investments in original designs and 
technologies, they were able to offer lower prices than their competitors from 
established brands in small, low-end automobiles. Despite significant investments in 
domestic R&D facilities, especially by Hyundai, most design concepts and innovations 
as well as technology and skill-intensive components and systems were still sourced 
outside Korea.
151
 To the previous forms of technology acquisition, it was then added the 
purchase of foreign high-tech firms by Korean automobile companies. This was most 
notable in the case of Daewoo who, after ending its partnership with GM, bought UK‘s 
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International Automotive Design were large part of its models have been conceptualised 
and styled thereafter.
152
 
Despite the substantial increase in the local supply of highly trained and 
experienced engineers and the simplification of design and product engineering work 
associated with the introduction of computer-assisted techniques, Korean industrial 
capital still had not sufficient access to the portion of the labour-force capable of 
performing these creative and complex tasks, at least not at world market standards. 
Neither did they reach the minimum efficient scale of 5 million units usually regarded 
as needed for the profitable investment in vanguard R&D.
153
 These, nevertheless, were 
not obstacles for the normal valorisation of capital invested in the Korean automobile 
industry. Hyundai‘s rate of profit during 1985-1996, when the company took-off and 
positioned itself as a major global producer of low-end passenger cars, was higher than 
Toyota‘s, the contemporary most competitive company in the global market of 
automobiles. While Hyundai‘s rate of profit averaged around 11% per year, Toyota‘s 
averaged 8.36% or 10.57% including interest earned on their financial assets.
154
 
The economic crisis that affected the Korean economy during 1997-98 showed, 
however, that not everything was rosy in the motor-vehicle industry. To being with, a 
large part of the resources used to fund the previous ambitious expansion in productive 
facilities had been borrowed, crucially in international credit markets.
155
 In addition, 
local producers were beginning to feel the pinch from new low-cost competitors for 
low-end products, located in countries like Mexico, Slovakia, China and India, while 
being still unable to compete in high-end auto markets. Indeed, Korean cars still had 
significantly higher rate of failures than their more established competitors and, 
consequently, a lower brand image.
156
 Moreover, the 1995 devaluation of the Japanese 
Yen had put extra pressure on Korean auto producers who had been largely competing 
on the basis of price. When global credit supply began to dry up in 1997-98, these 
problems became painfully evident and the Korean motor-vehicle industry entered a 
deep crisis together with most of the rest of the country‘s manufacturing sector. As 
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domestic demand contracted sharply, automobile production fell from 2.82 in 1997 to 
1.95 million in 1998.
157
 
As in the early 1980s, the 1997-98 crisis gave place to another rationalisation 
and consolidation of the sector characterised by two main features, both involving the 
further expansion of foreign-owned firms‘ participation in the industry. First, Kia and 
Daewoo Motors went bankrupt and were absorbed by Hyundai and General Motors, 
respectively. The former remained ‗independent‘ but sold 10-15% of its shares to 
Daimler-Chrysler who itself owned a third of Mitsubishi.
158
 Samsung, which was finally 
allowed into the passenger cars market in partnership with Nissan during the peak of the 
mid-1990s expansion but came on stream one year before the crisis, also collapsed and 
was bought by Renault, Nissan‘s new owner.159 These alliances helped the Korean 
automobile industry to acquire the know-how further to improve design capabilities and 
product quality, and to be able to expand into the higher segments of the automobile 
markets. Secondly, leading first tier auto-parts producers, like US‘s Delphi, Germany‘s 
Bosch and Japan‘s Denso, also managed to enter the market and established plants to 
produce in Korea, taking advantage of the effect of the undervaluation of the Korean 
currency on the value of domestic industrial assets.
160
 In addition, Hyundai and Daewoo 
started relocating some activities to lower-wage countries, like India, China, Romania 
and Poland, to produce the lower end of their product range
161
 and also expanded the 
use of low-cost ‗temporary‘ workers or subcontractors in Korea as a form of keeping 
domestic labour costs down. Temporary or subcontracted workers employed by 
Hyundai in Korea increased from 16.6% of the shop-floor personnel in 2001 to 31.2% 
in 2003. Wages paid to these types of workers have been on average about 60% of those 
paid to regular workers.
162
 Helped by these transformations and the post-1997 strong 
undervaluation of exchange rate, acting as an implicit subsidy to exports, Korean 
production of motor-vehicles rebounded sharply, expanding from just below 2 million 
units in 1998 to 4.1 million in 2007, with sales in foreign markets accounting for around 
half of total output.
163
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160
 See Bloomberg Businessweek (2005); Noble (2005: 15). 
161
 See O‘Brien (1998: 120-8); Ravenhill (2001: 2); Lautier (2001: 238-58); Lansbury et al. (2007: 53-4). 
162
 See Lee and Frenkel (2004); Chung (2005: 13). 
163
 See table A3.3.1 in the Appendix 3.3. 
 149 
Nevertheless, despite these transformations and the post-1998 impressive 
export-led recovery, the bases for the valorisation of industrial capital invested in the 
production of motor-vehicles in Korea remained unchanged. Though manufacturing, 
and to some extent design, capabilities finally reached world market standards, it is 
questionable the extent to which Korean firms have been undertaking vanguard R&D 
even if this has been increasingly simplified through the use of computer-assisted 
techniques and the local supply of highly skilled engineers has increased dramatically. 
To begin with, although Hyundai/Kia, the only independent Korean auto firm, has been 
rapidly approaching the five million units of production supposedly needed for 
profitable investments in R&D; this is well below the output of Toyota, the leader in the 
market niche targeted by Hyundai.
164
 With the recent modularisation trend and the 
consequent increase in the number of models (and thus units) per platform, it is doubtful 
that this scale difference is unimportant in terms of design capabilities. Moreover, with 
the partial exception of Mobis, a Hyundai spin-off, Korea‘s home-grown producers of 
auto-parts have lagged far behind those of any other major automobile manufacturing 
country.
165
 As mentioned above, in the last twenty years technological improvements in 
product design and production processes have been increasingly developed in the parts 
and components sector. The development of the capabilities to design original models 
as well as parts and components is a precondition to generate product innovations, to 
appropriate surplus profits (‗technological rents‘), and thus to normally valorise in the 
long term. Despite recent advances, Korea‘s auto firms have been lagging behind their 
competitors in this field. In effect, Korean producer‘s cost advantage has remained 
sustained on the cheapness of its workforce
166
 relative its productivity, and, after 1998, 
also the strong undervaluation of the national currency.
167
 
In summary, in Korea, as in several other ‗developing‘ countries, the state began 
to promote the motor-vehicle industry with import-substituting policies as early as 
1962. An initial policy ‗failure‘ became a ‗success‘ only by the mid-1980s, when the 
conditions for the valorisation of capital invested in the assembly of automobiles in 
Korea had significantly changed as a result of the dynamics of the global process of 
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capital accumulation depicted above. Korean auto-makers, independently or in 
partnership with, or under control of, foreign companies became global producers of 
low-end passenger cars.
168
 Production equipment, complex parts (e.g. engines, 
transmissions) and (original) design know-how have been sourced out of the country, 
with the partial exception of Hyundai recently. Until the late 1980s, the political 
repression of the local labour-force reinforced its cheapness due to its historical origins 
and thus helped reproduce the base of the industry‘s international competitiveness, 
namely, the access to a relatively cheap and disciplined, and thus highly productive, 
labour-force. This was particularly important when Korean firms specialised in the most 
labour-intensive sector of the industry, the final assembly of automobiles, and in low-
quality productions. Thereafter, as wages increased rapidly, Korean firms began to 
suffer, sooner or later, the competitive pressure coming from manufacturers established 
in low-wage countries, without being able to compete in the high-end of the market. 
Though this has changed recently, their price competitiveness in this sector of the global 
markets has continued to be sustained through long working-days and the 
undervaluation of the national currency. 
 
The Brazilian automobile industry 
 
Though the assembly of completely knock-down CKD kit by US automobile 
companies Ford and GM began in Brazil as early as the 1920s, it was only in the second 
part of the 1950s that local, integrated production of motor-vehicles would become a 
fact.
169
 By then, the industry received a strong boost with the implementation of a series 
of policies to foster import-substitution in the sector. Already in 1956, the government 
created the Executive Group for the Automobile Industry in order to design and 
coordinate the implementation of the policies necessary to accomplish the ambitious 
goals for the industry set for in the Targets Plan launched during Kubitschek‘s 
developmentalist government. These included the protection of domestic markets from 
foreign competition, the provision of subsidised loans by state banks like the BNDE and 
the exemption of tariffs for imports of equipment and parts not produced domestically. 
                                                 
168
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More important, however, was the permission, since 1955, to import used and amortised 
machinery, and the priority access to low-priced foreign exchange given, since 1956, to 
firms producing, rather than simply assembling, locally. The latter measure reduced the 
cost imported of parts and components and multiplied (by a factor equal of the degree of 
exchange rate overvaluation) the value in foreign currency of profit remittances.
170
 
Furthermore, during the implementation of the Targets Plan, the Brazilian government 
even guaranteed the profits of foreign-owned assemblers establishing in the country.
171
  
Supported by this arsenal of measures, transferring a portion of land rent to 
capital invested in the sector and thus compensating for the internationally high 
production costs emerging from the suboptimal scale of industrial facilities and the use 
of out-dated equipment, several major foreign-owned motor-vehicle firms, in some 
cases associated with local partners, entered the Brazilian economy to manufacture 
passenger cars and/or commercial vehicles. Local production of passenger cars thus 
increased from 1.166 to 60.205 units between 1957 and 1961 (motor-vehicles 
production in general increased from 30.542 to 145.584), achieving 87% and 93% of 
national content in terms of value and weight, respectively.
172
 Since then, the motor-
vehicle industry became Brazil‘s leading manufacturing sector in terms of capital 
invested, foreign participation, value-added and employment. 
In contrast with the Korean experience during its early stages, auto-parts 
manufacturing was strongly promoted in Brazil from the inception of the motor-vehicle 
industry. However, unlike in the assembly sector, a relatively large portion of 
components and parts producers emerging before and during this period were small 
nationally-owned companies.
173
 By transferring a portion of their surpluses to their 
larger partners, through low-priced inputs, the activities of these small domestic firms 
would subsequently support the process of valorisation of assemblers‘ capital or that of 
the largest foreign-owned auto-parts companies with which they entered in contact in 
the market.
174 
 
Despite expanding robustly during the second half of the 1950s, throughout the 
1960s, the Brazilian motor-vehicle industry experienced a mixed performance, broadly 
following the evolution of the resources available to subsidise it and to sustain domestic 
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demand for its output, namely, land-rent and, to lesser extent, interest-bearing capital 
inflows.
175
 The production of automobiles grew significantly until 1962; stagnated and 
consolidated during 1963-66 when a slow-growing land rent and the reversion of 
foreign credit flows manifested themselves in the weakening of local consumer demand 
for passenger cars and in the reduction of subsidies for producers; and, recovered 
robustly during 1967-73 as state resources to support it grew larger, production worker 
wages were squeezed and consumer demand enlarged thanks to the increase in high-
income earner wages and the state-promoted expansion of consumer credit.
176
 By the 
early 1970s, the Brazilian automotive industry had already become the largest and most 
developed outside North America, Europe and Japan. Furthermore, local content 
increased rapidly under legal requirements and market protection, reaching virtually 
100% by the middle of the decade. Labour productivity, however, remained low by 
world market standards and the entire local production of motor-vehicles was sold in the 
highly protected domestic markets.
177
 
As the land rent and interest-bearing capital inflows grew larger, during the rest 
of the 1970s, automobile production continued the 1967-73 expansionary path, although 
less strongly. A key change occurred, however, with respect to the developments of the 
previous period. Receiving a battery of incentives to export cars and components, auto 
firms began to slowly but constantly expand their sales in foreign markets.
178
 These 
subsidies were necessary to compensate for the internationally high local production 
costs, then enhanced by new import-substitution policies for the capital goods industry 
as well as the increased overvaluation of the exchange rate, both necessary to allow 
industrial capital to appropriate a portion of the expanding land rent.
179
 Moreover, 
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subsidies also transferred extraordinary resources to the sector. In 1975 and 1980, 
incentives to export transport material amounted to 50% and 35% of FOB prices while 
the exchange rate was 37% overvalued, implying a 27% export ‗tax‘, and on its parity, 
respectively. Despite these peculiarities, the notable expansion of exports throughout 
the 1970s gave the impression that the Brazilian motor-vehicles industry was finally 
maturing. Indeed, it was hailed by some contemporary analysts as one of the few cases 
of successful ‗infant industry‘ promotion in ‗developing‘ countries.180  
During the 1980s, as domestic demand for automobiles declined, exports of 
passenger cars and components expanded further. This expansion, however, did not 
result from an increase in the industry‘s international competitiveness but, largely, from 
three other factors. First, the sharp fall in real manufacturing wages that occurred 
between mid-1980 and early 1984, when they dropped by almost 40%, and after 1986, 
when the gains of 1984-86 were rapidly eroded. Secondly, the strong undervaluation of 
the exchange rate prevailing during 1984-87 (23% average). Thirdly, the substantial 
subsidies still received by automobile firms for their sales in overseas markets.
181
 
Indeed, this situation explains why exports did not fully replace domestic demand. 
Subsidies under the BIFIEX programme were limited and connected to sales in the 
domestic market.
182
 Hence, unlike the experience during the previous decade, when the 
magnitude of land rent and net credit inflows lent to the state were expanding, the 1980s 
exports growth took place in a context of falling domestic production and minimal 
investments.
183
 Between the 1980 peak and 1987, production of motor-vehicles fell by 
21% (27% for passenger cars) while exports increased to reach 37.5% of total output 
(41% for passenger cars). The level of domestic demand for motor-vehicles reached in 
1980 (around one million units) would only be attained again in 1993, after falling to 
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nearly half that amount during the recession of 1987.
184
 The conditions for the 
valorisation of capital in the sector, however, would then be substantially transformed. 
In 1993, as the land rent and the inflow of interest-bearing capital began to 
expand again, the production of motor-vehicles in Brazil entered a period of substantial 
recovery that lasted until 1997.
185
 Total output reached then two millions units, 1.7 
million of which were passenger cars. Though exports increased, notably to 
neighbouring Argentina under an ‗administrated‘ trade programme, this recovery was 
largely based on the expansion of domestic demand.
186
 As the internal market 
expanded, international assemblers redoubled their investment efforts in Brazil. This 
time, however, almost all investments in new plants were made outside the São Paulo 
metropolitan area, where the industry had been historically located. Peripheral regions 
offered much cheaper and less unionised labour, which, though less experienced in 
metal-mechanic activities, was nevertheless suitable under the new, increasingly 
automated, technological conditions. Moreover, somehow mirroring state actions during 
previous periods of high investments, regional governments embarked on an 
unprecedented ‗subsidies war‘ to attract assemblers which was not only extremely 
onerous for their constrained budgets, as subsidies were substantial, but conspired 
strongly against the achievement of minimum efficient scales (MES) of production.
187 
Indeed, only one of the 15 new plants built during the 1990s, Ford‘s factory in Camaçari 
(Bahia), achieved the ‗theoretical‘ MES of 250.000 units per year.188 Granting generous 
subsidies to new investments was not, however, the only state policy transferring 
resources to MNC auto assemblers. State-owned BNDES, then largely funded through 
forced savings programmes, also extended subsidised loans to finance investments and 
exports.
189
 Finally, sales and production taxes were substantially lowered for ‗people‘s 
cars‘ to stimulate their consumption.190  
Moreover, while the market for motor-vehicles was kept highly protected, that 
for production equipment and auto-parts, notably electronic components, were largely 
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liberalised and local content requirements significantly relaxed. This new protective 
structure was made operative through the implementation of the 1995 Automotive Plan 
that sharply increased the protection of the domestic market for finished automobiles, 
reversing the radical 1990-94 liberalisation programme which, in combination with a 
strongly overvalued exchange rate, had given place to a massive inflow of finished car 
imports and had provoked a strong lobby from the side of assemblers and trade unions 
for the reestablishment of trade controls.
191
 Import tariffs for finished vehicles increased 
from 20% in 1994 to 70% during 1995-99, although they stayed at 35% for companies 
producing in Brazil. Import tariffs for auto-parts remained at 18% in 1994-95 and were 
lowered to 2.4-9.6% for 1996-99. Taxes for equipment imports were lowered to 2%.
192
 
During 1995-98, the Real was 55-83% overvalued, thus reducing the cost of imports by 
35-43%. National content requirements thus went down from 85% at the beginning of 
the decade to 50-60% at its end.
193
 This differentiated structure of market protection 
allowed the appropriation of a portion of land rent by foreign-owned assemblers, and 
also increased the portion of profits of those surviving nationally-owned auto-part firms 
appropriated by assemblers and first-tier suppliers through low-priced components. This 
process accelerated the denationalisation and the vertical integration of the auto-parts 
sector.
194
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Source: IBGE, Annual Industrial Survey, various issues. 
 
Despite being notable in terms of output, the 1993-98 expansion of motor-
vehicles production differed in one key aspect from that of the period between 1968 and 
1980. It occurred together with a contraction in the sector‘s value-added (see graph 3.1 
above). As mentioned already, the combination of an overvalued currency (1994-98) 
and market opening for auto-parts and equipment improved the profitability of 
assemblers producing for protected domestic and, increasingly, regional markets but 
hurt that of inputs producers.
195
 These policies reduced assemblers‘ domestic costs 
while maintaining the prices of their output. They were necessary to allow the normal 
valorisation of assemblers‘ capital despite their still low levels of productivity.196 
During the 1993/4-98 expansion, output per assembly work hour in Brazil was only 7% 
higher than in neighbouring Argentina, even when plants in the former tended to 
specialise on smaller vehicles than their counterparts based in the latter,
197
 and 27% 
lower than the level of its, world-markets-oriented, Mexican counterpart.
198
 In addition, 
as domestic consumer purchasing capacities remained weak vis-à-vis pre-1980 levels 
(real wages were lower in the 1990s than before 1980), production itself shifted to low-
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value models. The share of ‗people‘s cars‘ (i.e. with engines smaller than 1,000 cc) in 
the Brazilian market of automobiles increased from 4.3% in 1990 to 73% in 1998.
199
 
As the 1970s expansion, the 1990s recovery, however limited, was followed by 
a sharp slump. At the end of the decade, domestic and regional (i.e. Argentine) demand 
for Brazilian motor-vehicles fell again as the global economy entered a new period of 
slow growth and the magnitude of land rent and foreign loans available to support 
industrial capital‘s valorisation in Brazil contracted strongly. Total motor-vehicles 
production fell from 2.07 in 1997 to 1.35 in 1999, recovered in 2000, and remained 
almost stagnant at around 1.8 million units per year until 2003. During this period, 
around 70% of the local sales of passenger cars were low-priced ‗people‘s cars‘.200 
Nevertheless, by 2004 the Brazilian automobile industry entered a new period of 
fast growth. The recovery of the land rent was then, again, both boosting the process of 
‗subsidisation‘ of industrial production, notably of motor-vehicles, and permitting the 
expansion of domestic demand for them. While the increasing overvaluation of the 
exchange rate was channelling a portion of the expanding land rent directly to industrial 
capital, BNDES loans were now funding not only producers but also consumers of 
motor-vehicles, thus helping expand the domestic markets.
201
 Moreover, the recovery of 
Brazil‘s main foreign markets for complex durable-consumer goods like automobiles, 
Argentina and Venezuela, was also enlarging the protected markets for Brazilian motor-
vehicles. On the basis of investments largely undertaken during the 1990s, by 2007 the 
production of motor-vehicles in Brazil reached 2.97 million units, 80% of which were 
passenger cars.
202
 Domestic sales then absorbed 73.5% of total output, while regional 
markets took 57% of foreign sales. Exports of automobiles outside South America, 
though increasing strongly, were largely destined to Mexico and South Africa, where 
quality regulations are not as stringent as in the industrially advanced countries.
203
 In 
2007, Mexico and South Africa took 16% and 11% of total foreign sales, respectively. 
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Yet, as exchange rate overvaluation strengthened from 24% in 2005 to 83% in 2008, in 
order to channel the expanding land rent to industrial capital, exports of automobiles fell 
strongly, by almost 20%. In US dollars at market exchange rates, assembly sector 
labour costs per motor-vehicle became higher than in its main export market, Argentina, 
and significantly above those in Mexico.
204
 On the other hand, as economy-wide 
employment and real wages increased and consumer credit expanded, the share of 
‗people‘s cars‘ in domestic sales during 2004-07 fell back to around 55%. Moreover, 
with a substantially enlarged land rent sustaining the process of capital accumulation, 
the now largely foreign-owned auto-parts sector also enjoyed a general recovery.
205
 
In summary, in contrast to the Korean experience but in line with most other 
‗developing‘ countries, motor-vehicle assemblers in Brazil have been almost 
exclusively wholly-owned foreign MNCs.
206
 Domestic firms have concentrated on the 
less technology-intensive segments of the auto-parts sector, as the largest producers of 
components have also been foreign-owned companies with global operations.
207
 Also in 
contrast to the Korean experience, the largest part of Brazilian production of motor-
vehicles has been sold in the domestic and, crucially since the 1990s, regional markets. 
Sales beyond these protected markets, in the upward trend since the 1970s, have been 
only possible thanks to substantial state subsidies, a strongly undervalued exchange rate 
and/or wage-squeezes compensating for the internationally low productivity of local 
labour, largely resulting from the use of out-dated equipment and suboptimal production 
scales. Effectively, while 24% of locally produced motor-vehicles (23% for passenger 
cars) were exported between 1993 and 2007, the Mercosur, the enlarged protected 
‗domestic‘ market, became the largest destination, taking on average over half of 
Brazil‘s exports of automobiles and components.208 Most of them occurred within the 
Argentina-Brazil automobile sector agreement of ‗administered‘ trade, in which imports 
and exports compensate each other. The rest of overseas sales were largely directed to 
specific middle-income countries, Mexico and South Africa, within the frame of 
relatively similar bilateral trade agreements. 
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 The relatively small size of the domestic and regional markets for motor-
vehicles and, above all, the wide range of model diversification have meant that 
production volumes in Brazil have been consistently below world-market norms.
209
 This 
has set up a barrier to the introduction of vanguard equipment, like CNC machine-tools, 
robots and other computer-controlled systems.
210
 Consequently, labour productivity in 
Brazil, even if increasing, has been constantly lower than in leading producing 
countries, including Korea recently. Effectively, it took four times as much direct 
(assembly) and indirect (parts and components manufacturing) labour-time to produce a 
motor-vehicle in Brazil than in Japan in the 1970s, 5 times during the 1980s, 3 during 
the 1990s and 2.5 in the 2000s.
211
 Production costs have thus been above those 
regulating world-market prices, despite several inputs, notably steel, electricity and, 
since 1990, labour-power have been usually purchased at below international prices.
212
 
The problems of international competitiveness have been most notable in the auto-parts 
sector where MES tend to be higher than in final assembly operations and the scale of 
Brazilian producers significantly below them. Moreover, the forms of appropriation of 
the land rent by industrial capital in general (e.g. the combination of an overvalued 
exchange rate and market protection) have further worsened the international 
competitiveness of local auto producers. Nevertheless, capital in the sector has been 
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engine blocks. Nevertheless, it is thus probably more revealing to compare the scale of production of 
Brazilian subsidiaries with that of their plants in their countries of origin. For instance, Volkswagen plants 
in Germany assembled during the 1990s an average of 3.4 times the amount of cars of its plants in Brazil. 
In 2004, Fiat‘s plant in Cassino (Italy) produced as many cars as its plant in Betim (Minas Gerais, Brazil) 
but far fewer models. While the former has concentrated in one or two models, the latter has mass 
produced at least four. In 2007, when passenger car production reached the all-time record of 2.4 million 
units, there were 10 firms in Brazil owning 17 assembly plants and producing an average of 140,491 units 
per plant (of different models). Only two companies, Fiat and VW, were producing more than 250,000 
units per plant. 
210
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Brazil were beginning to concentrate in the production of low-end ‗people‘s cars‘. Secondly, the post-
1990 reduction in local content requirements (and the increase in auto-parts imports) in Brazil artificially 
increased the levels of overall labour productivity, notably vis-à-vis highly self-sufficient national motor-
vehicle industries like the Japanese. 
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itself able to accumulate through the appropriation of a (substantial) portion of the 
Brazilian land rent. In this way, MNC subsidiaries have been able to valorise normally 
without competing with their own parent houses in world markets and using already 
amortised equipment. The development and growth of the auto industry, however, has 
been, as the rest of the industrial sector, dependent on the evolution of the magnitude of 
the land rent available in the economy. 
 
3.1.3) Transformations in the global semiconductors industry 
 
The production of semiconductors is at the core of the microelectronics, and thus 
electronics, industries. The sector was born in the aftermath of the Second World War 
when the transistor replaced the vacuum valve as the main device used to control the 
motion of electrons and thus produce electrical amplification through non-mechanical 
means. Though the industry was originally heavily related to the US defence sector, the 
use of transistors quickly found commercial applications. Indeed, the transistor rapidly 
became a key input used to manufacture consumer and capital goods incorporating 
electronically-controlled functions. Already in the early 1960s, the transistor was 
replaced by the integrated circuit (IC) when technological improvements in materials 
and production equipment permitted the combination of several transistors into one 
single system.
213
 ICs are at the centre of the development of electronically-controlled 
automated, computerised and robotised means of production (i.e. the so-called 
microelectronics revolution).
214
 
The production of semiconductors (i.e. microchips) involves several labour 
processes which, though functionally integrated, are technically disarticulated and thus 
potentially spatially separable: R&D; mask making (the production of the celluloid 
filaments that contain the microscopic electronic circuits); wafer fabrication (the process 
by which the circuits in the mask are transferred to the silicon wafer and etched into its 
surface); assembly of transistors, diodes and integrated circuits; testing of the product. 
These component labour-processes require different types of capital-investment, 
specialised inputs and labour skills. The R&D stage is capital-intensive and, crucially, 
involves the participation of highly qualified and creative scientific and engineering 
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workers. Mask making and wafer fabrication, in turn, are the most capital-intensive part 
of the production process and need highly-skilled engineers as well as technicians. In 
addition, wafer fabrication also requires a significant numbers of semi-skilled workers, 
particularly operators of the ‗diffusion‘ furnaces. The assembly stage has been 
predominately an unskilled-labour-intensive process, though since the second part of the 
1980s, automated equipment has begun to replace the former. Finally, the testing stage, 
although increasingly capital-intensive and automated, requires large amounts of both 
technical and unskilled labour.
215
  
Though semiconductor technology was born in the northeast of the USA, as 
soon as the industry emerged, it began to be relocated to the west coast, the Silicon 
Valley, in search for the proper supply of all types of labour-power needed in the 
integral process of microchips production. ―On the one hand, the industry‘s demands for 
unskilled and semiskilled labour was largely filled by immigrant female Latino and 
Asian (especially Filipino) workers who resided in the San Jose area of the County, 
some distance from the centre of production in such north-County cities as Palo Alto, 
Mountain View and Sunnyvale. On the other hand, the industry‘s demands for highly 
trained scientists, engineers, and technicians have been filled largely by white male 
graduates of local universities and colleges who tend to reside in relatively close 
proximity to the semiconductor plants and laboratories.‖216 
This ‗spatial fix‘, however, would not be the industry‘s last. In effect, taking 
advantage of the vast local availability of cheap and highly disciplined female labour of 
peasant origin, Japanese industrial capital emerged, already in the late 1950s, as a major 
producer of simple transistors, mainly used in the manufacture of radios for export 
markets. Soon after, in the early 1960s, US firms responded to this competitive pressure 
by beginning to move their assembly facilities of these types of semiconductors to East 
and, subsequently, Southeast Asian locations, where a labour-force with similar 
characteristics as, but cheaper than, the Japanese could be found, or by also 
subcontracting these activities to local firms there.
217
 A similar process of relocation 
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took place, later on, when ICs became the most important semiconductor device. Trade 
policies in the USA, including commercial laws, and in the recipient countries were 
modified to accommodate and mediate these transformations. The very low transport 
costs involved in the international movement of ICs, due to their low weight and small 
size, facilitated this process.
218
 
Effectively, already by the late 1970s, Japanese firms were beginning to 
compete successfully with US manufacturers in the production of one type of ICs: 
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chips. Apart from the actions of the 
Japanese ‗developmental‘ state supporting local firms, several inter-connected factors 
and trends favoured this transformation in the structure of the global microelectronics 
industry. First, with the appearance of the microprocessor, the automation and 
robotisation of industrial equipment, including that used to manufacture 
semiconductors, underwent a rapid development. Though final assembly was done 
manually, wafer fabrication and testing were largely automated and thus required low-
skill workers.
219
 Secondly, DRAMs, or memory chips, were (and still are) the most 
standardised, mass produced, low-end segment of the ICs market.
220
 Memory chips 
have thus been the segment of the advanced ICs market with the largest scale of 
production and the lowest level of scientific and engineering skills requirements; they 
require relatively little design capabilities.
221
 Unlike in the microprocessor or 
application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) sectors, in DRAMs manufacturing most 
productivity improvements have come from ―improving process technology and thus 
learning economies and yields, primarily through continuous improvements on the 
shop-floor and tedious trial-and-error.‖222 Thirdly, by the 1970s Japanese capital had 
access to a large supply of both skilled and semiskilled workers at internationally low 
cost. The ‗dual‘ character of the Japanese labour market, also assured the provision of 
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the unskilled portion of the labour-force, including that used in manual assembly, at 
particularly low costs. Fourthly, the discipline of the Japanese labour-force, of all types 
of qualities, increased its productivity when working as an appendage of automated 
systems of machinery or in the manual assembly of parts as particularly required in the 
semiconductors industry.
223
 Fifthly, Japanese firms were able to exploit the substantial 
scale economies existing in DRAMs production due to their vertical integration (i.e. as 
electronics goods producers). Furthermore, Japanese producers could take advantage of 
rapidly changing technologies and entered the industry with the most vanguard 
equipment while their US counterparts found themselves with obsolete fixed capital.
224
 
By the mid-1980s, Japanese memory chip manufacturers were not only out-
competing their US counterparts due to their lower production costs. They were also 
continuously introducing innovations in process, production and, consequently, product 
technologies in this segment of the industry.
225
 Nevertheless, sophisticated equipment 
and, above all, chip design were, well into the 1990s, developed through the adaptation 
of basic circuit architectures designed by US firms. In the case of higher value-added 
devices like microprocessors, which they were then beginning to produce, the 
technological dependence was even higher; they were mainly done under licenses from 
US firms. This commercial strategy was not, however, free of problems. Disputes over 
the copyrights of basic designs were frequently contested in the courts of law.
226
 Still, 
by the late 1980s, Japan became the largest producer of semiconductors by volume.
227
  
In global capitalism, however, nothing is stagnant. The same objective 
conditions that had allowed the development and growth of the Japanese 
semiconductors industry began, sooner or later, to challenge it. While automation of 
production equipment was developing further through the second half of the 1980s, 
including those used in the assembly stages,
228
 microchip design also began to be 
automated through the use of specialised software programmes. The combination of 
further equipment automation and design computerisation not only permitted the 
production of more complex semiconductors, and thus reinforced the trend. It also 
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resulted in the further standardisation of the production of complex microchips and thus 
gave place to new transformations in the industry‘s international division of labour.229 
First, US firms began to concentrate on the higher end of the industry‘s ‗value chain‘, 
namely, the design and, to a lesser extent, production of microprocessors and ASICs. 
Secondly, chip fabrication became increasingly done in East Asian locations, notably in 
Taiwan and Singapore. This type of commercial association gave place to the 
emergence of foundries specialised in wafer fabrication for different clients and 
‗fabless‘ (i.e. without fabrication facilities) companies specialised in the design of the 
microchips.
230
 On these bases, through the late 1980s, the US semiconductors industry 
started to reverse the previous trend and by the mid-1990s had, again, secured a larger 
share of the world markets of semiconductors than its Japanese counterpart.
231
 Thirdly, 
since the late 1980s, Japanese producers began to lose an increasingly larger segment of 
the DRAMs market against Korean firms,
232
 without being able to compete successfully 
with US firms in the design and production of higher value-added microprocessors and 
ASICs.
233
 The growth in the supply of skilled and semi-skilled labour-force in these 
East Asian countries, together with the increased automation and standardisation, and 
thus simplification, of production processes, was allowing the move of their 
semiconductors industries from simply final assembly of chips to their full 
fabrication.
234
 
The automation of microchips design not only facilitated the international 
separation of the R&D and fabrication stages. This process also tended to simplify 
several parts of the design engineering work, made possible its modularisation and, 
potentially, its international fragmentation. In effect, taking advantage of these 
developments, and also of the improvement in telecommunication technologies 
(resulting themselves from the on-going microelectronics ‗revolution‘) and the local 
availability of low-cost engineers, capital began by the late 1990s to relocate to Asia 
some parts of the now simplified design work. Due to the large local supply of labour-
force with engineering skills and their large experience in chip manufacturing, 
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Taiwanese and Korean capitals have been at the forefront in this new transformation in 
the international division of labour in the semiconductors industry.
235 
Brazil has been among the few non-Asian developing countries, if not the only 
one, to have developed some sort of semiconductors industry beyond the pre-ICs era 
and the assembly stages of ICs. The development of the Brazilian semiconductors 
industry was not, however, sustained on the capacity of individual capital to valorise 
normally in the long term through its competition in world markets by means of 
vanguard technological development or the use of a relatively cheap and disciplined 
workforce for ‗standardised productions‘. On the contrary, the Brazilian semiconductors 
industry developed as part of the local process of import-substituting industrialisation. 
As has been generally the case in the Brazilian industrial sector, the long-run 
development and growth of the semiconductors industry thus depended on the 
magnitude of the extraordinary resources available to sustain it. Consequently, it 
extended as much as the evolution the latter permitted it, and collapsed when subsidies 
and protection granted to it dried out in the early 1990s. 
 
The Korean semiconductors industry 
 
The Korean electronics industry started in the late 1950s with the assembly of 
vacuum valves used for the manufacturing of radios for domestic consumers. A wide 
range of ISI-style policies were implemented then to promote the sector‘s growth. Apart 
from market protection and subsidised credit, in 1962 the new military government 
implemented a campaign to send radios to rural areas to publicise its actions. 
Nevertheless, despite being largely oriented towards the domestic market, helped by a 
combination of low wages, mild export subsidies and a slightly weakening (though still 
overvalued) exchange rate, in 1962 exports of radios began in earnest with shipments to 
the USA. The value of electronic goods exports fell, however, sharply in 1963 when the 
overvaluation of the currency strengthened, but increased again in 1964 when the 
opposite occurred. In December 1966, after four consecutive years of strong export 
growth, the government finally passed the first ‗promotional law‘ for the electronics 
industry. The sector was then put at the centre of the Second Five-Year Economic Plan 
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for 1967-71, and to support its development, a special agency, the Fine Instruments 
Centre (FIC), was created.
236
 
In 1965, taking advantage of the large local availability of cheap and highly 
disciplined labour-power, mainly female workers of peasant origin, Komi became the 
first foreign-owned semiconductors firms to open productive facilities in Korea for the 
manual assembly of transistors and diodes. Recent changes in US tariff regulations, 
allowed these firms to export their output back to the USA paying only import taxes on 
the value added in Korea. The next year, Fairchild, the third largest and a leading US 
semiconductor manufacturer, followed suit and established a wholly-owned assembly 
facility, even if that was supposedly at odds with current regulations governing the 
inflow of FDI. The Foreign Capital Inducement Law was, nevertheless, soon amended 
in order to attract other companies in the sector. Under its auspices, all types of possible 
incentives were granted to foreign investors.
237
 
In 1969, after several years of strong growth, state support to the industry 
expanded. The Korean government then passed the comprehensive Electronics Industry 
Promotion Law and the Eight-Year Plan (1969-76) for the promotion of the sector. In 
1971, additional measures were implemented to further promote exports (e.g. relating 
access to domestic markets to export performance) and joint-ventures between foreign 
and local firms.
238
 Moreover, the sector was also included in the heavy and chemical 
industries drive launched in 1973 and the Kumi industrial estate and Masan Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ) were developed to accommodate firms in the sector. Under this 
policy umbrella, preferential loans were made available to the electronics industry for 
equipment and technology acquisition and generous tax breaks were granted. These 
programmes were aimed at developing the domestic fabrication of semiconductors used 
in the emerging consumer electronics industry, then mainly imported from Japan.
239
 
The production of components and parts, which included semiconductors, 
expanded rapidly and was until the mid-1970s the largest sub-sector within the Korean 
electronics industry.
240
 At this point, the semiconductors sector was, unlike the rest of 
the electronics industry, mainly controlled by foreign-owned companies. Only one 
Korean firm, Anam, assembled semiconductors, though under subcontracting 
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arrangements with US firms. Its place in the industry was, however, only marginal. 
Local production, nearly all exported, consisted of the manual assembly of transistors 
and ICs and their packaging, the two least skill-intensive parts of the industry‘s value 
chain.
241
 Most foreign-controlled semiconductors production plants were located in the 
Massan EPZ, where trade unions were forbidden and most labour rights not respected. 
Young female workers of rural origin constituted the vast majority of the employed 
workforce.
242
 This was not only an extremely cheap type of labour-power, notably as 
many workers lived in company dormitories, but also a highly disciplined, and thus 
productive.
243
 
Despite initial foreign domination and specialisation in the low-end of the 
industry, strong state support for local firms and higher value-added activities would 
slowly begin to render some fruits. In 1974, the first wafer fabricating firm, Korea 
Semiconductors Inc., was formed as a joint venture between a domestic company and a 
US firm which provided the needed technology and know-how. This project failed and, 
in 1975, was bought by Samsung Electronics, aiming to manufacture simple 
semiconductor devices for its expanding consumer electronics production. Other firms 
followed suit and attempted to enter the sector through alliances with US and Japanese 
firms supplying or licensing production and product technologies and know-how. These 
included a future market leader, Goldstar. None of these projects, however, prospered 
beyond the production and assembly of simple ICs. 
In 1975, as part of the implementation of the HCI Plan (1973-79), the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (MTI) devised a six-year plan for the electronics industry to 
promote the domestic production of six electronic components, including silicon wafer 
fabrication and memory chips. The primary goal of the sectoral plan was the 
domestication of the entire process of semiconductor manufacturing by 1978. To 
accomplish this ambitious task, the Korean government planned to invest $150 million 
in facilities and $58 in R&D. A major institutional overhauling took place to carry out 
the project. Responding to the MTI initiative, in 1976 private firms formed the 
Electronic Industries Association of Korea (EIAK) by merging two existing industry 
associations. Later, in 1979, the EIAK absorbed the FIC, the semi-public organisation in 
charge of the sector‘s promotion, and in 1980 the import recommendation functions of 
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the Electronic Products Manufacturers Association. Furthermore, also in 1976, the 
Korean Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) was created in the Kumi industrial 
park under joint public and private sectors support. Its main goal was to assist R&D 
efforts in high-tech areas. By 1979, the KIET had built, licensing the necessary foreign 
technology, a pilot plant for the production of 16K memory chips. The know-how 
acquired was subsequently transferred to private sector producers.
244
  
Despite these advances, by the turn of the decade, Korean semiconductors 
fabrication was still in its incipient stages. The material conditions were not yet mature 
for capital in Korea to do more than to assemble microchips or produce simple devices 
for low value-added consumer electronics such as wrist watches and transistors. In 
contrast to the previous period, during the 1970s consumer goods, rather than parts and 
components, led the fast growth (46% p.a.) of the Korean electronics industry. Parts and 
components production, still mostly controlled by foreign firms, declined as share of 
total output from 61.5% in 1972 to 48.4% in 1979.
245
 
 Nevertheless, the reality and performance of the Korean semiconductors 
industry would soon begin to change. In 1981-82, a number of promotional plans for the 
sector were launched and a new wave of investments in privately-owned fabrication 
facilities followed soon after. Apart from soft loans, the state also protected the 
domestic market for low-end products and granted subsidies for R&D projects destined 
to master foreign technologies.
246
 Samsung, again, led the process and was swiftly 
followed by Goldstar, Hyundai and Daewoo, the largest chaebols. Investments in 
manufacturing facilities accelerated sharply after 1984, growing 45% per year up to 
1991, totalling 12,200 million US$ of 2004.
247
 To fund these massive investments, local 
firms complemented the soft loans granted by the government with resources borrowed 
in the non-banking financial sector and, to a lesser extent, in foreign financial markets. 
Equipment, know-how and chip designs were imported or licensed from US and 
Japanese manufacturers. Following the strategy pursued by Japanese firms before them 
and responding to the on-going reconfiguration of the global semiconductors industry, 
Korean firms began then to specialise in the production of standardised memory chips 
(DRAMs).
248
 Indeed, Daewoo‘s attempts to do otherwise and produce more complex, 
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skill-intensive ICs, like microprocessors, failed massively and were quickly 
abandoned.
249
 
Stimulated by their incipient commercial success in this sub-branch of the 
semiconductors industry, mostly under OEM arrangements, Korean firms, Samsung in 
particular, made significant efforts to develop independent indigenous technological 
capabilities for the production of memory chips. Results, however, were mixed. First, 
local firms still required foreign basic chip designs and foreign trained engineers to 
manage their projects. Secondly, indigenous ‗designs‘ were still lagging well behind the 
world technological frontier. Thirdly, most part of domestic productions was done using 
technology licensed from foreign firms, in most of the cases already out-dated. Though 
allowing the growth of the industry, this commercial strategy was not free of difficulties 
for Korean firms as the prices of memory chips tend to fall rapidly with their technical 
obsolesce. Moreover, as their Japanese counterparts, Korean firms were sometimes sued 
by US semiconductors manufacturers for their alleged noncompliance with intellectual 
property rights.
250
 
In 1986, partly in response to the emerging lawsuits filed by US companies for 
the alleged infringement of intellectual property rights and partly in response to the 
demand from local firms, the Korean state sponsored and co-financed the creation of the 
research consortium Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). 
This project brought together the largest firms in a concerted effort for technological 
‗leapfrogging‘. This project, which attempted to develop locally Very Large-scale 
Integrated Circuits, allowed Korean firms to narrow the technological gap with their US 
and Japanese competitors in DRAMs production. In addition, in order to strengthen 
their technological capabilities, Korean firms also invested heavily in the creation of 
R&D centres in the Silicon Valley.
251
 The labour-force necessary to undertake these 
activities was more abundant there than in Korea. Yet, despite all these efforts, in the 
mid-1980s most of the sector‘s workforce (around 80%) was still employed by MNCs 
or domestic firms subcontracted to assemble and package semiconductors for foreign 
producers while the other fifth were employed by domestic firms, mostly the big three, 
both fabricating wafers and assembling them.
252
 Furthermore, an important part of 
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wafer fabrication by the latter was done under OEM arrangements between them and 
‗merchant‘ firms in the USA.253 
Nonetheless, when the early 1990s computer boom began, Korean firms were 
launching DRAM products similar to those produced by their foreign competitors, 
although still engaging in alliances of some sort with foreign partners for this purpose, 
or directly purchasing the technology.
254
 It was estimated that in 1992 and 1993 the 
Korean semiconductor industry had to spend 14% and 16% of its annual turnover on 
royalty payments.
255
 It was then apparent that Korean firms did not have access to an 
industrial labour-force capable of pursing independent vanguard technological 
development in semiconductors manufacturing, not even in the relatively simple DRAM 
market where innovations are mainly based on production and process rather than on 
product technologies. In 1994, there were only 252 PhD researchers in the entire Korean 
semiconductors industry. As had been the case during the 1970s ‗big push‘ to heavy 
industry, different state departments began to plan and implement policies to address 
this situation and rapidly upgrade the skills of the local workforce.
256
 
In spite of these limitations, by the mid-1990s, Korean firms were becoming the 
largest and most efficient DRAM manufacturers in global markets, displacing their 
Japanese counterparts ten years after these had displaced their US competitors. The 
further standardisation of production processes, in part resulting from continual 
advances in the microelectronics industry, and the improved qualification of the local 
workforce, made that possible. The automation of materials and information handling 
taking place during the 1990s greatly reduced the skills required from operators and 
technicians in semiconductors fabrication, by limiting their involvement in productive 
decision-taking and, thus, increasing the monotonousness of their work.
257
 Korean firms 
then reached the average levels of labour productivity of their US and Japanese 
counterparts at much lower wage cost.
258
 
Korean firms, however, did not become world-market leaders. To begin with, 
when they achieved full-scale operations and finally caught up technologically with 
global leaders in Japan and the USA, there were many competitors supplying state-of-
the-art DRAMs, most based in other Southeast-East Asian countries, notably Taiwan 
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and Malaysia. Furthermore, by then, it was apparent that, even if constantly upgraded in 
terms of memory power, DRAM chips were becoming a high-tech ‗industrial 
commodity‘ increasingly sold on the basis of low price rather than advanced 
technological features.
259
 Neither were Korean firms at the vanguard of memory chips 
production technologies and design, capable of capturing the so-called innovation quasi-
rents in a market where prices fall rapidly throughout the product‘s life-cycle.260 
In 1995, when the global market of semiconductors reached its peak, 91% of 
Korean semiconductors production was concentrated in mass produced, low-end 
memory chips. The insufficient local supply of world-class design engineers limited the 
domestic production of higher value-added microchips.
261
 Almost all equipment and 
high value components were imported, mainly from the USA and Japan.
262
 
Furthermore, despite the massive increase in DRAM manufacturing, 50% of the 
industry‘s revenue came from low value-added ICs assembly and testing and the 
production of relatively simple discrete devices such as diodes and transistors.
263
 One 
year later, the glut in the global market of semiconductors resulted in the massive fall in 
the price of DRAMs, not only severely affecting the profitability of semiconductors 
producers but also constituting one of the major causes of the 1997-98 economic and 
financial crisis in Korea.
264
 Semiconductors had become Korea‘s leading export.  
As with most of the previous periods of economic turmoil, the aftermath of the 
crisis saw consolidation in the semiconductors sector. Hyundai and LG merged to 
become Hynix which was later bought by market leader US‘s Micron. Only Samsung 
remained an independent producer of semiconductors, probably because of its world 
leadership in consumer electronics manufacturing where most of its output was 
destined. Semiconductors production in Korea expanded sharply after slump, with firms 
getting increasingly involved in the independent design of their own microchips. The 
bases of this recovery, however, have remained contradictory and limited. First, 
memory chips continued dominating the product mix despite the intention of companies 
to reverse this situation. Secondly, if local design capabilities improved significantly, 
this was largely helped by the further automation and modularisation of design activities 
which manifested themselves in the simplification/standardisation of specific stages and 
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types of design processes.
265
 Design software, basic chip architecture and advanced 
manufacturing equipment, as well as the capacity to design and produce complex 
semiconductors like microprocessors and ASICs, have not been yet developed in 
Korea.
266
 
 In summary, the integration of Korean semiconductors producers in the 
industry‘s global division of labour has, as in the cases of steel and automobile 
manufacturing, ridden on the possibility of using the country‘s relatively cheap and 
disciplined (and thus productive) workforce to perform different tasks either in the 
manual assembly of components, as an appendage of the machinery or in engineering 
and design activities for world-markets-oriented standardised productions.   
 
The Brazilian semiconductors industry 
 
The Brazilian semiconductors industry was born in the 1950s, when MNCs 
specialised in the production of electronic consumer goods, like radios and TV sets, for 
the domestic market began a process of substitution of imports of components, like 
transistors and diodes, with local productions.
267
 As in the rest of the expanding 
industrial sector, the process of normal valorisation of capital invested in this industry 
was based on the appropriation of a portion of the land rent rather than in the access to 
cheap and disciplined labour, as in 1960s Korea. The combination of an overvalued 
exchange rate (for imports of equipment, key inputs and core materials) and market 
protection, together with the subsidised provision of public utilities and tax breaks, 
constituted the main forms of land rent appropriation by individual capitals in the 
Brazilian electronics industry. This complemented the surpluses normally available for 
appropriation in the sector and thus sustained their process of accumulation despite their 
internationally high production costs. As in Korea, the emerging semiconductors 
industry largely concentrated on the less skill- and technology-intensive products and 
stages of the production processes, namely, the assembly of simple devices. 
Nevertheless, already in 1968, well before Korean efforts in the field began, the first 
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steps in the domestication of semiconductors manufacturing were taken with the 
creation of a Microelectronics Laboratory at the University of São Paulo.
268
 
Despite these public and private sector efforts, it was only in the 1970s, under 
the policy umbrella of the NDP II destined to promote the domestic capital goods 
industry, that some of the leading global semiconductors manufacturers, including 
Fairchild Semiconductors, Texas Instruments, Phillips, Siemens and NEC, established 
subsidiaries in Brazil to assemble and test low-tech ICs. On the one hand, the expansion 
of electronic goods consumption had enlarged the domestic market for micro-
components. On the other, new pecuniary incentives were added to the already existing 
ones, notably through the activities of the newly created Telebrás System (the federal 
state-owned telecommunications holding company). Telebrás became thereafter a key 
player in the import-substituting effort in the microelectronics industry. First, as most 
SOEs at the moment, when purchasing equipment, Telebrás not only gave priority to 
local suppliers but also promoted the development of the related local components 
industry. Secondly, in 1976 Telebrás created the Research and Development Council 
(CPqD), in charge of developing telecommunication technologies in partnership with 
local companies. These efforts included, among others, a project to design ASICs used 
in telecommunications equipment. Their ‗fabrication‘, however, was sourced abroad. 
There was then no foundry in the country capable of producing them.
269
 
During the latter part of the 1970s, as the land rent and the net inflow of credit 
available to support capital accumulation expanded, the Brazilian state pushed further 
towards ‗industrial deepening‘. As part of this strategy, the National Informatics Policy 
(PIN) was launched to coordinate policies for the development of the local 
microcomputers industry.
270
 As in other sectors, state subsidies and market reserves 
were then adopted for that purpose. In 1979, the PIN was absorbed by the Special 
Secretariat for Informatics (SEI), also in charge of promoting the local development of 
automation, software and electronics components (including semiconductors). Under 
these conditions, the Brazilian electronics and micro-components industries grew 
strongly during the late 1970s and most of the first part of the 1980s.
271
 
Despite these advances, the specific limitations to the development of the local 
microelectronic components industry in general and the semiconductors in particular 
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became already evident in the contradictory character of sectoral policy. While the 
aforementioned actions were undertaken, other policies implemented simultaneously 
were largely detrimental for the normal development of the industry. In 1967, the 
Manaus free trade zone (MFTZ) was established, and in 1972 was transformed into an 
industrial district. As Korea‘s Massan EPZ, the MFTZ mainly hosted electronics firms. 
However, in sharp contrast to other contemporary developing country experiences, 
particularly in Korea, the MFTZ was designed to supply the domestic, rather than 
export, markets. Electronics companies established there, most of them foreign-
invested, were allowed to import components and equipment duty-free.
272
 This 
‗regional promotion‘ policy was in practice a blow to the growth of the local production 
of semiconductors. It reduced the market for mass-produced, standardised low-end 
chips for the electronic consumer goods industry, the segment of the market first 
developed in all ‗late comers‘ to the sector (e.g. Japan, Korea).273 
During the 1980s, the Brazilian state, through the SEI, stepped up its promotion 
of the local semiconductors industry, as its Korean counterpart was concurrently doing. 
In 1985-86, the Brazilian authorities selected three companies, Itaú, Docas and Sharp, to 
perform the full cycle in the production of ICs in Brazil. The Technological Centre for 
Informatics, created to support the local development of software, was charged with 
production of the lithographic masks to be used by the three companies to print the 
circuits into silicon wafers.
274
 Despite these concerted efforts at expanding local 
productive capacities, by the second part of the 1980s, Brazilian production of ICs was 
still in an incipient stage. The largest part of local production still focused in assembling 
and testing discrete components, like diodes, capacitors and transistors. A few firms 
produced simple ICs, while almost the entire local demand for microprocessors, 
memory chips and ASICs was satisfied through imports.
275
  
Through the late 1980s, however, while the Korean semiconductors industry 
was beginning to take-off, Brazilian efforts in microelectronics would start to fall apart. 
Despite the strong support granted to it under the umbrella of the 1984 Informatics Law, 
the agreement between the government and the private sector to fund PNI‘s actions 
towards the development of the aforementioned projects fell through after 1986 as the 
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economy entered in a deep crisis.
276
 Involved companies desperately sought for niches 
in which to specialise. Only one of them, Sharp, had managed to master the full cycle in 
the production of ICs, although through its purchase of RCA‘s facilities to produce low-
complexity digital circuits when the US subsidiary was exiting the Brazilian market.
277
 
In the 1990s, as the land rent available for appropriation manifested itself 
incapable of sustaining a highly diversified and deepened industrial sector, the 
microelectronics industry suffered its strongest blow. The process of trade liberalisation, 
notably for industrial equipment, components and parts, combined with a strongly 
overvalued exchange rate, killed the microelectronics industry. As cheaper imports 
flooded the domestic market, firms involved in the fabrication of semiconductors 
disappeared, or concentrated in back-end stages (i.e. assembly), in niche productions or 
in providing related services.
278
 Support granted to firms established in the MFTZ were 
generalised to the rest of the consumer electronics industry. On the contrary, electronic 
goods assemblers kept enjoying market protection, subsidies and, now, low-cost 
components and equipment. Local content requirements in exchange for public 
subsidies were lowered and their enforcement relaxed.
 279
 Moreover, the formation of 
the Mercosur, where almost all exports of electronic goods have been destined, enlarged 
their protected markets.
280
 
If sharp market opening destroyed, in the early 1990s, the local production of 
micro-components used in consumer-electronic goods, the privatisation of Telebrás 
System in 1998 gave the last blow to the production of semiconductors used in 
telecommunications equipment. The new owners, most of them foreign companies, 
shifted their demand of equipment from local suppliers to their international partners, 
thus indirectly reducing the demand for domestically produced, relatively complex 
semiconductors. The CPqD was transformed into a not-for-profit organisation and 
abandoned almost completely the development of equipment and semiconductor 
components. Thereafter, the CPqD has increasingly concentrated in the development of 
software for the telecommunications industry and the provision of related services.
281
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 Yet, there was, however, a notable exception to these negative trends. In 1997, 
when the Brazilian economy was in its third year of relatively robust growth, global 
leader Motorola (later Freescale Semiconductors) established a R&D centre in the high-
tech area of Campinas (São Paulo) to design microchips for clients in the Latin 
American automotive and telecommunications sectors. Helped by the sharp devaluation 
of the national currency and the contraction of real wages during 1999-2003, Freescale 
managed to engage in the development of projects and design of circuits for export 
markets. Though marginal in international terms, Freescale‘s centre in Campinas has 
grown continuously, absorbing part of the personnel previously employed by CPqD.
282
 
Based on this experience, a new set of policies began to be implemented to support the 
industry again, especially the production and design of ASICs. These included the 
National Microelectronics Plan (2002) and the Industrial, Technology and Foreign 
Trade Policy (2004).
283
 Moreover, as the magnitude of the land rent expanded strongly 
after 2005, state efforts to develop an indigenous semiconductors industry resurfaced. In 
2008, the publicly-owned CEITEC SA was founded to design and produce ASICs, in an 
initiative that closely resembled the ISI projects implemented during the 1970s.
284
  
The long-term prospects of these policies are far from clear. To begin with the 
microelectronics industry faces the severe lack of highly-trained professionals. In 2001, 
there were only 198 individuals with postgraduate education (114 with a doctoral 
degree) working in the Brazilian microelectronics industry, either in public sector 
institutions or private companies. The supply of technicians with knowledge in physics 
and chemistry, required in the production of ICs, was even more deficient. At that time, 
there were only 86 engineers and 34 technicians working in the industry.
285
 In addition, 
due to the increasing overvaluation of the currency after 2004, the cost of the local 
labour-force in current US$ has become as expensive as that of established global 
leaders in East Asia. In 2006 hourly compensation costs for production workers in 
‗Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing‘ in Brazil were already higher than in 
Taiwan (US$ 7.03 v US$ 6.76), the leader among developing countries production 
ASICs, the sector of the industry in which Brazilian policy makers aim to enter.
286
 In 
2008, wages paid to chip design engineers working for CEITEC in Brazil were as high 
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as those paid in Taiwan and Korea, where the industry is already largely 
consolidated.
287
 Finally, CEITEC‘s equipment has been apparently donated by Motorola 
and is reputedly well away from the state-of-the-art facilities used by its Taiwanese 
counterparts.
288
  
 In summary, the Brazilian semiconductors industry developed, as the rest of the 
local industrial sector, under strong state support, market protection and the possibility 
to import equipment and key inputs with an overvalued currency. These policies 
mediated the appropriation by capital in this sector of a portion of the land rent, and 
eventually also of credit inflows. As the rest of the local industrial sector, its 
development and growth performance became, since its origins, dependent on the 
evolution of the land rent available to support it and thus compensate for the difference 
between local and global markets production costs. 
 
2.3) Summary and conclusions 
 
 The present chapter had two main goals. First, it aimed to present historical and 
analytical evidence in support of the hypothesis that the structural change undergone by 
Korea since the mid-1960s, and its transformation into a major global supplier of 
industrial goods, has resulted from specific transformations in global markets leading to 
the emergence of the NIDL sketched in the introduction of this thesis. In particular, it 
was claimed that the emerging technological base has led to a structure of skill 
requirements in large-scale industries that could be particularly satisfied with a labour-
force with the characteristics of the East Asian, notably the Korean. In essence, these 
technological transformations, associated with the computerisation of the calibration of 
machine-tools and the automation of the assembly line, have tended to simplify several 
labour processes in the shop-floor in a way that they could be efficiently performed by a 
less skilful but cheaper workforce. The discipline of Korean labour, vis-à-vis other 
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equally cheap national labour-forces, resulting from its historical origins and 
contemporary political circumstances, accentuated this newly emerging ‗competitive 
advantage‘. The second purpose of this chapter was to present historical and analytical 
evidence supporting the argument advanced above with respect to the specific 
characteristics of the Brazilian economy, namely, that capital has accumulated there 
through the appropriation of a portion of the land rent and its complementary sources of 
extraordinary social wealth. 
 In order to support these claims, the chapter identified the main characteristics 
and manifestation of key technological developments in the global steel, automobile and 
semiconductors industries since the 1960s and their impact in determining the 
respective and contrasting competitive capabilities of Brazilian and Korean companies 
in these sectors. These three industries were chosen not only because they have been at 
the centre of both countries‘ industrial development, but also, and mainly, because they 
together carried out the most important transformations in production processes in 
large-scale industrial productions in the last four decades or so. 
Through the analysis of the evolution of the Korean and Brazilian steel, 
automobile and semiconductors industries, the chapter advanced three main 
conclusions. First, that Korean competitiveness in world markets for steel, cars and 
memory chips, and the bases for the normal valorisation of capitals in these industries, 
has sprung from the relative cheapness of its workforce and from its particularly high 
productivity for specific, simplified portions of work processes in these sectors. This 
was irrespective of the technical and commercial singularities of each of the three 
sectors. Secondly, it was shown that the normal valorisation of capital in the Brazilian 
automobile and semiconductors (and also non-integrated steel) industries rested on the 
appropriation of a portion of land rent through the combination of specific state policies 
and institutions. For a large part of the period under study, these included, among 
others, the activities of state-owned integrated mills selling low-cost steel to 
downstream industries, as in Korea, and buying equipment and construction services at 
inflated prices from upstream sectors. This form of capital accumulation, it was shown 
in the analysis, lifted strong barriers to the use of vanguard technology and thus hurt 
industrial capital‘s international competitiveness in these sectors of production. This, 
too, was irrespective of the technical and commercial singularities of each of the three 
sectors.  
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Appendix 3.1 
Measuring the determinants of the rate of valorisation of industrial 
capital in the Korean, Japanese and Brazilian steel industries 
 
Chapter three presented a brief review of the specific transformations of the 
worldwide steel, automobile and semiconductors industries since the 1960s and then put 
forward an interpretation on the differentiated integration of Korean and Brazilian firms 
in these sectors‘ global division of labour. In so doing, the chapter identified the specific 
sources of profitability of Korean and Brazilian firms in these branches of industry. This 
appendix presents the methodology used for the measurement of the determinants and 
rate of profitability of individual capitals in the Korean and Brazilian steel industries. It 
also presents the results of the measurement of the concrete rate of profit of specific 
representative capitals in the steel under different hypotheses.  
 
1) The measurement 
 
 The measurement of the annual rate of profit of a specific industrial capital 
consists of comparing the mass of profits realised through the year (i.e. the difference 
between the revenues obtained from the sale of the output and all the costs directly or 
indirectly involved in its production) with the capital advanced to obtain them. The rate 
of profit measures then the valorisation capacity of each individual capital. 
 
Several methods have been derived from the theoretical foundations of 
mainstream economics to represent the rate of profit of specific industrial capitals. The 
most widely used is the practice of representing it by the so-called Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR). The IRR is the annual rate of compound discount that balances the net 
present value of an investment‘s income stream. The inadequacy of the IRR to represent 
the rate of profit accurately consists in its incapacity to account for the specifically 
determined turnover period of each component part of advanced capital.  
For instance, in the computation of the IRR, the portion of the fixed capital 
consumed that returns after each cycle of production is discounted by the interest rate 
and separated. This means that to reflect the turnover of fixed capital accurately, the 
IRR would either produce different annual rates of profit or, alternatively, would require 
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different output prices to sustain a constant rate of profit. Both are obviously in 
contradiction to the normal pattern of accumulation of any industrial capital.  
When considering the circulating part of capital advanced for valorisation, the 
inaccuracies multiply. First, the method treats differently the profits materialised in the 
circulating part of capital with a turnover period shorter than one year than those with a 
turnover period equal to one year. While the former are capitalised, the latter are 
separated from the capital in process of valorisation. This inconsistency is not free of 
problems in the measurement process; indeed, they manifest in different rates of profit 
for capitals of the same magnitude according to the turnover speed of their circulating 
part. Secondly, the procedure implicit in the method of computation of the IRR is based 
on the assumption that all different component parts of circulating capital have the same 
turnover period and do not overlap. This extremely strong assumption with no real 
plausibility distorts the exact magnitude of circulating capital advanced for valorisation. 
 These inconsistencies are not just a problem of measurement. On the contrary, 
behind them lie the very neo-classical foundations of the IRR model, notably its use of 
the cycle of valorisation of capital lent at interest (capital whose valorisation does not 
involved a productive process) to represent the cycle of valorisation of industrial capital.  
In order to overcome these difficulties, a model developed by Iñigo Carrera 
(1996), based on Marx‘s analysis of the process of turnover of industrial capital 
presented in Volume II of Capital, is used here. This model avoids the above mentioned 
technical problems by computing fixed and circulating parts of advanced capital 
through the register of the movement of each portion through its specific turnover 
process. In the case of circulating part, the amount of capital advance is equal to the 
addition of the money-capital advanced in each different portion of circulating capital 
by the number of times it turnover through the year.  
 
   ∑      
 
 
 
 
Where, 
Kc is circulating capital disbursed for the year; 
Kci is each portion of the circulating capital; 
vi is specific turnover speed of each portion of the circulating capital. 
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On its turn, the amount of fixed capital advanced for valorisation is computed as 
the average value through the useful life of the instruments that compose it.  
 
   ∑∑[(    
   
 
)  (   )]  
 
   
 
   
 
 
Where, 
Kfi is the amount of capital disbursed for the year in the instrument i; 
i is the number of instruments of production;  
j is the number of productive circuits in which the instrument i is used; 
m is useful life of instrument i measured in productive circuits. 
  
When the number of circuits for which an instrument is used is relatively large, 
its average value through its useful life tends to be equal to its replacement value 
divided by two. 
 
   ∑
   
 
 
 
 
 
Total advanced capital is thus: 
 
        
 
2) The data  
 
 The following variables are necessary to calculate the annual rate of profit and 
the other variables estimated by the model: 
 
1) Value (at replacement cost) and useful life of fixed capital invested in productive 
facilities 
2) Production costs per unit of output 
3) Value of sales  
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4) Output produced 
5) Turnover speed of circulating capital 
6) Production time 
7) Amount and conditions of credit offered by suppliers and extended to consumers 
 
The following sources were used to obtain the base data: 
Korea:  
1) POSCO (2004) 
2) Barnett D. and R. Crandall (1986) 
3) Park, Y (1997) 
4) US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009) 
5) Barnett. D and L. Schorsch (1983) 
 
Brazil: 
1) BNDES (1987) 
2) Instituto Brasileiro de Siderurgia, various years. 
3) Mendes de Paula, G. (1993)  
4) Fisher, B., et al. (1988)  
5) D‘Costa, A. (1999) 
 
Parameters and assumptions of the model: 
1) Based on data on merchandise turnover speed published in the Korean Economic 
Statistics Yearbook and Conjuntura Econômica (Brazil), circulating capital was 
assumed to turn over six times per year.  
2) The production process was assumed to last one month.  
3) It was assumed that producers pay their inputs in cash and sale at two months credit. 
 
3) Results of the measurement 
 
The model produces information on the following variables: 
1) Value of fixed capital advanced 
2) Value of circulating capital advanced 
3) Turnover speed of circulating and fixed capital 
4) Value of capital valorised  
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5) Value of capital used during the year 
6) Value of annual profit 
7) Annual rate of profit  
 
 The following table presents the results of the measurement of the profitability 
of individual capitals in the Korean, Japanese and Brazilian industries in different points 
in time. These measurements are presented for different hypothesis related to the 
concrete conditions of valorisation of individual capitals in these countries. The first 
line of the table presents the results for POSCO‘s Pohang plant in 1985. It presents the 
firm‘s rate of profit for the capital advanced in the Pohang plant for three hypothesis 
regarding output prices. The rate of profit is calculated valuing the output at the prices 
actually sold, at the prices the company charged for its exports and at those prevailing in 
the global markets for equivalent products. It is also calculated for two hypothesis 
regarding plant‘s useful life: fifteen and twenty years. The last column of the first line 
presents the average rate of profit in the manufacturing sector in Korea in 1985. The 
second line of the table presents the same set of measurements for POSCO‘s 
Gwangyang plant in 1995. The third line of the table presents the same sets of 
measurements for the aggregate of both plants in 2003. The fourth line in the table 
presents the rate of profit of a representative plant with the average productive capacity 
in the Japanese steel industry in 1985. It is calculated at average capacity utilisation in 
that and at full capacity. It is also calculated for two hypothesis regarding equipment‘s 
useful life: fifteen and twenty years. 
 The second part of the table presents the measurement results for the Brazilian 
steel industry. The first two lines present the rate of profit estimated for Tubarão Steel 
Company (CST) in 1985 under two hypotheses regarding construction costs and plant‘s 
useful life. The third line shows the rate of profit of estimated for Açominas under two 
hypotheses regarding the plant‘s useful life. The last three lines show the rate of return 
on capital invested (i.e. the rate of profit) for Brazilian steel producers in the flat (ex-
state-owned) sector calculated by McKinsey (1998) for 1995. It was calculated for three 
different hypotheses regarding the magnitude of capital advanced for valorisation: at 
‗replacement cost‘, ‗current market value‘ and ‗privatisation values‘.  
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Table A3.1.1        
Rates of profit in the steel industry. Different hypotheses.    
         
Year Plant / company Actual prices Export prices International prices Manufacturing  
  Useful life  
  15 20 15 20 15 20  
         
1985 Pohan 1.40 4.27 22.33 25.20 18.82 21.69 14.8 
1995 Gwangyang 2.26 5.15 30.05 32.94 22.29 25.17 10.8 
2003 POSCO 5.00 7.95 17.31 20.26   9.7 
         
  Actual capacity Full capacity    
  Useful life    
  15 20 15 20    
1985 Japan average 8.45 11.50 21.94 24.82    
         
  Actual capacity      
  Useful life      
  15 20      
1985 CST -2.39 0.73     14.8 
1985 CST (1) 5.26 8.33      
1985 Açominas -1.80 1.37      
1995 Ex-SOEs (2)   23.4    5.5 
1995 Ex-SOEs (3)   3.6     
1995 Ex-SOEs (4)   10.2     
 
Source: See text 
Notes: (1) = at international construction costs; (2) = at privatisation values; (3) = at replacement values; (4) = 
at current market values 
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Appendix 3.2  
Measuring the rate of valorisation of industrial capital in the Korean 
and Japanese automobile industries 
  
Due to lack of sufficient information, the model presented in Appendix 3.1 
cannot be used to analyse the determinants and magnitude of the rate of profit of 
individual capitals in the motor-vehicle industry. The companies‘ balances were, 
instead, used to measure the average profitability of one Korean representative firm, 
Hyundai, and the global leader, Toyota. These companies‘ balances for the period 1985-
1996 were published in Storey (1997). 
In order to calculate the rate of profit of Hyundai and Toyota in each specific 
year, the operational surpluses earned (plus interests gained) during that year were 
divided by the residual value of the capital advanced for valorisation. The latter was 
estimated by adding to the stock of capital of the first year the flow of new investments 
and deducting the flow of depreciation of each portion of capital existing in the first 
year of the series and added to it thereafter. The consumption of fixed capital (i.e. the 
rate of depreciation) was assumed to be 6.67% per year (i.e. 15 years of useful life for 
the equipment). Toyota‘s stock of fixed capital in 1985 was considered to be in the 
middle of its useful life. The value of the stock of fixed capital in 1985 was divided by 
2. Hyundai‘s stock of fixed capital in 1985 was considered to be at the beginning of its 
useful life. A new modern plant was opened in 1985 in the city of Ulsan with the 
capacity to produce 300,000 units per year, an amount equal to that registered in 
balances of the company during that year. The following table presents the basic data 
and results. 
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Table A3.2.1          
Profitability of Toyota and Hyundai        
           
 TOYOTA HYUNDAI 
 OP OP + I K OP / K (OP+I)/K OP OP + I K OP / K (OP+I)/K 
1983 187 277 3,219 5.8 8.6      
1984 498 594 3,315 15.0 17.9      
1985 698 819 3,607 19.4 22.7 82 90 966 8.5 9.3 
1986 509 639 3,437 14.8 18.6 109 117 917 11.9 12.8 
1987 373 498 3,874 9.6 12.9 449 449 1,673 26.8 26.8 
1988 463 601 4,273 10.8 14.1 446 446 2,362 18.9 18.9 
1989 476 713 5,936 8.0 12.0 482 482 1,868 25.8 25.8 
1990 757 1,061 6,926 10.9 15.3 539 539 4,235 12.7 12.7 
1991 1,134 1,376 6,931 16.4 19.9 485 485 5,252 9.2 9.2 
1992 436 654 7,872 5.5 8.3 373 373 5,896 6.3 6.3 
1993 352 506 7,714 4.6 6.6 408 408 6,330 6.4 6.4 
1994 224 355 8,108 2.8 4.4 704 704 7,146 9.8 9.8 
1995 252 335 8,420 3.0 4.0 951 951 8,089 11.8 11.8 
1996 402 491 8,291 4.8 5.9 1,040 1,040 8,916 11.7 11.7 
1997 728 806 9,274 7.9 8.7      
average   9.29 11.98    13.32 13.47 
 
Note: OP = Operating profits; I = Interest earned; K = Fixed capital   
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Appendix 3.3 
Brazilian, Korean, Japanese, Argentinian and Mexican automobile 
industries: base data 
 
This appendix presents base time-series of the Brazilian, Korean, Japanese, 
Argentinian, and Mexican motor-vehicle industries. The goal here is to compare their 
average labour productivity and labour costs per unit of output. The former were 
constructed dividing the total amount of motor-vehicle units annually produced by the 
number of workers employed in the industry (both in assembly and components sectors) 
and the average number of hours worked in the sector. Tables A3.3.1 and A3.3.2 
present the data for the Japanese, Korean and Brazilian motor-vehicle industries 
between 1969 and 2007 while table A3.3.3 does it for the Brazilian, Mexican and 
Argentinian between 1974 and 2007. 
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Table  A3.3.1         
Motor-vehicle industry - totals (includes terminals and parts producers)   
          
 Production units (thousands) Employment (thousands) Output per worker 
 Japan Korea Brazil Japan Korea Brazil Japan Korea Brazil 
1969 4,675  354 561   8.3   
1970 5,289  416 581   9.1   
1971 5,811  517 575   10.1   
1972 6,294  622 605   10.4   
1973 7,083  750 632   11.2   
1974 6,552  906 612  304 10.7  3 
1975 6,942  930 604 21 335 11.5  2.8 
1976 7,842 50 987 622  338 12.6  2.9 
1977 8,514 85 921 631  347 13.5  2.7 
1978 9,269 159 1,064 639  394 14.5  2.7 
1979 10,038 204 1,128 652 69 400 15.4 3 2.8 
1980 11,482 123 1,165 683 60 412 16.8 2 2.8 
1981 11,731 133 781 698 56 302 16.8 2.4 2.6 
1982 11,347 163 859 696 51 327 16.3 3.2 2.6 
1983 11,899 221 896 700 59 312 17 3.8 2.9 
1984 12,378 265 865 720 65 348 17.2 4.1 2.5 
1985 12,271 378 967  79 383  4.8 2.5 
1986 12,260 602 1,056  99 421  6.1 2.5 
1987 12,249 980 920  125 394  7.9 2.3 
1988 12,700 1,084 1,069  148 401  7.3 2.7 
1989 13,026 1,129 1,013 746 158 428 17.2 7.1 2.4 
1990 13,487 1,322 914  176 403  7.5 2.3 
1991 13,245 1,498 960  183 365  8.2 2.6 
1992 12,499 1,730 1,074   337   3.2 
1993 11,228 2,050 1,391   343   4.1 
1994 10,554 2,312 1,581   344   4.6 
1995 10,196 2,526 1,629  221 319  11.5 5.1 
1996 10,347 2,813 1,804   292   6.2 
1997 10,975 2,818 2,070   302   6.9 
1998 10,050 1,954 1,586  193 264  10.1 6 
1999 9,895 2,843 1,357 705  257 14  5.3 
2000 10,145 3,115 1,691 683 204 273 14.9 15.3 6.2 
2001 9,777 2,946 1,817 664  273 14.7  6.6 
2002 10,257 3,147 1,792 646  288 15.9  6.2 
2003 10,286 3,178 1,828   338   5.4 
2004 10,512 3,469 2,317 725 247 363 14.5 14.1 6.4 
2005 10,800 3,699 2,531  254 373  14.6 6.8 
2006 11,484 3,840 2,611   380   6.9 
2007 11,596 4,086 2,970   408   7.3 
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Table A3.3.1         
Motor-vehicle industry - totals (includes terminals and parts producers)   
          
 Annual hours worked per 
employee 
Hours per car 
 Japan Korea Brazil Japan Japan* USA* Korea Korea* Brazil 
1969 2,329  2,144 279 280 173    
1970 2,310  2,145 254 254 189    
1971 2,268  2,129 225 224 162    
1972 2,250  2,112 216 217 169  3,033  
1973 2,258  2,096 202 203 167  2,244  
1974 2,128  2,080 199 200 182  2,378 698 
1975 2,030  2,064 177 176 174  1,475 742 
1976 2,112  2,048 168 173 163  1,360 702 
1977 2,143  2,032 159 158 165  1,270 764 
1978 2,125  2,016 147 146 170  1,006 746 
1979 2,167 2,691 2,000 141 147 179 905 917 710 
1980 2,216 2,750 1,985 132 139 202 1,348 1,255 702 
1981 2,200 2,780 1,974 131 138 204 1,175 1,118 764 
1982 2,153 2,783 1,963 132 140 204 870 839 746 
1983 2,168 2,815 1,952 128 139 163 748 725 680 
1984 2,220 2,812 1,942 129 141 165 685 670 780 
1985 2,207 2,802 1,931  139 155 587 572 765 
1986 2,209 2,852 1,920  133 154 467 453 765 
1987 2,214 2,815 1,910  132 173 358 348 818 
1988 2,211 2,743 1,899  132 174 374 352 713 
1989 2,190 2,640 1,889 125 132 170 370  798 
1990 2,155 2,594 1,879    345  827 
1991 2,086 2,568 1,874    314  712 
1992 2,008 2,539 1,869      586 
1993 1,923 2,539 1,865      459 
1994 1,925 2,540 1,860      404 
1995 1,946 2,564 1,855    224  363 
1996 1,968 2,521 1,850      299 
1997 1,989 2,491 1,846      269 
1998 1,936 2,400 1,841    237  306 
1999 1,925 2,466 1,841 137     349 
2000 1,968 2,483 1,841 132   163  298 
2001 1,946 2,465 1,841 132     277 
2002 1,979 2,428 1,841 125     295 
2003 1,980 2,422# 1,841      340 
2004 1,967 2,411# 1,841 136   172  288 
2005 1,954 2,384# 1,841    163  271 
2006 1,964 2,342# 1,841      268 
2007 1,965 2,317#        
 
Sources: Watanabe (1987: 42); Williams (1994: 61-2); Fuss and Waverman (1992: 32-6); Fischer (1988: 
99); Bae (1987); ANFAVEA (2008); Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2007); Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (2008); Groningen Growth Centre (2006); Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, Annual Industrial Survey, various issues. 
Note: * = Williams (1994) estimates; # = calculated using the evolution of hours worked in 
manufacturing. 
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Table A3.3.2        
 Motor-vehicle industry - Labour costs      
         
 US$ per hour                                                 US$ per car PPP US$ per car 
 Japan Korea Brazil Japan Korea Brazil Korea Brazil 
1969 1.0  1.1 291     
1970 1.2   304     
1971 1.4   322     
1972 1.9   406     
1973 2.5  1.6 512     
1974 3.2  1.7 630  1,213  949 
1975 3.8   672     
1976 4.1  2.2 695  1,525  1,186 
1977 5.0  2.5 787  1,947  1,433 
1978 7.2  2.8 1,055  2,093  1,574 
1979 7.4  3.1 1,037  2,197  1,890 
1980 7.3   960     
1981 8.0  4.0 1,051  3,046  3,006 
1982 7.7 1.4 4.2 1,021 1,252 3,120  3,234 
1983 8.5 2.0 3.0 1,087 1,495 2,045  2,806 
1984 8.5  2.4 1,103  1,869  3,007 
1985         
1986         
1987         
1988   4.9   3,527  3,947 
1989   9.1   7,273  6,669 
1990   7.9   6,539  4,612 
1991         
1992   8.7   5,121  4,545 
1993   10.4   4,780  4,150 
1994  8.1 11.0   4,462  2,993 
1995  9.9 14.2  2,218 5,158 2,428 2,823 
1996 28.9 11.8 12.9   3,852  2,191 
1997 27.2 9.7 12.4   3,345  2,040 
1998 25.5 7.4 12.0  1,759 3,673 2,881 2,378 
1999 29.0 9.7 7.7 3,973  2,697  2,683 
2000 30.0 10.8 8.1 3,980 1,753 2,420 3,292 2,359 
2001 27.2 9.9 6.7 3,589  1,861  2,210 
2002 26.4 12.4 5.8 3,287  1,711  2,210 
2003 28.6 13.1 6.1   2,087  2,442 
2004 30.5 14.9 7.0 4,134 2,549 2,028 4,049 2,128 
2005 30.3 17.0 9.1  2,783 2,459 4,454 1,978 
2006 28.5 19.6 10.9   2,920  1,987 
2007 28.3 21.7 13.1   3,304  1.951 
 
Source: Table A3.3.1 
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Table A3.3.3         
Latin American Motor-vehicle industry               
          
 Production units Assembly employment Output per worker 
 Brazil Mexico Argentina    Brazil Mexico Argentina   Brazil        
B 
Mexico Argentina 
1974 905,920  286,312 104,072  57,400   4.99 
1975 930,235  240,036 104,556  54,556 8.90  4.40 
1976 986,611  193,517 112,429  50,012 8.78  3.87 
1977 921,193  235,356 111,514  48,765 8.26  4.83 
1978 1,064,014  179,160 123,927  38,402 8.59  4.67 
1979 1,127,966  253,217 127,081  41,201 8.88  6.15 
1980 1,165,174  281,793 133,683  38,851 8.72  7.25 
1981 780,883  172,363 103,992  28,334 7.51  6.08 
1982 859,304  132,117 107,137  23,267 8.02  5.68 
1983 896,462  159,876 101,087  23,449 8.87  6.82 
1984 864,653  167,323 107,447  23,620 8.05  7.08 
1985 966,708  137,675 122,217  20,715 7.91  6.65 
1986 1,056,332  170,490 129,232  22,129 8.17  7.70 
1987 920,071  193,315 113,474  21,820 8.11  8.86 
1988 1,068,756  164,160 112,985  21,313 9.46  7.70 
1989 1,013,252  127,823 118,369  19,281 8.56  6.63 
1990 914,466  99,639 117,396  17,430 7.79  5.72 
1991 960,219  138,958 109,428  18,317 8.77  7.59 
1992 1,073,861  262,022 105,664  22,161 10.16  11.82 
1993 1,391,435  342,344 106,738  23,027 13.04  14.87 
1994 1,581,389 1,100,000 408,777 107,134 46,838 25,734 14.76 23.49 15.88 
1995 1,629,008 900,000 262,401 104,614 38,926 21,362 15.57 23.12 12.28 
1996 1,804,328 1,200,000 313,152 101,857 40,777 22,728 17.71 29.43 13.78 
1997 2,069,703 1,400,000 446,306 104,941 43,987 26,286 19.72 31.83 16.98 
1998 1,586,291 1,500,000 457,956 83,049 49,047 22,963 19.10 30.58 19.94 
1999 1,356,714 1,500,000 304,834 85,100 52,168 18,522 15.94 28.75 16.46 
2000 1,691,240 1,900,000 339,246 89,134 53,950 17,381 18.97 35.22 19.52 
2001 1,817,116 1,900,000 235,577 84,834 51,628 14,250 21.42 36.80 16.53 
2002 1,791,530 1,800,000 159,356 81,737 47,262 12,166 21.92 38.09 13.10 
2003 1,827,791 1,600,000 169,621 79,047 41,101 12,501 23.12 38.93 13.57 
2004 2,317,227 1,577,000 260,402 88,783 38,569 13,751 26.10 40.89 18.94 
2005 2,530,840 1,684,000 319,755 94,206 38,746 16,485 26.86 43.46 19.40 
2006 2,611,034 2,045,000 432,101 93,243 44,833 19,095 28.00 45.61 22.63 
2007 2,970,280 2,095,000 544,647 104,274 49,266 24,164 28.49 42.52 22.54 
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Table A3.3.3       
Latin American Motor vehicle industry     
       
 Hourly compensation US$ Annual hours worked 
 Brazil Mexico Argentina Brazil Mexico Argentina 
1974    2,080 2,063 1,993 
1975    2,064 2,061 1,990 
1976    2,048 2,060 1,987 
1977    2,032 2,058 1,983 
1978    2,016 2,057 1,980 
1979    2,000 2,055 1,977 
1980    1,985 2,054 1,974 
1981    1,974 2,055 1,961 
1982    1,963 2,056 1,949 
1983    1,952 2,057 1,936 
1984    1,942 2,058 1,923 
1985    1,931 2,058 1,911 
1986    1,920 2,059 1,899 
1987    1,910 2,060 1,886 
1988    1,899 2,061 1,874 
1989    1,889 2,062 1,862 
1990    1,879 2,063 1,850 
1991    1,874 2,063 1,856 
1992    1,869 2,062 1,862 
1993    1,865 2,061 1,869 
1994 11.0 4.1  1,860 2,078 1,875 
1995 14.2 2.6  1,855 2,095 1,882 
1996 12.9 2.7 9.6 1,850 2,233 1,889 
1997 12.4 3.0 9.4 1,846 2,201 1,896 
1998 12.0 3.1 9.8 1,841 2,145 1,903 
1999 7.7 3.5 11.4 1,841 2,195 1,899 
2000 8.1 4.0 11.0 1,841 2,155 1,872 
2001 6.7 4.7 11.0 1,841 2,128 1,836 
2002 5.8 4.9 3.9 1,841 2,155 1,739 
2003 6.1 4.6 4.5 1,841 2,120 1,774 
2004 7.0 4.5 5.1 1,841 2,110 1,774 
2005 9.1 4.8 6.5 1,841 2,179 1,774 
2006 10.9 5.0 7.7 1,841 2,150 1,774 
2007 13.1 5.3 9.3 1,841 2,136 1,774 
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Table A3.3.3       
Latin American Motor-vehicle industry     
       
 Hours per car Labour cost per car - US$ 
 Brazil Mexico Argentina Brazil Mexico Argentina 
1974 239 
232 
233 
246 
235 
225 
228 
263 
245 
220 
241 
244 
235 
236 
201 
221 
241 
214 
184 
143 
126 
119 
104 
94 
96 
115 
97 
86 
84 
80 
71 
69 
66 
65 
239 
 400    
1975  452    
1976  513    
1977   411    
1978 235  424    
1979 225  322    
1980 228  272    
1981 263  322    
1982 245  343    
1983 220  284    
1984 241  272    
1985 244  288    
1986 235  246    
1987 236  213    
1988 0   243    
1989 2  281    
1990 41  324    
1991 214  245    
1992 184  158    
1993 143  126    
1994 126 88 118 1,391 362  
1995 119 91 153 1,694 232  
1996 104 76 137 1,344 204 1,312 
1997 94 69 112 1,163 208 1,047 
1998 96 70 95 1,157 214 937 
1999 115 76 115 893 264 1,316 
2000 97 61 96 789 247 1,059 
2001 6 58 111 578 273 1,218 
2002 84 57 133 486 276 520 
2003 80 54 131 488 250 594 
2004 71 52 94 496 234 476 
2005 69 50 91 622 242 597 
2006 66 47 78 717 234 604 
2007 65 50 79 845 266 735 
 
Sources: ANFAVEA (2008); ADEFA (2008); US BLS; Hufbauer and Schott (2005:373-
7); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (2010). 
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Chapter 4 
Long-term Development, Potentialities and Limitations of the 
Brazilian and Korean Processes of Capital Accumulation 
 
 The previous two chapters put forward evidence in support of the two main 
hypotheses proposed in this thesis. Chapter 2 presented the measurement of primary 
sector surpluses, largely under the form of agrarian land rent, in Brazil and Korea 
between 1955 and 2005 and of the portions of these surpluses respectively appropriated 
by landowners and other social actors. It was shown that industrial capital and its junior 
partners in Brazil were supported for most of the period by the transfer, through state 
policies, of a portion of the land rent available in the economy. It was also shown that 
the same process occurred in Korea before the late-1960s but not thereafter. Since the 
early-to-mid-1970s, the Korean agrarian sector has become a net recipient of resources 
from the rest of the economy and the profitability of industrial capital rested entirely on 
the surpluses normally available for appropriation in that sector, though foreign loans 
were important in supporting capital formation.  
 Chapter 3 analysed main trends in the post-1950s processes of technological 
development on a global scale, and their impact upon the structure of skills required 
from the industrial workforce. It also examined the specific cases of the steel, 
automobile and semiconductors industries, and traced their development in Korea and 
Brazil since the 1950s, analysing and comparing the bases for the valorisation of 
individual capital there. The qualitative and quantitative analyses presented in the 
chapter confirmed that the process of valorisation and accumulation of industrial capital 
in Brazil and Korea rested on specifically different bases: the possibility to appropriate 
land rent in Brazil, and the possibility to produce goods for world markets using a 
relatively cheap and disciplined labour-force in Korea. 
The present chapter will relate the findings presented in the previous two 
chapters to general trends in the Brazilian and Korean processes of economic 
development and growth between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s. The main political-
economy developments associated with these processes in each country have been 
schematically depicted in Chapter 1. Specific attention will be paid here to the evolution 
of quantitative economic indicators and political institutions expressing the essential 
characteristics of Brazilian and Korean capitalist development. In order to support the 
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task, this chapter will also refer to appropriate developments in the USA and Japan. The 
USA is used here as an expression of a national process of capital accumulation that 
reproduces itself through the development of vanguard science and technology. The 
Japanese economy is, in turn, the earliest and so far most developed national process of 
capital accumulation based, at least originally, on the use of relatively cheap and highly 
disciplined labour-power. 
  
4.1) Economic growth in Brazil and Korea between the mid-1950s and the mid-
2000s 
 
Before analysing in detail the long-term performance of the Brazilian and 
Korean economies, it is necessary to clarify the methodology used to measure the 
evolution of economic growth. Unless stated differently, economic growth is measured 
in terms of the evolution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in local currency of 
constant purchasing power (i.e. time-series of nominal GDP are deflated using the 
evolution of the relevant Consumer Price Index) rather than in constant prices of a base 
year. In the first place, and crucially, the evolution of GDP in prices of a base year is a 
quantity index, incapable of measuring the evolution of social wealth in its capitalist 
value-form. In other words, it measures the temporal evolution of the quantity of goods 
and services produced, not of their combined value. Secondly, in the Brazilian case, the 
base year for the computation of the GDP in constant prices is 1980, when the post-
WWII period of fast growth through ‗state-led‘ ISI ended and the long-term fall of 
international commodity prices began.
1
 As graph 4.1 below shows, the purchasing 
capacity of prices implicit in the Brazilian GDP fell significantly after the mid-1980s. 
This further reduces the relevance of the GDP in constant prices as an accurate measure 
of the evolution of the production of social wealth in Brazil.    
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Though the base was changed to 2000, values before 1995 were estimated using the growth rate of the 
‗old‘ GDP in constant prices of 1980. 
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Source: Table C.1 in Appendix C 
 
 
Source: Tables C.1 and C.3 – Population data: IBGE (Brazil); Bank of Korea and 
World Development Indicators (Korea) 
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Source: Tables C.3 and C.17  
Notes: Values in domestic currency were converted into US$ using PPP exchange rates 
estimated in this thesis. GDP per capita appears in dotted lines. 
 
The growth experiences of the Brazilian and Korean economies during the 
period under study show similarities and differences. Between the mid-1950s and the 
late-1970s, both countries grew robustly, averaging 8% and 12% (4.6% and 8.2% in per 
capita terms) per year, respectively. As was seen in Chapter 2, in Brazil this was a 
period of relatively strong expansion of the land rent and, after 1968, also of large 
inflows of foreign interest-bearing (loan) capital. Combined, these sources of 
extraordinary social wealth were able to sustain a strong process of capital accumulation 
through ‗state-led‘ ISI. In Korea, this period included the rapid recovery from war 
destruction, supported by the available agrarian and mining surpluses and large foreign 
aid inflows. It also included the post-mid-1960s structural transformation of the 
economy into a major producer of industrial goods for world markets, supported by a 
large inflow of loan capital to fund capital formation. As the Brazilian and Korean 
economies grew rapidly, they went from being only 2% and 0.2% of the size of their US 
counterpart in 1955 to 8.7% and 1.4%, respectively. In this process, income per capita 
in these countries increased from 5.5% and 1.5% to 17% and 8.5% of US levels, 
respectively (see graph 4.3 above).   
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Source: Tables C.1 and C.3 
 
 
Source: Tables C.1 and C.3 
 
 As can be grasped from the graphs above, similarities also prevailed with respect 
to Brazilian and Korean rates of growth during large parts of the 1955-1980 period. 
Growth was fast but irregular in both economies during the second half of the 1950s and 
the first part of the 1960s. Indeed, the two countries suffered severe economic crises 
during 1964-65 as the masses of extraordinary social wealth supporting the process of 
ISI fell relative to capital‘s need for them. In Brazil, this was associated with a 
contraction of the land rent and of interest-bearing capital inflows. In Korea, the crisis 
was largely related to a sharp drop in foreign aid inflows. Yet, while the growth process 
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accelerated sharply in Korea immediately thereafter, when the economy was undergoing 
a key moment in its structural transformation (i.e. the emergence of labour-intensive, 
export-oriented industries like electronics and clothing), in Brazil recovery did not occur 
until 1968, when foreign loans were again forthcoming in large quantities and managed 
to complement a stagnant land rent. 
 The 1970s was a period of fast economic growth for both countries. Brazil 
enjoyed a massive expansion of the land rent available for appropriation and the inflow 
of interest-bearing capital associated with the ‗commodities boom‘ and the recycling of 
petrodollars, respectively. With these enlarged resources, the process of ISI reproduced 
itself on an expanded scale. Korea was now undergoing its transformation into a major 
producer of heavy industrial and petrochemical goods (e.g. steel) for world markets, as 
well as a major provider of overseas construction services, using large reserves of 
cheap, disciplined and highly productive labour-power, and taking advantage of the 
large supply of low-cost credit in global financial markets. Yet, when the decade ended 
both economies were entering into severe crises. The global economy slowdown was 
affecting negatively the demand for raw materials, and hence their prices and the 
magnitude of the Brazilian land rent, and also the demand for those industrial inputs, 
consumer and capital goods produced in Korea. At the same time, the tightening of 
global credit markets was reducing the availability of financial resources for developing 
country economies. Indeed, both countries entered the decade of the 1980s with their 
economies going through their deepest crises since the 1950s. 
After the early 1980s, the differences between the Brazilian and Korean growth 
trajectories became greater than their similarities (see graphs 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5). 
Economic growth slowed significantly in Brazil while accelerating in Korea. Between 
1981 and 2005, the Brazilian and Korean economies grew at 1% and 7.6% annual 
average (-0.75% and 6% in per capita terms), respectively. As this occurred, the relative 
size of the Brazilian economy shrank from 8.7% of its US counterpart in 1980 to 5.5% 
in 2005, while the Korean increased from 1.4% to 11.5%. In this process, income per 
capita in these countries went from 17% and 8.5% to 8.8% and 72% of US levels, 
respectively (see graph 4.3). It was argued above that the reasons behind this 
differentiated performance are to be found in the distinctive forms under which 
industrial capital (and its junior partners) valorised and accumulated in each country 
after the mid-1960s, and in the way in which the post-1980 global economy 
developments thus manifested themselves in these national economies. 
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In Brazil, throughout the entire period, capital accumulated under the same, 
unchanged specific form. Small-scale by international standards, industrial capital was 
able to compensate for high production costs by appropriating a portion of the abundant 
land rent and of foreign interest-bearing capital inflows (i.e. external credits) which 
increasingly complemented the former. In general terms, the reproduction of the 
Brazilian process of capital accumulation has thus depended on the evolution of the 
mass of these resources available for appropriation to compensate for the difference 
between local and world markets production costs, broadly determined by labour 
productivity differences. As was seen for the specific industries analysed in the previous 
chapter, the low cost of the local labour-force was not, generally, enough to compensate 
for its low productivity resulting from this particular type of economic organisation. 
Hence, the post-1980 deceleration of the rate of economic growth largely resulted from 
the contraction of the combined masses of extraordinary social wealth available to 
support capital relative to capital‘s need for them to valorise normally (i.e. at the general 
or normal rate of profit). As was seen above, this relative contraction of the land rent 
resulted in the dismantling of several state policies supporting the ISI process and thus 
in the collapse of industrial valued added and the stagnation of GDP growth. 
The long-term stagnation (i.e. relative contraction) of the combined mass of land 
rent and interest-bearing capital inflows, however, was realised through the alternation 
of periods of expansion and contraction of these resources. To a very large extent, the 
pace of economic growth in Brazil after 1980 was marked by that irregular evolution, as 
well as that of the constantly widening ‗productivity gap‘.2 Following global 
developments in the demand for raw materials (and, thus, their prices and the size of 
land rent), and in the supply of credit to developing countries (and, thus, the magnitude 
of net interest-bearing capital inflows), economic growth accelerated around the middle 
part of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and decelerated around the beginning and end of 
these decades.
3
 Again, while periods of land rent expansion gave place to the 
reintroduction of some forms of state support for the ISI process, the opposite was 
generally the case during periods of land rent contraction. 
                                                 
2
 See graphs 2.10 and 2.13 in Chapter 2 for the evolution of the land rent and of the net inflow of foreign 
loans in Brazil. 
3
 See graphs 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1 for global economy developments in terms of commodity prices and 
interest rates. See Kaminsky (2005) for the evolution of private capital inflows to developing country 
economies since the 1970s.   
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In terms of strength, the post-1980 Korean growth experience has been radically 
different from the Brazilian. Nonetheless, in terms of cyclicality, both economies have 
shown a relatively similar movement. In general terms, the Korean process of economic 
growth during this period remained, as hitherto, dependent on the evolution of global 
demand for the type of industrial goods produced in Korea and on the capacity of 
capital there to compete in world markets based on the use of a relative cheap and 
disciplined labour-force. As the 1979-82 global economy recession ended, Korean 
economic growth accelerated strongly during 1983-88 while exports expanded and 
increasingly included high value-added products, like automobiles, cold-rolled steel and 
ships. Growth decelerated during 1989-92, when global economic growth and exports 
demand slowed, but accelerated again during 1993-96, as external demand recovered 
and productions for world markets began to include high-tech goods, like 
semiconductors and consumer electronics under Original Brand Manufacturer 
arrangements. Yet, economic growth decelerated once again thereafter as the 
international competitiveness of the local industrial sector began to be challenged by 
industrial capitals located in lower-wage countries, crucially in Southeast Asia, Mexico 
and China. 
 
4.2) Growth of industrial exports in Brazil and Korea 
 
The most immediate manifestation of the specific differences between the 
Korean and Brazilian processes of capitalist development is their distinct experiences 
with industrial exports. As was shown for the sectors analysed in Chapter 3, the 
expansion of manufactured exports has been far stronger in Korea than in Brazil.
4
 
Effectively, while the strong expansion of industrial exports has been a key aspect of the 
post-mid-1960s structural transformation of the Korean process of capitalist 
development, the reproduction of the Brazilian process of capital accumulation during 
the post-WWII resulted in a much weaker record in this area of economic activity. 
During its post-mid-1960s export-led growth process, Korea‘s sales in global 
markers expanded strongly, at around 30% (36% for industrial goods) per year during 
1965-1980, albeit starting from a very low base, and 8.5% (8.6% for industrial goods) 
per year during 1981-2005. As a result of this growth, the share of exports in GDP 
                                                 
4
 See table A4.1 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter for the evolution of exports in Korea and 
Brazil. 
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increased from 8% in 1965 to 44.5% in 1980 and, though decreasing to around 15% in 
2002, remained at 20% in the second part of the 2000s. In this process, the participation 
of industrial goods in total exports increased from 10% (most of which were processed 
raw materials like food and beverages) in 1962 to more than 90% from 1980 onwards.  
However, more significant, and revealing of the transformations at stake, has 
been the evolution of the relationship between the value of industrial exports and the 
value added in the sector. While in 1962, the value of industrial exports in Korea was 
equal to 6% of the industrial value-added, it was around 180% during the second part of 
the 1970s and the early 1980s. This not only shows the strong export orientation of 
Korea‘s industrial sector after the mid-1960s, but also the high import content of its 
exports during that period. The exports-to-value-added ratio fell continuously during the 
1980s and 1990s to reach only 60% in 2002 as the process of industrial deepening 
proceeded further and, with it, the expansion of domestic demand for intermediate and 
consumer goods. The latter was needed to manufacture higher value-added goods for 
world markets and to reproduce a labour-force undertaking increasingly complex 
productive activities. Thereafter, the ratio of exports value to industrial value-added 
increased again to 76.5% in 2005 as the economy embarked on an export-led recovery 
and domestic consumption growth remained contained in the period that followed the 
1997-98 economic crisis.
5
 This significant expansion of the international 
competitiveness of Korean industrial capital, as seen in the previous chapter, has 
resulted not only from the cheapness of the local labour-force relative to that of its main 
competitors, but also from its rapidly increasing productivity. Both combined have 
resulted in relatively low unit labour costs in several, though not all, manufacturing 
branches and activities. The next section will analyse the evolution of labour 
productivity in the Korean and Brazilian industrial sector relative to world market 
standards (i.e. the USA). Section 4.5 below will analyse the evolution of labour costs. 
The Brazilian exporting experience contrasts markedly with the Korean. The 
annual rate of growth of Brazilian exports averaged 12% (22% for industrial goods) 
during 1964-1980, albeit also starting from a very low base and receiving generous 
subsidies, and 4.4% (5.4% for industrial goods) during 1981-2005. In this process, 
export participation in GDP oscillated around 8-9% between the 1960 and 1990, when 
the domestic market remained highly protected, and around 10-12% between 1991 and 
                                                 
5
 See table A4.2. 
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2003 as large-scale trade opening policies were introduced. In 2004-05, they jumped to 
17.7% of GDP as primary goods prices rose in the build-up to the 2007-08 
‗commodities boom‘. Yet, this level of exports-to-GDP was similar to those 
experienced in the mid-1950s, at the end of the ‗commodities boom‘ associated with the 
Korean War. In Brazil, high value-added industrial productions have been particularly 
oriented towards domestic and, since the 1990s, regional markets. Though industrial 
goods constituted more than 50% of total exports after the late 1980s, most of them 
have been processed locally available raw materials (i.e. food and beverages, cotton 
textiles, leather shoes, steel and aluminium) or, as in the case of motor-vehicles, 
agricultural machinery and consumer-electronics, receiving substantial subsidies or 
destined to the Mercosur – i.e. the expanded, and still protected, ‗domestic‘ market. 
It is interesting to note here that the evolution of the relationship between 
industrial exports value and the value added in the sector followed in Brazil a trend 
different from that observed in Korea. The value of industrial exports was equal to only 
5% of industrial value-added during the 1960s, 11% during the 1970s, when export 
subsidies peaked, and 18% in the 1980s, when the strong undervaluation of the 
exchange rate stimulated overseas sales. These relatively low exports-to-value-added 
ratios resulted from the general domestic-markets orientation of Brazil‘s industrial 
sector during that period, itself an outcome of the specific form under which capital 
accumulates there. The ratio of exports to value-added increased from 25% in the early 
1990s to 62.7% in 2005, as industrial value-added contracted (see graph 4.2 above) and 
high valued-added sales to regional markets expanded.
6
 Both of these trends were 
already seen for the motor-vehicles industry and will be discussed in more detail in the 
second part of this thesis.  
 
4.3) Growth of labour productivity in the Brazilian and Korean industrial sectors 
 
 The increased international competitiveness of the Korean industrial sector was 
not simply the result of a comparative advantage in production intensively using cheap 
labour, as already argued above. It was also based on the continuous, strong surge in the 
productivity of the local industrial workforce, resulting from three main factors: the 
simplification/standardisation of several industrial labour-process due to the continual 
                                                 
6
 See table A4.2. 
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developmental of equipment automation; the historically-developed characteristics of 
the local workforce (i.e. its subordination to factory authority and its discipline for 
large-scale collective/collaborative labour-processes); and, the continuous upgrading, 
especially after the mid-1970s, of its quality (i.e. formal skills and on-the-job 
experience). 
In Brazil, material conditions supporting productivity growth in the industrial 
sector have been radically different. In general terms, the narrowness of the domestic 
market and the highly diversified structure of the local industrial sector have imposed 
strong constrains on the use, let alone the development, of vanguard technology and, 
consequently, to the increase in labour productivity. Moreover, the possibility to 
accumulate through the appropriation of land rent has allowed, and thus created the 
incentives for, MNC subsidiaries to use out-dated, fixed capital, further limiting the 
growth of labour productivity in the industrial sector.   
 
 
Source: Table C.28 
Note: Korea* = labour productivity per hour; Brazil* = mainstream manufacturing 
sector 
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Source: Table C.28 
Note: corrected for differences in hours worked in the case of Korea 
 
 Under the above-mentioned conditions, labour productivity in the Korean 
industrial sector grew at an annual average rate of 2.9% between 1955 and 1965, before 
the structural transformation of its accumulation base began, and 10% between 1966 
and 2005, after the change. Consequently, as can be gathered from graph 4.6 above, the 
average level of labour productivity in the Korean industrial sector remained around 
only 6% of US levels between 1955 and 1965 and increased continuously thereafter to 
reach 65% of US levels in 2005. This massive catching-up process, nevertheless, 
occurred at different speeds across the post-mid-1960s period. The productivity of 
industrial labour in Korea grew substantially faster than in the USA between 1965 and 
the early 1980s (12% p.a. against 2.8% p.a.) and thus increased from 6% to 25% of US 
levels; grew only slightly faster than in the USA during the 1981-87 (5.7% and 4.3%) 
and thus remained around 30% of US levels; and grew again significantly faster than in 
the USA thereafter (9.4% and 3.8%), more than doubling the ratio between them. As 
can be observed in graph 4.7 above, it has been during the post-1987 period that the 
absolute productivity gap first stabilised (1987-97) and, subsequently, shrank markedly 
(after 1997). Before the mid-1980s, the large original absolute gap was enough to 
neutralise the relatively faster growth of labour productivity in Korea than in the USA. 
Graph 4.6 also shows that labour productivity in the Brazilian mainstream 
industrial sector fluctuated around 20-30% of US levels across much of the period 
studied, growing at an average of 4.35% per year between 1955 and 2005, which was 
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only 1% faster than in the USA. As in Korea, there were marked differences across that 
fifty-year long period. Labour productivity in Brazil grew faster than in the USA during 
much of the second half of the 1950s, when MNCs accelerated their entry in the country 
and thus upgraded the technological profile of the local manufacturing base, and during 
the second half of the 1960s, when a wave of foreign direct investments, fusions and the 
disappearance of small firms took place in the Brazilian industrial sector.
7
 Labour 
productivity in Brazil grew approximately as fast as in the USA during much of the 
1970s and the 1980s, and sped up during the 1990s, when large sections of small- and 
medium-sized nationally-owned companies disappeared, a new wave of FDI took place 
and the strong overvaluation of the currency allowed the rapid importation of 
equipment, and slowed again during the post-2000 recovery. As can be seen in graph 
4.7 above, with the productivity of industrial labour in Brazil growing approximately as 
fast as in the USA, and starting from a much lower level, the absolute gap between them 
has widened continuously. It is this constantly widening of the absolute productivity gap 
that partly explains the contraction in the production of industrial value-added during 
1994-97 when the magnitude of the land rent and net interest-bearing capital inflows 
available and actually appropriated by industrial capital reached levels close to those of 
the 1970s. 
 
4.4) Individual and collective characteristics of the Brazilian and Korean industrial 
labour-forces 
 
The substantial increase in the productivity of Korean industrial labour 
described in the previous section has not meant, however, the ‗upgrading‘ of its quality 
to the levels of its counterparts in the industrially advanced economies. Though rapidly 
catching-up, the average productivity of industrial labour in Korea has remained lower 
than in the USA throughout the period studied. As shown in graph 4.6 above, even after 
the impressive surge since the mid-1980s, the average productivity of Korean industrial 
labour in the mid-2000s remained around 65-70% of US levels. Unsurprisingly, though 
partly converging, the individual and collective characteristics (e.g. levels of average 
formal education, structure of skills and composition) of both national labour-forces 
have remained distinct. The average productivity of Brazilian industrial labour, on the 
                                                 
7
 See Newfarmer and Muller (1975: 98-111). 
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contrary, has been far from approaching industrially advanced economy levels. The 
possibility for capital to accumulate without investing the use and development of state-
of-the-art technologies has resulted there in the development of an industrial workforce 
with attributes that have also tended to differ from those of its US counterpart. The 
specific evolutions of the productive characteristics of the Korean and Brazilian 
workforces have been a form of realisation of the processes of capitalist development 
that use and reproduce them. These evolutions have come about through differences in 
the conditions of their purchase and use by capital and in the consumption patterns of 
these national labour-forces, especially their distinct educational experiences. 
It is usually argued that the availability of a highly educated workforce was one 
of the main factors explaining Korea‘s strong post-1960s productivity gains and overall 
growth experience.
8
 This, however, was hardly the case. When the Korean economy 
began its impressive export-led growth process, the average years of education received 
by the local labour-force were not only low in absolute terms, but also below those 
received in countries like Brazil where illiteracy was extensive.
9
 On the contrary, rapid 
and sustained advances in educational attainments in Korea, notably in comparison to 
Brazil, have themselves resulted from the developments and transformations of the 
process of export-oriented industrialisation, rather than having been a precondition to 
that process, legacy of the Japanese colonial period, as sometimes claimed.
10
 
Moreover, the post-mid-1960s rapid increase in the average level of education of 
the Korean labour-force to approach industrially advanced country levels, hides some, 
often unnoticed peculiarities that reveal the underlying specific characteristics of the 
local process of capital accumulation. First, class sizes have been larger and students-to-
teacher ratios higher in Korea than in countries like the USA and Brazil, notably before 
the 1990s.
11
 This had the effect of reducing the contact between teachers and students 
and, consequently, strengthened the reliance on lecture-centred education strategies and 
the use of pedagogical practices such as memorisation and recitation (i.e. rote-learning) 
which are known to stifle creativity as well as independent thinking. These teaching 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Rodrik (1994). 
9
 See table A4.3 at the end of this chapter for the evolution of average years of schooling in Korea, Brazil 
and the USA. Illiteracy rates in Korea in 1945 reached 78% (Lee 2008: 11). In 1970, 33% of Brazilian 
population of age 15 or more was analphabetic. This proportion fell to 25% in 1980, 18.7% in 1990 and 
11.1% in 2005. This information was published in various demographic censuses and is available in 
Ipeadata. 
10
 See also Amsden (1989: 220) on this point. 
11
 See table A4.4. 
 208 
practices, nevertheless, promoted discipline and collective/collaborative work habits.
12
 
In effect, the rapid quantitative expansion in the provision of educational services 
during the 1960s, 1970s and most of the 1980s was achieved there at a relatively low 
cost and, consequently, at the expense of qualitative improvements.
13
 Education 
expenditure as a proportion of national income in Korea was, until recently, low in 
international terms.  Moreover, even if they have increased recently, per capita 
expenditure in education in Korea has been in absolute terms (the only ones that matter 
in practice) well below those of leading industrial countries.
14
 Secondly, the practice of 
‗automatic promotion‘ has been widely used at all levels of the system while a central 
role has been given to moral (i.e. discipline), health and physical education, notably 
before the mid-1970s but also subsequently.
15
 It was only after the 1970s, as the 
demand for a relatively qualified labour-force increased sharply, that the Korean state 
introduced specific reforms in order to include science and technology teaching at 
secondary education level
16
 and, more important, implemented its massive programmes 
of ‗vocational training‘ to increase rapidly the supply of semiskilled workers, almost 
non-existent in the country hitherto.
17
 Primary and secondary education, together with 
the three-year long compulsory military service, enabled male prospective industrial 
workers to acquire rapidly the specific skills and discipline required for factory labour. 
It was only after the 1980s, when class sizes and students to teacher ratios fell 
substantially, that ‗student-centred‘ educational methods began to prevail in Korea.18 
Nevertheless, as late as 2007 the module ‗disciplined life‘ still formed part of the 
compulsory curriculum during the first 10 years of formal education in Korea.
19
 
In Brazil, the situation has been markedly different. Resources spent on 
education have never been stretched as thinly as in Korea. On one hand, this has meant 
                                                 
12
 See Golladay and King (1979: 157); McGinn (1980: 77). 
13
 See World Bank (1993: 243); Huh (2007a: 12-4). 
14
 See table A4.5. 
15
 See McGinn (1980: 40-5, 73-5); Huh (2007b: 137, 142). ―Although there was emphasis on 
individualism and productivity in the curriculum in the 1950s, that was replaced in the 1960s with more 
emphasis on collectivity and conformity. What distinguished the curriculum of Korean schools from that 
of countries whose attempts at development have not resulted in rapid growth and relative equity is not its 
emphasis on science and technology. The major difference seems to be that Korean education places a 
heavy stress on moral education [which includes ‗anti-communism‘] and discipline. It is hard to fit this 
characteristic into the human resources development of the education‘s contribution.‖ (Mason et al., 
1989: 370). 
16
 See Lee (2008: 54-5, 64-5). 
17
 See Lee (2008: 41-4); Shin (2003: 103-4). The level of instruction provided through this programme, 
however, was basic. See Amsden (1989: 223-4). 
18
 See Huh (2007a: 15-7, 34-40). 
19
 See Huh (2007a: 46). 
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that class sizes have been smaller, thus theoretically improving the quality of the 
education provided and the space for the development of ‗independent‘ thinking. On the 
other hand, educational attainments in Brazil, though improving constantly, have been 
nowhere near as universally spread as in Korea. Nevertheless, two caveats should be 
introduced here in relationship to the formal education received by the Brazilian 
industrial workforce vis-à-vis the Korean. First, given the low levels of education 
attained by Brazilian rural inhabitants and the urban marginal populations, it is highly 
probable that the evolution of average years of schooling underestimates the real 
educational levels of workers in the mainstream manufacturing sector, notably as 
average student to teacher ratios in Brazil have been relatively similar to US levels. 
Secondly, and probably more relevant for manual worker skills acquisition, from the 
1940s onwards, well before the Korean experience in the field began, vocational 
training programmes were extensively implemented in Brazil, both by the state and by 
employer associations, notably during the 1970s process of industrial ‗deepening‘.20 
Not only has the average level of education of the Korean and Brazilian 
industrial workforces been lower than their US counterparts. More importantly, their 
composition has also been different. First, the proportion of production (i.e. manual) 
workers in the total industrial workforce has been significantly higher in Korea and 
Brazil than in the USA.
21
 Secondly, and related to the previous, the proportion of 
employees with tertiary education has been lower in these countries than in the USA 
throughout the entire period under study, though it has been increasing rapidly after 
1980 in Korea.
22
 Thirdly, the availability of such highly qualified workers as scientists 
and engineers involved in Research and Development (R&D) activities, and thus the 
production of scientific and applied knowledge, have been lower in Korea than in the 
industrially advanced countries against which its industrial sector has been competing in 
global markets. Crucially, this portion of the industrial workforce has been significantly 
lower in Korea than in Japan, a country that not only has a relatively similar economic 
structure, and pattern of insertion into the international division of labour, but also 
specialises in productions closely competing with Korean industrial output.
23
 In Brazil, 
the participation of R&D workers in the total labour-force has been substantially lower 
                                                 
20
 See Correa do Lago et al. (1983: 123-28, 401-30); Valle Silva (2008: 476). 
21
 See table A4.7. 
22
 See table A4.8. Enrolment rates in higher education in Korea increased from only 16% in 1980 to 35% 
in 1985 and 55% in 1995. See Shin (2003: 133). 
23
 See table A4.9. 
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than in Korea and the industrially advanced countries. In other words, due to the 
specific characteristics of both processes of capital accumulation, the portion of the 
workforce producing technological and scientific developments, whether vanguard or 
adaptive, has been significantly smaller there than in those countries where capital 
accumulates through the development of vanguard technology.
24
 Moreover, the share of 
non-production workers in Korea‘s industrial sector has been particularly reduced due 
to the relatively low presence of supervisory and administrative personnel, resulting 
from the high degree of subordination of manual workers to factory authority.
25
 
 
4.5) Cost and reproduction patterns of the Brazilian and Korean labour-forces 
 
As mentioned above, the increasing international competitiveness of Korean 
industrial capital, revealed in the rapid growth of manufactured exports, resulted from 
the high productivity of its labour-force relative to its cost. Table A4.12 in the 
Appendix, at the end of this chapter, shows the evolution of hourly labour compensation 
costs in Korea, Brazil and USA. It can be seen there that, relative to US levels, Korean 
labour costs in US dollars at market exchange rates were not only low but, also, lower 
than the ratio of labour productivity throughout the entire period studied except the 
years immediately before the 1997/98 crisis. In Brazil, on the contrary, the same was 
true only during periods when the exchange rate was not kept overvalued (i.e. late 
1960s, 1980s and early 2000s). 
Though relevant when analysing competition in world markets, the evolution of 
labour costs in US$ at market exchange rates distorts the real cost of labour-power in 
each national economy. As was seen before, the price of foreign currency in each 
country varies depending on the exchange rate policy being implemented. An 
overvalued currency increases domestic costs in world markets while an undervalued 
exchange rate has the opposite effect. To avoid this distortion, the following graph plots 
the evolution of Korean and Brazilian labour costs in US$ at PPP exchange rates 
relative to US levels.
26
 
 
                                                 
24
 See tables A4.10 and A4.11 for the evolution of scientific production in Brazil, Korea and several 
industrially advanced countries.  
25
 See Amsden (1989: 167-73). 
26
 As explained in Chapter 2, ‗absolute‘ PPP exchange rates are not useful for this purpose. PPP exchange 
rates estimated in this thesis are thus used for the conversion. 
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Source: Tables C.4, C.5 and C.17  
Note: Korea* = manual workers in permanent employment; Brazil* = manual workers 
in permanent employment 
 
Three main observations can be made from graph 4.8. First, it can be seen that 
the real cost of labour in Brazil increased from 9% of US values in 1955 to 28% in 
1980 and, as economic growth slowed, decreased thereafter to be only 13% in 2005. 
Secondly, that the cost of manual labour with permanent employment contract in the 
Korean industrial sector increased from 2% to around 100% of the average cost of US 
manual industrial labour between 1955 and 2005. Thirdly, that the average cost of 
industrial labour in Korea increased more slowly, from 3.5% to 52.5% of US levels 
between 1970 and 2005. Fourthly, comparing graph 4.8 and table A4.12, it can be seen 
that post-1997 labour costs in Korea remained low for international standards only due 
to the exchange rate undervaluation policy pursued there.  
Yet, though relevant to measure the real cost of labour-power in each domestic 
market, graph 4.8 does not provide an accurate picture of the evolution of industrial 
wages‘ purchasing power and thus of their capacity to reproduce labour‘s productive 
attributes and to absorb domestic productions. As foreign exchange, the price of goods 
and services consumed by the labour-force also differs from country to country and so 
does, then, the purchasing capacity of wages. To account for this distortion, the 
following two graphs plot the evolution of Korean and Brazilian hourly industrial wages 
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in 2005 PPP US$ relative to US levels and in local currency of constant purchasing 
power.
27
  
 
 
Source: Tables C.30 
Note: Korea* = Manual workers in permanent employment; Brazil* = Manual workers 
in permanent employment 
 
 
Source: Tables C.4 and C.5 
Note: Korea* = Manual workers in permanent employment 
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 As explained in Chapter 2, ‗absolute‘ PPP exchange rates are used for this purpose. 
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As can be gathered from graph 4.9 above, the average purchasing power of 
hourly manufacturing wages in Korea and Brazil has been substantially lower than in 
the USA throughout most of the period studied. In Korea, however, it has been 
catching-up with US levels, increasing from less than 10% of the latter during the late 
1960s to 55% for all employees and 80% for mainstream manual workers in the mid-
2000s. This substantial and continuous improvement in the purchasing capacity of 
industrial wages has resulted in the expansion of labour‘s productive attributes, as 
reviewed in the previous section. This general trend, however, hides both a changing 
speed in the catching-up process and a changing pattern in the evolution of the payment 
conditions of the different portions of the industrial workforce. The increase in the 
average purchasing power of industrial wages in Korea (see graph 4.10) and their 
catching-up with industrially advanced country values (see graph 4.9) was constant but 
relatively slow until the late 1980s when they reached only 20-22% of US levels. 
Moreover, during this period, crucially before the late 1970s, the gap between wages 
paid to manual workers and to their clerical and managerial counterparts, and the 
‗premium‘ paid for education, were not only substantially larger than in industrially 
advanced countries like the USA, but was also growing rapidly.
28
 As with labour 
productivity, the growth of real wages and their catching-up process were extremely fast 
after the mid-1980s. In contrast to the previous period, while real wage growth 
accelerated, the gap between blue and white collar worker wages decreased 
substantially until the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the gap started to increase again 
thereafter, together with that between large and small company employee wages. 
Internationally high and growing differences in the payment conditions of ‗permanent‘ 
and ‗temporary‘ employees have also been common in Korea, notably after the late 
1990s crisis. Indeed, while until the late 1980s wages paid to manual industrial workers 
with permanent contracts were roughly equal to the average wage paid in the sector 
(which includes those paid to ‗temporary‘ workers as well as clerical worker salaries), 
in 2005 permanent worker wages were at least 50% higher (see graph 4.10 and table 
C.5). Gender-based wage differentials in the Korean manufacturing sector, though 
decreasing continuously since the 1970s, have been, together with the Japanese, the 
largest in the world for a large part of the period studied.
29
 These differentials have been 
larger at lower levels of educational attainments. In other words, since the early 1970s, 
                                                 
28
 See tables A4.13, A4.14 and A.15. 
29
 See also Amsden (1989: 204); Monk-Turner and Turner (2000); Seguino (2000). 
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industrial capital has found in Korea a labour market with not only an internationally 
cheap and highly disciplined industrial labour-force, but also with a highly 
differentiated structure of remunerations. These conditions have been particularly 
suitable for the emerging and consolidating technological base. On the one hand, these 
wage disparities allowed the differentiated compensation of the portion of the labour-
force working as an appendage of the machine and of the fraction performing more 
skill-intensive activities. On the other hand, they allowed, crucially through gender-
based wage disparities, the development of the relatively high-wage heavy and 
petrochemical industries while minimising the impact on the normal functioning and 
international competitiveness of low-wage clothing, textile and electronics industries, 
where female employment has tended to be concentrated.  
The evolution of industrial wages‘ purchasing power has also been irregular in 
Brazil. First, as can be seen in graph 4.10, the average purchasing capacity of industrial 
wages increased substantially between the end of WWII and the mid-1970s, remaining 
throughout this period at around 35% of US levels (see graph 4.9), well above the ratio 
of labour productivity. Though this growth was relatively universal within the 
mainstream manufacturing sector until the mid-1960s, it was marked by an increased 
differentiation thereafter, when the military took over. In contradistinction to what was 
taking place in the industrially advanced countries, between the mid-1960s and the early 
1970s, the purchasing power of skilled industrial worker wages/salaries in Brazil 
increased substantially while those of manual workers remained largely stagnant and 
even fell slightly.
30
 Secondly, between the early 1970s and 1980, the average 
purchasing capacity of wages in the mainstream industrial sector in Brazil increased 
substantially to reach around 50-55% of US levels, as the manufacturing base deepened 
and industrial productions for domestic markets grew strongly. Again in contrast to the 
Korean experience, that ratio was almost double that of Brazilian industrial labour 
productivity relative to US levels. As mentioned, the use of out-dated equipment in 
Brazil limited, ceteris paribus, the growth and level of productivity of labour of a given 
quality. The growth of purchasing power evidenced during most of the 1970s was, also 
in contrast to the contemporary experience in industrially advanced countries, broadly 
universal. Thirdly, the purchasing power of Brazilian industrial wages oscillated around 
40% of US levels during the 1980s, and thereafter, as industrial value-added and 
                                                 
30
 See table A4.16. 
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employment contracted, fell continuously to become only 25% of US levels during the 
first half of the 2000s. This massive wage contraction, however, generated another 
source of extraordinary profits for capital to complement the land rent in sustaining 
capital‘s valorisation. Fourthly, unlike in Korea, the purchasing capacity of Brazilian 
wages relative to US levels has been substantially higher than the real costs of labour 
for social capital throughout the entire period studied (see graphs 4.8 and 4.9). The 
appropriation of land rent through low food-prices allowed capital to lower the cost of 
labour-power of any given quality. 
Fast increases in wages and labour productivity in Korea, however, have been 
accompanied by internationally long working-days, even increasing during the 1970s 
and most part of the 1980s, when the manufacturing sector was undergoing its 
‗deepening‘ into heavy and, subsequently, consumer-durable goods industries. Even as 
late as 2005, the working-day in the Korean industrial sector was 27% longer than in the 
USA.
31
 This trend indicates that workforces in both countries have been, on average, 
performing labour-processes of different quality, notably with respect to their average 
intellectual intensity and complexity. Indeed, this was one of the conclusions yielded by 
the analysis of the composition of both labour-forces. In contrast, the evolution of the 
length of the average working-day in Brazil has been similar to the US pattern, and has 
remained around 5-10% above of US levels throughout the entire period. This 
evolution, together with the relatively high average purchasing power of manufacturing 
wages, indicates that, until the mid-1980s, the industrial labour-force in Brazil was 
reproduced with productive attributes and performed activities closer to those of its US 
counterpart than its Korean. This was necessary to reproduce a process of 
industrialisation that then was, in many respects, a small-scale replica of its US 
counterpart. Partly as a consequence of this evolution in the length of the working-day, 
industrial accidents have also been substantially higher in Korea than in the USA and 
Brazil during much of the period under study.
32
 Together with the low wages prevailing 
there until the late-1980s, this has meant that job separation rates were, until the 1990s, 
substantially higher in Korea than in Brazil and in such countries as Japan and 
Taiwan.
33
 These conditions also resulted in particularly high mortality rates in Korea, 
notably among female workers who were rapidly being incorporated into the industrial 
                                                 
31
 See table A4.7. 
32
 See table A4.17. 
33
 See table A4.18. 
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labour market.
34
 Indeed, only a society with access to a massive surplus population, as 
the Korean then, can afford the accelerated wear and tear of its labour-force.
35
 
 
4.6) Labour market institutions and working-class political representation in 
Brazil and Korea 
 
 The individual and collective characteristics of the Korean and Brazilian 
industrial labour-forces reviewed above have not sprung spontaneously. On the 
contrary, they have been a product of, and have expressed and realised, the specificities 
of the national processes of capital accumulation that use, and thus reproduce, them. As 
such, they have largely resulted from the evolution of three intrinsically related factors: 
state expenditures on labour‘s reproduction; the structure and dynamics of labour 
markets; and, the forms of working-class political representation. 
During most of the period studied, expenditures on such services as education, 
healthcare and housing in Korea were, as a general trend, undertaken largely by the 
private sector.
36
 In the case of education, a division of labour tended to prevail between 
public and private sectors. While the former concentrated almost fully in providing 
universal primary instruction, the latter largely monopolised the provision of secondary 
and tertiary tuition.
37
 Only in the last couple of decades, have increases in state 
expenditures in higher education meant that the overall cost of education provision has 
tended to be shared almost equally between the private and public sectors.
38
 Housing 
and healthcare, as well as social security, have remained largely privately supplied.
39
 
The cost of reproducing the Korean labour-force has thus been largely included in the 
direct and indirect wages paid by employers. This trend has, ceteris paribus, introduced 
a limit to labour‘s universal, undifferentiated reproduction. In Brazil, on the contrary, 
until the early 1990s neoliberal reforms, state participation in labour‘s reproduction was, 
as a general trend, relatively extended, albeit until the 1970s and crucially the mid-
                                                 
34
 See table A4.19. 
35
 See Koo (2001: 54-6). 
36
 See Shin (2003). 
37
 See McGinn (1980: 15-7); World Bank (1993: 199); Huh (2007b: 137-8). 
38
 See Huh (2007a: 65). See World Bank (1993: 43-6) for a comparison between East Asian countries, 
including Korea, and other developing countries. 
39
 See McGinn (1980: 15-27, 70-1) for education; Park (1998) for housing; Shin (2003: 90-2) for 
healthcare. 
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1980s, directed largely to urban workers with formal employment contracts.
40
 
Moreover, to a much larger extent than in Korea, services like healthcare, housing and 
leisure were provided by industry-wide trade unions rather than by individual 
companies.
41
 Combined, state and trade union actions sustained a minimum degree of 
universality in the consumption of ‗public‘ services among workers in the mainstream 
manufacturing and service sectors while excluding the rest of the working-class from 
that consumption. 
Hence, the specific features of labour market institutions and working-class 
political representation have thus been fundamental in mediating the respective patterns 
of consumption and the conditions of reproduction of the Korean and Brazilian labour-
forces. Not only through their role in the determination of wages paid to the different 
fractions of the industrial workforce, but also through their part in the determination of 
state expenditures in universal public services. In this way, these market and political 
institutions have mediated the reproduction of the specific characteristics of the Korean 
and Brazilian processes of capital accumulation. 
Post-WWII labour market institutions and working-class politics in Korea and 
Brazil have not only differed from each other, since they have mediated specifically 
distinct processes of capitalist development, but also from those prevailing in countries 
where the process of capital accumulation involves the production of a workforce 
capable of pursuing vanguard scientific and technological development. In the USA, for 
instance, labour unions have been structured in the form of trade or industry-wide 
organisations affiliated to national confederations, the AFL-CIO (American Federation 
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organisations) the largest and until recently the only 
one.
42
 Between the passage of the 1935 Wagner Act and the early 1980s, industrial 
relations there were broadly structured around the process of collective bargaining by 
which employers negotiated with trade unions not only payment conditions but also 
detailed work rules and grievance procedures for a particular branch of industry during 
a specific period of time. Negotiated at the company level, contracts agreed in this way 
became thereafter effective for the entire branch of industry, thus homogenising 
                                                 
40
 See Correa do Lago et al. (1983: 174-93) and Plank (1996: 70-85, 123-28) for education; Santos (1999) 
for housing; Cardoso and Jaccoud (2009: 230-39) for an overview of educational and healthcare policies. 
See also Maloy (1979); Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock (2009) for social security provision. 
41
 See Erickson (1979: 36-9). 
42
 See Aglietta (1979: 190-8). See Boyer (1995) for a comparison of the US experience with that of other 
developed nations. 
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payment and working conditions across each industrial sector.
43
 National 
confederations, in turn, lobbied the state, with more or less success according to the 
historical circumstances, for certain universal working conditions and the universal 
provision of public services and social welfare, sometimes through direct intervention in 
national party politics.
44
 Though being legally entitled to do otherwise, crucially after 
the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act,
45
 the US state restrained from systematically 
intervening in trade union affairs and in the bargaining process between them and 
private-sector employers, as well as from enforcing the legal restriction of public sector 
employees to the right to strike.
46
  
Since the mid-1970s, and crucially the early 1980s, several changes have taken 
place in the US system of industrial relations. These changes have help mediate the 
reproduction of the essential features of the NIDL within the US national process of 
capital accumulation. To being with, in parallel to the introduction of neoliberal reforms 
in the fields of social and economic policy, the US state changed its overall approach to 
labour issues, pursing a ‗political offensive‘ against trade unions.47 Together with the 
1974-75 recession and the 1979-82 economic crisis, this policy-shift weakened labour‘s 
bargaining power and helped capital to accelerate the process of differentiation of the 
conditions of work and remuneration of the distinct portions of the US labour-force.
48
 
As a consequence of these developments, the process of collective bargaining was 
transformed thereafter. First, collective bargaining has tended to be increasingly located 
at the company, or even plant, level, reducing industry-wide homogeneity of contracts, 
                                                 
43
 See Aglieta (1979: 193-8); Coriat (1992: 211-4); Silver (2003: 153). 
44
 Unlike in Western Europe, the process of capital accumulation in the USA did not need to come about, 
at the end of WWII, through the concentration of industrial capital under public ownership as a 
precondition for capital to compete in the global markets through the vanguard development of science 
and technology. The scale of the US domestic market was large enough to accommodate more than one 
industrial capital in every branch of production. There was no need, therefore, for the consolidation there 
of an independent working-class party with reformist social-democratic ideology aiming to gain control 
of the state for the construction of ‗socialism‘ as in Western Europe. The Cold War presented the perfect 
excuse to eliminate these elements from the US mainstream trade union movement (Aglietta 1979: 191-3; 
Silver 2003: 157). Nevertheless, the latter, though remaining politically independent from mainstream 
parties, usually granted their support to the Democratic Party, generally favouring the universal provision 
of public services and the legal regulation of working conditions (Goldfield (1987: 26-32); Perusek and 
Worcester, 1995: 6, 13). 
45
 The Taft-Hartley Act removed large part of the labour rights introduced by the Wagner Act and also 
helped ‗purged‘ trade unions from their so-called radical elements. See Aglietta (1979: 191-2). 
46
 See Perusek and Worcester (1995: 8-12); Silver (2003: 151-8, 160-1). 
47
 See Campbell (2005: 195-7).  
48
 See Perusek and Worcester (1995: 12-5); Toulouse (1995: 35-46); Silver (2003: 163-4); Brenner (2005: 
165-6, 195-8). 
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and thus working and pay conditions.
49
 Secondly, the rigidity of work rules in 
negotiated contracts has been eased, notably in terms of job specifications, thus 
‗flexibilising‘ work practices and facilitating the development of ‗multitask‘, Japanese-
style manual workers. Thirdly, industrial sectors and regions where non-unionised firms 
prevail have expanded significantly, thus weakening the bargaining power of trade 
unions in traditional industrial areas.
50
 
As noted, Korean labour market institutions and forms of working-class political 
representation tended to differ from these patterns, as well as from the Brazilian. In 
general terms, three main stages can be identified in the evolution of Korean labour 
relations and politics. The first period included the US military government (1945-48) 
and Rhee‘s autocratic regime (1948-60) during which trade unions were first brutally 
‗purged‘ from the ‗radical‘ elements that had emerged through the liberation struggles 
and, subsequently, incorporated, in a subordinate role, into the structure of Rhee‘s 
ruling Liberal Party in a pseudo-corporatist fashion, even if labour laws had been 
designed following the US ‗liberal‘ model.51 The second stage lasted most of the 1960s. 
After a period of complete suspension of trade union rights and a new purge of their 
potentially ‗radical‘ elements, following the 1961 military coup, in 1963 the 
government reformed the labour laws, establishing an openly corporatist model. Unions 
were organised along industrial lines and industry-wide unions under the umbrella of 
the government-sponsored, KCIA-controlled Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU).
52
 Nevertheless, the firm remained the unit upon which trade unions were 
structured. Following the corporatist model, the state was given the power to recognise 
unions and to intervene in their affairs, while unions were granted exclusive 
representation. As in many other corporatist labour regimes, the right to strike was, de 
facto, severely restricted through the stipulation of lengthy formal processes to solve 
labour disputes without affecting social ‗peace‘. However, in sharp contrast to most 
corporatist experiences, trade unions were banned from taking part in political activities, 
crucially supporting opposition parties. Moreover, the labour courts were, unlike in 
Brazil, usually hostile to workers and labour protection laws were thus never fully 
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 See Freedman (1982: 16); Goldfield (1987: 46-8); Theelen (2001: 78). 
50
 See Coriat (1992: 214-8) for the automobile industry and Scherrer (1995) for the steel industry. 
51
 See Hamilton (1986: 23-4); Choi (1989: 28-9); You (1995: 117); Bello and Rosenfeld (1992: 29-30); 
Koo (2001: 26). 
52
 The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was a massive counterintelligence state institution 
formed in 1961. See Part II of this thesis. 
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enforced. Labour-management councils were also formed to promote ‗industrial peace‘, 
though their activities remained limited.
53
 
The third stage started in the late 1960s and, in most relevant aspects, has lasted 
until the present. This period began with the passing of legislation severely restricting 
trade union activities in foreign-owned companies, which was soon after generalised, 
for reasons of ‗national security‘, to the rest of the industrial sector. The rights of 
collective bargaining and collective action were curtailed and interference of 
counterintelligence agencies in labour affairs largely increased.
54
 In 1972, another 
measure expanded further the range of sectors where trade unions were banned in the 
‗public interest‘. These changes in labour market institutions were strengthened through 
the implementation, during 1973-74, of a series of amendments to the pre-existing 
labour laws that de facto established a structure of working-class economic 
representation following the Japanese model of company-centred industrial relations, 
ending for most practical purposes with industry-wide associations. The functions of 
hitherto largely decorative labour-management councils at the company or factory level 
were strengthened while the organisational structure and the role of industrial unions 
were considerably weakened.
55
 With the exception of a few sectors where small 
companies prevailed (e.g. the clothing industry), negotiations between capital and 
labour would thereafter take place at company, and sometimes plant, level, and 
increasingly without union intermediation. State interventions in the labour market 
would concentrate in the political persecution and intimidation of non-compliant 
workers attempting to form independent unions. The state would also acquiesce to 
companies taking advantage of the system of exclusive representation and registering 
company-controlled ‗puppet‘ unions. Unsurprisingly, most chaebol conglomerates and 
large-scale state firms remained largely union-free until the late 1980s. Unlike Brazil, 
direct and comprehensive state intervention in the determination of the conditions of 
purchase and use of labour-power would only occur when the parties failed to agree on 
contested issues, or during specific moments of economic hardship to limit wage 
growth.
56
 Hence, in this unfavourable environment, trade unions slowly lost centrality 
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 See Choi (1989: 84-5); You (1995: 118); Bello and Rosenfeld (1992: 30-1); Koo (2001: 27-8). 
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as representatives of labour‘s interests. Negotiations, then, took place increasingly in the 
so-called ‗management-labour committees‘ while trade union associations at higher 
levels than the company remained under state control and usually stifled lower-level 
incipient activism. This consolidated a type of ‗corporatism without labour 
participation‘ which was further reinforced through new legislation passed in 1980, 
transforming de jure the structure of union representation.
57
  
From 1987 onwards, the formation of democratic unions became easier, 
crucially in the chaebols, but umbrella federations competing with the state-controlled 
FKTU and union participation in national politics remained banned until the second part 
of the 1990s. Despite these latter changes, two key characteristics of Korean labour 
affairs have remained intact. First, trade unions and the process of collective bargaining 
have remained based at the company level. Secondly, the participation of trade unions 
in national politics has remained marginal and distant from mainstream parties.
58
 
In general terms, these labour market institutions have, ceteris paribus, 
structurally weakened labour‘s bargaining power, as workers in each company have 
tended to compete implicitly with their counterparts in other firms in the same sector of 
production. These labour market institutions limited wage growth and working 
conditions improvement, and thus helped sustain labour costs at internationally low 
levels until the mid-1980s. They reinforced historically developed settings. Moreover, 
the combination of weak federations and trade unions legal or practical exclusion from 
any significant involvement in national party politics has also restricted inter-union 
solidarity and lobbying for the universal provision of public services and social security 
by the state. In this way, these labour market institutions have helped reproduce a 
differentiated structure of working and payment conditions. Finally, by excluding 
irregular and unemployed workers from union representation, even when working in the 
mainstream industrial sector, these institutions have turned this type of workers into 
social pariahs, further reducing their cost for capital. Together, these forms of working-
class economic and political representation have thus mediated the reproduction of the 
fragmented labour markets, as reviewed in the previous section in relation to real wage 
evolution.
59
 
                                                                                                                                               
acquiescent blue collars workers registered compliant company unions with the monopoly of labour‘s 
representation. 
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 See West (1987); Shin (2003: 128-9). 
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In Brazil, labour market and political institutions have been closer to the 
‗classic‘ corporatist type. To begin with, the Brazilian Labour Code (Consolidação das 
Leis do Trabalho) has governed industrial relations since it was created in 1943, 
consolidating a number of laws that had been passed during the previous twenty years. 
The Labour Code set regulations not only related to working conditions and grievance 
procedures, but also to the structure of the system of industrial relations. Trade unions 
were to be organised at industry and regional levels, for a specific occupational 
category, with representation at county level, which was the base unit of organisation. 
Federations and national confederations were allowed to emerge coordinating the 
actions of regionally based industry associations. Confederations including different 
occupational categories were, however, forbidden until the late-1980s. Nevertheless, 
they were tolerated during much of the post-WWII period, with the exception of 1965-
79. The Labour Code was so detailed in terms of regulations over working conditions 
that the process of collective bargaining, when not forbidden, was largely confined to 
negations on remunerations.
60
 In contrast to the Korean experience, this has taken place 
at the industry or occupation, rather than at the enterprise, level. In contrast to the US 
experience, the process of collective bargaining has taken place between unions and 
employers‘ association in the same industrial sector. Conflicts over other issues have 
been dealt with in Labour Courts, the state institution created to enforce the 
implementation of labour laws. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the experiences in the 
industrially advanced countries and in Korea, trade unions in Brazil have concentrated, 
apart from their economic functions, on the provision of ‗public‘ services and social 
security for their members. In effect, a portion of their incomes, collected through a 
compulsory tax on all workers with formal employment contracts in a specific sector 
(regardless of their affiliation status), has been earmarked for the provision of social 
welfare. Finally, as in Korea, the Brazilian state has, until the 1980s, also controlled the 
emergence and development of trade unions, as their legal status and funding has 
depended upon approval and control from the Ministry of Labour.
61
 
Brazil‘s labour legislation experienced just a few important changes after its 
promulgation, the most significant being those introduced in the aftermath of the 1964 
military coup, and those included in the 1988 Constitution after the reintroduction of 
democratic government. The military regime introduced two main changes. First, it 
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passed legislation that together with the action of counterintelligence agencies, 
including persecution and torture of non-compliant union leaders, reduced significantly 
the power of trade unions, which had increased during the previous years, and the 
ability of workers to organize collectively. Secondly, the military government also 
passed legislation in order to allow the state to influence more closely the evolution of 
real wages, suspending de facto the process of collective bargaining. This legislation 
was mostly used during 1965-79, but was only completely abrogated in 1995. 
Conversely, the 1988 Constitution reinstated, or extended in terms of coverage, most 
labour rights restricted or eliminated during the military dictatorship and updated the 
existing regulations on wages, working hours and severance payments.
62
  
Forms of working-class political representation in Brazil have also differed from 
the Korean and US experiences. Trade unions in Brazil, however restricted their actions 
might have been, were generally allowed to participate in national politics, both during 
democratic periods (1946-1964 and after 1985) and when the military regime 
maintained the pretension of conserving pseudo-democratic political institutions. 
However, unlike in Western Europe, the political intervention of the Brazilian working-
class has not been independent from other social classes.
63
 
These labour market and political institutions, crucially the structure of trade 
unions, have resulted, ceteris paribus, in stronger bargaining power on the side of 
Brazilian labour and relatively more universal provision of public services and welfare 
for those in formal employment vis-à-vis the Korean experience. In this way, these 
labour market and political institutions helped reproduce a structure and level of skills 
and remunerations, as well as working conditions, in the mainstream industrial sector 
closer to those prevailing in the industrially advanced countries than in Korea, at least 
before the mid-1980s. These institutions have also helped reproduce the limited 
character of the Brazilian process of industrialisation in three other ways. First, 
working-class political dependence on inter-class alliances prevented the centralisation 
of capital under public ownership beyond basic industries as happened in many 
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European countries. Secondly, by making public services and social security (state and 
union provided) available only to workers with formal employment contracts, as was 
largely the case until the 1970s, capital managed to expand the productive attributes of 
these workers without expending resources in the rest of the working-class. Thirdly, 
state direct involvement in the regulation of wages, crucially during 1965-79, allowed 
their rapid contraction when extra surpluses were needed to complement the land rent 
available for appropriation. 
 
4.7) Summary and conclusions  
 
 The present chapter analysed the evolution of a number of key macro and 
microeconomic variables that jointly express the specific characteristics and the 
transformations of the Brazilian and Korean processes of capitalism development 
throughout the period under study. Some of these variables reveal the relationship 
between global industrial capital and its Brazilian and Korean portions. Others express 
the characteristics and transformations in the productive attributes of the Brazilian and 
Korean labour-forces that realised that relationship. The present chapter also briefly 
analysed the general evolution of labour market and political institutions that have 
mediated the specific reproduction of these workforces as forms of realising the global 
integration of capitalism through the evolving international division of labour. The 
second part of this thesis will rely on this information to pursue a political economy 
analysis of the historical development of the Brazilian and Korean processes of capital 
accumulation. In doing so, it will deepen the analysis of the transformations in labour 
market and political institutions presented above. 
 This chapter found that the specific characteristics of the Brazilian and Korean 
processes of capitalist development, explained previously, manifested themselves in 
different evolutions of their growth patterns, of their export activities, and of the 
characteristics and productivity of their labour-forces. It was shown that the 
productivity of Korean industrial labour increased strongly after the mid-1960s 
transformation of the country‘s economic formation and got increasingly closer to world 
market leaders. Throughout this period Korean industrial exports expanded massively 
and economic growth accelerated and remained robust while the productive attributes of 
the local labour-force undertook a substantial transformation. It was also shown that the 
evolution of these variables in Brazil was far more modest, expressing the specific 
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characteristics and limitations of the local process of capitalist development. After 
growing strongly during much of the pre-1980 period, the performance of the Brazilian 
economy slowed markedly as the land rent and its complementary sources of 
extraordinary social wealth became incapable of compensating for the growing 
productivity gap between local industrial labour and world market norms. As growth 
slowed, a new source of extraordinary profits emerged, namely, the payment of labour-
power below its value. 
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Table A4.1        
Exports         
         
 Total exports (in 
millions of US$) 
Total exports (% of 
GDP) 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
Industrial exports (in 
millions of US$)  
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil * Korea Brazil ** Korea 
1955 1,423 18 17.74 2.43     
1956 1,482 25 16.48 3.47     
1957 1,392 23 13.37 2.85     
1958 1,243 14 9.48 1.60     
1959 1,282 20 9.15 2.01     
1960 1,269 32 8.07 2.85 -    
1961 1,403 41 7.65 3.21 -    
1962 1,214 56 6.21 3.92 3 18 37 10 
1963 1,406 87 7.30 4.61 3 45 42 39 
1964 1,430 118 7.32 5.14 5 47 205 55 
1965 1,596 173 8.83 7.92 8 59 284 103 
1966 1,741 251 7.84 8.98 7 61 293 152 
1967 1,654 321 7.21 10.29 10 67 343 214 
1968 1,881 457 6.42 11.83 8 74 381 338 
1969 2,311 624 6.60 12.49 10 76 495 475 
1970 2,739 836 6.41 13.53 13 77 665 641 
1971 2,904 1,067 5.95 15.11 15 82 822 872 
1972 3,991 1,625 6.89 21.49 19 84 1,222 1,360 
1973 6,199 3,221 9.09 31.71 20 84 1,942 2,706 
1974 7,951 4,462 9.82 35.31 24 85 2,263 3,777 
1975 8,670 4,945 9.22 32.88 25 81 2,585 4,025 
1976 10,128 7,716 9.04 41.73 23 87 2,776 6,747 
1977 12,119 10,048 9.92 42.03 25 85 3,840 8,525 
1978 12,658 12,722 8.94 42.11 33 88 5,083 11,229 
1979 15,244 15,057 8.51 40.07 38 89 6,645 13,385 
1980 20,132 17,512 8.30 44.40 37 90 9,028 15,684 
1981 23,293 21,268 9.72 46.01 39 90 11,884 19,146 
1982 20,175 21,853 7.62 41.29 38 91 10,253 19,920 
1983 21,899 24,446 8.94 35.79 39 91 11,276 22,222 
1984 27,005 29,245 9.47 34.48 41 91 15,132 26,678 
1985 25,639 30,282 7.69 31.18 44 91 14,063 27,651 
1986 22,349 34,715 6.26 29.18 48 92 12,404 31,909 
1987 26,224 47,281 7.65 33.55 50 92 14,839 43,664 
1988 33,789 60,696 10.42 35.40 53 93 19,188 56,494 
1989 34,383 62,377 9.65 31.47 54 93 18,634 57,964 
1990 31,414 65,016 10.18 26.58 52 94 17,011 60,805 
1991 31,620 71,870 9.44 23.75 55 93 17,757 66,719 
1992 35,793 76,632 10.97 22.11 57 93 20,754 71,141 
1993 38,555 82,236 10.77 20.49 59 93 23,437 76,593 
1994 43,545 96,013 12.63 20.38 55 93 24,959 89,617 
1995 46,506 125,058 11.74 21.99 54 93 25,565 116,703 
1996 47,747 129,715 10.62 19.95 54 92 26,411 119,832 
1997 52,986 136,164 10.60 18.76 54 91 29,192 123,883 
1998 51,120 132,313 9.94 19.23 55 91 29,380 120,835 
1999 48,013 143,685 8.74 17.75 54 91 27,331 131,414 
2000 55,119 172,268 9.32 19.05 59 91 32,559 156,331 
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Table A4.1        
Exports         
         
 Total exports (in 
millions of US$) 
Total exports (% of 
GDP) 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
Industrial exports (in 
millions of US$)  
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil * Korea Brazil ** Korea 
2001 58,287 150,439 9.41 15.44 54 91 32,959 136,470 
2002 60,439 162,471 9.83 14.52 53 92 33,069 149,733 
2003 73,203 193,817 12.03 16.10 52 93 39,764 179,623 
2004 96,678 253,845 14.67 19.08 54 92 53,137 233,989 
2005 118,530 284,419 17.66 19.81 54 91 65,353 258,365 
 
Source: Tables C.3, C.16 and C.17 
Note: * = does not include semi-manufactured products; ** = includes semi-manufactured products 
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Table A4.2       
Industrial value-added and GDP in US$ PPP     
       
 Industrial value-added (in 
millions) 
Value of industrial exports 
(% of industrial value-added) 
GDP in millions 
 
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea 
1955     8,023 741 
1956     8,993 721 
1957     10,405 808 
1958     13,115 875 
1959     14,018 997 
1960     15,718 1,125 
1961     18,341 1,279 
1962 4,773 173 0.78 5.91 19,538 1,427 
1963 4,754 246 0.88 15.95 19,251 1,886 
1964 4,726 332 4.33 16.56 19,549 2,295 
1965 4,113 372 6.90 27.56 18,069 2,184 
1966 5,049 465 5.80 32.69 22,208 2,794 
1967 5,059 507 6.78 42.15 22,946 3,118 
1968 6,865 630 5.54 53.66 29,299 3,862 
1969 8,300 820 5.96 57.99 35,036 4,996 
1970 10,519 990 6.32 64.72 42,699 6,181 
1971 12,336 1,130 6.66 77.20 48,830 7,063 
1972 14,988 1,337 8.15 101.67 57,946 7,563 
1973 19,471 2,057 9.97 131.56 68,201 10,159 
1974 23,934 2,458 9.45 153.63 81,007 12,638 
1975 28,064 2,904 9.21 138.62 94,082 15,041 
1976 32,995 3,887 8.41 173.59 112,081 18,488 
1977 34,533 4,982 11.12 171.11 122,122 23,906 
1978 41,512 6,367 12.24 176.38 141,659 30,214 
1979 53,273 8,017 12.47 166.96 179,176 37,577 
1980 73,919 8,411 12.21 186.48 242,523 39,443 
1981 71,179 10,078 16.70 189.97 239,526 46,229 
1982 81,366 11,531 12.60 172.76 264,592 52,923 
1983 72,185 15,464 15.62 143.70 244,832 68,296 
1984 87,158 20,345 17.36 131.13 285,017 84,817 
1985 108,235 23,053 12.99 119.95 333,320 97,116 
1986 109,435 29,986 11.33 106.41 356,737 118,951 
1987 102,493 37,002 14.48 118.00 342,993 140,943 
1988 97,218 45,739 19.74 123.51 324,290 171,441 
1989 104,398 50,292 17.85 115.26 356,438 198,183 
1990 70,468 57,985 24.14 104.86 308,688 244,631 
1991 73,161 72,580 24.27 91.93 334,999 302,589 
1992 76,052 80,688 27.29 88.17 326,281 346,630 
1993 93,292 93,889 25.12 81.58 358,132 401,279 
1994 81,795 111,404 30.51 80.44 344,818 471,073 
1995 64,381 136,804 39.71 85.31 396,125 568,783 
1996 66,463 150,023 39.74 79.88 449,574 650,310 
1997 73,729 163,910 39.59 75.58 500,092 725,674 
1998 71,470 163,496 41.11 73.91 514,249 687,990 
1999 77,170 194,879 35.42 67.43 549,538 809,649 
2000 88,220 225,382 36.91 69.36 591,436 904,394 
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Table A4.2       
Industrial value-added and GDP in US$ PPP     
       
 Industrial value-added (in 
millions) 
Value of industrial exports 
(% of industrial value-added) 
GDP in millions 
 
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea 
2001 91,131 225,640 36.17 60.48 619,189 974,254 
2002 89,310 250,179 37.03 59.85 615,136 1,119,255 
2003 94,833 263,976 41.93 68.05 608,448 1,203,592 
2004 108,663 317,666 48.90 73.66 658,819 1,330,136 
2005 104,158 338,048 62.74 76.43 671,033 1,436,037 
 
Source: Tables C.3, C.16 and C.17 
 
 
Table A4.3     
Average years of schooling (working age population) 
 Korea Brazil Sao Paulo USA 
1944 0.6    
1960 3.3 2.1 3.9 11 
1966 4.5    
1970 4.8 2.9 3.3  
1973  3.2  12 
1974 5.6    
1980  4.2 4.4  
1987 8 5.3  13 
1991  5.4 5.8  
1999 9   13 
2001  6.0 6.9  
2002  6.1 7.2  
2003  6.3 7.3  
2004  6.4 7.4 13.3 
2005 11.2 6.5 7.5  
 
Source: Ipeadata for Brazil; McGinn, et al. (1980: 109) for 
Korea (1944-1974); Iñigo Carrera (2008: 92) for Korea 1987 
and 1999, and for USA 1960-1999; Ministry of Education 
and Department of Human Resources (2007: 22) for Korea 
2005; OECD Family Database for USA 2004. 
Note: The values for Korea (1944-74) were calculated by 
taking the weighted average of the average of each category 
(0; 1-6; 7-9; 10-12; 13-14; 15+, years) of educational 
attainment 
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Table A4.4         
Students per teacher        
         
 Primary education  Secondary education    
 Korea USA Brazil Korea Korea # Korea ## USA Brazil 
1960 58.6   33.95 40.7 27.2   
1965 62.4  26.1 34.75 39.3 30.2  10.2 
1970 56.9  24.3 36.05 42.3 29.8  8.9 
1975 51.8  21.8 37.3 43.2 31.4  14.5 
1976  20 22.7    18 14.7 
1977   22.9     14.5 
1980 47.5   39.2 45.1 33.3   
1985 38.3   35.5 40 31   
1991 35.6  22.53 25.23    14.54 
1998 30.9 15.68  22.69     
1999 30.9 15.41 25.95 22.13   14.92 22.62 
2000 32.2 15.01 24.80 21.02   14.61 22.12 
2001 32.1 15.44 22.97 19.91   15.16 19.33 
2002 32.0 14.83 24.05 18.24   14.88 19.12 
2003 31.3 14.81 21.57 17.68   14.92 16.73 
2004 30.1 14.21 21.39 17.76   14.98 16.00 
2005 29.0 14.13 21.04 18.04   14.94  
2006 27.9 13.81             
 
Sources: Correa do Lago (1983); World Development Indicators (2008); McGinn (1980); Cho and Breazeale 
(1991: 568). 
Notes: # = Middle-school; ## = High-school       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 232 
Table A4.5    
Education expenditure (% of GNI) 
    
 Korea USA Brazil 
1970 2.65 7.45 3.60 
1971 2.13 7.44 3.60 
1972 2.13 7.44 3.60 
1973 2.13 7.44 3.60 
1974 2.13 7.44 3.60 
1975 1.62 7.42 3.60 
1976 2.38 7.04 3.60 
1977 2.38 7.04 3.60 
1978 2.38 7.04 3.60 
1979 2.38 7.04 3.60 
1980 3.14 6.65 3.60 
1981 2.74 6.43 4.10 
1982 5.65 6.64 4.35 
1983 3.59 6.63 3.11 
1984 3.52 6.48 2.86 
1985 3.55 4.49 3.40 
1986 3.32 6.75 4.19 
1987 3.26 4.56 4.23 
1988 2.65 4.67 4.27 
1989 2.94 4.68 4.55 
1990 3.08 4.75 4.63 
1991 3.14 5.09 4.63 
1992 3.35 5.43 4.63 
1993 3.52 5.26 4.63 
1994 3.70 5.36 4.63 
1995 3.68 4.79 4.72 
1996 3.36 4.79 4.23 
1997 3.20 4.79 4.23 
1998 3.13 4.79 5.02 
1999 3.06 4.79 4.18 
2000 3.31 4.79 4.17 
2001 3.31 4.79 4.16 
2002 3.57 4.79 4.09 
2003 3.73 4.79 4.19 
2004 4.04 4.79 4.29 
2005 4.04 4.79 4.29 
2006 4.04 4.79 4.29 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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Table A4.6      
Per capita expenditures in education (in US$ PPP)  
      
 Korea USA UK Japan Finland 
1997      
Elementary 3,308 5,718 3,206 5,202 4,639 
Secondary 3,518 7,230 4,609 5,917 5,065 
Higher 6,844 17,466 8,169 10,157 7,145 
1999      
Elementary 2,838 6,582 3,627 5,240 4,183 
Secondary 3,419 8,157 5,608 6,039 5,863 
Higher 5,356 19,220 9,554 10,278 8,114 
2001      
Elementary 3,714 7,560 4,415 5,771 4,708 
Secondary 5,159 8,779 5,933 6,534 6,537 
Higher 6,618 22,234 10,753 11,164 10,981 
      
 
Source: Huh (2007a: 67) 
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Table A4.7        
Production workers and hours worked      
         
 Production workers / all 
workers (man.) 
Hours worked per year Hours worked in 
manufacturing 
 Korea Brazil USA Korea Brazil USA Korea USA 
1960 0.84 0.80 0.75 2,269 2,134 1,956  1,943 
1961  0.77 0.74 2,235 2,135 1,942  1,945 
1962  0.77 0.74 2,240 2,136 1,958  1,964 
1963  0.83 0.74 2,235 2,137 1,946 2,825 1,968 
1964  0.81 0.74 2,165 2,138 1,953 2,856 1,974 
1965  0.83 0.74 2,259 2,139 1,972 2,960 1,989 
1966  0.81 0.75 2,245 2,141 1,981 2,976 1,995 
1967  0.81 0.74 2,273 2,142 1,958 2,919 1,967 
1968  0.82 0.74 2,315 2,143 1,953 2,903 1,956 
1969  0.81 0.73 2,367 2,144 1,953 2,862 1,947 
1970 0.82  0.68 2,273 2,145 1,909 2,789 1,903 
1971 0.82  0.70 2,329 2,129 1,893 2,717 1,906 
1972 0.82  0.71 2,386 2,112 1,889 2,697 1,937 
1973 0.81 0.82 0.71 2,428 2,096 1,887 2,683 1,940 
1974 0.81 0.81 0.70 2,475 2,080 1,859 2,607 1,902 
1975 0.81  0.68 2,494 2,064 1,826 2,635 1,881 
1976 0.81 0.85 0.69 2,569 2,048 1,820 2,743 1,899 
1977 0.81 0.85 0.68 2,541 2,032 1,819 2,762 1,903 
1978 0.81 0.85 0.69 2,569 2,016 1,827 2,765 1,906 
1979 0.80 0.85 0.68 2,555 2,000 1,826 2,713 1,897 
1980 0.80  0.65 2,541 1,985 1,812 2,772 1,867 
1981 0.80 0.83 0.64 2,527 1,974 1,795 2,802 1,873 
1982 0.79 0.84 0.63 2,635 1,963 1,783 2,806 1,834 
1983 0.78 0.85 0.63 2,612 1,952 1,792 2,838 1,891 
1984 0.78 0.85 0.63 2,593 1,942 1,808 2,834 1,919 
1985 0.78  0.63 2,593 1,931 1,813 2,825 1,914 
1986 0.79  0.61 2,536 1,920 1,794 2,875 1,913 
1987 0.80  0.62 2,607 1,910 1,797 2,838 1,920 
1988 0.80 0.73 0.62 2,621 1,899 1,811 2,765 1,940 
1989 0.79 0.73 0.61 2,569 1,889 1,825 2,661 1,940 
1990 0.79 0.72 0.61 2,527 1,879 1,807 2,615 1,930 
1991 0.78  0.60 2,511 1,874 1,796 2,589 1,914 
1992 0.75 0.73 0.61 2,491 1,869 1,786 2,560 1,940 
1993 0.74 0.73 0.63 2,485 1,865 1,802 2,560 1,966 
1994 0.78 0.74 0.61 2,484 1,860 1,816 2,561 1,984 
1995 0.78 0.73 0.61 2,497 1,855 1,832 2,585 1,969 
1996 0.79 0.75 0.61 2,490 1,850 1,828 2,542 1,964 
1997 0.79 0.76 0.61 2,439 1,846 1,839 2,511 1,981 
1998 0.74 0.76 0.61 2,351 1,841 1,850 2,419 2,100 
1999 0.78 0.75 0.62 2,358 1,841 1,856 2,611 2,113 
2000 0.79 0.76 0.62 2,377 1,841 1,855 2,579 2,094 
2001 0.78 0.77 0.62 2,366 1,841 1,831 2,527 1,928 
2002 0.77 0.77 0.59 2,327 1,841 1,812 2,495 1,932 
2003 0.77 0.77 0.59 2,298 1,841 1,788 2,489 1,930 
2004 0.76 0.76  2,260 1,841 1,789 2,478 1,947 
2005 0.75 0.77  2,222 1,841 1,785 2,451 1,936 
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Source: Ratio of production to all workers from Amsden (1989: 171) for 1960 Korea and ILO for 
1970-2005; from the Annual Industrial Survey for Brazil; from US Census Bureau for USA. Hours 
worked in all sectors from Groningen Grown and Development Centre (GGDC) ‗Total economy‘ 
database for Korea, Brazil and USA. Hours worked in manufacturing from GGDC ‗ICOP Industrial‘ 
database for Korea 1963-98; from Korea Ministry of Labour for Korea 1999-2007; from NIPA 
Tables for USA 1960-2005.  
 
 
Table A4.8    
Labour force with tertiary education (% of total) 
    
 Korea Brazil USA 
1990 14   
1991 15   
1992 16 6 52 
1993 18 6  
1994 18   
1995 19 6 56 
1996 20 7 56 
1997 20 7 56 
1998 23 7 57 
1999 24 7 57 
2000 24   
2001 25   
2002 27   
2003 30   
2004 31   
2005 32   
2006 34   
 
Source: KOSIS (Korea), World Development Indicators (Brazil), 
US Census Bureau (USA) 
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Table A4.9       
Scientists and engineers in R&D (per million people)    
       
 Korea Japan Brazil UK France USA 
1980 484 3,778   1,391 2,859 
1981 536 3,934 175 2,254 1,580 2,973 
1982 725 4,048 256 2,271 1,658 2,993 
1983 808 4,156 299 2,251 1,698 3,047 
1984 921 4,425 362 2,283 1,790 3,332 
1985 1,017 4,538 391 2,314 1,855 3,512 
1986 1,141 4,737  2,361 1,893 3,671 
1987 1,267 4,840  2,353 1,961 3,744 
1988 1,344 5,016  2,397 2,053 3,811 
1989 1,560 5,175  2,319 2,135 3,675 
1990 1,645 5,395  2,311 2,186  
1991 1,762 5,558  2,217 2,267 3,743 
1992 2,032 5,671  2,263 2,475  
1993  5,138  2,413 2,536 3,676 
1994 2,637 6,293  2,441 2,583  
1995 2,235 5,368 168 2,504 2,607  
1996 2,193 4,909  2,448 2,659  
 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics 
 
Table A4.10       
Scientific and technical journal articles (per million people)  
 Korea Japan Brazil UK France USA 
1981 4 213 12 547 343 576 
1985 10 245 11 570 334 579 
1986 13 263 13 673 377 742 
1987 16 253 12 646 362 712 
1988 18 281 12 641 383 727 
1989 24 297 14 669 402 759 
1990 27 312 16 682 404 767 
1991 31 319 17 696 413 767 
1992 40 355 20 736 457 775 
1993 50 348 18 736 456 759 
1994 66 374 19 785 490 759 
1995 84 375 21 784 499 726 
1996 105 400 23 794 513 717 
1997 126 408 27 787 521 696 
1998 152 426 31 789 538 690 
1999 182 436 34 797 535 674 
2000 204 450 37 819 534 683 
2001 232 441 40 771 517 668 
2002 246 442 44 752 512 661 
2003 280 448 46 759 504 675 
2004 317 442 52 760 494 688 
2005 340 434 53 757 498 692 
 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics 
 237 
Table A4.11       
Scientific and technical journal articles (per million employees) 
 Korea Japan Brazil UK France USA 
1982 45 455 24 944 675 1065 
1983 51 462  984 689 1084 
1984 65 510 30 1069 769 1100 
1985 81 500 27 1080 774 1071 
1986 106 538  1147 841 1058 
1987 134 541 31 1136 845 1005 
1988 165 575 35 1142 864 988 
1997 198 582 41 1116 883 950 
1998 257 611 48 1114 903 937 
1999 305 632 52 1118 892 913 
2000 333 652  1138 872 925 
2001 377 639 61 1068 832 918 
2002 393 645 67 1045 822 925 
2003 450 652 70 1049 820 956 
2004 501 639 79 1052 805 959 
2005 535 625  1048 812 963 
 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics 
Note: Values in Table A4.10 were standardised using employment rates 
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Table A4.12      
Labour costs in US$ and productivity in manufacturing    
       
 Korea as % of USA Brazil as % of USA 
 Cost* Cost** Productivity Cost* Cost** Productivity 
1955  3.66   6.03   18.11      16.30  
1960  2.88   7.55   17.46      21.49  
1965  2.57   5.83   16.11      18.91  
1966  2.82   6.63   14.85      21.66  
1967  3.35   6.87   16.25      21.54  
1968  3.87   7.79   15.31      23.15  
1969  4.73   8.99   15.30      24.50  
1970  5.27 5.63 9.90 21.54 16.52      26.89  
1971  5.59 6.27 10.71 19.69 15.02      26.66  
1972  5.48 5.58 11.13 22.44 17.05      26.60  
1973  5.64 6.31 12.46 23.79 18.09      25.27  
1974  6.95 6.97 14.49 26.80 20.45      23.69  
1975  6.50 5.90 14.50 24.52 18.86      23.09  
1976  7.72 6.85 14.62 26.36 20.52      23.70  
1977  9.33 7.94 16.04 27.64 21.92      22.85  
1978  11.43 9.78 18.28 30.46 24.75      23.54  
1979  13.74 11.66 20.53 31.03 25.26      24.79  
1980  12.04 10.85 20.22 27.66 22.07      25.75  
1981  11.57 11.25 23.18 29.08 23.49      24.69  
1982  11.47 10.18 21.63 28.72 22.83      25.09  
1983  11.57 10.33 22.75 17.66 14.23      24.22  
1984  11.64 11.02 25.09 14.41 11.70      25.22  
1985  11.47 9.82 23.84 16.22 12.98      24.77  
1986  11.90 10.59 24.72 18.28 14.38      23.69  
1987  14.13 11.95 25.17 21.18 16.66      22.97  
1988  18.93 15.97 27.19 17.68 13.82      22.45  
1989  26.45 18.31 28.15 32.51 25.48      22.54  
1990  29.49 19.78 29.96 28.24 22.47      20.94  
1991  33.00 22.31 31.95 21.25 16.76      22.26  
1992  36.09 24.17 35.18 21.34 16.53      21.80  
1993  38.43 26.72 38.04 22.49 17.55      23.30  
1994  42.31 28.99 37.69 26.88 21.01      24.15  
1995  46.84 35.65 39.63 32.58 25.55      24.33  
1996  50.52 40.05 42.55 32.50 26.02      26.78  
1997  47.60 37.54 45.53 31.71 25.36      28.23  
1998  33.44 30.25 55.23 29.69 24.76      28.91  
1999  46.20 37.39 56.77 17.99 14.17      29.33  
2000  49.03 37.98 59.21 17.84 14.44      29.76  
2001  43.62 26.56 55.93 14.49 10.29      29.35  
2002  45.76 27.78 58.06 11.87 7.98      27.37  
2003  48.78 28.21 58.48 12.21 7.52      26.41  
2004  57.99 32.12 61.66 14.88 8.54      25.94  
2005  60.86 37.26 64.44 17.49 11.19      24.50  
2006  70.13 42.20 69.97 21.02 14.32      23.27  
 
Source: Tables C.4, C.5, C.28 and C.30 
Note: Cost* = manual workers; Cost** = all employees 
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Table A4.13           
Korea: Wage differentials 1967-89         
            
 M C SA SE P E+MS HS JC C F male 
1967      63 100   46 100 
1971 359 204 118 90 100 71 100   44 100 
1972 382 183 133 91 100 68 100   46 100 
1973 406 206 151 100 100 70 100   48 100 
1974 354 197 130 92 100 71 100 136 208 44 100 
1975 458 215 123 104 100 70 100 135 215 42 100 
1976 474 222 112 103 100 69 100 139 216 44 100 
1977 439 206 131 100 100 71 100 139 211 46 100 
1978 431 181 125 99 100 72 100 141 214 45 100 
1979 436 176 107 97 100 77 100 137 215 43 100 
1980 395 162 89 100 100 77 100 131 213 44 100 
1981 367 163 96 100 100 78 100 129 206 45 100 
1982 345 158 134 102 100 79 100 126 199 44 100 
1983 343 155 130 101 100 82 100 123 195 45 100 
1984 337 153 128 101 100 83 100 119 191 46 100 
1985 340 153 136 99 100 85 100 118 189 47 100 
1986 318 150 130 96 100 86 100 114 184 48 100 
1987 306 144 117 94 100 90 100 112 180 50 100 
1988 282 136 113 95 100 90 100 108 167 50 100 
1989 258 131 103 87 100 91 100 108 162 51 100 
 
Source: Lee and Lindauer (1997: 60, 63) 
Note: M = Managerial; C = Clerical; SA = Sales; SE = Service; P = Production; E+M = Elementary 
plus middle school; HS = High school; JC = Junior college; C = College; F = Female  
 
Table A4.14  
Korea: Wage differentials between College and High School Graduates (100) in 1978 
   
 Korea USA 
Male 208 140 
Female 214 128 
 
Source: Source: Lee and Lindauer (1997: 61) 
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Table A4.15            
Korea: Wage differentials 1993-2007         
             
 O/T O/P -HS/U HS/U Col/U S/L I/R F/M B/W B/A* 
 monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly wage 
 total total total total total total Total total total manufacturing sector 
1993 0.75 0.66 0.67 0.58 0.48 0.56 0.65 0.74  0.53 0.68  
1994 0.75 0.66 0.67 0.57 0.48 0.58 0.66 0.71  0.54 0.68  
1995 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.57 0.47 0.57 0.66 0.71  0.55 0.68  
1996 0.75 0.64 0.67 0.55 0.45 0.57 0.65 0.67  0.55 0.71 0.88 
1997 0.75 0.64 0.67 0.55 0.45 0.57 0.65 0.69  0.56 0.70 0.87 
1998 0.75 0.66 0.67 0.58 0.45 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.71 0.87 
1999 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.57 0.46 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.55  0.87 
2000 0.75 0.64 0.62 0.51 0.46 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.57  0.87 
2001 0.74 0.64 0.63 0.52 0.44 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.62 0.58  0.87 
2002 0.75 0.63 0.66 0.53 0.43 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.56  0.87 
2003 0.74 0.62 0.64 0.52 0.42 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.56  0.87 
2004 0.74 0.64 0.66 0.56 0.42 0.56 0.61 0.55 0.57 0.55  0.87 
2005 0.78 0.67 0.65 0.53 0.43 0.55 0.60 0.53  0.56  0.87 
2006 0.80 0.69 0.65 0.54 0.44 0.56 0.61 0.55  0.58  0.87 
2007 0.79 0.67 0.67 0.55 0.46 0.54 0.6 0.54  0.58  0.87 
 
Source: Occupational Wage survey and Economically Active Population survey, Ministry of Labor - BLS (*) 
Note: O = operators; T – technicians; -HS = workers with below high School education; HS = high school; Col = 
college; U = university; S = small firms; L = large firms; I = irregular or temporary workers; R = regular or permanent 
workers; F = female workers; M = male workers; B = blue collar workers; W = white collar workers; A = all industrial 
workers. 
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Table A4.16    
Brazil:  Wage differentials in manufacturing 1962-84 
     
 T/S T/SM T/US S/U 
1961 2 100 100 100 100 
1962 1 95 103 109 119 
1963 1 94 102 108 116 
1964 1 85 91 88 106 
1965 1 105 105 106 101 
1965 2 106 100 111 109 
1966 1 102 107 110 108 
1966 2 97 101 116 118 
1967 1 95 109 114 109 
1967 2 98 109 122 114 
1968 2 109 120 106 97 
1969 1 108 113 112 99 
1969 2 104 110 113 109 
1970 1 107 118 124 115 
1970 2 114 123 131 128 
1971 117 127 139 123 
1972 125 137 152 127 
1973 128 142 162 139 
1974 123 138 154 137 
1975 117 136 146 135 
1976 108 121 139 131 
1977 109 123 154 145 
1978 108 116 133 136 
1979 1 108 115 124 133 
1979 2 106 110 126 131 
1980 1 103 112 122 123 
1980 2 105 109 126 131 
1981 1 106 107 114 126 
1981 2 106 107 115 125 
1982 1 99 102 109 121 
1982 2 101 111 122 122 
1983 1 100 113 110 129 
1983 2 106 98 113 92 
1984 1 97 92 108 125 
 
Source: Zurron Ocio (1986) 
Note: T = technicians; S = skilled workers; SM = 
semiskilled workers; U = unskilled workers  
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Table A4.17      
Fatal injuries per 100,000 workers    
       
 Brazil Brazil # USA USA # Korea Korea # 
1974      31 
1975     55 44 
1976      43 
1977      45 
1978 23     45 
1979 23    43 36 
1980 21    34 36 
1981 19    37 34 
1982 22    35 40 
1983 19    37 40 
1984 22    38 36 
1985 21    38 32 
1986 21    35 30 
1987 23    33 27 
1988 20    34 25 
1989 19    26 20 
1990 23    30  
1991 20    29  
1992 16  5 4 34  
1993 16  5 4 32  
1994 14  5 4   
1995 17  5 3   
1996 19  5 3   
1997 14  5 4   
1998 20  5 3   
1999 19  4 4   
2000  12 4 3   
2001   4 3   
2002   4 3   
2003   4 3   
2004   4 2   
2005   4 3   
2006   4    
 
Source: International Labour Organisation (Laborsta); Koo (2001) 
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Table A4.18    
Monthly job separation rates in manufacturing     
 
     
 Korea Taiwan Japan 
1970 6.0  2.2 
1971 5.4  1.9 
1972 4.5  2.0 
1973 4.5 3.7 1.9 
1974 5.1 3.9 1.7 
1975 4.4 3.3 1.5 
1976 4.4 3.6 1.5 
1977 5.1 3.2 1.4 
1978 5.9 3.5 1.4 
1979 6.3 3.9 1.4 
1980 5.6 3.4 1.4 
1981 5.4 3.9 1.4 
1982 5.0 3.7 1.3 
1983 5.0  1.3 
1984 5.4   
1985 4.5   
 
Source: Park (1990: 401)  
 
 
Table A4.19          
Mortality rate, adult, (per 1,000 female adults)      
           
 Female Male 
 Korea Brazil USA K/U K/B Korea Brazil USA K/U K/B 
1960 341.0 222.4 130.6 2.6 1.5 405.6 294.8 233.3 1.7 1.4 
1970 280.2 186.2 128.5 2.2 1.5 356.5 248.3 237.0 1.5 1.4 
1980 155.9 160.7 102.5 1.5 1.0 269.8 221.1 194.8 1.4 1.2 
1990 116.6 134.9 90.8 1.3 0.9 239.1 193.1 172.1 1.4 1.2 
1997 66.5 140.0 85.2 0.8 0.5 173.4 264.5 149.2 1.2 0.7 
2000 58.6 134.6 83.2 0.7 0.4 150.8 256.1 143.7 1.0 0.6 
2002 53.4 131.0 83.8 0.6 0.4 135.7 250.6 144.3 0.9 0.5 
2005 48.4 124.7   0.4 119.7 237.9   0.5 
2006 46.8 122.6   0.4 114.3 233.7   0.5 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Note: K/U = Korea/USA; K/B = Korea/Brazil 
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Part II 
Historical Development of the Brazilian and Korean Processes of 
Capital Accumulation between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s 
 
The first part of the thesis advanced several hypotheses about the economic 
structure and developmental experiences of Brazilian and Korean societies since the 
mid-1950s. Two main arguments were presented. First, it was argued that throughout 
the period under study, the process of capitalist development in Brazil revolved around 
the appropriation of the massive land rent available there. Land rent complemented 
other forms of surplus-value normally (i.e. ordinarily) available for appropriation by 
capital. Secondly, it was suggested that though initially structured in a relatively similar 
form to the Brazilian, though supported by much smaller primary sector surpluses, from 
the mid-1960s, the Korean economy came to be structured to produce several industrial 
goods for world markets, taking advantage of the large local supply of relatively cheap 
and disciplined labour. 
The first part of the thesis also presented quantitative and qualitative evidence 
supporting these hypotheses. These included the measurement of land rents and 
intersectoral income transfers and the assessment of latter‘s importance in terms of the 
size of these economies and of the overall surpluses available there to support capital‘s 
valorisation. The first part of the thesis also included an analysis of the recent and 
contemporary transformations of the global steel, automobile and semiconductors 
industries and traced their development in Korea and Brazil since the 1950s, analysing 
and comparing the bases for the valorisation of individual capital there. This analysis 
was centred on the evolution of commercial strategies of firms and of state actions 
supporting them. These industrial sectors were chosen because they have been central 
not only to the transformations undergone by the Korean society during the last forty 
years or so, but also the continual reproduction of the limited structure of the Brazilian 
economy during the same period. 
In addition, Chapter 1 and, to a lesser extent, Chapter 2 of the first part of the 
thesis put forward a brief and schematic analysis of the historical development of the 
main political, institutional and ideological forms of realisation of economic processes 
in the two countries. This second part of the thesis returns to these topics and adds 
substantially to the schematic analysis by pursuing a more detailed examination of the 
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historical evolution of both national economies and of the transformations in the 
political institutions and ideological cleavages that have mediated and shaped their 
developments. In doing so, it will show the intrinsic unity of the processes studied, 
revealing specific transformations in Korea and Brazil as part of the realisation of the 
globally integrated process of capitalist development.  
The second part of the thesis is composed of five chapters, each covering a 
specific time period. Each chapter is divided into two sections, plus a conclusion. The 
chapter sections focus on the analysis of the economic and political developments of 
each country during the period in question. The brief conclusions included at the end of 
the chapters summarise the findings and compare the developments of the two 
countries. The first chapter covers the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s; the 
second deals with the period between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s; the third 
analyses the period between the early and late 1970s; the fourth focuses on the period 
between the early 1980s and the early 1990s; the fifth concentrates on the period from 
the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. 
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Chapter 5 
Brazil and Korea up to the Mid-1960s 
 
Brazil: From national to developmentalist populism (1940s-1964) 
 
In the mid-1940s, Brazilian society was at a critical juncture. The process of 
industrialisation had advanced steadily and considerably since it commenced in the late 
nineteen century. Manufacturing capacity had already expanded to include most non-
durable and some durable consumer, as well as limited intermediate and capital goods 
production. The rapid development of the industrial sector was giving place to a change 
in occupational structures and, consequently, to a fast process of urbanisation, crucially 
in the Southeast of the country where most manufacturing was located.
1
 Furthermore, 
from the 1930s onwards, the state had been increasingly involved in the regulation of 
the Brazilian economy. One characteristic of the Brazilian process of capitalist 
development, however, revealed already its underlying specificity. The manufacturing 
sector was largely populated by nationally-owned firms that were small by prevailing 
international standards, producing mainly for the domestic market.
2
 These firms, it was 
argued above, compensated for their internationally low productivity levels through the 
appropriation of a portion of the land rent. These specific characteristics and trends 
would be reinforced strongly thereafter. 
The end of the Second World War was followed by a strong expansion in land 
rent as the international price of coffee, the country‘s main export, doubled while US 
price ceilings were phased out.
3
 Apart from this increased amount of extraordinary 
social wealth in the form of land rent, the Brazilian economy had also acquired a 
sizable, though blocked, British debt, resulting from sale on credit of agrarian 
commodities during the war, and a readily usable and substantial mass of foreign 
exchange reserves accumulated during the conflict.
4
 The Korean War would, later on, 
disrupt the global markets for raw materials and sharply increase commodity prices 
again, prolonging the expansion of the Brazilian land rent. With these resources at hand, 
                                                 
1
 See Valle  Silva (2008: 467-8) 
2
 On the process of industrialisation in Brazil up to the mid-1940s, see Baer (1965: 12-34); Fishlow 
(1971). On the magnitude of land rent appropriated by capital during this period, see graph 2.3 in Chapter 
2. 
3
 See Besserman Vianna (1987: 22). 
4
 See Abreu (2008a: 320-1). 
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the process of capital accumulation would then be reproduced on an enlarged scale. The 
local economy would thus undergo a period of fast growth through industrialisation.
5
 
In effect, a large portion of the land rent materialised in the foreign exchange 
reserves and financial assets accumulated during the Second World War, together with 
that appropriated by the state in its aftermath and, to a much lesser extent, the funds 
borrowed externally, mainly from the USA. These resources constituted an important 
part of the resources used to nationalize foreign-owned public utilities, to create and 
later expand the activities of numerous state-owned companies, and to finance public 
investment programmes in social overhead capital.
6
 Several SOEs producing industrial 
inputs were created during the ten years up to the mid-1950s. These included the Rio 
Dolce Valley Company (for iron ore extraction), the San Francisco Hydroelectric 
Company (for electricity generation and distribution), the National Steel Company 
(CSN), and, eventually, Brazilian Petroleum (Petrobras, the state monopoly for oil 
exploration, extraction and, later on, refining). Key institutions for scientific research 
and technological development were also established during this period, for example the 
Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (1948), the National Council of Research 
(1951) and the Technological Institute for Aeronautics (1952). Additionally, the 
National Economic Development Bank (BNDE/S), the major public bank for financing 
infrastructural and large-scale industrial projects, was founded in 1952. Public utility 
companies nationalized during this period included the main railway and shipping 
companies as well as the ports.
7
 Although, unlike private industrial firms, some of these 
SOEs had technical scales large enough to introduce the most modern methods of 
industrial production and organisation, from the beginning their accumulation capacities 
were limited due to their subordination to the requirements of providing cheap inputs, 
and constituting large markets, for private industrial capital.
8
 
The sharp increase in international commodity prices and therefore in the 
magnitude of the land rent available for appropriation during the post-WWII and 
Korean War booms facilitated in Brazil not only the creation and development of SOEs. 
It also resulted in the continuous expansion of local industrial production destined for 
                                                 
5
 See graphs 4.2 and 4.4 in Chapter 4 on GDP and industrial value-added growth. 
6
 See Avelãs Nunes (1991: 181); Abreu (2008a: 323) 
7
 See Baer (1965: 61-8); Baer et al. (1973: 25-7); Serra (1982: 72-4); Abreu (2008a: 326-7, 333). 
8
 On the contrary, the main electricity companies, Canada‘s Light and US‘s Amforp, and most 
Telecommunication companies, remained privately-owned until they were nationalized in the 1960s and 
1970s, respectively. It was only then that prices of electricity in Brazil fell from internationally high 
levels. See Carneiro (2000) for the long-term changes in the electricity industry. 
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the small, highly protected domestic market.
9
 Though several MNCs had been 
producing non-durable consumer goods and assembling durables (e.g. completely 
knock-down kits of automobiles) in Brazil since the 1920s, and expanded their activities 
thereafter, the bulk of the local industrial sector during this period was still composed of 
small nationally-owned firms. The land rent appropriated through the combination of a 
strongly overvalued currency,
10
 market protection and state subsidies supported the 
process of capital accumulation. 
After WWII, a liberal trade regime was combined with a strongly overvalued 
exchange rate to favour the re-equipment of local industry. In 1947, however, as foreign 
exchange reserves fell rapidly, a system of quotas was introduced to limit import 
demand and protect the domestic market by reducing the supply of foreign exchange 
used to purchase foreign goods competing with local productions.
11
 These new foreign 
exchange and trade regimes were complemented with the Law of Similarity (passed in 
1911 but made an effective instrument of industrial policy only in 1949), banning 
imports of goods that could be manufactured locally, in principle, at the same price and 
quality as their international competitors. In contrast, imports of capital and 
intermediate goods not produced locally could be purchased with an overvalued 
currency and were allowed in the country duty free.
12
 
The reproduction of the Brazilian process of capitalist development through the 
expansion of small, mainly, nationally-owned industrial companies and large-scale 
SOEs came about not only through specific economic policies, but also through the 
development of specific labour market and political institutions. These facilitated 
substantial real wage increases in the industrial and public sectors, notably during the 
Korean War commodities boom, and the expansion of state provision of services. In the 
first place, the fast growth of small-scale industrial productions, and also of the 
provision of public services, resulted in the strong expansion of demand for labour-
power. Industrial employment grew at around 5% p.a. during the first half of the 
1950s.
13
 Real wage increases were thus necessary to attract rural workers to expanding 
urban centres. Secondly, the development of the process of capital accumulation 
through ISI was already incorporating relatively modern technologies and extending to 
                                                 
9
 See Baer (1965: 69-77) on the evolution of the industrial sector during that period. 
10
 See graph 2.1 in Chapter 2 for the evolution of the over/undervaluation of the Brazilian exchange rate. 
11
 See Besserman Vianna (1987: 19-22); Avelãs Nunes (1990: 181-4); Abreu (2008a: 320-21). 
12
 See Malan and Bergsman (1970: 173-74); Besserman Vianna (1987: 23-4). 
13
 See table C.6 in Appendix C for the evolution of industrial employment in Brazil and Korea.  
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include increasingly complex productions, notably in state-sector firms. This process 
thus required the expansion of the productive characteristics of the local industrial 
workforce.
14
 Finally, the widening and deepening of the domestic market for consumer 
goods was then required to absorb a rapidly expanding industrial output.
15
 All these 
processes needed to manifest themselves in the transformation of the consumption 
patterns of the Brazilian working-class. The enlargement of consumption levels and 
overall improvements in the conditions of reproduction of the labour-force, however, 
would not come about smoothly, without political conflicts. On the contrary, this 
transformation, already initiated during the second part of the 1930s, was realised 
through the strengthening of trade union activism and working-class political 
intervention. This transformation would come about not only through an increase in real 
wages but also through the expansion of public sector expenditures in urban social 
services, including healthcare, education and pensions.
16
  
Nevertheless, despite recurrent episodes of belligerence, during this period the 
mainstream trade union movement remained controlled, politically and financially, by 
the state and incorporated into the structure of the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) or the 
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) which after 1950 was frequently allied to the former. 
In effect, unlike during the pre-1930s period, when it had been heavily influenced by 
anarchist and socialist ideologies, the post-WWII trade union movement focused mainly 
on immediate economic goals and acted in many respects as an organ of the state in the 
provision of welfare for its members.
17
 In national politics, it was allied, through the 
PTB, to the Social Democratic Party (PSD), representing politically the Brazilian 
industrial bourgeoisie and some sectors of the landowning class. Both parties had been 
created by different sectors of the Vargas administration at the end of the corporatist 
Estado Novo (1937-1945) to face the forthcoming 1945 general elections.
18
 The 
constitution of an independent working-class party with the goal of gaining control of 
the state, as with Western European social-democratic parties, was not on the cards. On 
the contrary, an inter-class alliance with the national bourgeoisie in its ‗fight‘ against 
landowners and ‗imperialist‘ interests allied to them, then mainly represented politically 
                                                 
14
 See Wells (1983: 323-5). 
15
 See Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 127-43); Wells (1983: 325-6). 
16
 On the expansion of urban social services and social security, see Malloy (1979: 66-71, 91-105); Valle  
Silva (2008: 470-7); Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock (2009: 116-9). 
17
 See Mendes de Almeida and Lowy (1976: 104); Erickson (1979: 36-7); Malloy (1979: 58-60). 
18
 See Skidmore (2007: 54-64); Bethell (2008: 88, 93-6). 
 250 
by the National Democratic Union (UDN), was considered to be in the most immediate 
interest of the Brazilian urban working-class.
19
 
Unsurprisingly, this inherently limited form of working-class political 
representation generated improvements in the conditions of reproduction of the labour-
force that were far from universal. Public sector employees and those industrial workers 
in formal contract employment, both skilled and unskilled, were the main immediate 
beneficiaries. This was the portion of the labour-force performing the most complex 
industrial activities and constituted a market large enough to absorb the expanding 
manufacturing output. Rural workers and those wage-earners in the urban informal 
sector were not represented by the mainstream trade unions and political parties and 
hardly benefited from the increases in public sector social expenditures and unions‘ 
welfare programmes.
20
 
The combination of an overvalued exchange rate, public sector activities, market 
protection and ‗populist‘ political institutions constituted then the main forms of 
channelling a portion of the land rent to private industrial capital. In effect, a portion of 
the land rent equivalent to as much as 60% of the economy‘s overall surpluses was 
appropriated directly or indirectly by private (mainly industrial) capital and the state 
between 1947 and 1954, during Dutra‘s (1945-1950) and Vargas‘ (1950-4) 
governments, both supported by the PSD-PTB alliance.
21
 
The expansion of the domestic market, which the growing land rent allowed 
during the late 1940s and the early 1950s, was so remarkable that, by the mid-1950s, it 
began to attract several industrial MNCs to the Brazilian economy.
22
 These were then 
undertaking a process of overseas expansion similar to that pursued by US firms during 
the 1910s and 1920s. As the largest and fastest growing developing country markets, 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were among the largest recipients of this new wave of 
FDI.
23
 Motor-vehicle firms were, again, leading the process. The smooth and 
widespread establishment of MNCs in the most dynamic branches of the Brazilian 
industrial sector, however, was not be fully accepted by the nationalistic branch of the 
populist movement in power under Vargas (1950-4). The early 1950s Vargas 
government had been mediating politically and ideologically the creation of SOEs and 
                                                 
19
 See Mendes de Almeida and Lowy (1976: 105); Bethell (2008: 95). 
20
 On the limited impact of welfare policies during this period, see Malloy (1979: 91-113); Lewis and 
Lloyd-Sherlock (2009). 
21
 See Grinberg (2008). 
22
 See Newfarmer and Mueller (1975: 96-7); Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 157-8); Anglade (1985: 56-7). 
23
 See Jenkins (1987: 5-8). See table C.37 in Appendix C for the inflow of FDI to Brazil and Korea. 
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the expansion of small nationally-owned industrial capital, both of which constituted a 
condition for the subsequent establishment of MNCs. Yet, their full-scale entrance in 
the Brazilian economy (i.e. the participation of foreign-owned capital as a main partner 
in the appropriation of the land rent) required different political and economic 
institutions. The change in the political forms of realisation of the process of capitalist 
development, necessary to mediate the transformations in its economic forms, would 
come about through a politico-economic crisis.   
The Korean War had given place to a sharp increase in the prices of raw 
materials and, consequently, to an expansion of the Brazilian land rent, which had 
allowed the implementation of Vargas‘ nationalistic populist policies.24 The end of the 
commodities boom led to the rapid deterioration of the Brazilian economy as the land 
rent available for appropriation began to contract sharply. The material base of support 
of Vargas‘s policies was thus being removed. The fall in international commodity prices 
was immediately reflected in the stagnation of the growth of export earnings and, thus, 
in Brazil‘s capacity to import and to fund large factor income deficits, even after the 
partial devaluation of the currency implemented in mid-1953 through the introduction 
of the so-called Auction System.
25
 These emerging difficulties strengthened the idea 
held by many in the state, the business and academic sectors and international 
organisations that the full-blown promotion of FDI was needed both to accelerate and 
deepen the ISI process and to avoid the painful ‗external bottlenecks‘ related to its 
financing.
26
  
More generally, the contraction of the land rent required a rapid revision, partial 
or complete depending on the case, of policies that had been channelling it to economic 
agents other than landowners, notably industrial capital. These policies were then 
creating serious imbalances in the Brazilian economy. The prevailing strong 
overvaluation of the currency was sustaining the balance-of-payments deficit while the 
growth of the public sector deficit, largely resulting from the contraction of the land rent 
                                                 
24
 See Radetzki (2006) on the commodities boom during the Korean War. 
25
 During the implementation of the Auction System, the monetary authority monopolised the purchase of 
foreign exchange and decided its sale to different categories of importers using a bidding system. The 
amount of foreign exchange allocated to each category of imports was decided on the basis of the 
overarching import-substituting programme. Equipment and raw materials not produced domestically 
were either exempted from the system or given priority in the allocation of foreign exchange. The price of 
foreign exchange used to import them was substantially below its value. Consumer goods that could be 
manufactured domestically received the opposite treatment. The so-called Auction System thus resulted 
in multiple exchange rates. See Kafka (1954); Malan and Bergsman (1970: 150-60); Abreu (2008a: 331-
2).   
26
 See Anglade (1985: 56); Bielschowsky (1996: 92-7, 122-5). 
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appropriated by the state, was manifesting itself in an increase in the inflation rate. The 
Vargas government, however, was hardly suited to represent politically any of the 
corresponding changes, most notably as they not only involved the increased 
participation of MNCs in the economy but also a contraction in industrial wages and the 
sharp adjustment of public sector‘s finances. In effect, the administration‘s half-hearted 
attempt to undertake such policy shift during 1954, when the difficulties began to 
surface, failed completely to control inflation and only raised pressure on the 
government.
27
 
The first to leave government was João Goulart, the young Minister of Labour 
with close links to the trade unions, both those affiliated to the ruling PTB and to the 
still formally illegal PCB. Goulart had been appointed in mid-1953, at the peak of 
expansion of the Brazilian land rent. He resigned in early 1954, after the 100% increase 
in minimum wages he had proposed was vetoed by the conservative branches of the 
army. The resignation of Goulart and the subsequent implementation of a mildly 
orthodox economic plan, however, were not enough to placate the political opposition 
which was becoming increasingly vociferous. Economic growth faltered and inflation 
surged as public sector deficits were increasingly monetised. Conservative opposition to 
the Vargas government scaled up and became virulent. Responding to the pressure of its 
main bases of political support, the nationalist branches of the military and the official 
trade unions, the government reacted by increasing the stakes. Against the advice of his 
economic advisors, Vargas confirmed that he would apply Goulart‘s proposed wage 
hike. At the same time, he announced the partial nationalisation of the oil industry and 
                                                 
27
 The problem of increasing inflation has been a recurrent political issue in Brazilian history, especially 
after WWII. Increasing and uncontrolled inflation usually preceded sharp policy changes, sometimes 
including the collapse of entire governments. An inflationary process involves the redistribution of 
resources to those sectors of society who have the capacity to protect themselves against it from those 
who do not. In 1950s Brazil, and also afterwards, inflationary processes resulted largely from the 
expansion of the monetary base in excess of the demand for it. In the first place, this was necessary to 
cover the public sector deficit when state expenditures were larger than revenues, especially when the 
latter stagnated. Secondly, together with the Usury Law that set a ceiling of 13% p.a. to nominal interest 
rates, it turned the real return on savings into negative grounds (see table C.34 in Appendix C for the 
evolution of interest rates). Landowners, as renters, and wage-earners, through social security funds and 
current income if not adjusted frequently, tended to be net savers and thus particularly suffered from 
inflationary processes. Furthermore, when systems of fixed exchange rates prevailed, mounting inflation 
also increased the degree of exchange rate overvaluation and thus reduced landowners‘ capacity to 
appropriate a portion of the land rent. It is not surprising, then, that the ideological and political 
representatives of both sectors, notably of landowners, were among the leading voices against any signs 
of inflationary process. Rents control in the urban sector, usually in effect during the populist period, was 
the other side of interest rates ceilings. It was necessary to reduce the profitability of investments 
competing with fixed term bank deposits as the rampant inflation rates were turning the interest rate 
largely negative. Landowners were net investors in both markets; financial and real estate. Moreover, it 
helped keep real wages in the urban centres low. 
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the creation of the state monopoly for exploration activities, Petrobras.
28
 A campaign of 
public support for the latter measure ensued and political tension increased. 
Furthermore, the government also threatened to take over foreign-owned electricity 
firms and set to implement a bill, passed in 1952, that limited the repatriation of profits 
earned by MNCs. Vargas argued that the repatriation of MNC profits was the main 
cause of the emerging economic crisis. Only a trigger was needed to produce the 
downfall of the government. This came when, in a bizarre episode, the most outspoken 
member of the conservative opposition was attacked by state security officials. The 
conservative opposition now gained the support of all but the most nationalist branches 
of the military. The finale was tragicomic. The military gave Vargas an ultimatum to 
resign. The coup, however, was averted as, on 24
th
 August 1954, Vargas took his own 
life, leaving a note in which he accused the conservative opposition and foreign (i.e. 
US) interests for the troubles his government was facing. Popular support for the 
‗martyr‘ suddenly reappeared.29 
 João Café Filho, Vargas‘ conservative deputy, assumed the presidency to finish 
the term.
30
 A military coup was no longer needed to change the course of state policies. 
On assuming control of the executive power of government, Café Filho formed a UDN-
led conservative cabinet with a liberal economist in charge of the Ministry of Finance. 
The latter immediately implemented a set of orthodox monetary and fiscal policies, 
cutting public sector expenditures, increasing taxes and reducing credit to the private 
sector.
31
 In 1955, the Brazilian economy contracted for the first time since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and real industrial wages fell by 1% having grown 8.5% on 
average during the previous year.
32
 With the intention of attracting foreign capital, 
allegedly to solve the external financing problems, the monetary authority issued 
Instruction 113 which not only authorized the importation of machinery by MNCs 
without foreign exchange cover and under a reduced tariff regime, but also allowed the 
entrance of second-hand and out-dated capital goods.
33
  
                                                 
28
 See Abreu (2008a: 333); Skidmore (2007: 131-6). 
29
 On the events leading to Vargas‘ suicide, see Skidmore (2007: 136-42); Fausto (1999: 248-50); Bethell 
(2008: 116-9). 
30
 By then, president and vice-president were elected separately in Brazil and could belong to different 
parties. Café Filho was a member of the populist Progressive Social Party (PSP) but heavily supported by 
the UDN. Due to health problems, however, he could not finish the term. See Skidmore (2007: 143-6). 
31
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Responding to the new political environment, the PSD-PTB alliance sought a 
‗balanced‘ ticket for the forthcoming presidential election. Juselino Kubitschek, 
governor of the state of Minas Gerais and well-regarded developmentalist with close 
links to the national industrial bourgeoisie, was nominated as PSD candidate for the 
presidency. Gourlart, Vargas‘ former Minister of Labour, representing the PTB, was 
selected Kubitschek‘s running mate for the vice-presidency. They won the election and, 
following a bitter constitutional dispute, assumed office.
34
 In order to restart the process 
of economic growth and to accelerate the modernisation of the industrial sector, the new 
government launched a large-scale development programme, the so-called Targets Plan 
(1956-60). This ambitious Plan was based on recommendations contained in two reports 
produced, respectively, by the Joint Brazil-United Stated Commission for Economic 
Development (1953), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
in association with the BNDE (1952). Aiming to compress fifty years development into 
five, the Plan set out thirty-one industrial and infrastructural targets. Among others, 
there were targets for the steel, coal, electricity and motor-vehicle industries and for the 
construction of roads, ports and schools. Moreover, a new capital, Brasilia, was to be 
constructed in the Centre-West of the country, as the ‗synthesis‘ target. Accelerated 
development was to be achieved by the combination of private and public sector 
investments. Furthermore, the Targets Plan incorporated the promotion of foreign direct 
investments as state industrial policy.
35
 MNCs from the USA and Western Europe were 
allocated a key role on the assumption that their participation would help close savings, 
foreign exchange and technology gaps. The outcome was that foreign-owned firms 
rapidly became predominant in the key, and heavily supported, motor-vehicle and 
white-goods sectors, as well as in the electrical, petrochemical and machinery 
industries.
36
 
 As already mentioned above, MNCs did not settle in Brazil with the 
technological conditions needed for successful competition in world markets. They 
entered the Brazilian economy on a scale suitable to cater for the relatively small and 
protected domestic market. Following nationally-owned capital, newly established 
industrial MNCs compensated the extraordinary costs, and thus potentially lower 
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profits, arising from their reduced scale of production, and the use of out-dated 
equipment, through the appropriation of a portion of the land rent. Special subsidies and 
tax exemptions were also added to the previously described forms of land rent 
appropriation.
37
 Moreover, in 1957 a tariff reform was passed introducing ad-valorem 
duties to replace the system of multiple exchange rates and quotas. The new tariff 
regime not only increased the absolute level of protection but also established a graded 
structure by which imports of capital goods and industrial inputs not produced locally 
would pay duties usually lower than the degree of overvaluation of the exchange rate or 
would be exempted from paying taxes altogether.
38
 
As would be common thereafter, the implementation of the Targets Plan came 
about through an institutional overhaul. The Development Council was formed to 
coordinate special industry ‗executive groups‘, incorporating both private and public 
sector representatives. These groups were in charge of recommending, designing and 
implementing policies and regulatory frameworks necessary to promote the industries 
included in the Plan. Among the most active of these ‗executive groups‘ were those for 
the motor-vehicles, naval construction, agricultural and road construction machinery, 
and heavy mechanical and rail transport equipment industries.
39
 At the same time, the 
BNDE increased its participation in the allocation of credit and played a critical role in 
the implementation of the Targets Plan.
40
 The Council and the BNDE were largely 
independent of ministerial control. 
The Plan was partly funded with a portion of the land rent appropriated by the 
state through import taxes and the monopoly of the foreign exchange market. During 
the operation of the Auction System (1953-61), the average price at which the state sold 
foreign exchange was significantly above that it had paid for it to exporters (the so-
called ‗confisco cambial‘). As the Plan‘s implementation progressed, economic growth 
recovered strongly. Industrial output, employment and wages continued their upward 
trend, only interrupted in 1955, and the ‗populist alliance‘ strengthened, actively 
incorporating the still-illegal PCB to the bases of political support of Kubitschek‘s 
developmentalist government.
41
 The land rent, though contracting during the second 
half of the 1950s, was still substantial and was now complemented by a sizeable inflow 
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of foreign capital in the form of equipment and loans to the state. During 1956-60, net 
capital inflows were equivalent to 3.8% of the economy‘s surpluses.42 Moreover, the 
foundations erected during the previous years (i.e. investments in SOEs and social 
overhead capital) were sufficiently strong to help sustain the profitability of an 
expanded industrial sector. 
By the end of the decade, however, international prices of Brazil‘s most valuable 
agrarian productions collapsed.
43
 The land rent contracted further and this resulted in 
the reduction of public sector revenues. The Kubistchek administration, nevertheless, 
proceeded apace with the implementation of the Targets Plan, funding part of its 
expenditures with short-term privately contracted foreign loans and the rest through the 
expansion of money supply, monetizing up to 25% of the public sector budget. 
Unwilling to accept US government requirement to balance public sector‘s accounts, 
‗official‘ long-term loans at favourable interest rates were not then readily available to 
the Brazilian economy.
44
 Under these weakening conditions, economic growth slowed 
and the inflation rate reached 40% in 1959.
45
 The dismantling of most of the previous 
forms of appropriation of the contracting land rent thus began to be implemented by the 
Kubitschek administration. 
An orthodox economic plan was then designed and implemented by Roberto 
Campos, Kubitschek‘s new Ministry of Finance, to reduce the public sector deficit and 
curb the inflation rate. The plan, however, was never fully implemented as it would 
have significantly hurt the Targets Plan as well as the government‘s main bases of 
political support, the national industrial bourgeoisie and the urban working-class. The 
full-scale adjustment was only being postponed, and despite government efforts to 
minimise unpopular recessionary policies, Jânio Quadros, the eccentric, but charismatic, 
ex-governor of São Paulo and UDN‘s last-minute candidate, managed to defeat the 
PSD-PTB alliance in the 1960 general election. Quadros promised to mend the 
bankrupted state and to end with the alleged underlying cause behind that problem, the 
ensuing corruption. Nevertheless, Goulart, the PTB incumbent vice-president, managed 
to get re-elected for the post.
46
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Immediately after its accession to power in early 1961, the Quadros government 
eliminated the Auction System, unifying and devaluing the exchange rate for exports. It 
also reduced public sector expenditures with the intention to balance the budget.
47
 This 
policy shift did not, however, end the appropriation of the land rent by social actors 
other than landowners. Under the argument that the devaluation of the currency had 
benefited the rural sector, Contribution Quotas (i.e. taxes) on coffee exports were 
introduced as new forms of land rent appropriation.
48
 Moreover, the compulsory 
purchase of ‗import bills‘, for a value equal to the imported goods, with 150 days 
maturity and yielding negative returns, partly replaced the Auction System as forms of 
channelling a portion of the land rent to the state.
49
 
During 1961, however, the mass of the land rent began to recover while the 
inflow of loans expanded sharply as the USA launched the Alliance for Progress and the 
Quadros administration committed itself to reduce the public sector deficit.
50
 The 
performance of the Brazilian economy thus started to improve. The political options 
Quadros personified no longer expressed fully the necessities of the process of capital 
accumulation. Indeed, the President himself had become a contradiction in terms. 
Elected with conservative (i.e. economically liberal) support, he was soon approaching 
national-developmentalist circles to design his economic strategy and launching a new 
‗independent‘ foreign policy. The gap between the President and his main (original) 
political allies thus slowly grew wider. In August, after less than 7 months in office, 
Quadros unexpectedly resigned. With this move, the ‗eccentric‘ President attempted to 
recover UDN support in Congress, lost after establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba 
and the Soviet Union. To his surprise, however, Congress simply acknowledged his 
resignation and quickly discussed the name of his successor.
51
 
As in 1954, the peculiarities of the Brazilian Constitution provided the necessary 
institutional flexibility to accommodate political changes mediating movements in the 
material bases of support of the local economy. Goulart, the populist vice-president 
from the PTB, was the first in the line of succession for the presidency. His close ties 
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with the trade unions, however, made him strongly resisted by the most conservative 
sectors of the political elite, including those within the military. As it had tried with 
President-elect Kubistchek in 1955 when Vargas‘ suicide created a political stand-off, 
the UDN attempted to stop Goulart from succeeding Quadros. After heated 
parliamentary disputes and a peak in social conflicts, which included mass 
demonstrations, a compromise solution was finally agreed in Congress: Goulart would 
be allowed to assume power but the presidential system of government was to be 
replaced by a parliamentary one. This, it was hoped by many, would transform Goulart 
into a puppet of a Congress controlled by the conservative fraction of the PSD and the 
UDN. A plebiscite was planned for 1965 to consult the electorate on the matter.
52
 
As soon as the new administration assumed control of the state apparatus, 
despite its limited power, it extended the appropriation of the land rent by reinforcing 
some of the policies implemented by the previous government or reintroducing others 
that had been suspended. The overvaluation of the exchange strengthened again and the 
compulsory ‗import bills‘ were increased to 150% of the value of the related imports.53 
Contribution Quotas on coffee exports were increased and were also applied to cocoa 
overseas sales.
54
 Public sector spending soared, credit supply expanded and a major 
SOE, Brazilian Electricity (Eletrobras) was finally created by merging existing regional 
publicly-owned companies and nationalising others that were privately-owned.
55
 
Similar plans were laid for the telecommunications industry. Under the ideological form 
of being in the interest of national autonomy, the purchase of foreign assets in this 
process transferred a portion of the expanding land rent to their previous owners.
56
  
Economic activity recovered strongly in 1961, especially in the industrial sector, 
and, though it slowed thereafter, it remained on trend. Industrial value-added grew at 
18.2, 4.5 and 5 per cent in 1961, 1962 and 1963, respectively, while GDP grew 9.7, 7.1 
and 3.9 per cent during those years. The demand for labour expanded sharply as did the 
need for an enlargement of the domestic market where industrial capital sold its entire 
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production. The economic recovery thus manifested itself in the strengthening of trade 
unions and working-class parties, and, therefore, in the increase in real wages in the 
industrial and public sectors, crucially through the introduction of the ‗thirteenth‘ wage 
to be paid at the end of the year. The independent General Confederation of Workers 
controlled by the still illegal, but now openly tolerated, PCB became actively integrated 
into the structure of political support for the populist government. Peasant leagues and 
unions of rural workers also strengthened and joined in support of the proposed land 
reform and the regulation of the rural labour market.
57
 The Superintendency of Agrarian 
Policies was created in 1962 with the purpose of carrying out a land reform and a Rural 
Workers Bill was promulgated in 1963.
58
 Students‘ unions became more radicalised in 
their support for the ‗basic social reforms‘ now being proposed by the Goulart 
administration, which also included granting voting rights to illiterates and Army 
officers and freezing urban rents. The PTB made substantial gains in the 1962 
Congressional elections, coming second after the PSD, and the referendum on the form 
of government was brought forward. In January 1963 the parliamentary system was 
ended.
59
 
The economic recovery, however, was short-lived. After two years of relatively 
robust growth, in 1963 the net inflow of foreign interest-bearing capital, which had been 
equivalent to 2.2% of the net surpluses available for appropriation in the Brazilian 
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economy during 1958-62, became negative.
60
 Global interest rates had been increasing 
since their low 1961 levels, thus raising the cost of private loans. In turn, the tightening 
of US aid policy, crucially when dealing with ‗nationalist‘ governments like Goulart‘s, 
and the worsening of the public sector accounts, made the attraction of ‗official‘ loans 
increasingly difficult.
61
 Moreover, after four consecutive record coffee harvests 
(averaging 4.35 million tons), a particularly acute frost in the state of Parana cut the 
1963 production of Brazil‘s leading export by 25% and destroyed a large part of the 
stock of trees.
62
 Yet, international coffee prices remained stagnant, at one-half the level 
of the early 1950s. Land rent appropriated by the state thus began to contract. Without 
these resources to support private capital accumulation, economic growth slowed 
sharply. Public sector‘s budget deficit mounted as expenditures were now growing 
faster than revenues and Goulart‘s fiscal policies were anything but restrained. Deficit 
monetisation rapidly fuelled the rate of inflation at the same time that the reversion of 
capital flows and the fall in exports were creating, again, a severe balance-of-payments 
crisis.
63
 
Already in late 1962, as economic troubles began to emerge, Brazil‘s foremost 
structuralist economist, Celso Furtado, was named Special Advisor in Economic Affairs 
and charged with the task of developing a plan to control inflation without affecting 
economic growth and the pace of ‗basic social reforms.‘ In line with structuralist ideas, 
Furtado‘s Three-year Plan for Economic and Social Development attempted to pursue a 
land reform in order to increase labour productivity in the agrarian sector and thus 
simultaneously reduce food prices and expand the domestic market for industrial goods. 
In contradistinction to structuralist prescriptions, Furtado‘s Plan also included a 
monetarist approach to inflation aimed at controlling aggregate demand. This would 
come about through the reduction of the public sector deficit by cutting subsidies, such 
as those granted through the low prices of wheat and fuel, and through the contraction 
of the supply of credit to the private sector. Both actions were aimed at restricting the 
growth of money supply. Yet, without enough political support to implement its 
‗structuralist‘ part and to sustain in time its ‗monetarist‘ side, the Plan failed to achieve 
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its stated goals.
64
 In 1963, GDP growth slowed markedly, falling to only 1% in per 
capita terms, and inflation accelerated from 49.5% in 1962 to 72.75%.
65
 Industrial 
employment fell by 5%. Real wages, however, increased by 11%.
66
 Industrial capital‘s 
rate of profit collapsed.
67
 The Goulart government was becoming increasingly incapable 
of expressing politically the current state of the Brazilian process of capitalist 
development. Though Goulart had been allowed to hold onto power when the economy 
rebounded strongly, this would no longer be the case when it entered into crisis.  
In 1964, the conflict between the magnitude of the extraordinary sources of 
social wealth available for accumulation, and industrial capital‘s requirement for them, 
became acute. Affected by the frost of the previous year, production of coffee dropped 
by a further 37%, while the international prices of other primary goods produced in 
Brazil, notably of cacao, began to fall.
68
 The increase in coffee prices resulting from the 
impact of a second harvest failure was largely insufficient to compensate for the 
reduction in local output of that grain. On both sides, this resulted in a contraction of the 
land rent available for appropriation by industrial capital. External loans dried up 
rapidly to the point that during 1964 the net outflow of interest-bearing capital 
amounted to as much as 4.8% of total surpluses available in the Brazilian economy.
69
 
Moreover, labour productivity growth in the industrial sector during the previous years 
had lagged well behind world market evolutions, further expanding the productivity gap 
and thus the resources necessary to sustain capital‘s valorisation.70 
The contraction of the land rent and the strong reversion of its complementary 
sources of extraordinary social wealth (i.e. the net inflow of interest-bearing capital lent 
to the state) were manifesting themselves in the stagnation of economic activity which 
was heavily dependent on them. Sooner or later, the new circumstances also needed to 
come about through the withdrawal of those policies through which the appropriation of 
those resources by industrial capital had taken course. A populist government heavily 
supported by trade unions, as that of Goulart, could hardly administer such sharp change 
in economic policies. Indeed, the contradictory nature of the ill-fated Three-year Plan 
designed by Furtado had made this evident. 
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At the height of the crisis, Goulart did what was necessary to ‗provoke‘ his own 
ouster. As Vargas before him, following the ‗advice‘ of the military and labour branches 
of the ruling party, the administration‘s main bases of political support, and against the 
suggestions of his Minister of Finance, Goulart finally implemented a bill passed in late 
1962 restricting MNC profit remittances, conceded a 100% wage increase for public 
sector employees, finally passed a decree allowing the expropriation without monetary 
compensation of unused rural properties and even proposed an urban rents ‗reform‘. On 
March 13
th
 1964, in front of an audience of half a million demonstrators, Goulart 
announced that he would implement a sweeping land reform and nationalise oil 
refineries.
71
 The response was immediate; on March 31
st
  a military coup, in the offing 
for several months, fully supported by the industrial bourgeoisie, much of the urban 
middle classes, landowners and the US Embassy, deposed Goulart without much 
resistance, and installed a ‗provisional‘ government to ‗purify‘ Brazilian democracy and 
‗protect‘ it from the threat of Communism and trade unionism. The military regime 
installed in 1964 would, however, remain in power for 21 years. PTB leader, and 
Goulart‘s brother-in-law, Brizola and the nationalistic branches of the military related to 
the party attempted to mobilise popular sectors and the army to pursue the same type of 
resistance that had proved successful in 1961, when defending Goulart‘s constitutional 
right to the presidency. This time, however, the underlying economic conditions were 
quite different.
72
 
 
Different arguments have been advanced to account for the 1963-64 political and 
economic crises. Some writers argued that the crises resulted from the secular 
stagnation and exhaustion of the developmental model based on the program of import-
substituting industrialisation. This ‗model of development‘, it was claimed, expanded 
the demand for imports of industrial inputs and equipment, and thus reproduced the 
external bottlenecks it was supposed to supersede. This was particularly so since, for 
reasons of technical scales of production and the reduced size of the domestic market, it 
became impossible to substitute the importation of certain means of production.
73
 
Though popular, this thesis was subsequently disproved by the post-1968 experience. 
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As will be seen, strong economic growth was then essentially based on a relatively 
similar ‗model of development‘.74 Other writers, have claimed that the crisis of the 
Goulart government was largely politically engendered. Firms and foreign creditors 
were reluctant to invest in, and lend resources to, a country where trade unions, rural 
peasants and a nationalistic military were the government‘s key political support.75 This 
account, however, fails to note that substantial amounts of foreign credit and FDI flew 
in Brazil until 1962, notably in the motor-vehicle industry, despite Goulart‘s populist 
credentials.
76
 Moreover, none of these types of capital inflows recovered fully until the 
late-1960s, well into the rule of a military regime that had the political and military 
support of the US government, and the approval of foreign investors. More generally, 
the main problem with both types of explanations is that they fail to consider state 
policies and political institutions as mediations (i.e. forms of realisation) of the 
reproduction of economic processes (i.e. the process of capital accumulation) rather 
than their cause or origin. 
 
Korea: From import-substituting to export-oriented Industrialisation (1955-1964) 
 
In 1955, the Republic of Korea was recovering from the devastation produced 
during the 1950-53 war with the People‘s Democratic Republic of Korea (hereafter 
North Korea). Output growth, notably in the industrial sector, was increasing rapidly, 
albeit from a low base. The period of reconstruction and recovery lasted until well into 
the second half of the 1950s. ―By 1957 the economy had largely recovered from the 
damage inflicted during the Korean hostilities, and for the first time in many years a 
measure of stability began to evince itself in all walks of national life, including house-
keeping [sic], business enterprise and government administration.‖77 Despite all the 
singularities associated with the reconstruction process, during this and the immediately 
subsequent period, the Korean economy was structured in a manner qualitatively similar 
to the Brazilian. The largest portion of social wealth, notably of industrial goods, was 
produced by small nationally-owned capitals and destined for the protected and small 
domestic markets. Exports were relatively limited and concentrated in primary, notably 
                                                 
74
 See Abreu (2008a: 356) on this point. 
75
 See e.g. Gudin (1969); Simonsen and Campos (1979). 
76
 FDI inflows in 1961-62 were only marginally below the records of 1956-60. See table C.37 in 
Appendix C. 
77
 Economic Planning Board (1962: 27). See also Cole and Lyman (1971: 123-27). 
 264 
mining, products. As in Brazil, this was not simply the result of the workings of free 
markets. State policies in Korea were instrumental as they attempted to foster the 
development of the domestic industrial sector by promoting the replacement of several 
previously imported goods by local productions.
78
 
In Korea, as in most developing countries pursing policies promoting import-
substituting industrialisation, agrarian surpluses made up a substantial portion of the 
resources used to sustain the process of capital accumulation in the industrial sector. 
The Korean experience with ISI had, however, differed from the Brazilian in at least 
two aspects, since its early stages. First, the Korean economy was probably the only one 
of those then integrating in the global division of labour through the production of 
primary goods not benefiting from the increase in the international commodity prices 
during the Korean War. Secondly, also in contrast to the Brazilian case, and to most 
developing countries, Korea had access, before, during and, crucially, after the military 
conflict with its northern neighbour to a mass of foreign aid that compensated for the 
destruction caused during the war.
79
 In effect, during the period from 1955 to 1970, aid 
received from international donors, mainly the USA, in the form of cash or commodities 
amounted to as much as 20 billion of US$ at 2004 prices. This was equivalent to about 
25% of Korean GDP during that period and to approximately 110% of primary (mainly 
agrarian) sector earnings appropriated by social subjects other than the (small) agrarian 
capitalists/landowners during that period.
80
 
Three main policies were implemented by the Korean state to transfer a portion 
of primary sector surpluses and aid resources to industrial capital (and its junior partners 
commercial and service capital) during the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s. 
First, an intricate system of multiple exchange rates acted as a medium for the 
transference of resources to the industrial sector. Secondly, market protection through 
the combination of quotas and tariffs simultaneously allowed their appropriation by 
specific portions of industrial and commercial capitals. Thirdly, different types of state 
subsidies were granted to the former to sustain its process of accumulation.
81
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The system of multiple exchange rates was introduced in 1950, during the 
Korean War, and remained in effect, though with modifications, until 1964.
82
 Two 
different exchange rates prevailed for imports. The official exchange rate was used for 
any transaction related to US aid grants or to the expenditures undertaken by US forces 
stationed in the country. Given the low levels of exports at that time, these constituted 
the main sources of foreign exchange available to the Korean economy. Indeed, they 
were 14 times as valuable as exports between 1955 and 1960 and 3.5 times during 
1961-64.
83
 The official exchange rate was kept strongly overvalued in order to 
maximise the amount dollars received from the USA in the form of cash grants and to 
reduce the cost in the domestic market (i.e. in local currency) of aid commodities 
(mainly cotton, wheat, barley and sugar).
84
 This had the effect of reducing production 
costs of consumer goods (e.g. textiles) using them as inputs and the cost of the urban 
labour-force as food was sold domestically below its international price, thus helping 
sustain industrial capital‘s profits. In the case of barley, the only ‗aid commodity‘ 
produced locally in significant quantities, the low price was extended, through 
competitive pressures, to the portion of total supply produced domestically and thus 
constituted a form of transferring resources from the primary sector to the rest of the 
economy. A lower, but still overvalued, exchange rate prevailed for private sector 
imports, mainly made up of intermediate products and capital goods. In this way, the 
latter managed to appropriate a portion of aid resources in cash and of the primary 
surpluses materialised in exports. The purchase of foreign exchange for import 
purposes, however, was not free from restrictions. In mid-1954 an ‗auction system‘ 
similar to the Brazilian was implemented to administer the allocation of foreign 
exchange. It lasted for only one year. Between mid-1955 and mid-1957, foreign 
exchange was allocated through a ‗lottery‘ system. However, as foreign aid began to dry 
up, foreign exchange began to be allocated among bidders on the basis of the amount of 
national debt bonds they were willing to buy. As this type of financial investment 
yielded returns below alternative options, a portion of those resources was thus 
appropriated by the state. Finally, in mid-1958, the ‗auction system‘ was reintroduced.85  
                                                 
82
 On the system of multiple exchange rates, see Frank et al. (1975: 28-36) and Krueger (1979: 43-54). 
83
 See table A4.1 in Chapter 4 for the evolution of exports.  
84
 Three fourths of aid was in commodities, half of which were agricultural products and the rest mostly 
fertilizers and petroleum products. See Haggard et al. (1991). 
85
 See Krueger (1979: 65-9); Luedde-Neurath (1985: 60-1) on the allocation of foreign exchange for 
imports.  
 266 
Different exchange rates also prevailed for exports, according to their 
destination. As in Brazil, exports were then mainly composed of raw or semi-processed 
materials such as tungsten, fish, seaweed and, occasionally, rice. Also as in Brazil, the 
average exchange rate for exports was kept strongly overvalued, though at varying 
levels, until 1964. The overvaluation of the currency for exports not only transferred a 
portion of the surpluses materialised in them to importers. It also, and crucially, reduced 
the price of exported goods in the domestic markets. To the extent that these were food 
products, the overvaluation of the currency for exports also helped to keep local 
nominal wages low. Industrial capital thus managed to appropriate a portion of the 
primary sector surpluses and have, ceteris paribus, its profits increased. 
Tariffs and, crucially, quantitative restrictions were used to protect domestic 
producers and thus allow the appropriation of a portion primary sector surplus and US 
aid funds by industrial and commercial capital. Before 1957, non-tariff restrictions, 
prohibiting the importation of goods not approved by the government, constituted the 
main form of domestic market protection. Licences, however, could be obtained for 
‗less essential‘ goods not included in the list of those receiving automatic approval; 
though relatively high import taxes were levied on them. The system was revised semi-
annually in order to allow for changes suitable to industry‘s evolving ‗requirements.‘ 
Almost all equipment and intermediate goods bought with an overvalued currency 
entered practically duty free. Taking account for the emergence of new industrial 
productions, in 1957 the tariff system was reformed, becoming a more active instrument 
supporting the accumulation of industrial capital through import-substitution. Tariffs 
were lowered further for capital and intermediate goods not produced domestically, and 
were increased for locally manufactured goods.
86
 
The collection of import taxes and the sale of national debt bonds, both paid for 
with an overvalued currency, as well as the administration of the ‗auction system‘ for 
foreign exchange sales, directed to the public sector a portion of the resources received 
in the form of foreign (cash) aid and of primary sector earnings.
87
 These, together with 
resources raised through the sale of US aid in the form of specie, made a substantial part 
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of public sector revenues during this period. Taxes on income earned in the urban sector 
of the economy (falling either on capital or labour) were relatively low at this stage.
88
 
These resources found their way to support the process of accumulation of 
industrial capital in different ways. Some resources were spent on rebuilding and 
expanding the stock of social overhead capital, like roads, ports and power plants,
89
 
which were used by industrial capital at subsidised rates (i.e. at prices that did not 
include the full cost of producing these goods and services).
90
 In this way, industrial 
capital was largely exempted from the need to fund, with a portion of its profits, 
investments in the overhead capital it extensively used. Other resources were channelled 
through the provision of subsidised credit by publicly-owned ‗developmental‘ banks.91 
Indeed, while commercial banks previously owned by Japanese interests were being re-
privatized during 1954-57 after a period of public ownership, several new state banks 
were being created. These included the Korean Reconstruction Bank (KRB), which in 
1969 would become the prominent Korean Development Bank (KDB), and the Korean 
Agricultural Bank (KAB). From its origin, the KRB/KDB became a major source of 
subsidised credit for the industrial sector. The KAB did not constitute a significant 
source of funds for agrarian productions until well into the second half of the 1960s.
92
 
Finally, some resources were channelled to local industrial capital through tax 
exemptions and by means of favourable assessments by tax officials.
93
 
 Widespread corruption and ‗rent-seeking‘ were then inherent to the Korean 
process of capitalist development at this stage. The massive transference of relatively 
scarce resources to the industrial sector, necessary to support the profitability of an 
international uncompetitive capital, came about through the mediation of the state, in 
most cases through seemingly arbitrary means.
94
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On these bases, economic growth in Korea accelerated between the end of the 
Korean War and 1958 – during the ‗reconstruction‘ period. While the magnitude of 
primary sector surpluses was growing fast, as agrarian and mining production recovered 
strongly after the end of the war, the amount of foreign aid received reached 
unprecedented levels. As in Brazil, industrial production expanded faster than the rest of 
the economy, notably the food processing and textile industries (the infamous ‗three 
whites‘, cotton, wheat and sugar processing) where most of the subsidisation was 
focused.
95
 Also as in Brazil, almost all industrial output was sold in the protected 
domestic markets. Exports of manufactured goods, though promoted, remained 
insignificant until the early 1960s.
96
 The subsidies exporters received, through cheap 
loans and the so-called export-import link,
97
 were not enough to compensate for the 
overvaluation of the currency and the low level of labour productivity in the industrial 
sector. 
Yet, despite the fast expansion undertaken during the second half of the 1950s, 
by the early 1960s the Korean process of industrialisation through import-substitution 
was already differing from the Brazilian in three significant ways. First, primary 
surpluses were largely complemented in supporting industrial capital‘s profitability not 
only, as noted, by foreign aid, but also through the payment of urban labour-power 
below its value. Surplus rural populations were sufficiently large, notably after the war, 
to avoid any significant growth of real industrial wages between 1954 and 1963, despite 
the rapid expansion in the demand for labour-power. Moreover, the shallow 
development of the industrial sector did not require any substantial increase in 
purchasing capacities to expand the productive characteristics of the labour-force and to 
enlarge the domestic market. In this context, those trade unions that developed remained 
structurally weak, even in comparison with their Brazilian counterparts. After being 
actively repressed, and its ‗radical‘ elements violently purged during the 1945-8 US 
military government, a compliant trade union movement became one of the several legs 
of support for the nationalist and pseudo-populist, but conservative and increasingly 
autocratic, ruling Liberal Party (LP) headed by Syngman Rhee.
98
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Secondly, the magnitude of primary sector surpluses and foreign aid available 
for appropriation by industrial capital were not large enough to sustain the production of 
durable-consumer goods for the domestic markets as was already occurring in Brazil 
through the second half of the 1950s.
99
 Foreign-owned industrial capital, consequently, 
did not venture in to Korea in any significant scale even when the 1960 Foreign Capital 
Inducement Act provided one of the most generous incentives schemes in Asia. FDI 
merely concentrated in few basic industries like oil refining.
100
 
Thirdly, further expressing the limitations of the Korean process of capitalist 
development during its ISI stage, a portion of agrarian surpluses was appropriated by 
interest-bearing capital (i.e. moneylenders in the informal credit markets). Interest rates 
charged to small agrarian capital for the resources borrowed in the ‗curb‘ (i.e. 
unregulated) markets to fund productive activities were largely in excess of those 
charged in other sectors of the Korean economy.
101
 
Yet despite these essential differences, the Korean process of economic 
development shared a critical experience with the Brazilian. By the end of the 1950s, 
the pace of economic growth began to slow sharply while its main bases of support 
weakened. After peaking in 1957, US aid began to fall rapidly to halve by 1961. US 
policy for international development was then changing from ‗aid‘ to ‗trade‘ as balance-
of-payment difficulties there were becoming permanent.
102
 Despite its specific 
geopolitical condition, Korea was not spared from the cuts. Moreover, agrarian output 
growth stagnated, thus limiting the increase in the amount of resources that could be 
transferred out of that sector.
103
 With the inflow of foreign aid in sharp contraction, the 
previous overvaluation of the national currency could no longer be sustained. The 
former had constituted the bulk of the foreign exchange resources available in the local 
economy. Thus, under the strong ‗advice‘ of the US government, the Korean economic 
authorities finally devalued the Won and implemented an ‗orthodox‘ monetary policy, 
curtailing credit supply and, therefore, part of the subsidisation granted to industrial 
capital.
104
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If the period between 1954 and 1958 was marked by post-war recovery and 
relative institutional stability, the years 1959-1961 were characterised by a succession of 
economic and political crises. As the economy entered into reverse mode, opposition to 
Rhee‘s increasingly autocratic, repressive regime mounted rapidly and found a way of 
expressing itself in the fourth National Assembly elections held in May 1958. Rhee‘s 
LP only managed to gain 38.7% of votes despite its control over the electoral process 
and government funds, and the massive fraud undertaken. The opposition Democratic 
Party (DP), a conservative faction originally supporting Rhee in his post-Independence 
struggle to gain power against left-wing political groups and later on antagonising with 
his administration more over form than policy content, came second with 29.5% of the 
votes. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the opposition in the National Assembly was 
met with further political repression culminating in the passage of a series of national 
security bills in December 1958, virtually suspending the remaining vestiges of the 
democratic process. As would become common later on, the fight against ‗communist‘ 
infiltration was the excuse used to justify this attack on civil liberties and political 
adversaries.
105
 
As state resources contracted, economic policies increasingly concentrated on 
adjusting government spending to the new circumstances. The fight against inflation, so 
enthusiastically promoted by US advisors, was no more than an ideological excuse for 
that purpose. The inflation rate, though at 22-3% during 1956-7, had actually been 
falling during the previous period of fast growth and stood at -3.07% in 1958, as 
monetary control shock therapy was applied to the Korean economy.
106
 The Economic 
Development Council, created in early 1958 at the peak of the previous expansionary 
cycle to design a long-term plan to promote the process of industrialisation, remained 
marginal to the process of economic policy-making, a shadow of what its successor, the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB), would become. In effect, the implementation of the 
long-discussed First Five-Year Plan was suspended. The Plan would only come to life 
in 1961, after Rhee had left the government.
107
 
As in Brazil, by 1960, the prospects of the Korean economy were increasingly 
bleak. While agrarian output growth stagnated and global grain prices were falling, the 
mass of primary sector surpluses available for appropriation by industrial capital got 
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now reduced. Furthermore, by then, US aid had already fallen to half the amount of its 
1957 peak. Without these resources, industrial production growth stopped and so did the 
demand for labour-power in the sector. Real wages fell by 10% thus partly 
compensating for the negative effect on industrial capital‘s profits caused by the drop in 
the subsidies granted to the sector. Gross domestic product growth also came to a virtual 
halt.
108
 
With the economy in a deep crisis, opposition to Rhee‘s government reached a 
climax. The regime could no longer fully express the necessities of the Korean process 
of capital accumulation. Loyal to its style, the regime, which had been increasingly 
relying on the police forces and the bureaucracy to run the country, then did what it 
needed to trigger its own downfall. In the midst of the crisis, the LP government 
massively and openly rigged the fourth presidential election held in March 1960. The 
fact that Rhee, already an elderly man, obtained 88.7% of the votes was strange but not 
entirely shocking as he ran unopposed; his main contender unexpectedly died in 
hospital a couple of weeks before Election Day. The main locus of conflict, however, 
was the government‘s desperate attempt to get Rhee‘s successor elected to the post of 
deputy-president. In an openly fraudulent operation, Lee Ki-pung, Rhee‘s protégé, 
comfortably defeated Chang Myon of the DP, against whom he had lost the position in 
the previous election when Rhee‘s victory had been extremely narrow.109 
The response was swift. Already anticipating the fraud that was in the making, 
student demonstrations began in the port city of Masan on Election Day. The explosion, 
however, came a few days later when one of the demonstrators was found dead, 
apparently from police brutality. On April 18
th
, students rallied in Seoul and the 
following day over 20,000 demonstrated against the regime. They were brutally 
repressed by police forces; over 100 students were killed. The revolt spread to other 
major cities.
110
 University students held massive protests during the following week. 
                                                 
108
 See graphs 4.2 and 4.5 in Chapter 4. 
109
 See Cole and Lyman (1971: 30); Kim (1975: 162-3). 
110
 It has been argued elsewhere (see e.g. Kim, 2000: 43-4) that Korean students incarnate in modern 
times the moral leadership that Confucian scholars had in the past. This allegedly explains students‘ 
constant participation in pro-democracy movements throughout Korean modern history. This might help 
explain the actions of those who have followed students lead, though perhaps it has been more directly 
related to social hierarchy than moral leadership. The social position of students, however, does not fully 
account for the reasons behind their own stance. In general terms, university students have a strong reason 
to oppose authoritarian governments. The weaker the democratic institutions, the lower, ceteris paribus, 
the bargaining power of those who sell their labour-power in exchange for a wage/salary. University 
students, as prospective salary-earners, are interested, as the rest of the working-class, in the existence of 
political institutions that allow them to maximise their bargaining power, vis-à-vis capital, in the labour 
 272 
These were met, again, by violent state repression. Instead of receding, the protests 
against the electoral fraud and the autocratic and corrupted Rhee regime grew stronger. 
The options were narrowing for the government, notably when 40 LP members of the 
National Assembly withdrew their support from the president. Rhee called the military 
to intervene with further repression. They refused. Without the support of this key 
repressive institution, the President resigned, and, on 26
th
 April 1960, fled to Hawaii. 
Rhee never returned to Korea. Lee Ki-pung and his family reportedly committed 
suicide. The US government did not do much to stop Rhee‘s fall; his fierce anti-Japan 
nationalism had become a liability for US policy in the region. The first Korean 
Republic thus came to an abrupt end.
111
 
After Rhee‘s resignation, following the Constitution, Prime Minister Ho Chong 
established an interim government. Its response to the political crisis was not, however, 
radically different from Rhee‘s repressive and corporatist measures.112 A new 
Constitution was quickly promulgated, creating a bicameral National Assembly and 
establishing a cabinet system of government. This reform sought to reduce significantly 
the powers of the president who was to be chosen by the National Assembly rather than 
by direct popular vote.
113
 Elections for the National Assembly were held in late July. 
The DP won by a large majority in both chambers and after hard internal negotiations, 
Chang Myon was elected prime minister. The new administration, however, was weak 
from the first day. Divided over the choice of president, the DP broke apart and those 
who opposed Chang‘s designation left after his election.114 Indeed, it was the perfect 
government for an economy that was crumbling while its material bases of structural 
support were being eroded rapidly. 
In 1960, a poor rice harvest reduced further the amount of resources that could 
be transferred to the urban sector and, together with the reduction of US commodity aid 
under Public Law 480, resulted in severe food shortages in the urban centres. The 
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‗spring famine‘, common in rural areas, worsened further.115 As US aid in cash also 
contracted, exchange rates for imports were devalued further, thus reducing the 
magnitude of primary sector surpluses and the contracting aid resources transferred 
through this mean to industrial capital. In an effort to cover the gap in public sector 
finances left by the reduction in foreign aid, tax collection and fares of public services 
provided by state-owned companies were increased, thus reducing the subsidies granted 
through them to urban consumers.
116
 In early 1961, exchange rates for imports and 
exports were devalued again and unified, putting a momentary end to the system of 
multiple exchange rates that had characterised the Korean process of ISI.
117
 
With the economy in recession and real wages falling from their already low 
levels, popular unrest spread now across all segments of urban society, this time also 
including the hitherto inactive trade unions. The political opening brought about by the 
end of Rhee‘s regime facilitated the multiplication of popular protests against a 
government that had promised fast economic growth and development but was 
achieving very little in this field. Demonstrations, crucially, of university students, 
became endemic during the second part of 1960 and first half of 1961. The economic 
crisis was rapidly manifesting itself in a new, more acute political crisis.
118
 
 In effect, Chang‘s administration was a contradiction in terms. It was a 
conservative government brought to power by a reformist movement.
119
 Much to the 
surprise of those who had facilitated its emergence, Chang‘s government, as Rhee‘s 
before it, attempted to respond with new repressive measures; by limiting 
demonstrations and cracking down on ‗communists‘. Students‘ protests spiralled rather 
than subdued and the situation got rapidly out of control.
120
 In the middle of the crisis, 
the military, the strongest and most professionalised state institution, intervened 
allegedly to ‗restore the order‘ and ‗revitalise‘ the struggle for the goals of the 
Revolution that had removed Rhee by ‗rescuing‘ it from ‗corrupted‘ politicians and 
‗radical‘ activists.121 On 16th May 1961 a group of junior members of the military, most 
of them of rural origin and not directly in charge of Rhee‘s repressive system or 
benefiting from its corrupt administration, toppled the democratically elected 
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government of Chang. They faced little opposition. The coup, apparently, had been in 
the offing since Rhee‘s times, but was postponed as the ‗student revolution‘ unfolded. 
On the following day, the coup leader, Park Chung-hee, dissolved the National 
Assembly, prohibited indefinitely all political and trade unions activities, dictated 
martial law, and announced the formation of a junta of thirty colonels and brigadier-
generals to head the executive branch of the government.
122
 
As soon as it grabbed power, the military government reorganised the structure 
of the state bureaucracy and reformed the Constitution once more. First, the junta was 
replaced by the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Secondly, following the 
proposal made during Chang‘s short-lived tenure, the Economic Planning Board was 
created to replace the Economic Development Council. This new ‗super‘ ministry took 
responsibilities from different ministries in order to centralise key aspects of economic 
policy-making, including the public sector budget, economic planning and the use of 
foreign capital. Thirdly, a massive and far reaching government department, the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), was created to fight and dismantle any kind of 
political opposition to the regime and, crucially, labour and left-wing activism. These 
would thereafter be considered to be influenced by North Korea and therefore to be 
conspiring against national interests and ‗social peace‘. For that purpose, the KCIA also 
pursued a massive purge in the public administration and the army; a practice that 
would become common after each change of government. The new Constitution 
reinstated a strong presidential regime, weakening the power of the unicameral National 
Assembly. Under strong domestic and international pressure, however, the military 
government reluctantly called elections for mid-1963. The third Korean Republic then 
began.
123
 
Among its first economic measures, the regime forgave all rural debt deemed as 
having arisen from usury and rescheduled loans that were considered fair.
124
 This 
reduced the size of agrarian surpluses appropriated by money-lending capital and thus 
expanded the share potentially appropriable by industrial capital.
125
 Furthermore, in 
1962, in the middle of the crisis, a ‗revolutionary‘ court and a prosecution office were 
established under the Political Activities Purification Act to try those accused of various 
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crimes, including opposition politicians, members of previous governments, student 
activists and the so-called ‗illicit fortune makers‘.126 Under the argument of being a 
punishment from their past abuses and corruption, large private companies were fined 
and, in some cases, their assets confiscated.
127
 
By the end of 1961, however, the economy began to recover. With agrarian 
production and prices jumping more than 10%, the mass of agrarian surpluses available 
for transference to, and appropriation by, industrial capital expanded significantly.
128
 
With this expanded resources and real industrial wages still around 10% below their 
1959 peak values, industrial production expanded and GDP growth returned even when 
foreign aid remained at relatively low levels.
129
 By the end of the year, state policies 
began to change to accommodate to, and facilitate, economic recovery. Park‘s 
government then launched the First Five-Year Economic Plan (FFYP) for the period 
1962-66, which was strongly influenced by the Three-year Plan first drafted by the 
Economic Development Council during Rhee‘s administration.130 The punishment of 
‗illicit wealth makers‘ was largely dispensed with and most fines and sentences were 
pardoned and all assets reinstated; the main exception being privately owned shares in 
commercial banks which were renationalised only four years after being privatised.
131
 
These, however, had become relatively unimportant as state banks offering subsidised 
loans had expanded at their expense as providers of long-term funds, and as interest rate 
ceilings had led to a loss of deposits at the expense of the unregulated, ‗curb‘ market.132 
In other words, the farce, with all its locally-embedded cultural singularities, which 
included parading punished businessmen in front of large audiences, had mediated 
politically the economic crisis and, thus, reproduced the Korean process of capitalist 
development under its unchanged specific form. It had not been, as it is claimed 
elsewhere, a form of disciplining capital or reasserting government‘s authority for the 
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concomitant transformation of the economy through the adoption of an export-oriented 
‗model of industrialisation.‘133 
In contrast to what is frequently claimed,
134
 the FFYP was firmly set within the 
ISI tradition. The Plan placed particular emphasis on basic industries like cement, 
fertilizer, steel, oil refining and chemicals. These were supposed to stimulate other 
sectors of the economy and constitute the foundation for the economic activities to be 
‗promoted‘ in the Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP), which would aim at economic self-
sufficiency.
135
 As was seen before, the motor-vehicle industry was also to be promoted 
during the period of the FFYP. So were other durable-consumer goods industries like 
electronics (e.g. television sets and watches).
136
 Exports were encouraged, but their 
place in the Plan was secondary to the import-substituting effort. Moreover, those 
exports most encouraged were in the mining, fishing and agrarian sectors rather than the 
labour-intensive manufactures that would expand sharply thereafter.
137
 As in Brazil, and 
many other ‗developing‘ countries, export promotion policies (either of traditional or 
‗non-traditional‘ goods) were planned to help ‗finance‘ ISI programmes. They were not 
yet at the centre of economic policy-making.
138
  
To make the FFYP operational, the government instituted a number of financial 
sector reforms, all of which significantly increased the importance of bank lending in 
the allocation of capital. Apart from nationalising commercial banks, the government 
reorganised agricultural financing institutions, created the Small and Medium Industry 
Bank and authorized the KDB to guarantee private sector foreign loans and to borrow 
abroad. Moreover, the Bank of Korea (the Central Bank) was brought under the control 
of the Ministry of Finance in order to further centralise and coordinate credit policies.
139
 
Though not the core of the Plan, standard policies were used to ‗promote‘ 
exports, mainly of raw and semi-processed materials. These consisted of the exemption 
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of tariffs on imports of raw materials and spare parts used in exportable productions, the 
exemption of some domestic taxes and the granting of subsidised credits to exporters. 
Furthermore, exporters kept receiving direct subsidies paid in cash.
140
 These, however, 
were far from enough to compensate for the still high degree of overvaluation of the 
national currency. In summary, these ‗export promotion‘ policies were not yet 
mediating the structural transformation of the Korean economy from a type of process 
of capital accumulation based on the appropriation of primary sector surpluses and 
foreign aid through ISI to one based on the use of a cheap and highly disciplined labour-
force through EOI. On the contrary, they were still a particular form of realising the 
former (i.e. part of the ‗import-substituting‘ effort.)  
Furthermore, as would become common in Korean history, between 1961 and 
1963, labour market institutions were also reformed to express the new economic 
conditions. On one hand, trade unions were restructured in the form of industry-wide 
organisations unified under a single national federation, while ‗union shops‘ were 
recognised, thus in principle strengthening labour‘s bargaining power. On the other 
hand, allegedly to avoid the repetition of the events that had brought down Chang‘s 
administration, trade unions were banned from party politics while state intervention, 
crucially by the newly-created KCIA, in their internal affairs was extended in scope, 
thus in practice reducing labour‘s bargaining power. In the short run, these institutional 
changes greatly limited wage recovery. Despite their corporatist characteristics and the 
theoretical toleration of collective bargaining, the new labour market institutions had 
two features that could potentially enable them to give shape and mediate future 
transformations of the economy. These were the consolidation of enterprise unions as 
the lowest-level unit of representation, in most cases controlled by management, and the 
lack of unions‘ involvement in political activities. Both favoured the differentiated 
reproduction of the different portions of the labour-force (i.e. the ‗dual‘ or ‗fragmented‘ 
features of the labour market).
141
 
With agrarian surpluses and foreign aid recovering, the overvaluation of the 
Won was strengthened again in 1962.
142
 As state resources also increased, monetary and 
fiscal policies regained their expansionary shape, thus increasing the subsidisation of 
industrial capital. The supply of credit expanded rapidly, crucially to industry, jumping 
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by 20% in 1961 and 1962 (compared to -24% in 1960) while government spending 
increased from 17% to 25% of national output between 1960 and 1962.
143
 This time, 
however, these extraordinary resources were not as large as in 1957, when US aid had 
peaked. Nevertheless, they were now complemented with the payment of labour-power 
well below its value. In 1962, real wages in manufacturing were still 5% below the peak 
level of 1959 while labour productivity was 11% above.
144
 
The economic recovery, however, was short-lived. By 1963 economic growth 
began to slow down when the balance between the extraordinary sources of social 
wealth available for appropriation (i.e. primary sector surpluses and foreign aid) and 
their requirement by local industrial capital tightened once more. The system of 
multiple exchange rates was then reintroduced to direct their transfer to an industrial 
capital that was mainly accumulating through the production of non-durable consumer 
goods for the protected domestic markets. A US-backed stabilisation plan was 
implemented severely cutting public sector expenditures to 15% of GDP in 1963 and 
11.5% in 1964. Credit supply growth in real terms was also curtailed to -5% and -15% 
in 1963 and 1964, respectively.
145
 As the economy slowed, growth in the demand for 
labour-power also receded. Real wages in manufacturing fell a further 11% during 
1963-64, compensating the negative effect of the low level of labour productivity and 
reduced subsidies on capital‘s profitability. 
By the end of the 1963, the Korean economy was in reverse gear. Park only just 
managed to win the presidential election, getting much less than half of the votes, 
despite the fact that his party, the Democratic Republic Party (DRP), had complete 
control over the state apparatus and its resources and had manipulated the electoral law 
in its favour.
146
 When the new ‗democratically‘ elected Park administration assumed 
power in 1964, the economy was in crisis, public sector revenues were collapsing 
rapidly (as foreign aid kept falling), and the US-backed stabilisation programme 
proceeded with the adjustments. Manufacturing employment fell for the first time since 
the end of the Korean War while real wages in that sector were already 16.5% below 
their 1958 peak. The FFYP was revised downwards two years before its end.
147
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Nevertheless, despite having been generally poor, the performance of the 
economy during 1962-64 was not uniformly bad. Helped by the sharp fall in industrial 
wages, exports unexpectedly grew at a very rapid pace, notably in unskilled-labour 
intensive manufacturing sectors such as textiles, electronics (e.g. radios) and plywood. 
The rate of profit of industrial capital thus increased sharply to peak in 1964.
148
 Some 
authors attribute the strong export performance to the subsidies granted to them since 
1960-61.
149
 This, however, was hardly the case as subsidies were more than offset by 
the increased overvaluation of the exchange rate during 1961-63.
150
 Other authors 
attribute it to the political support received by the exporting industries after the raise of 
the military to power.
151
 Yet, as reviewed above, this type of state support to export 
activities was relatively mild until the mid-1960s.  
 
End of chapter conclusions 
 
During the period between 1955 and 1964, the Brazilian and Korean economies 
were structured in a relatively similar fashion. Industrial capital accumulated there 
producing largely for small-sized, protected domestic markets. Its inherently high 
production costs were compensated through the appropriation a portion of primary 
sector surpluses, notably land rent, and of foreign capital inflows in the form of credits 
to the state in Brazil and aid in Korea. Furthermore, as primary sector surpluses 
contracted and capital inflows slowed at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 
1960s, both countries went through an economic crisis that triggered political changes. 
In neither, however, did this entail a structural transformation in the predominant form 
of economic organisation. Nevertheless, by the early 1960s the Brazilian and Korean 
economies already differed in one major aspect. While the process of import-
substituting industrialisation in the former had already incorporated some of the largest 
industrial companies in the world for the production of durable-consumer goods, this 
was not the case in the latter. The amount of primary sector surpluses and foreign aid 
available for appropriation were not large enough in Korea to sustain the expansion of 
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the domestic markets and the degree of subsidisation necessary to undertake these 
productive activities. 
Yet, by 1964-65 both economies were again in serious difficulties. Economic 
growth slowed and balance-of-payments crises emerged as foreign capital (credit or aid) 
stopped flowing in the amounts it had previously. One key difference in their future 
development experiences, however, was already apparent. During the first half of the 
1960s, Korean exports of labour-intensive industrial goods expanded rapidly, despite 
the limited state support producers received to counterbalance the increasing exchange 
rate overvaluation. Brazilian industrial capital, on the other hand, remained fully 
concentrated on selling in the protected domestic markets and compensating its 
particularly high cost structure largely through the appropriation of a portion of land 
rent. 
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Chapter 6 
Brazil and Korea between the Mid-1960s and the Early 1970s 
 
Brazil: From ‘corrective inflation’ to the ‘economic miracle’ (1964-1973)  
 
In order to pursue its stated goal of purifying Brazilian democracy, the self-
proclaimed ‗revolutionary‘ military government began its tenure by reshaping political 
institutions. It did so through a series of so-called Institutional Acts (AIs) which counted 
as presidential decrees and had precedence over existing laws and the Constitution. The 
first AI, though it did not close the Congress completely, did transfer much, if not all, of 
its power to the executive branch of the government. Parliamentary immunity was 
suspended and the newly formed Revolutionary Supreme Command was authorised to 
cancel electoral mandates and to suspend the political rights of any Brazilian for a 
period of up to ten years. Congressmen from the main opposition parties were expelled 
or imprisoned. Goulart and Kubistchek, the heads of the PTB and PSD, respectively, 
were forced in to exile, together with their closest collaborators. Opponents to the 
regime and the leaders of trade and students unions and of the peasant leagues began to 
be persecuted, imprisoned and tortured in the name of the fight against the communist 
‗insurgency‘ allegedly spreading throughout the country. In June 1964, the National 
Information Bureau (SNI), a counter-intelligence state institution like the KCIA, was 
formed for the purpose of fighting the ‗internal enemy‘. In practise it persecuted those 
groups whose actions directly or indirectly opposed the deterioration of the wages of 
industrial and rural workers. Groups dedicated to the ‗revolutionary armed struggle‘ 
were minor and not always the main focus of the SNI‘s actions. Thus, the so-called 
National Security Doctrine was officially implemented in Brazil.
1
 
 With firm control over the urban and rural working class and the parties that had 
represented it politically, the new administration implemented the Government 
Programme of Economic Action (PAEG) devised by Campos, the economist who had 
previously designed Kubistchek‘s failed stabilisation plan, and his more orthodox 
colleague Otávio Gouvêa de Bulhões. The Programme was based on an eclectic 
evaluation of Brazil‘s inflationary problem – this was thought to have multiple causes – 
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and was designed to rebalance the economy as a condition to restart growth.
2
 In 
practice, the PAEG entailed the partial or total revision of previous policies that had 
transferred a portion of the land rent from landowners to the rest of the economy, in 
particular industrial capital. First, in order to balance the country‘s external accounts, 
the currency was devalued and import tariffs were proportionally lowered while prior 
import deposits were eliminated altogether, thus reducing the portions of land rent 
appropriated by industrial capital (directly) and the state. Secondly, a fiscal reform was 
implemented to balance public sector accounts and thus control inflationary pressures 
caused by ‗excessive demand‘. Tax collection augmented and prices of services and 
industrial inputs provided by SOEs were increased in a drive called ‗corrective 
inflation‘. The price of wheat and fuel also increased; subsidies to consumers granted 
through them decreased accordingly. State investments in social overhead capital, 
however, were not curtailed.
3
 Thirdly, a system of indexation was devised in order to 
allow the public sector to cover its deficit through debt issued in the domestic capital 
market. This arrangement would attempt to protect creditors against inflation. The need 
to monetise the public sector deficit was thus further reduced.
4
 Fourthly, in order to 
increase private savings and thus reduce inflationary pressures allegedly resulting from 
the low growth of investments relatively to consumption, the Usury Law was scrapped. 
Rent controls on urban properties were abolished. At the same time credit supply to the 
private sector was squeezed, thus in practice eliminating yet another form of land rent 
transference to industrial capital.
5
 Fifthly, with the declared intention of reducing the 
part of inflation allegedly springing from wage settlements above productivity trends, 
the labour market was ‗reformed‘, eliminating job stability clauses, and, starting in 
1965, private sector companies were ‗induced‘ to apply a formula for wage adjustments 
for manual worker retributions that underestimated the increase in the cost of living. 
Strikes were outlawed and labour‘s bargaining power greatly diminished.6 Sixthly, 
foreign private lenders and multilateral institutions of credit were re-approached while 
new incentives were created to entice investors to venture their ‗risk‘ capital in Brazil. 
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The 1962 law limiting profit repatriations was quickly removed.
7
 Finally, already in 
1966, in order to compensate for the labour market ‗reforms‘ and to increase domestic 
savings, private sector employers were forced to contribute 8% of their wage costs 
towards the newly created Service Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS) to provide wage 
earners with some income in case of dismissal and retirement or to contribute towards 
the purchase of a family house. The unused FGTS funds would be invested in the newly 
created National Housing Bank (BHN) and the National Savings Bank (Ciaxa 
Econômica Federal), and used to finance the purchase of private housing, mostly by 
high-earners, and public investments in road-building, sewage and water systems.
8
 
 With the land rent stagnating, or growing slowly, and its use partly diverted to 
service the public sector external debt, the PAEG prolonged until 1967. Economic 
growth came to a virtual halt. In effect, capital flight during 1964-67 was substantial, 
equivalent to 2.4% of total surpluses, despite US financial ‗support‘ for the military 
regime. During this period, the Brazilian economy grew at an average rate of merely 
1.4% (-1.4% in per capita terms) which was not only well below the 6.25% average (3% 
per capita) of the previous ten years (1954-1963) but also largely insufficient to create 
enough jobs for the rapidly increasing economically active population.
9
 The decline in 
economic activity, together with the wage policy and the active repression of the 
working-class resulted in the fall of labour‘s income. Average real wages in the formal 
industrial sector collapsed by 10% during 1964-65, recovered 6.7% in 1966, and fell 
again 2.24% in 1967.
10
 This evolution of average wages, however, was not uniform. 
While real wages paid to skilled workers were in 1967 already 10% above the 1964 
level, those paid to unskilled manual labourers were still around 6% below.
11
 Moreover, 
although falling as the economy stagnated, inflation remained relatively high, at around 
40% and 30% in 1966 and 1967, respectively, despite the sharp reduction of the public 
sector deficit and aggregate demand.
12
 
The economic recession not only affected the scale of the Brazilian process of 
capital accumulation. It also resulted in the restructuring of the industrial sector. With a 
shrinking domestic market and inadequate access to subsidised credit, a large portion of 
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small, domestically-owned firms went bust. Some of these were absorbed by MNCs, 
giving place to a process of rapid centralisation of capital and the internationalisation of 
its ownership. During this period, new FDI remained limited and was largely 
concentrated in displacing national capital rather than in expanding industrial productive 
capacity.
13
 
As the economy stagnated and recessionary, crucially wage-squeezing, policies 
prolonged, the need, and thus actual possibilities, for a rapid reestablishment of 
democratic institutions grew increasingly slimmer. In late October 1965, in view of 
UDN‘s recent setback in the July regional elections and its almost sure defeat in the 
forthcoming contests, the ‗revolutionary‘ government postponed the presidential 
elections (for late 1966) and, subsequently, passed the Second AI, increasing the 
political power of the President and decreeing the end of traditional political parties. 
From then onwards, there would be only two main parties: the National Renewal 
Alliance (ARENA), supporting the government in Congress, and the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (MDB), the ‗official‘ opposition. Three months later, the 
military regime passed the Third AI making future elections of president, vice-president 
and state governors indirect, to be decided by an electoral college which could be easily 
manipulated through the use of patronage and pressure from the military. The farce of 
the military regime ‗purifying‘ Brazilian democracy was quickly over.14 Moreover, in 
early 1967, a new Constitution was approved further concentrating decision power in 
the executive branch of government and increasing the scope of ‗national security‘ 
policies and press censorship. In March, General Costa e Silva, a hard-line nationalist 
military elected in October 1966 against the wishes of Castello Branco, the ‗moderate‘ 
incumbent head of the executive, assumed the presidency.
15
 
 By late 1967, however, economic policies began to shift direction and so did, 
later on, the performance of the Brazilian economy. After the change in the military 
leadership, a new Minister of Finance, Antonio Delfim Neto, was appointed and an 
expansionist set of policies was implemented. After four years of tight credit, loans to 
the private sector were expanded, under the ‗structuralist‘ assumption that high financial 
costs and low levels of capacity utilisation in the industrial sector were two of the main 
causes behind the stubbornly high inflation rates. Public sector investments in social 
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infrastructure and industrial production were increased further. Exports of ‗non-
traditional‘ products were promoted by different means, notably through tax exemptions 
and ‗soft‘ loans. Subsidies luring FDI were augmented, notably in the motor-vehicle 
sector.
16
 Furthermore, already in 1968, in line with the recommendations of the never-
implemented Ten-year Social and Economic Development Plan for 1967-76, the more 
modest Strategic Development Programme was launched for the period up to 1970. In 
1970, as economic growth gained momentum and installed capacities reached full 
utilisation in several industrial sectors, the National Steel Plan and the First 
Shipbuilding Industry Plan were launched together with major projects for the 
construction of motorways and hydroelectric dams. In 1971, these initiatives were 
combined in the First National Development Plan for the period 1972-74, in principle 
the first step in a project for long-term planning.
17
 
Led by the industrial sector, notably the consumer-durable goods branch, the 
economy responded and growth picked up to an annual average of 11.5% between 1968 
and 1973, the years of the so-called Brazilian economic ‗miracle‘.18 Industrial wages 
recovered slowly, growing on average at 3% per year in real terms. The inflation rate 
fell from 30.4% in 1967 to 16.6% in 1972, the year before the first ‗oil shock‘.19 FDI in 
the consumer-durable goods sector recovered and industrial exports expanded rapidly 
responding to the battery of stimulus they were receiving, notably after 1972 when the 
Special Fiscal Benefits for Exports (BEFIEX) programme was launched.
20
 
The performance of the Brazilian economy during this period was so 
remarkable, especially the expansion of ‗non-traditional‘ exports, that policy-makers 
(e.g. Delfim Neto) believed that the ‗outward-looking‘ strategy allegedly pursued by the 
military government was leading to a process of economic growth comparable with that 
being experienced by several East Asian countries, including Korea.
21
 This, however, 
could have hardly been the case. While industrial capital in East Asia was then 
beginning to ‗specialise‘ in production for world markets that required relatively cheap 
and disciplined labour (e.g. textiles, apparels, electronics), the bulk of Brazil‘s new 
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industrial exports was composed of raw or semi-processed locally produced primary 
goods (e.g. orange juice, leather products, cotton textiles, soybeans, etc.) and/or 
supported by substantial subsidies.
22
   
Effectively, under the appearance of being an industrial policy implemented to 
expand local export capacity, the generous subsidies granted to industrial goods exports 
became a new form of appropriation of land rent by industrial capital, especially of 
foreign origin, during the period of the ‗economic miracle‘.23 Though granted to all non-
primary goods exports, subsidies were proportional to the value-added and therefore 
differed greatly across sectors. In 1972, average subsidies were 17% of FOB value of 
exports, ranging from 8% on wood products to 37% on apparel and footwear.
24
 
Industries exporting processed primary goods thus received subsidies that tended to 
compensate for the negative effect of exchange rate overvaluation on value added by the 
processing industry. For consumer goods exports, subsidies more than compensated for 
the overvaluation of the currency, acting as a constant transference of social wealth to 
industrial capital. In 1971, for instance, subsidies to motor-vehicle exports – the largest 
recipient – amounted to 35% of the FOB price while the currency was at par.25 
Moreover, despite the high subsidies, the Brazilian industrial sector was, unlike its East 
Asian counterparts, still exporting only a small fraction of its production.
26
 Indeed, 
rather than being an export-led recovery, the fast growth of industrial production in 
Brazil was kick-started by state expansionist policies and oriented largely towards the 
domestic market. 
A substantial portion of the resources used to finance expansionary policies, and 
channelled to industrial capital to sustain its profitability, continued being made of land 
rent, appropriated largely through a combination of Contribution Quotas and recently 
implemented taxes on commodity exports.
27
 The Brazilian currency was sold at its 
purchasing power parity during this period, as the government implemented a policy of 
frequent ‗mini-devaluations‘ to avoid the rate of exchange becoming overvalued.28 
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Furthermore, in 1968 the Inter-ministerial Price Council (CIP), created to control the 
inflationary process, also imposed regulations to the circulation of certain raw materials 
and further reduced their domestic prices, thus channelling another portion of land rent 
to commodity consumers.
29
 
Nevertheless, after peaking in 1967, the magnitude of land rent available for 
appropriation experienced a contraction between 1968 and 1970, as did the portion 
seized by the state and private industrial capital.
30
 Agrarian output growth stagnated 
while international commodity prices fell during this period. Indeed, during these years, 
GDP growth was rather weak, despite the popular references to an economic ‗miracle‘ 
taking place in Brazil. After growing a massive 11% in 1968, per capita GDP growth 
decelerated sharply to a merely 4.4% and 2.1% in 1969 and 1970, respectively. It was 
only after that date, when the magnitude of land rent available for appropriation started 
to expand robustly again in the build-up of the early 1970s commodities boom, that per 
capita GDP growth accelerated to a yearly average of 11.3%.
31
 By then, international 
prices of raw materials were experiencing a substantial recovery and the expansion of 
the agricultural frontier into the Centre-West region of Brazil, made possible after the 
move of the capital to Brasilia, was giving place to a substantial increase in the volume 
of agrarian production, crucially of soybeans.
32
 Industrial value-added growth followed 
a similar irregular performance.
33
 The mass of land rent appropriated by social actors 
other than landowners jumped from 15% of the economy‘s total surpluses (i.e. profits) 
in 1964 to 36% in 1967, and remained at around 20% during 1968-73, while the mass of 
profits expanded strongly during 1971-73.  
  Land rent, however, was not the only source of extraordinary social wealth 
available to compensate for the particularly high costs of domestic industrial 
production. In effect, from 1968 the increased liquidity in international financial 
markets, notably in the so-called Eurodollar market, began to allow a sharp expansion 
of Brazilian external borrowing, permitted by recently passed regulations to attract 
foreign capital. The net inflow of interest-bearing capital became strongly positive after 
five years of net outflows.
34
 Between 1968 and 1973, social wealth equivalent to 5.8% 
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of all surpluses available in the Brazilian economy entered in this form. The largest 
portion of these loans was privately contracted, notably by foreign-owned companies. 
Another portion was borrowed by the state. Publicly borrowed funds generally found 
their way to feed industrial capital‘s profits through the operations of state-owned 
companies.
35
 These borrowed externally to finance their expansion and to cover part of 
their operational deficits as they were again selling their output at subsidised prices and 
purchasing their inputs from local producers at inflated prices. The newly created CIP 
had decreed the end of the ‗corrective inflation‘ and stopped the rise of prices charged 
by SOEs.
36
 Finally, another portion of the borrowed funds was used to support Central 
Bank foreign exchange reserves.
37 
In sharp contrast with the evolution of foreign loans, 
FDI, notably ‗greenfield‘, only accelerated after 1970, when the economy was already 
growing fast and the land rent available to fund subsidies to the industrial sector began 
to expand. In Brazil, unlike in Korea and the rest of East Asia, FDI in the industrial 
sector was not in search of relatively cheap and highly disciplined labour-power but of 
state subsidies and a large protected domestic market, both dependent on the magnitude 
of land rent and its complementary sources of extraordinary social wealth. 
Finally, there was a third source of extraordinary social wealth supporting the 
profitability of industrial capital during the ‗miraculous‘ years, namely, the payment of 
a portion of the local labour-force below its value. In effect, after four years of 
economic stagnation, a battery of policies and the repression of political and trade union 
activities, average real industrial wages in 1967 were 6% below their 1963 peak. They 
grew strongly in 1968-69; fell again significantly in 1970; increased in 1971-72; and fell 
again in 1973 when they were only 10.7% above the 1963 level.
38
 As during 1964-67, 
the evolution of real wages during 1968-73 was far from uniform. Not all the Brazilian 
labour-force suffered the same fate during the ‗miracle‘. While semi-skilled and, 
notably, skilled and managerial workers enjoyed the payment of their labour-power for 
its value, wages paid to manual unskilled workers contracted during the ‗economic 
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miracle.‘39 Real minimum wages, for instance, continued the fall they began to suffer 
during the end of the Goulart government until they bottomed in 1973.
40
 It was only 
then, when they were 50% below their early 1960s peak value, that real minimum 
wages started to increase. State policies generating the so-called ‗wage squeeze‘, 
together with cuts in the provision of universal social services, allowed capital to 
increase its profits by introducing a sharp differentiation in the conditions of purchase 
and reproduction of the different segments of the Brazilian labour-force.
41
 In any case, 
the increase in high-earners‘ income and the expansion, under state incentives, of 
consumer credit were enough to enlarge the domestic markets for durable-consumer 
goods while export subsidies expanded those for non-durable goods.
42
 As a 
consequence, while the production of consumer non-durable goods grew by 9.5% on 
average during 1968-1973, mainly due to an ‗extensive‘ expansion of the domestic 
market (i.e. population growth) and an increase in exports,
43
 the output of consumer-
durable goods, mostly destined to the domestic markets, expanded at an annual average 
rate of 24%.
44
 
Furthermore, another portion of the value of the labour-force also began to be 
appropriated by capital during the period of the ‗economic miracle‘, namely, that raised 
through forced savings programmes. First, the funds accumulated in the FGST and 
channelled through the BHN and the Caixa yielded a return which was usually below 
the inflation rate.
45
 Secondly, in 1970 two other social security funds were established 
for private and public sector employees, respectively: the Social Integration Programme 
(PIS) and the Civil Servant Wealth Fund Program (PASEP). These funds, to be used as 
unemployment insurance or income support for low-wage earners, were deposited in the 
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Banco do Brasil and the Caixa and used to finance public sector investment in social 
overhead capital. They too yielded returns usually below the inflation rate. Both 
transferences accelerated in the early 1970s when the National Integration Program 
(PIM) to build the Trans-Amazonian Highway and populate the Amazonian region with 
surplus peasant population from the poverty-stricken Northeast was launched, and the 
First National Development Plan was put forward.
46
 
As the general wage contraction of the period 1964-67, the process of wage 
differentiation during 1968-73, necessary to compensate for the stagnation of the land 
rent, could only come about through the actions of a repressive, authoritarian state. In 
effect, the hard-liners in charge of the executive branch of the state since early 1967, 
when the recession that commenced in 1963 bottomed out, tightened their grip over the 
Brazilian society. The incipient revival of political opposition in Congress, trade union 
activism and pro-democracy struggles in mid-1967 and, notably, in 1968, when the 
economy boomed for the first time since 1962 and labour market conditions began to 
improve, were met with increasingly fierce repression. In late 1968, a minor incident in 
Congress that somehow challenged the military‘s supreme authority gave the 
government the excuse to pass the Fifth, and most draconian, AI. This closed the 
Congress indefinitely (it would be purged and reopened in 1970) and put forward a 
further crackdown on political and civil liberties, including the suspension of habeas 
corpus. Press censorship became complete, except for regime addict Globo media 
group, and torture of political dissidents or trade unionists was turn into an active state 
policy. Furthermore, when Costa e Silva‘s sudden succession was discussed in 1969, 
General Garrastazu Medici, another hard-liner in charge of the SNI, was chosen for the 
position.
47
 
Garrastazu Medici‘s government (1969-73) marked not only the peak of the 
growth process but also of the state‘s repressive activities. Under the ideological 
argument of fighting domestic guerrilla insurgency, which had emerged as a form of 
resistance against the authoritarian regime, but was now numerically unimportant and 
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confined to marginal, unpopulated regions of the country,
48
 the military pursued a 
further crackdown on its political enemies. The always active students‘ unions were 
repressed harshly.
49
 The lack of a Confucian tradition, nevertheless, did not stop 
students from attempting, as their Korean counterparts, to demonstrate and militate 
against the military dictatorship. Independent trade unions were silenced almost 
completely and only those controlled by the state were allowed to remain active. In line 
with their corporatist spirit and tradition, their actions, however, were largely functional 
to the implementation of the government‘s wage and welfare policies.50 Only some 
sectors of the Catholic Church emerged as an audible voice against the authoritarian and 
repressive military government.
51
  
In sum, rather than experiencing a kind of structural transformation that departed 
from the previous ISI process, as argued elsewhere,
52
 the previous limited specific form 
of capitalist development was regenerated after the 1963-67 economic crisis. The 
particularity of the 1968-73 years arose, however, from the existence of a large inflow 
of interest-bearing capital, and the payment of a portion of the labour-force below its 
value (i.e. its full cost of short and long-run reproduction), complementing the land rent, 
in supporting industrial capital‘s profitability. Industrial capital kept selling the largest 
portion of its output in a domestic market that, despite the claims of ‗openness‘, 
continued to be highly protected by import tariffs and the Law of Similarity.
53
 Indeed, 
the reduction of import tariffs was roughly proportional to the reduction in the degree of 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. Neither was the recovery simply the result of a 
favourable international context (e.g. strong external demand and large supply of credit) 
that could be taken advantage of at low cost thanks to the large idle industrial capacities 
existing after the prolonged recession of 1964-66, as suggested elsewhere.
54
 First, as 
argued above, manufacturing exports only expanded due to the generous subsidies that 
supported them and the reduced wages industrial capital paid in the non-durable 
consumer goods sector. Secondly, the inflow of foreign loans, though strongly 
expanded, was still substantially smaller than the land rent appropriated by social actors 
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other than landowners. In a nutshell, the key task is to explain why in 1968-73, given 
the international context, the Brazilian economy developed in the form it did, which 
differed in essence from the path followed by its Korean counterpart and only in form 
from its own previous experiences. 
  
Korea: From the democratic ‘restoration’ to the Yusin Republic (1964-1972) 
 
In 1964, the Korean economy was in crisis and the FFYP practically finished 
two years before completion. In May that year, the different exchange rates for imports 
and exports were unified again and were significantly devalued thereafter, though still 
remaining approximately 32% above the real purchasing power parity of the Korean 
Won in 1964-65.
55
 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, exports of unskilled labour-
intensive goods had grown strongly during the previous two years; contrasting with the 
weak overall performance of the economy, crucially the import-substituting industries. 
The fast expansion of industrial exports in a relatively unfavourable 
environment (i.e. a substantially overvalued currency and low compensatory subsidies) 
surprised policy-makers and convinced them to start ‗supporting‘ these activities 
actively.
56
 Several policies were then introduced, or reinforced, in order to ‗promote‘ 
exports of industrial goods. None of these policies, however, constituted an actual 
subsidy helping to improve artificially the competitiveness of Korean exports of light 
manufactures in world markets. First, some policies levelled the playing field between 
Korean exporters and their foreign competitors, generally benefiting from these 
measures already. These included the complete exemption of tariffs and other 
restrictions on the importation of raw materials and equipment used to manufacture 
export goods.
57
 As exports were rapidly expanding and diversifying, during 1965-66 
there was thus a corresponding increase in the number of goods automatically approved 
for importation. Indeed, the transformation was so remarkable that from 1965 to 1966, 
in only on year, the import content of Korean exports jumped from 8% to 53%. 
Secondly, other policies were used to compensate for the negative effect of the still 
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prevailing, though reduced, overvaluation of the currency on the portion of the value of 
exports added domestically, and thus to allow the expansion of industrial exports by not 
penalising (i.e. ‗taxing‘) them. These included the exemption, partly or completely, of 
domestic taxes on profits earned on exportable productions; the granting of subsidised 
loans to finance the production and commercialisation of exports and to supplying 
industries; the permission granted to exporters to sell in the protected domestic markets 
imported raw materials not used in exportable productions (the so-called ‗wastage 
allowance‘); and, after 1967, the provision of inputs by state-owned public utility 
companies and overhead capital at reduced rates. Most of this type of policies had been 
in effect since the late 1950s. Their scope and magnitude, however, had been limited 
and their impact, consequently, almost insignificant.
58
 
In effect, ‗genuine‘ (from world-markets perspective) subsidies granted to 
exporters in the form of internal tax exemptions, low-cost credit and ‗wastage‘ 
allowances (i.e. not including import tariff exemptions) averaged 17.7% of the value of 
exports during 1966-8 according to the most generous estimations.
59
 The exchange rate 
for exports, during the same period, was on average 48% overvalued, implying a 29% 
‗tax‘ on net exports (i.e. the value added domestically).60 During those years, however, 
only 48.6% of the value of manufacturing exports was added domestically.
61
 
Consequently, the actual ‗subsidy‘ minus ‗tax‘ was equivalent to only 4% of the value 
of net exports. 
On the other hand, the overvaluation of the exchange rate reduced the cost in 
local currency of imported equipment and thus aided the rapid formation of capital in 
the industrial sector. This was necessary to undertake the swift transformation of the 
structural bases of the Korean process of capitalist development and engender the 
process of ‗export-led‘ growth. Thanks to its permanent access to international credit, 
the Korean state managed to keep the national currency overvalued until 1985 when the 
economy posted its first post-WWII trade surplus. Before then, the overvaluation of the 
Won stimulated trade deficits, which were financed with substantial foreign ‗savings‘.62 
Until the early-1970s, the overvaluation of the currency, usually not 
compensated with subsidies granted through state purchases, high minimum prices and 
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market protection, also kept domestic prices of rice and barley below international 
values and thus made possible the payment of even lower industrial wages. Moreover, 
in doing so, this same policy kept rural incomes at subsistence levels and thus generated 
the large migrations to the urban centres that were necessary to supply labour to the 
rapidly growing manufacturing sector and to limit pressures on industrial wages.
63
 
Apart from these policies, the government also created or sponsored the 
formation or expansion of several organisations charged with the promotion and 
facilitation of industrial exports. Some of these organisations were under direct control 
of different organs of the state. These included the so-called Thirty-five Commodities 
Chiefs and the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) which had been 
founded in 1962 but became a key part of the export effort only after 1965. The former 
were designated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry to develop programmes for the export of specific commodities 
and to coordinate them with representatives of the corresponding industries. KOTRA, in 
turn, became the overseas arm of the MoCI, establishing facilities to display Korean 
goods, seeking buyers for them and giving advice to firms on market requirements. A 
second group of organisations was, at least in principle, under private control. These 
included the Korean Traders Association (KTA) which, nevertheless, sustained a close 
relation with the MoCI and KOTRA. The KTA was in charge of organising meetings 
with foreign partners and advising the government about private sector requirements 
related to its export activities. Finally, there was a group of ‗mixed‘ institutions – i.e. 
integrated by both public and private sector representatives. Among them, the most 
well-known was the Export Promotion Subcommittee (EPSC) which was created in 
1965 and became a central organisational locus for mobilising support for exports 
expansion. The EPSC consisted of a series of ‗task groups‘ assigned to examine all 
problems and issues related to export industries and influenced the annual export 
promotion policies proposed by the MoCI.
64
 
Supported by this arsenal of policies and organisations, export growth, notably 
of light manufactures, accelerated after 1964. Industrial output and value-added growth 
thus accelerated even if GDP growth slowed down markedly in 1964-65.
65
 Labour 
demand growth recovered strongly in the industrial sector, notably in 1965 when around 
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135,000 new jobs were created. Real industrial wages, nevertheless, remained stagnant. 
The massive surplus population existing in the rural sector and the political repression 
of the industrial working-class militated against any sort of wage recovery.
66
 
By 1965, it was increasingly clear to policy-makers that light manufactures were 
the most dynamic sector in the economy. The government then embarked in the 
preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan (2FYP) for the period 1967-71, to provide a 
coherent institutional framework to make the policy shift effective.
67
 On the other hand, 
as overall economic growth slowed, two other sharp policy shifts were also 
implemented. First, an ‗interest rates‘ reform was effected, sharply increasing the cost 
of loans granted by public banks and the returns on private savings. This reform, much 
vaunted for its alleged positive impact on the evolution of domestic savings and 
investments,
68
 marked the end of negative interest rates as a form to provide unselective 
support to the valorisation of industrial capital producing for the domestic market. 
During this period, subsidised credit would be granted only to exporters; irrespective of 
the type of product they were selling in the world market for working capital and to 
labour-intensive industries only for medium- and long-term investments.
69
 The positive 
effect of reform on resource mobilisation is, however, debatable as it probably simply 
facilitated the transference of savings from non-financial assets (e.g. inventories, real 
estate) and the unregulated financial markets to the state-controlled banking sector, as 
policy makers intended, rather than increasing them, as ex post analysts claimed.
70
 
Secondly, with the intention of securing new sources of foreign exchange to compensate 
for falling US aid, in 1965 Korea joined USA‘s crusade in Vietnam and also signed a 
treaty normalising its relations with Japan despite widespread opposition to both. The 
result of this action was to open a new source of foreign exchange income, aid and 
loans, as Korea secured material compensation from its former colonial master, and also 
of commercial partners for its emerging export businesses.
71
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In effect, for Korea to become rapidly a producer of unskilled-labour intensive 
industrial goods for world markets, capital had to become available to be invested in 
equipment and raw materials. The problem was that not much capital was available, 
even when interest rates hike supposedly increased domestic savings. These still 
averaged only 14.3% of GDP during 1966-69.
72
 Foreign industrial capital was not 
flowing to Korea in large amounts as its domestic market was small, and the prospects 
for producing labour-intensive goods there for global markets were regarded as far from 
certain. 
In an attempt to speed up the inflow of capital, in 1966 the Law for Payment 
Guarantee of Foreign Borrowing (originally passed in 1962) was merged with the 
Special Law to Facilitate Capital Equipment Imports (1962) and the Foreign Capital 
Inducement Law (1960), to become the Foreign Capital Inducement Law. While 
domestic bank loans were being rationed, the new law introduced a more flexible 
process for the provision of state guarantees to private foreign borrowing for the 
acquisition of equipment and inputs used in export productions, by allowing 
commercial banks, now under public ownership, to grant them.
73
 These laws, together 
with the Foreign Exchange Management Act (passed in 1961) gave the government 
almost complete control over the use of foreign exchange, and to channel it directly or 
indirectly to export-oriented industries. In this way, the state not only accelerated the 
concentration of capital but also kept consumption patterns under control.
74
 In effect, 
other uses for scarce foreign exchange (either for production or consumption) were 
considered ‗unnecessary‘ or ‗wasteful‘ and thus restricted or forbidden altogether (e.g. 
‗sumptuary‘ consumption such as foreign holidays).75 Furthermore, the new legislation 
expanded the incentives granted to foreign capital to undertake direct investments. In 
1966, limits on equity investment and profit remittances by foreign investors were 
completely removed while tax exemptions were expanded. Nevertheless, although 
inflows of interest-bearing capital grew massively, FDI remained modest.
76
 
Was the specific structure of capital inflows the result of the prevailing political 
uncertainties as argued by some authors?
77
 Or, was it the result of unwritten 
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administrative regulations limiting FDI, as claimed by other commentators?
78
 Though 
these factors were probably important, at this stage of Korean development, the 
phenomenon was most likely connected to the type of export-oriented industries that 
were most rapidly developing. In effect, by then there was a key difference between the 
structures, organisation and governance of ‗commodity chains‘ in the various branches 
of the light manufacturing sector. The textile and clothing industries, which rapidly 
developed in Korea and were the predominant sector in the export-led growth 
experience until the mid-1970s, were mainly organised as buyer-driven global 
production networks (GPN).
79
 In this type of GPN, MNCs, such as large retailers 
located in industrially advanced countries, control the design and marketing of goods 
whose integral production is subcontracted to firms in low-wage ‗developing‘ countries. 
On the other hand, the electronics industry, which was secondary in Korea‘s export 
experience until the mid-1970s, was then largely organised in the form of producer-
driven GPNs. In these cases, MNCs either directly control the different stages in the 
production of a good (its value chain) by establishing subsidiaries in low-wage 
‗developing‘ countries to perform specific parts of the industrial labour-processes (e.g. 
manual assembly) or by subcontracting them to domestic firms there. Effectively, 
though this sector was smaller than the textile, garments and wigs industries, by 1966 
Korea began to receive substantial investments by MNCs to assemble electronic 
components and consumer goods, such as integrated circuits and radios, for export 
markets. In contrast to the textile and garments industries, in the electronics sector 
foreign companies were, until the mid-1970s, in charge of the largest part of Korean 
production for world markets. Moreover, in 1970, the first Free Trade Zone was opened 
in Masan to accommodate mainly electrical machinery and appliances productions by 
foreign, mostly Japanese, companies. To the usual lavish set of incentives, was added 
the practical prohibition to any kind of trade union activities in foreign-invested firms.
80
 
The narrowness of the Korean domestic market severely reduced the incentive for 
foreign manufacturers of durable-consumer goods and industrial inputs to invest there 
vis-à-vis other developing countries like Brazil. As was seen above, this was evident in 
the negotiations between the state and foreign investors unwilling to venture into the 
Korean steel and motor-vehicle industries. Restrictions on FDI, in terms of ownership 
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and sector, would only begin to be systematically used in the mid-1970s, after the 
launching of the Heavy and Chemical Industries Plan.
81
 
To reinforce the change in the direction of economic policies that was then 
mediating the structural transformation of the Korean process of capitalist development, 
in 1966 the Second Five-Year Economic Plan (2FYP) for the period 1967-71 was 
launched with the core goal of promoting exports of light manufactures and sectors 
supporting them, as well as basic industries like fertilizers, metals, machinery, 
chemicals and oil refinery. The former two, it was intended, would increase foreign 
exchange earnings. The latter group of industries, it was argued, would reduce the use 
of foreign exchange. The Plan was, in effect, a mixture of ISI and EOI ‗developmental‘ 
strategies, allegedly intended to help reduce Korea‘s heavy reliance on ‗foreign 
savings‘, especially when US aid was being cut substantially and rapidly.82 The Plan 
also recognised Korea‘s lack of skilled manpower and pointed at putting forward 
concrete measures to correct this.
83
 
As part of the policies that made the 2FYP operative, and continuing with the 
measures implemented during the previous two years to facilitate the development of 
export-oriented industries, in 1967 the foreign trade regime was reformed and 
liberalised further. The system of positive discrimination against imports (i.e. only listed 
items could be imported) was replaced by one that allowed the importation of goods not 
explicitly banned. Thereafter, all goods necessary for export productions would be 
excluded from the list of forbidden items and could be freely imported, paying 
relatively low taxes.
84
 Conversely, those items still included in the ‗list‘, largely 
consumer goods, kept being protected by higher taxes and, crucially, quotas and other 
quantitative restrictions.
85
  
Furthermore, in 1968, the Law for Fostering Capital Markets was passed to 
encourage public sector external borrowing.
86
 This was necessary partly to fund 
investments in SOEs producing industrial inputs and to sustain the overvaluation of the 
national currency in light of the falling inflow of foreign aid. From 1969 onwards, only 
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the public sector was allowed to borrow in global financial markets. Private firms 
would, after government‘s approval, only borrow to finance imports of raw materials 
and equipment.
87
 
Led by a rapid increase in exports of light manufactures, the provision of 
materials and military ‗services‘ to the US Army in Vietnam, and supported by a 
substantial inflow of foreign credit, equal to around 19% of GDP during 1966-69, which 
financed imports of industrial equipment, economic growth speeded up strongly. In 
effect, GDP per capita grew at an average rate of 9% per year during the second half of 
the 1960s while industrial employment and wages expanded by 14% and 10% per year, 
respectively.
88
 Some authors have argued that this strong export-led growth resulted 
essentially from the association of Korean industrial capital as junior partner of its 
Japanese counterpart, which needed to relocate several labour-intensive productions to 
lower-wage locations.
89
 Other authors have claimed that it resulted from the 
combination of favourable macroeconomic policies (e.g. devaluation, interest rates 
reform) and, crucially, the consolidation of an export friendly institutional setting.
90
 A 
third group of authors has suggested that it resulted from the penalisation of firms not 
complying with government export plans and leadership.
91
 All these characterised the 
structural transformation of the Korean economy through the 1960s. They were, 
however, secondary factors in terms of explaining the structural transformation of the 
Korean economy. 
As mentioned above, the transformation, throughout the 1960s, of the Korean 
economy into an ‗export-oriented‘ one, where capital accumulation revolves around the 
production of unskilled-labour intensive industrial goods for world markets, resulted 
from three main underlying processes. First, the increase in the cost of the Japanese 
labour-force, as Japanese industrial capital was beginning to produce heavy and 
durable-consumer goods for world markets under the conditions described above. 
Secondly, the availability in Korea of a large pool of unskilled labour-power of peasant 
origin that was not only extremely cheap in international terms but that also had 
productive characteristics (in terms of discipline and subordination under authority) 
similar to the Japanese industrial workforce. This latter factor particularly increased the 
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productivity of labour when put to perform relatively simple, standardised tasks. 
Thirdly, the relatively small and stagnant size of the Korean primary sector surpluses 
and the falling magnitude of foreign aid inflows were weakening the bases of the 
previous specific form of capital accumulation at the same time that they were 
expanding, through the contraction of real wages, the potentialities of the emerging one. 
The aforementioned policy and institutional changes, as well as the particular 
type of FDI inflows and modality of integration of local firms into GPNs, were concrete 
forms under which the transformation of the Korean process of capitalist development 
came about through the 1960s. In other words, these political and institutional 
transformations mediated the economic one; they did not cause it. These institutional 
and policy transformations, some of which did not differ radically from those 
implemented in Brazil during the second halves of the 1950s and 1960s, were largely a 
response to the necessities or signals of markets (domestic or global) and depended on 
the objective material conditions for the valorisation of industrial capital. They yielded 
positive results only because global market circumstances and the productive 
characteristics of the Korean labour-force meant that, once the minimum requirements 
for their development were fulfilled, specific industries could compete successfully 
worldwide without further state support.
92
 Moreover, as Kohli (2004) and Jones and 
Sakong (1980) put it, the fine-tuning of these economic policies and institutional 
settings was ‗pragmatic‘ and ‗flexible‘, followed a ‗trial-and-error‘ pattern which 
included frequent ‗feedback‘ from capitalists and ‗had to be made to fit the private 
calculations of profitability.‘ Yet, and crucially, these economic policies and institutions 
were not the only ones mediating and making effective the transformation of the 
specific structural bases of the Korean process of capitalist development. The 
suppression of fully democratic institutions of government and the repression of the 
Korean labour-force, notably female workers, were not unfortunate, otherwise 
avoidable, accidents in the Korean political economy: they were an integral part of the 
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development of the process of capital accumulation under its transformed specific base. 
Effectively, the payment of internationally low wages and the imposition of long 
working hours under hazardous and, sometimes, semi-slave conditions, notably for 
female and unskilled workers, were key factors supporting the profitability of export-
oriented industrial capital in Korea during this period.
93
 
As noted in Chapter 1, such conditions were possible not only due to the 
historical origins of the Korean labour-force, namely, the highly hierarchical and 
patriarchal structure (i.e. male chauvinism, cult to educated individuals, and submission 
towards authority) of the Korean society and the habituation to harsh labour 
conditions.
94
 These conditions were also reinforced by a disproportionally large 
repressive state apparatus, supported by the US military stationed in the country, press 
censorship and the enactment of highly restrictive labour laws. As was discussed in 
Chapter 4 above, legislation passed since Park‘s arrival to power prohibited strikes and 
the formation of independent federations of trade unions, limited collective bargaining, 
circumscribed wage negotiations to the company-level, forbade the unionisation of 
temporary workers and left in the hands of the Ministry of Labour the definition of any 
dispute over working conditions and compensations. 
In effect, under these tight and politically controlled labour market institutions, 
wages, though growing, remained at below subsistence levels, notably in the export-
oriented labour-intensive industries, while working hours and industrial accidents 
remained not only among the highest in the world but were also, on average, 
increasing.
95
 Moreover, these institutions, together with minimal state expenditures on 
such universal social services as pensions, healthcare, housing and, to a lesser extent, 
education, helped maintain the differentiated reproduction of the Korean working-
class.
96
 Poverty remained widespread, notably among those migrating from rural areas, 
and slums mushroomed in the main industrial cities, especially in Seoul where they 
constituted around 30% of the housing stock.
97
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It is then hardly surprising that Park, the general-turned-politician, and his DRP 
managed to obtain only slightly more than one-half of the valid votes in the 1967 
presidential and National Assembly elections, despite use of massive funding (most of it 
illegally obtained from private domestic and foreign sources), having control of the state 
repressive arm, the lack of an independent media, and rigging vote counting. It is not 
surprising either that, as in Brazil, most of the government‘s political support came from 
the rural areas where patronage and intimidation were pervasive. In Seoul, Korea‘s 
rapidly growing industrial centre, where most of the textile and garments industries 
were located, the opposition was strong.
98
 Nevertheless, the 1967 victory allowed the 
Park regime to consolidate its control over the National Assembly and eventually to put 
forward, not without opposition, a new Constitutional reform permitting the indefinite 
re-election of the president.
99
 
By the turn of the decade, however, Korean economic growth began to slow, 
falling from 12.25% per capita average between 1966 and 1969 to 7.8% during 1970-
72.
100
 Though these levels of growth would have been considered sufficiently high for 
other developing economies, including Brazil, they were not so for Korean society with 
its very low wages, hard working conditions and rapidly increasing labour-power 
supply, as large portions of the rural underemployed (amounting to half a million per 
year) were migrating to seek employment in the urban centres. In 1970, official 
unemployment and underemployment stood together at 9% of the economically active 
population.
101
 Though almost half the level of 1964, this was still significant, notably 
considering that the employment rates were 75.1% and 38.5% for males and females, 
respectively (56.8% average).
102
 
As the 1966-69 acceleration of economic growth, the deceleration of 1970-72 
resulted from the dynamics and contradictions inherent to the new specific form of 
capitalist development. In 1969, global economic growth began to slow, thus limiting 
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the expansion of Korean exports.
103
 This process triggered a new wave of protectionist 
policies across industrially advanced economies. In 1971, for example, the US 
government forced Korea to sign a bilateral trade-restraint agreement on textiles, a 
sector that, in 1970, had accounted for 33% of total manufacturing output, 32% of 
industrial employment, and 38% of total exports. Textile exports to the US themselves 
had accounted for 20% all Korean manufacturing exports.
104
 Furthermore, in June 1971, 
the USA withdrew one-third of its troops in Korea and abruptly terminated its food 
assistance under PL 480 at the same time that Korean troops were returning from 
Vietnam. These together resulted in a reduction in the inflow of foreign exchange 
resources equivalent to approximately $150 million per year (one-third of the net 
external borrowing in 1971).
105
 Despite the alleged US geopolitical interest in, and 
special support for, the Korean process of export-led industrialisation, the Korean 
government had then no choice but to apply for IMF assistance to deal with its 
emerging balance-of-payments difficulties.
106
 
In accordance to the IMF stand-by arrangement, a series of adjustments were 
undertaken beginning in 1970. First, new medium-term loans were strictly limited in 
order to reduce the accumulation of external liabilities and debt-servicing growth.
107
 
Global credit markets were not booming anyway as the US government tightened its 
monetary policy in a short-lived attempt to control inflationary pressures.
108
 The net 
inflow of foreign interest-bearing capital fell by a third between 1968-69 and 1970-
72.
109
 Foreign exchange reserves fell sharply, putting pressure on the Korean Won and 
forcing a partial devaluation of the exchange rate. Secondly, monetary expansion was 
tightened in order to control the inflationary process and thus reduce the pressure on the 
exchange rate. By 1971, a slowdown in economic activity was evident, albeit from very 
high levels. Real growth rates declined as did the growth of imports, particularly of 
equipment, resulting in a contraction of capital formation.
110
 
In 1971, the Third Five-Year Economic Plan for the period 1972-76 was 
launched in response to the emerging bottlenecks in the external accounts of the Korean 
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economy. First, the promotion of the agricultural sector was put as a top priority of the 
Plan. The end of low agrarian prices was quickly made effective through the so-called 
Positive Price Policy administered by the Grain Management Fund, thus putting an end 
to the systematic transfer of resources from the agrarian to the industrial sector. The 
state-sponsored Saemaul (New Community) Movement, in turn, channelled public 
funds to rural areas to finance investments in infrastructure and housing.
111
 In the short 
run, these policies were instrumental to Park‘s electoral plans by broadening its support 
in the countryside. In the long run, however, they were sustainable because they helped 
improve the conditions of reproduction of rural populations and thus the quality of the 
migrant workforce. Secondly, exports would continue to be promoted but heavy 
industrial goods would receive increasing support to cope with the potential reduction 
of light manufacture exports. Thirdly, heavy and chemical industries were, again, 
included among the priorities for the period 1972-76 to reduce imports and ‗balance‘ the 
structure of the local economy.
112
 
Despite these government initiatives, foreign loan inflows kept shrinking, and 
the availability of local official credits failed to fill the gap, crucially as their demand 
expanded due to the growing economic hardship. Korean industrial firms were 
increasingly forced to rely on the domestic unregulated money market where the cost of 
funds was substantial. Interest rates in the unregulated ‗curb‘ market were 40-50% per 
year, well above the 15-22% charged by official banks.
113
 To make things worse, the 
devaluation of the currency was increasing the value of foreign liabilities and putting 
extra pressure on industrial profitability. Some privately-owned industrial firms were 
then beginning to default on their foreign debts, passing the burden to those public 
banks that had guaranteed them.
114
 Against this backdrop, in 1971 the Federation of 
Korean Industries, the organisation representing the largest industrial firms, the 
chaebols, put forward a petition to have their unofficial debts transformed into official 
ones, with the corresponding change in repayment conditions, and for corporate taxes to 
be lowered to improve the sector‘s profitability. The government rejected these claims 
slating that the crisis would not last much longer. Public finances were not healthy 
either.
115
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As the economy slowed, employment and wage growth were affected 
negatively, crucially in the export-oriented, labour-intensive industries where young 
unskilled female workers, largely on temporary contracts, constituted the bulk of the 
labour-force.
116
 As business failures multiplied in this sector of the Korean economy, 
worker discontent, which had been increasing steadily since the late 1960s, became now 
openly manifest, even under the prevailing tight political environment.
117
 Protest, 
however, was usually inorganic, as most workers were not unionised and independent 
trade unions were almost non-existent. The self-immolation of a male tailor in a street 
demonstration in Seoul‘s garments industry claiming respect for labour protection laws, 
the burning of several factories over unpaid wages, and the unsuccessful struggles for 
establishment of democratic unions in the textile industry were examples of this type of 
impotent labour resistance.
118
 Unions in industries where semi-skilled male workers 
were concentrated, as most of the rest of the Korean society and opposition parties, 
were, nevertheless, relatively immune to these protests. Sectors of the Catholic and 
Protestant Churches, relatively important in Korea, together with groups of students, 
became the most important source of worker ‗external‘ support.119 In this context, it is 
hardly surprising that, again, the official DRP lost in the major cities in the general 
elections held in 1971. Public funds (e.g. patronage), intimidation and vote rigging in 
rural areas were, as in most of previous electoral contests, necessary to assure DRP‘s 
victory on national level.
120
 
The Park regime responded to this incipient state of social unrest in the only way 
it could; with further political repression. In early December 1971, a ‗national 
emergency‘ was declared. A few weeks later, in an illegal secret session, the National 
Assembly passed the Law Concerning Special Measures for Safeguarding National 
Security which gave President Park ―the authority to ban public demonstrations; freeze 
wages, rents, and prices; and to ‗mobilize any material or human resources for national 
purposes‘. As part of this special law, the legislation limiting labour activities at foreign 
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firms was both tightened and expanded to include workers in all enterprises. While it 
remained legal to form unions, the Office of Labour Affairs would thereafter dictate the 
terms of collective bargaining for all industries and would also act as the sole mediator 
of all labour disputes; its rulings would be final and binding on all parties‖.121 Though 
passed largely as a response to a climate of incipient social unrest, these measures 
would be critical in the subsequent period. 
By 1972 the shape of the Korean economy had worsened significantly and, to 
avoid widespread bankruptcies in the private sector, the government was forced to do 
what it had refused in the previous year. In early August, it passed an emergency decree 
transforming the terms and conditions of all private debts outstanding in the unregulated 
money market. These were now to be ruled by the conditions of the official, 
government-controlled, credit market, as the Federation of Korean Industries had 
lobbied for before. The state was hardly ‗leading the market‘ and ‗disciplining capital‘ 
as argued elsewhere.
122
 The unregulated credit market almost disappeared overnight and 
would only remerge when the economy recovered.
123
 
Continuing the process of political closure initiated the previous year; the Park 
government dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the Constitution.
124
 In 
December, without much previous discussion, the new Yusin (‗revitalizing‘) 
Constitution was approved in a referendum held under martial law and boycotted by 
opposition parties. In sharp contrast to the repressive measures passed during the 
previous years, when the threat from North Korea was used as an excuse, this time the 
on-going negotiations with the latter were used to justify this new, more thorough 
crackdown on democratic institutions and political liberties.
125
 The Yusin Constitution 
reinforced presidential powers and lifted any limitations to the President‘s re-election. 
The direct presidential election system was, once more, replaced by an electoral college, 
the National Conference for Unification. Moreover, the President, Park himself, gained 
the power to appoint a portion of the National Assembly members large enough to 
guarantee the parliamentary majority the regime needed to rule regardless of the 
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electoral result. Indeed, this was the case after DRP‘s defeat in the February 1973 
National Assembly elections.
126
 The Yusin Constitution transformed Park‘s presidency 
from a fraudulent pseudo-democracy into a ‗legal‘ dictatorship.127 
 
End of chapter conclusions 
 
After implementing a series of relatively ‗orthodox‘ economic reforms (e.g. 
interest rate increases, currency devaluations, trade opening) during 1964-66, both 
economies experienced a period of fast growth accompanied by declining rates of 
inflation and the rapid expansion of industrial exports. The similarities between both 
countries, however, were more of form than substance. The Korean economy was then 
beginning a process of structural transformation. The Brazilian process of capitalist 
development, on the contrary, was essentially reproducing under the same previous, 
limited form. In effect, while Korean exports were goods that could be produced 
profitably using cheap and highly disciplined unskilled labour, Brazilian ‗new‘ exports 
were mainly made of non-traditional commodities or processed raw materials which 
benefited from the low local cost of the inputs used to manufacture them and, after 
1968, generous subsidies. 
Political institutions in both countries developed also under relatively similar 
forms. The process of fast economic growth during this period came about in both 
countries through the abandonment of democratic institutions of government and the 
emergence of authoritarian and repressive regimes that would last until the mid-1980s. 
Yet these superficial similarities also hid a differentiated underlying determination. In 
Brazil, the authoritarian regime emerged to realise (i.e. mediate politically) the 
simultaneous reduction of blue collar worker wages and increase of white collar worker 
salaries. This process of increased income disparities was necessary simultaneously to 
compensate capital for the negative impact that a stagnant land rent had on its 
valorisation capacities and to expand the domestic markets for its output. The Korean 
authoritarian regime emerged to control the evolution of industrial wages, notably those 
paid to unskilled workers, and to limit the emergence of any effective opposition to the 
worsening of working conditions in the fast growing export-oriented industries.  
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Chapter 7 
Brazil and Korea between the Early and Late 1970s 
 
Brazil: From the first to the second ‘oil shock’ (1974–1979) 
 
In late 1973, the mass of land rent available for appropriation in Brazil 
experienced a sharp expansion as international commodity prices, in upward trend since 
1972, shot up strongly.
128
 The expansion of land rent available to support capital 
accumulation needed to come about through a new change in economic, social and 
labour policies and in the political institutions bringing them about. Not only was the 
payment of labour-power below its value no longer necessary, but the expansion of 
domestic markets for mass-consumed goods was also needed to absorb the increased 
production. The ‗hard-line‘ sectors of the army were thus no longer capable of 
expressing politically the necessities of the Brazilian process of capital accumulation. 
Like Castelo Branco in 1966, they were incapable of forcing one of themselves as 
Medici‘s successor. In late 1973, General Geisel, a ‗moderate‘ and nationalist 
Castelista, current president of Petrobras, was picked by the military to assume the 
presidency.
129
 
 In effect, in 1974, as the new government was formed, the economic and 
political forms of realisation of the Brazilian process of capitalist development began to 
show new features. By then, not only the land rent but also interest-bearing capital 
inflows enlarged sharply. The mass of extraordinary social wealth available to support 
industrial capital thus grew substantially. The first, late 1973, ‗oil shock‘ was then 
manifesting itself not only in a sharp rise in international commodity prices but also in 
expanded global liquidity as the so-called petrodollars were being recycled through the 
banking system.
130
 In 1974, the magnitude of the Brazilian land rent and the net inflow 
of foreign loans thus increased, respectively, to 11% and 6% of GDP and to 19% and 
10% of all surpluses available in the economy.
131
 
As soon as they assumed control of the state, ‗moderate‘ sectors within the 
military, who succeeded the ‗hard-liners‘ in command of government through the 
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‗miracle‘, implemented a series of nationalist and developmentalist policies reminiscent 
of the pre-1964 populist era. The currency became again overvalued and import taxes 
were raised to compensate for this, thus expanding the portion of the enlarged land rent 
appropriated, respectively, by industrial capital (directly) and the state. The prohibition 
to export part of certain primary goods output, such as soybeans, rice and cotton, 
remained in effect, especially during the years of high international prices, as a way of 
keeping local prices further below international levels. In addition, the promotion of 
industrial exports, notably of motor-vehicles, was enhanced through an increase in 
subsidies that more than compensated for the overvaluation of the exchange rate.
132
 
Export subsidies were increased from around 20-25% of FOB values in 1969-1975 to 
32.5% in 1976 and 34-38% in 1977-1979.
133
  
Moreover, under the claim of being a response to the new international 
economic environment emerging from the quadrupling of oil prices and the concomitant 
increase in Brazil‘s import bill, the government launched the Second National 
Development Plan (NDP II, 1975-1979) to deepen the process of import-substituting 
industrialisation by increasing the local production of industrial inputs and the provision 
of infrastructure by state firms and of capital goods by private nationally-owned 
companies. It was assumed the Plan would finally transform Brazil into a global 
industrial power. Apart from the expressed desire of keeping economic growth at 10% 
per year, the NDP II had four main specific goals. First, it aimed at substantially 
substituting imports of capital goods and basic industrial inputs, including heavy and 
sophisticated machinery, chemicals, non-ferrous metals and steel products. Secondly, it 
sought to increase exports of raw and semi-processed materials such as agricultural 
products, cellulose, iron ore, aluminium and steel. Thirdly, it intended to expand local 
production of energy by investing in oil exploration, increasing the production of 
hydroelectricity, constructing nuclear plants and promoting the substitution of petrol by 
alcohol made from sugarcane for motor-vehicle transportation. Fourthly, it attempted to 
develop the railway and telecommunications system, and to extend rural electrification, 
irrigation and storage facilities, in order to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks. Moreover, 
the Plan also declared its intention to correct severe regional and income disparities. 
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This, it was stated, was not only desirable in itself, but it would also contribute to 
expand the domestic market for durable-consumer goods.
134
 
Policies used to implement the NDP II were extensive. First, tax benefits were 
given to companies, nationally or foreign-owned, willing to venture into the newly 
favoured sectors. Secondly, the Law of Similarity and import tariffs were used to 
protect markets for nascent or expanding industries.
 
Thirdly, SOEs policy of paying 
excessive prices for procurements, in particular for equipment and machinery, and 
charging low fees for their output reached its maximum expression, notably as these 
companies were leading the investments spree under the NDP II. Fourthly, the BNDE, 
hitherto focused on funding SOE investment programmes, granted heavily subsidised 
loans to nationally-owned industrial firms, especially to capital goods producers. 
Fifthly, a large programme of investments by state-owned companies and different 
organs of the public sector was launched. To make the Plan operational, new 
administrative divisions and state firms were formed and special savings schemes were 
created, including the National Development Fund.
135
 Like during the implementation 
of the Targets Plan (1956-1960), investment priorities were defined by non-ministerial 
government agencies like the Councils for Economic and Industrial Development 
assisted by sectoral bodies for main supported industries (e.g. steel, shipbuilding, 
telecommunications equipment and mining). Fiscal incentives were also granted by 
regional development agencies such as Sudene (for the Northeast), Sudam (for the 
Amazon region) and Suframa (for the Manaus Free Zone).
136
 Industry-specific sections 
were also created in the BNDE to administer the allocation of soft loans. Together, this 
set of ISI policies and the new institutions that implemented them mediated the 
transference of resources, most of them made out of the expanded land rent and foreign 
credits, from the state to industrial capital and its junior partners. 
As was the case during the years of the ‗economic miracle‘, the land rent 
appropriated by the state through different means was complemented, in enlarging 
public sector resources, not only with funds borrowed externally but also with a portion 
of the value of labour-power. Social insurance funds were channelled to industrial 
capital through the BHN and the BNDE. While the former continued ‗managing‘ the 
FGTS to fund urban construction and infrastructure works, the latter now began to 
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‗administer‘ PIS/PASEP funds. As the rate of inflation increased throughout the 1970s, 
the magnitude of the resources transferred from wage earners (i.e. the working-class) to 
industrial capital grew larger.
137
 In effect, the monetisation of a portion of the public 
sector deficit remained a usual practice to finance part of the investments programme 
under the NDP II and the inflation rate averaged 39% per year during 1974-1979.
138
 
Economic growth remained strong in 1974 when the NDP II was launched, even 
if it decelerated with respect to the 1973 peak. Per capita GDP grew 11.4% in 1974 led 
by large state investments in infrastructure and industrial facilities. The investment rate 
reached unprecedented levels (22% of GDP). Industrial employment increased 6% and 
average real wages in manufacturing by 7.3%.
139
 This time, under government-
controlled adjustments, wages paid to unskilled industrial workers grew as fast as those 
received by their skilled and managerial counterparts.
140
 Industrial capital no longer 
needed to resort to politically expensive harsh repression in order to effect the payment 
of a portion of the labour-force below its value. On the contrary, the opposite was 
needed in order to further enlarge the domestic market for durable-consumer goods. 
Legal regulations on wage adjustments were relaxed at the same time that a process of 
political ‗distension‘ was promoted and independent trade unions activities were slowly 
allowed to emerge.
141
 Moreover, in November 1974, the military permitted, for the first 
time in years, legislative elections to be held in a climate of relative freedom. 
Unsurprisingly for most, except the military in power, the MDB opposition actively 
fought the election, making significant gains in the large industrial centres of the 
Southeast. The official party, ARENA, only managed to retain the control of the 
Congress through the votes gained in the poverty-stricken Northeast. The old age 
system of patronage with public funds was still relatively effective there.
142
 
During the second half of the decade, however, the inherent contradictions and 
weaknesses of the Brazilian process of capitalist development began to surface again as 
the global economy became increasingly unstable. The deceleration of world economic 
growth that had started around the late 1960s, but worsened after the increase in 
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commodity prices, began to manifest itself in the slowdown of global demand, 
including that for raw materials. International commodity prices thus began to fall, and 
with them the Brazilian land rent. In addition, the increase in global credit supply that 
resulted from the recycling of the petrodollars through commercial banks, though partly 
compensated the former, was not continuous either. It largely depended on the evolution 
of OPEC country balance-of-payments surpluses.
143
 The evolution of the Brazilian 
process of capital accumulation would thereafter be subjected to the irregular 
development of these global forces. Hence, the slowdown of the rate of growth during 
the second half of the 1970s, after peaking in 1972-1974, was not a linear process. On 
the contrary, it came about through the irregular evolution of GDP growth, broadly 
following the progression of the combined masses of land rent and external credits 
available for appropriation by industrial capital, and the realisation of these movements 
through the alternation of expansive and contractive economic policies; the ‗stop and 
go‘ cycle allegedly ‗administered‘ by orthodox Finance Minister Mario H. Simonsen.144 
In 1975, the international recession that followed the 1973-1974 hike in raw 
materials prices resulted in a movement in the opposite direction. The sharp increase in 
prices had severely affected the process of capital accumulation in the industrially 
advanced economies, notably in Europe and Japan. The ensuing recession would 
subsequently impact negatively on commodity prices and, therefore, on oil exporters 
balance-of-payment surpluses.
145
 Brazilian land rent then contracted while the net 
inflow of loan capital to the local economy shrank. The combined mass of land rent 
appropriated by social subjects other than landowners and net interest-bearing capital 
inflows fell from 29% of the economy‘s surpluses in 1974 to 20% in 1975.146 Once 
again, the relative contraction of the extraordinary sources of wealth that had been 
sustaining the developmentalist policies came about through their partial replacement 
with more orthodox measures. Both public sector expenditures (including some 
investments corresponding to the NDP II) and credit supply growth decelerated.
147
 The 
pace of the process of political opening slowed markedly as the ‗hard-liners‘ still in 
command of several repressive state institutions attempted to reassert their influence 
through a series of criminal acts, including the killing of a member of the independent 
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press.
148
 State-controlled wage adjustments slowed, and average industrial wages fell by 
8% in real terms, partly compensating the contraction of the land rent and external 
credit inflows in sustaining the process of capital valorisation. 
As the rate of economic growth decelerated, a new, unexpected opposition 
began to emerge against the military regime. Some sectors of industrial capital under 
national ownership - the national industrial bourgeoisie - initiated a campaign against 
the excessive ‗statism‘ allegedly pursued by the regime. Their institutional 
representatives claimed that the widespread intervention of the state in the economy, 
notably since 1974, had been largely benefiting foreign-owned companies at the 
expense of domestically-owned firms. They signalled this as the main cause behind 
emerging economic difficulties.
149
 
During 1976-78, however, the world process of capital accumulation entered 
into a new period of rapid economic growth partly fuelled by the sharp increase of 
global liquidity resulting from the continuous recycling of ‗petrodollars‘ and, 
increasingly, from the expansion of credit supply as a form of realising the global 
process of overproduction of capital.
150
 Industrially advanced economies recovered 
strongly after the 1974-75 recession, crucially the USA. This expansion helped sustain 
global demand for raw materials and commodity prices remained at historically high 
levels even if below their 1973-74 peak.
151
 As the land rent and net interest-bearing 
capital inflows expanded strongly, the Brazilian economy picked up, though at a lower 
speed and more irregularly than before 1975. Economic growth accelerated in 1976 as 
investments under the NDP II continued (or resumed in some cases), while subsidies to 
the private sector were expanded again, notably those granted through the price of 
goods and services provided by state-owned companies and BNDE loans. Growth 
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slowed in 1977, as the combined masses of land rent and foreign loans available to 
sustain capital accumulation suffered a short-lived fall, and accelerated again thereafter, 
as these resources grew larger. Industrial output expanded while the manufacturing base 
deepened substantially incorporating complex, high value adding productions.
152
 
Though not all the ambitious targets set out in the NDP II were fully completed, 
throughout its implementation the Brazilian industrial sector ‗deepened‘ substantially. 
During that period, investment rates fluctuated between 20 and 24% of GDP p.a., 
comparable to Korean levels.
153
 The production of industrial inputs and energy 
expanded massively, while the country managed to produce all except high technology 
and design intensive means of production. The local production of steel, aluminium, 
fertilizers, hydroelectricity and cellulose, for instance, increased 13.1%, 15.9%, 23.6%, 
12.4% and 19.7% per year, respectively, between 1974 and 1979.
154
 Capital goods 
production began to include industrial equipment for hydroelectricity generation, 
telecommunications, nuclear plants and steel mills. The domestic supply of capital 
goods as a portion of apparent consumption increased from 73.2% in 1974 to 82.3% in 
1977 and even higher in 1979.
155
 Heavy engineering firms also expanded strongly. For 
instance, while in 1963 the proportion of hydroelectric equipment supplied domestically 
in large scale projects was only 11%, in 1975 it had reached 41% and in 1978 it was 
equal to 82-84% of the total.
156
 The production of ships increased from around 200 
deadweight tonnage per year in the early 1970s to 1200 in 1978 and Brazil became an 
internationally large producer of ships (by tonnage).
157
 Agrarian production increased 
30% during 1973-79 while employment in the sector remained stagnant thanks to the 
loans granted to the acquisition of agricultural machinery and inputs, and to the 
incorporation of new areas, like the Cerrado region, into production.
158
 
This process of industrial growth and ‗deepening‘ not only resulted in the 
increase of the demand for labour-power but also manifested itself in strong increases in 
labour‘s compensation. The latter were needed not only to expand the domestic markets 
for durable-consumer goods but also, and crucially, to reproduce an industrial 
workforce performing increasingly complex and more intensive activities. Under the 
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prevailing, state-controlled labour market institutions and wage-adjustment processes, 
however, pay increases could not come about simply through the interaction between 
supply and demand for labour. Hence, the late 1970s witnessed the further relaxation of 
the system of political repression that had been limiting labour‘s bargaining power and 
the emergence, and later strengthening, of ‗independent‘ trade unions and their 
successful mobilisation for higher wages during 1978-1979.
159
 Moreover, this process 
of political advance of the Brazilian working-class at large (i.e. blue and white collar) 
peaked through the widely supported strikes of mid-1979 and the campaign for the 
amnesty to those who had allegedly committed political crimes.
160
 These advances not 
only resulted in relatively universal wage increases (real wages grew 7.5% per year 
average in 1976-80) but also in the strong expansion of public sector expenditures in 
social welfare.
161
 The process of political ‗distension‘ began to be known then as 
‗opening‘.162 
 Not only in these respects did state policies then resemble those of the ‗national-
developmentalist‘ period. The expansion of the bases of support for the Brazilian 
process of capital accumulation, land rent and foreign interest-bearing capital inflows, 
was also manifesting itself in a change in foreign policy, as had been the case when 
Quadros and Goular decided to pursue their ‗independent‘ foreign policy. In 1977, 
Brazil unilaterally repudiated the military pact it had had with the USA since the 1940s 
over a disagreement about its nuclear programme. Following its traditional stance on the 
topic, the US government opposed Brazil‘s acquisition of nuclear technology and 
blocked the sale of equipment by US suppliers. The Brazilian government complained 
with no avail. In the end, it acquired the necessary equipment and know-how from 
German companies and, in this way, allegedly reaffirmed its political ‗independence‘ 
and its commitment to transform the national economy into a global industrial power.
163
 
As with Vargas, Kubistchek, Quadros and Goulart, this move was an ideological form 
of realisation of the overall policy shift following the expansion of land rent (and its 
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complementary sources of extraordinary social wealth). Brazil was neither becoming a 
global industrial power nor gaining any extra international independence. Moreover, in 
the longer term, the nuclear programme proved to be largely an expensive failure.
164
 Despite the above-described substantial advances in the development of the 
domestic industrial sector, by the turn of the decade, the Brazilian process of capital 
accumulation would again start to enter a period of deep crisis. As the global economy 
fell into a recession, international commodity prices dropped further and the land rent 
available for appropriation in Brazil contracted at the same time that the net inflow of 
external credit decreased from equalling 10% of total profits in 1978 to less than 1.7% 
in 1979-80.
165
 Nonetheless, the trajectory of the Brazilian economy from fast, but 
slowing and irregular, growth to an open crisis was not a straightforward process. 
As many times before, the contraction of the main bases of support of the 
Brazilian economy needed to come about through an alteration of those policies through 
which their appropriation by industrial capital had been taken course. In March 1979, 
General João Baptista de Oliveira Figuereido succeeded Geisel as President, promising 
to continue the ‗democratisation‘ process. Simonsen, Geisel‘s Finance Minister, became 
Minister of Planning, with extra powers to manage the economy. As he assumed full 
control over economic policy-making, Simonsen put forward a plan to ‗cool down‘ the 
economy in order to combat the accelerating inflation (already 52.7% in 1979) and the 
ensuing balance-of-payments difficulties, both resulting from the negative impact the 
contraction of land-rent and the net interest-bearing capital inflows was having on 
public sector accounts and the financing of the current account deficit. Simonsen‘s 
package included typical orthodox measures: tight monetary policy, expenditure cuts, 
currency devaluation, reduction of export subsidies, and a modest liberalisation of 
import restrictions.
166
 Together this set of policies would reduce the transference of 
contracting land rent and foreign credit inflows to industrial capital, and, consequently, 
would slow down its process of accumulation. 
Simonsen‘s adjustment plan faced widespread opposition, notably among 
representatives of industrial capital. As in 1973, it was argued by many in the state and 
private sectors that Brazil should weather the stormy global environment through 
expansionary policies. In response to these claims, in August 1979, Simonsen left the 
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Ministry of Planning and was replaced by Delfim Netto, the ‗father‘ of the 1968-73 
‗economic miracle‘.167 The global context, however, was exactly the opposite of that 
prevailing after 1973: the amount of land rent was contracting and external loans were 
drying up rapidly. Yet, as in 1967, Delfim Netto claimed that inflation was caused by 
‗structural‘ factors, and proposed to fight it again with expansionist, rather than 
‗orthodox‘, policies. As soon as he assumed the reins of economic policy-making, 
Delfim launched the Third National Development Plan for the period 1980-85 which 
was more a vague expression of desire about growth prospects than an articulated and 
properly calibrated economic programme.
168
 To reduce industrial costs, interest rates 
were cut sharply. Agrarian production was promoted through new lines of credit on 
favourable terms, in order to increase the supply and reduce the price of commodities. 
In response to a new upsurge in protests in the more dynamic branches of the 
manufacturing sector, real wages were allowed to increase again and the formula 
regulating their adjustment reformed to further protect them from price inflation. 
Domestic demand increased accordingly and GDP growth accelerated from 4.6% to 
7.9% while industrial value-added growth jumped from 8.4% to 9.5% between 1978 
and 1979.
169
 
The bases for this growth, however, were getting increasingly weaker. Unlike, 
the previous ‗shock‘, the 1979 ‗oil shock‘ was followed by an increase in global interest 
rates and the fall of international non-oil commodity prices, with the exception of sugar 
which would enjoy a short-lived boom. As international credit markets tightened, 
foreign loans dried up rapidly. By the end of the year, the situation had become 
unbearable, as foreign exchange reserves accumulated during 1976-78 had fallen by as 
much as 25% (US$ 2004 5.9 billions).
170
 The space for expansionist policies shrank 
quickly. Delfim then announced his ‗Christmas Package‘ which, despite the 
government‘s still developmentalist rhetoric, was much in line with IMF orthodox 
recommendations and Simonsen‘s much opposed programme. A maxi-devaluation was 
implemented while subsidies to exports and restrictions on imports were removed. A 
30% tax on most primary goods exports replaced the combination of exchange rate 
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overvaluation and import taxes as forms of land rent appropriation by the state. 
Moreover, the Law of Similarity, the symbol of the Brazilian ISI process, was 
eliminated altogether.
171
 The land rent available for appropriation there was becoming 
increasingly insufficient to sustain the previous diversified scale of industrial 
production.  
Through 1980, the government attempted a new bluff that would supposedly 
change the mood among private economic agents and speed up the economic recovery. 
Subsidised credit was extended to the industrial sector (for working capital) and to 
consumers again in a desperate attempt to increase aggregate supply and market-
demand.
172
 Growth picked up, especially in the industrial sector. The bases for this 
expansion were openly unsustainable. Part of the resources supporting these policies 
originated in land rent appropriated by state through its monopoly of the sugar trade, 
then enlarged as international sugar prices almost trebled that year.
173
 Another portion 
was made, as before, of forced savings. Moreover, the government was again making 
extensive use of Central Bank foreign exchange reserves to finance the large current 
account deficit. Finally, newly imposed interest rate ceilings channelled financial 
resources onto the demand for durable-consumer goods and real stock assets, thus 
creating an unsustainable credit expansion.
174
 Resources required for expansionist 
polices rapidly became insufficient. The contraction of the net inflow of interest-bearing 
capital continued as the retraction of medium- and long-term credits was roughly 
compensated for by a sharp increase in short-term loans.
175
 Average wage growth in 
manufacturing came to a halt, becoming negative in some occupations and industries.
176
 
Unlike in 1979, industrial worker actions for wage increases found this time hard-line 
negotiators on the government side.
177
 Moreover, large cuts in universal social welfare 
expenditures were implemented as the government was trying to balance the public 
sector accounts.
178
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By the end of the year, Delfim‘s bluff was finally called. The economy was 
already in a recession and inflation out of control. Delfim had to implement an openly 
orthodox adjustment package. Interest rate ceilings in the domestic money market were 
abandoned and price controls were lifted, thus eliminating two forms of resource 
transference to industrial capital through the mediation of the state.
179
 The exchange rate 
was devalued again to avoid it becoming overvalued, thus eliminating this form of 
direct appropriation of land rent by economic ‗agents‘ other than landowners. Current 
expenditures, notably subsidies to the industrial sector, were reduced further, and there 
were drastic cuts in public sector investments.
180
 
 
Some writers have argued that, by allegedly postponing the structural adjustment 
of the Brazilian economy to the end of the long period of low-cost oil, the NDP II 
aggravated the local impact of the global crisis which was beginning to unfold in the 
early 1980s without fulfilling its goal of producing structural change. Moreover, these 
authors claimed that the Plan left the economy massively indebted and thus particularly 
vulnerable to the second ‗oil shock‘ and to the changes in the cost and conditions of 
refinancing its debts.
181
 Other authors have contested this view, suggesting that the Plan 
largely achieved its goal of structurally transforming the local economy and could not 
be blamed for the externally caused early 1980s crisis.
182
 Both positions, however, fail 
to capture the Plan‘s underlying specificity. The NDP II was not simply an ideologically 
informed economic policy option among other possibilities then available to the 
government. It was the normal course of development, in terms of economic policy, of 
the Brazilian process of capital accumulation as its main bases of support, land rent and 
foreign credit inflows, expanded sharply. In effect, as would become evident when these 
bases contracted during the 1980s, the specific characteristic of this process of capitalist 
development was not changed whatsoever throughout the implementation of the NDP 
II. Neither was the Plan simply a response to the increase in the price of oil, its 
ideological justification notwithstanding. Had oil been the only commodity whose price 
increased or Brazil not have access to low-cost external credits to complement the land 
rent, the military would have simply not had the resources to implement the Plan. The 
Brazilian economy was affected by the increase in the price of oil, and therefore of the 
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land rent paid to petroleum producing countries, as much as those countries where 
industrial capital accumulates through the sale of goods in world markets (i.e. 
industrially advanced and East Asian countries) as the increases were, in most cases, 
passed onto industrial and individual consumers there. In this respect, the effect of the 
increase in the price of oil was neutral. During the period after the first ‗oil shock‘, 
nevertheless, industrial capital in Brazil benefited, unlike those in these countries, from 
the increase in the prices of other commodities and, therefore, from the possibility to 
appropriate an enlarged agrarian and mining land rents. 
 
Korea: From the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan to the Comprehensive 
Stabilisation Programme (1973-1979) 
 
By 1973, the global economy had already recovered. The USA, the largest 
market for Korean exports, was experiencing its second consecutive year of strong 
growth. External demand for Korean industrial goods was thus picking up again while 
the inflow of foreign loans was expanding.
183
 With these extraordinary resources at 
hand, and the compensation already secured from the Japanese government as part of 
the 1965 ‗normalisation‘ treaty between both countries, in early 1973, the Park regime 
launched the Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) Plan. Given US rapprochement with 
China and North Korea‘s rapid advance in these sectors, the Korean government 
claimed that the HCI Plan was necessary for national security reasons. The Plan would 
finally make effective the goals for a self-sufficient and balanced economy aimed for in 
the First, Second and Third Five-year Plans. It was designed to promote the five 
following sectors: steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, machinery (including motor-
vehicles), electronics and shipbuilding.
184
  
The HCI Plan was not a novelty that developed the heavy and chemical 
industries from scratch. All sectors included in the HCI Plan had either been included in 
one of the previous five-year plans, or had received support under the many industry-
specific promotion laws already passed, however ineffective they might have been 
hitherto.
185
 Some sectors included in the HCI Plan (e.g. the machinery industry) had not 
grown much during the preceding period despite the substantial subsidies received. 
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Other sectors (e.g. shipbuilding) had been growing slowly but consistently, although 
receiving relatively mild state support. As was seen above, the automotive industry had 
been growing weakly, despite the several state-sponsored attempts to develop it, while 
the electronics industry had been expanding rapidly since the mid-1960s, even if 
receiving limited state support apart from tax holidays and a ‗trade union-free‘ 
environment in foreign-owned facilities.
186
 
The key difference between the HCI Plan and the previous five-year plans or 
industry-specific promotion laws was not only the sheer magnitude of the financial 
support these sectors would receive during its implementation, but also that the HCI 
Plan constituted a detailed programme for the development of specific industries rather 
than a general framework of indicative goals and incentives to achieve them. The Plan 
included a list of plants and infrastructure projects to be constructed by both the private 
and public sectors. It also included a plan for the specific geographical location of each 
of the selected sectors. These were to be allocated to different regions of southern coast 
of the country.
187
 In this way, transport costs for imported raw materials and exported 
products would be reduced.
188
 
With the partial exception of the electronics industry, all sectors included in the 
HCI Plan had relatively high minimum efficient scales of production and lengthy 
maturity periods. Hence, in contrast to the previous and contemporary experiences in 
the textile and garments industries, the development of HCIs in Korea required the 
concentration of capital in such a degree that excluded the participation of small- and 
medium-sized companies. The constitution of large-scale individual capitals was both a 
precondition for, and a consequence of, the development of these industries. This was 
especially the case as they became increasingly oriented to compete in world markets, in 
most cases through the introduction of state-of-the-art technologies.
189
 
In early 1970s Korea, the fast concentration of capital, necessary to develop the 
HCIs, could have not been achieved simply through the workings of market 
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competition. On the contrary, the emergence of Korean industrial capital as a producer 
of heavy and chemical goods for world markets required the intervention of the state, 
directing resources to the ‗selected‘ sectors and ‗coordinating‘ their growth and 
development. In other words, the autonomous (market-led) regulation of the global 
process of capital accumulation came about through the action of the Korean state. In 
some of the sectors included in the HCI Plan, such as steel, aluminium and 
petrochemicals, the minimum efficient scale was unreachable for privately-owned 
Korean firms, even with the massive support of the state. For instance, while the initial 
capital invested by Hyundai in its state-of-the-art shipbuilding yards amounted US$ 900 
million, POSCO‘s capital investments in its first plant at Pohang reached US$ 4000 
million when fully finished in 1985.
190
 In those cases, the Korean state concentrated 
industrial capital under its ownership. Moreover, these sectors would also become 
suppliers of key raw materials for downstream ‗favoured‘ industries, thus contributing 
to their development and international competitiveness through the provision of low 
priced inputs. This condition also made them unattractive for private capital.
191
 
Different types of policies were implemented to make the HCI Plan operational, 
including tax, trade, credit, and regulatory measures. Industry specific promotion laws, 
some already in place, and the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Law regulated the 
implementation of these policies. Furthermore, apart from its direct involvement in the 
metal and petrochemical industries, the Korean state also concentrated on the provision 
of social overhead capital. The latter not only included the construction of roads, 
railways and ports, but also of the industrial estates where the different sectors 
located.
192
  
The tax system provided incentives for firms in these sectors, subject to certain 
conditions specified in the promotional laws. The major incentives were tax holidays, 
special arrangements for the depreciation of fixed capitals and temporary investment tax 
credits lasting for a period of five years. Effective tax rates on corporate profits in 
promoted sectors were significantly below those applied to other sectors of the economy 
during the entire period when the HCI Plan was implemented.
193
 Trade policy during 
the 1970s limited imports of foreign goods competing with domestic productions in the 
promoted industries, partly reversing the liberalising trend initiated through the mid-
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1960s. Exporters of labour-intensive goods, nevertheless, continued largely importing 
inputs and equipment duty free.
194
 Policies regulating domestic and foreign investments 
were also streamlined. In sharp contrast to the contemporary Brazilian experience, the 
Korean state began to control the entrance of private firms into most branches of 
industrial production. In this way, it attempted to limit ‗unnecessary‘ competition 
leading individual firms to produce below the minimum efficient scales.
195
 Moreover, 
the government also reinforced entry restrictions to foreign enterprises in the industrial 
sector. Joint ventures became more acceptable than wholly-owned foreign firms. 
Domestic firms would be given priority in export markets and technology-intensive 
projects.
196
 Nevertheless, in the electronics industry, largely located in the Masan EPZ, 
100% foreign ownership was permitted and the already generous incentives given to 
attract FDI in the sector maintained.
 197
 
Finally, the most powerful tool the government used to carry out its industrial 
policy was the allocation of investment funds. The government was directly involved in 
allocating financial resources not only to different manufacturing industries but also to 
individual investment projects. State-owned ‗commercial‘ banks were directed to lend 
resources to investment projects in the HCIs. These loans became to be known as 
‗policy loans‘ and were offered at preferentially low interest rates, often lower than the 
inflation rate. As industrial policy was implemented, ‗policy loans‘ expanded to take on 
an increasingly large share of domestic credit. In the early 1970s, the share of all policy 
loans in domestic credit to the private sector was already nearly one-half. By the late 
1970s and early 1980s the policy loans expanded further, accounting for 60% of all 
domestic credit to the private sector.
198
 During this period, the share of bank loans given 
to HCIs increased from 22.6% in 1970 to 32.1% in 1980 while the share received by 
light industries fell from 23.5% in 1970 to 21.7% to in 1980.
199
 To contribute to the 
finance numerous, large scale investment projects in the HCIs, the National Investment 
Fund was established in 1974, ‗mobilising‘ public sector employee‘s pension funds.200 
As many times before, the restructuring of labour market institutions was also a 
crucial part of state intervention. Labour and social policies were tightened throughout 
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the 1970s to streamline the reproduction of the ‗dual‘ structure of the labour market. 
Labour and union rights were reduced in 1973. This was achieved through the de facto 
elimination of industry-wide association and subsequent concentration of all 
negotiations at the company level, by limiting further the right to bargain collectively, 
and by expanding the scope of the public sector where unionisation was forbidden.
201
 
Furthermore, despite launching several initiatives, state expenditures on universal social 
services remained, with the exception of education, negligible during the 1970s, as these 
were left to the private sector. The Medical Insurance Program, based on shared 
contributions, was created in 1976 but was made compulsory only for large firms.
202
 
The National Pension Law was passed in 1973 to create the National Pension Fund 
(NPF) but its implementation was suspended indefinitely after the business sector 
manifested its opposition and the difficulties created by the first ‗oil shock‘ were 
beginning to hurt the economy.
203
 By letting the market allocate most resources spent 
on healthcare, housing, social security and, to lesser extent, education, Korean social 
capital avoided the universal, undifferentiated reproduction of the labour-force. It 
minimised, in this way, the portion of national output spent in its reproduction. The 
massive surplus population of peasant origin, and the relatively simple jobs it was put to 
perform, allowed the payment of labour-power below its value, notably in the small-
scale unskilled labour-intensive, export industries.
204
 On the other hand, the portion of 
the labour-force working in large-scale heavy and durable-consumer goods industries 
tended to perform more skilful jobs and therefore had relatively more favourable 
working and payment arrangements. 
The policy shift undertaken through the 1970s HCI Plan required the large and 
concerted mobilisation of limited financial resources and the tight control over the local 
labour-force. The implementation of this shift thus required the increased centralisation 
of political power and the repression of the Korean working-class. Between 1973 and 
1975, the already dictatorial Yushin Constitution was reinforced through the 
promulgation of a series of ‗emergency‘ decrees that increased political closure.205 
Furthermore, the execution of the HCI Plan also involved the reorganisation of state 
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institutions related to economic policy-making. The HCI Committee and the Blue 
House (the Presidential Secretariat) were placed in charge of the Plan‘s implementation 
and evaluation, partly replacing the EPB and MoCI.
206
 
With the world economy growing and international liquidity expanding, the 
Korean economy boomed during 1973, enjoying its fastest growth of the entire post 
Second World War period. Exports increased by an astonishing 90% and real GDP 
grew 22% in per capita terms.
207
 The implementation of the HCI Plan proceeded full 
speed. This boom, however, was relatively short-lived. In 1974, only one year into the 
Plan, the world economy entered a recession and Korean export growth slowed sharply. 
Furthermore, the sharp increase in the prices of raw materials also expanded the current 
account deficit and therefore accelerated the build-up of external debt, most of it of 
short-term maturity.
208
 
Economic growth fell sharply in 1975 and average real wages in the industrial 
sector collapsed 9%. The fall was stronger for female and temporary workers in labour-
intensive industries. Political opposition to the Park regime mounted. As during most of 
the 1970s, this mainly consisted of an upsurge of spontaneous and narrowly 
circumscribed protests by female workers in the garments industry, usually triggered by 
the non-payment of wages, and occasional demonstrations by university students and 
opposition politicians. As before, these were met in the only way the regime knew: 
further political repression. In May, the Park regime issued Emergency Decree No. 9, 
the most comprehensive of all, outlawing making any ‗false‘ statements about or 
demonstrations against the President, the Yusin Constitution or the government. ―As a 
result of this decree, it became illegal for any South Korean to call for democracy, 
object to any government act, or say or do anything that might defame or harm the 
‗welfare‘ of South Korea while abroad or with a foreigner while in South Korea. Given 
the scope of Emergency Decree No. 9, Park had no need for further decrees.‖209 
Persecution of, and violence against, students, workers, and political opponents 
continued; not even members of the National Assembly were spared from these 
assaults.
210
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In 1975, with the world economy in deep recession and the local economy 
growing ‗only‘ 5.4% in per capita terms (one-fourth of the 1973 record and well below 
what had been planned), even the HCI Plan was revised downwards only two years after 
its launch.
211
 The drafting of the Fourth Five-Year Plan for the period 1977-1981 scaled 
down the scope of some of the projects included in the HCI Plan.
212
 Gross fixed capital 
formation fell during 1975 while inflation spiked at 25%, partly as a result of an 
increase in the public sector deficit and partly as a result of higher international 
commodity prices.
213
 
By 1976, however, the performance of the global, crucially the US, economy 
began to recover strongly and the Korean process of capital accumulation entered into a 
new period of fast growth that would last until the second half of 1979. External 
demand for Korean exports expanded rapidly with global recovery, while foreign loans 
became, again, available in large amounts, as the so-called ‗petrodollars‘ were being 
recycled through the European and US commercial banking systems. Production and 
capital formation thus accelerated rapidly in the industrial sector. In addition, the 
Middle East construction boom that followed the increase in the price of oil boosted the 
demand for construction services.
214
 Demand for labour-power expanded accordingly 
and real average wages in the industrial sector grew 15% per year during 1976-79.
215
 
Moreover, in sharp contrast to the trend experienced in most industrially advanced 
countries, from 1976 onwards wages paid to unskilled and semi-skilled labourers began 
to grow faster than those paid to their more skilled colleagues, partly reversing the 
previous trend.
216
 As exports expanded 4.5 times between 1973 and 1979, the current 
account deficit reduced sharply and turned positive, for the first time since 
Independence, in 1977, thanks to the massive export of construction services to the 
Middle East. Though the textile, clothing, footwear and plywood industries still 
remained central to the Korean economy, accounting together for 21.2%, 34% and 34% 
of manufacturing value-added, employment and exports, respectively, the unforeseen 
spectacular growth came from the side of those sectors included in the HCI Plan. Value-
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added, employment and exports in the heavy, chemical and electronics industries 
expanded 8, 5 and 25 times, respectively, throughout the 1970s.
217
 
The degree of diversification of Korean industrial productions and exports 
emerging through the 1970s was remarkable, even when compared with the experiences 
of other ‗Asian Tigers‘, Taiwan included.218 Nevertheless, despite differences, the 
industrial branches growing the most and carrying out the deepening of the Korean 
manufacturing base, many of them included in the HCI Plan, shared one specific 
characteristic. All required the coordinated mobilisation of large masses of semi-skilled 
labour-power to work as an appendage of automated and computerised machinery 
systems or in manual assembly operations. The Korean economy had access to a large 
surplus population that not only commanded very low wages by international standards 
but also was highly disciplined, used to endure harsh working conditions during long 
hours and easily trainable, especially after the strict two-year long military conscription 
served by all males.
219
 The programme of public and private Vocational Training 
introduced in the late 1960s was massively expanded during the 1970s to provide the 
local workforce with the basic skills necessary to perform the emerging industrial 
activities. Firms were forced either to provide in-house training to new workers or to 
pay a levy to fund publicly-run institutes. A total of 815,000 workers were trained 
during the Third and Fourth Year Plans for the periods of 1972-76 and 1977-81, 
respectively.
220
 Moreover, the extension of the state promoted and funded Saemaul 
‗movement‘ (see above) into the industrial sector was used further to indoctrinate and 
discipline the enlarging industrial labour-force. The programme‘s emulation of 
traditional values of paternal piety, loyalty, self-sufficiency and nationalism helped 
enhance the already largely militaristic and highly hierarchical environment within 
private and public large-scale industrial firms.
221
 
The Korean electronics industry, the most dynamic of the sectors promoted 
during the 1970s, consisted of three sub-sectors: components and parts, consumer 
electronics and industrial electronics. The first two sub-sectors were at that point 
unskilled labour-intensive, characterised by the manual assembly and packaging of 
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integrated circuits and other semiconductor devices, and the manual assembly of radio 
and TV sets. Almost all inputs and equipment used in these sectors were imported. 
Foreign capital participation in the industry was relatively important, either in the form 
of full control of production facilities, joint-ventures or under OEM arrangements by 
which local firms were subcontracted to perform simple assembly operations. The 
production of electrical machinery, most of which was telephones and calculators, 
remained relatively underdeveloped in Korea during the 1970s, constituting only 6% of 
the sector‘s output, despite the support received by the state.222 Regardless of the 
nationality of individual private capital and the type of business model, Korean 
international competitiveness in this sector was based exclusively on the cheapness and 
discipline-driven high productivity of its labour-force. This was particularly the case in 
the components and consumer electronics sectors where badly-paid young female 
workers, most of them living in on-site accommodation, constituted the bulk of the 
workforce.
223
 As noted before, industrial capital managed to use gender-based 
discrimination, deeply ingrained in the Korean society, to segment the domestic labour 
market and keep female worker wages at around 45% of those earned by their male 
counterparts. This was, together with Japan, the lowest proportion in the world.
224
 
The developments of the global steel industry, the second most dynamic sector 
during the 1970s, were already described in Chapter 3. It was shown that Korea‘s 
capacity to jump into world leadership in steel manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 
1980s resulted from three key factors: the simplification of labour processes ensuing 
from the continuous advances in equipment computerisation and automation; the 
increase in the cost of the Japanese labour-force as a result of its own process of 
industrial ‗upgrading‘ (requiring an improvement in worker skills and the shortening of 
the working-day); and the local availability of large pools of labour-power cheaper than 
the Japanese and with relatively similar productive attributes of discipline, 
subordination and endurance. It was also shown above that all complex equipment, 
plant design and key raw materials used in the Korean steel industry during this period 
were imported, mainly from Japan and Western Europe. Furthermore, it was shown 
that, unlike in the electronics industry, where labour-intensive techniques prevailed, 
POSCO, Korea‘s single large-scale integrated steel producer, used close to state-of-the-
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art technology and the same amount of capital per worker as most of its Japanese 
competitors. POSCO compensated its lower level of labour productivity, largely due to 
the lower experience of its workforce, with significantly lower wages. 
The manifestation of the NIDL in the structure and dynamics of the global 
shipbuilding industry also impacted upon its development in Korea. This was the third 
most rapidly growing sector during the ‗big push‘ of 1970s. Thanks to earlier 
technological developments, crucially the replacement of riveting with welding for 
joining the steel sheets during WWII and the improved mechanisation of materials 
handling introduced throughout the 1960s, the industry was then increasingly moving 
into the adoption of ‗block construction‘ production methods (i.e. the assembly of 
prefabricated parts).
225
 These production and organisational techniques, which had 
already contributed to the transformation of the Japanese shipbuilding industry into the 
largest and most competitive in global markets of large carriers and tankers, resulted in 
the simplification of manual worker activities and made possible the spatial separation 
of different parts of the production process. As noted, the characteristics of the Korean 
industrial labour-force were particularly suitable for this type of large-scale industrial 
projects requiring the coordinated mobilisation of great numbers of semi-skilled 
workers. And, though significantly less productive than the Japanese, the Korean 
labour-force in the sector was, on average, paid one-tenth of the former‘s wages. 
Furthermore, Korean shipbuilders also benefited, from the mid-1970s, from the 
provision by state-owned POSCO of steel at below international market prices.
226
 Both 
circumstances were of considerable importance as labour and steel each constituted one-
third of the total cost of the ships being constructed in Korea. Production equipment and 
know-how, skill-intensive parts and, crucially, dockyard and ship designs were sourced 
abroad; in Japan the first three items, in Europe the last two.
227
 Korean firms did not 
have at the time the facilities or the labour-force necessary to produce them locally at 
internationally competitive prices.
228
 Hence, they specialised in the production of ships 
at the lower end of the market, bulk carriers and oil tankers. By the end of the 1970s, the 
Korean shipbuilding industry became the second largest in terms of orders received by 
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tonnage.
229
 A decade later, still thanks to its low wage costs, but then also to the much 
increased labour productivity, the industry would not only consolidate as a major 
international player in the lower end of the market but would also produce relatively 
high value-added ships.
230
 Nevertheless, it would only be in the 2000s, three decades 
after entering the global scene, that Korean shipyards would became world leaders and 
internationally competitive in some high-end products like liquefied petroleum gas and 
natural gas tankers.
231
 
Exports of construction services to the Middle East were concentrated in 
projects requiring relatively basic engineering work and large mobilisations of cheap 
and disciplined labour-power, such as roads and residential buildings. Indeed, Korean 
firms were the only ones of those taking part in the Middle East ‗construction boom‘ to 
use workers from their country of origin. Moreover, they frequently needed to establish 
commercial alliances with foreign partners to acquire the technologies and 
organisational/technical know-how necessary to undertake their activities.
232
 Still, 
between 1976 and 1979, Korean firms signed contracts for a yearly average of US$ 
10,800 million at 2004 prices. More than 100,000 Korean workers were employed in 
Middle East construction in 1979. The number kept increasing to reach 172,000 in 1982 
and began to slowly decrease thereafter to 98,000 in 1985. From then onwards, the 
numbers diminished as the Middle East ‗construction boom‘ vanished and Korean firms 
began to contract lower wage workers from countries in Southeast Asia.
233
 
However, not all the industries promoted through the HCI Plan enjoyed the same 
level of success during the 1970s or thereafter. Some sectors and projects did not yield 
positive outcomes or did so only in the very long run. In general terms, the unsuccessful 
sectors were those intensive in raw materials and energy, such as the petrochemical and 
aluminium industries, and those requiring a highly skilled workforce, such as heavy 
machinery production. The fertilizers industry was a prime example of over-ambitious 
investments in a resource-intensive sector. As was the case in the rest of the HCIs, 
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investments in productive capacity far exceeded domestic demand as they were meant 
to produce competitively priced goods for export markets. Yet, based on naphtha 
instead of natural gas, the competitiveness of the Korean fertilizer industry was highly 
vulnerable to oil price changes. For instance, in 1980, after the second ‗oil shock‘, 
production costs of Korean urea were five times higher than US and Canadian costs, 
and ten times higher than Middle Eastern costs. Consequently, substantial productive 
capacity had to be scrapped.
234
 Korean firms not only had no access to below 
international prices raw materials, as many of its competitors in Mexico and the Middle 
East, but also had to bear higher transport costs. These disadvantages could not be 
compensated for with a cheaper labour-force and lower plant construction costs.
235
 This 
branch of Korean industry thus remained marginal until feedstock prices fell 
substantially in the late 1980s.
236
 Being highly intensive in electricity and bauxite, none 
of which was available at low cost in Korea, the aluminium industry followed a 
relatively similar fate. Hence, the largely state-owned Aluminium of Korea Company 
(AKC), unlike steel producer POSCO, never managed to compete successfully in the 
global market against producers with access to both key inputs at below international 
prices, such as those located in Brazil. After ACK‘s sale to Hyundai in the early 1990s, 
the company finally decided to concentrate in processing imported aluminium rather 
than smelting it.
237
 Investments in the heavy machinery industry, particularly in the 
Changwon complex, also sharply overestimated Korean and world demand for electrical 
generators and equipment for heavy industry, and failed, in general, to produce 
competitively priced products.
238
 In effect, unlike process, or continuous flow, 
industries like steel and chemicals, where the production is machine-paced and 
technology embodied mainly in the equipment, machinery production is skill and craft 
intensive, with much of the know-how being tacit, embodied in the engineers and 
technicians that constitute the workforce.
239
 These types of industrial workers were not 
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yet available in Korea in large amounts and low prices. Indeed, they frequently needed 
to be attracted from abroad. 
Hence, the transformation of the Korean industry throughout the 1970s was not 
simply the result of state planning or design. That, in some cases, state intervention 
reinforced already existing private ventures, and that the different branches of the HCI 
sectors exhibited dissimilar performances and varying degrees of commercial success 
despite being promoted in the same form, confirms at least two things. First, that the 
Korean state did not invent the local HCIs from scratch, as already mentioned. 
Secondly, that state support was neither the single nor the most important reason behind 
the impressive process of industrial development in Korea during the 1970s. It was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition, as several authors claim.
240
 In effect, all sectors 
included in the HCI Plan had already received state support without yielding 
significantly positive results. What, then, was the basis of the process of valorisation of 
industrial capitals invested in the branches of production in Korea during the 1970s? 
This, it was argued above, was the availability of large pools of internationally cheap 
and highly disciplined labour-power, whose productivity was being significantly 
enhanced through the use of the increasingly computerised and automated equipment 
available in global markets. Had Korea not had access to that type of labour-power or 
had the technological conditions been different, as they had been during the previous 
decades, the HCI Plan would have not been as successful as it was, if at all. Korean 
industrial capitalists would have, most likely, not been as quiescent with state‘s policies, 
as they allegedly were. 
Korean state actions, then, were a form of realising and mediating the global 
unity of the process of capital accumulation through the NIDL and the concomitant 
determination of Korean capital as producer of several heavy industrial and electronics 
goods for global markets. In other words, the self-regulation of the global process of 
capital accumulation came about through the intervention of the Korean state, 
promoting the local development of those sectors. Furthermore, that most mid-sized 
developing countries, Brazil included, were then promoting the expansion of the heavy 
and chemical industries shows that geopolitical considerations played no specific part 
(other than shaping its ideological forms of realisation) in the successful transformation 
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of those industrial sectors in Korea. Effectively, with the exception of the steel industry, 
the rest of the sectors promoted during the 1970s were not directly related to the theme 
of national security and the production of weapons. 
By the end of the decade, the structure of the Korean industrial sector was 
radically transformed. The participation of the heavy, chemical and electronics 
industries in manufacturing value-added, employment and exports jumped from 45%, 
24% and 12% in 1970 to 56%, 51% and 33% in 1980, respectively.
241
 While these 
industries grew, large-scale individual capitals, both private and publicly owned, also 
emerged. The concentration of industrial capital thus proceeded apace. The chaebol, the 
large-scale privately-owned conglomerates, became increasingly dominant actors in the 
Korean economy throughout the 1970s. For instance, the combined sales of the ten 
largest chaebol increased from 15% of Gross National Product in 1974 to 48% in 1980. 
The participation of the twenty largest chaebol in manufacturing sector sales increased 
from 24.6% in 1974 to 29.3% in 1977 and 36.6% in 1982. The implementation of the 
HCI Plan had indeed been a key part of this transformation.
242
  
Nevertheless, during the 1970s the textile and garment industries remained 
together the largest employers and exporters in the manufacturing sector despite the 
relatively low level of state support received. The situation of the sector, however, was 
not entirely promising. Korean textile firms in the spinning, weaving and knitting 
sectors were losing grounds in world markets, as new technological improvements in 
machinery automation were reducing the advantage of having access to cheap and 
disciplined labour-power. Moreover, in the garments industry, they were facing 
increasing levels of protectionism in OECD countries and the emergence of lower wage 
competitors in Southeast Asia.
243
   
In 1978, the Korean economy was at its peak. Pulled by a strong export 
performance, it was undergoing its third consecutive year of 15% per capita growth. At 
that moment, however, its supporting bases were beginning to crumble. The resources 
to carry on with the HCI Plan were starting to falter as the net inflow of foreign loans, a 
key source of funds for capital formation, was one-half of those entering the economy 
during 1977. By the end of the year, Deputy Prime Minister Nam Duck Woo, one of the 
economic policy leaders during the implementation of the HCI Plan, was replaced by 
                                                 
241
 See Van Liemt (1988: 119); Michell (1988: 36, 41). See also Amsden (1989: 58). 
242
 See Amsden (1989: 116-24) for different indicators of the evolution of market concentration. 
243
 See World Bank (1984: 60-3); World Bank (1987: 148-55). 
 334 
orthodox economist Shin Hyon Hwak of the EPB as a result of rift between those 
branches of the government favouring a review of industrial policy and macroeconomic 
management, and those supporting the continuation of the ‗big push‘ towards industrial 
deepening. Under the new economic policy leadership, the government embarked on the 
planning of a programme to restructure the economy, even if that meant to slow down 
the pace of growth. The new economic strategy was to be focused on the reduction of 
the rate of inflation, most of which had been caused by the rapid expansion of money 
supply related to the financing of the HCI Plan.
244
 
For that purpose, in early 1979, the Comprehensive Stabilisation Programme 
(CSP) was launched three months before the second ‗oil shock‘ rocked the global 
economy. The CSP called for a partial redirection of financial resources from HCIs to 
less favoured sectors such as light manufacturing industries where equipment was 
becoming out-dated. There was also a reduction in the fiscal deficit and the related 
growth of money supply.
245
 The second ‗oil shock‘, the following sharp increase in 
global interest rates, and the concomitant deceleration of the international economy 
radically changed the parameters. The rise in the international cost of credit and the 
price of oil resulted in the increase of Korea‘s import bill and of the cost of financing 
the enlarged current account deficit. With fewer resources to sustain the latter, the 
Korean currency was sharply devalued while domestic interest rates were pushed up. 
Imports then fell and gross fixed capital formation dropped by 12% and 6% in 1980 and 
1981, respectively. Economic growth thus became markedly negative while real wages 
fell by 6.7% and 2.1% in 1980 and 1981, respectively.
246
  
As the economy went into a recession, opposition to Park‘s authoritarian grip re-
emerged and grew stronger. In the National Assembly elections held in December 1978, 
the NDP, the main opposition party, won, for the first time since 1960, the majority of 
contested seats. The Park government, nevertheless, was able to keep control of the 
Assembly through the direct appointments it was entitled to make under the Yusin 
Constitution.
247
 In mid-1979, labour and student unrest mounted once more. The slow 
increase in militancy that had been accompanying the tightening of the labour market 
and the corresponding improvements in labour‘s bargaining power through the 
expansion of the 1970s erupted openly as employment and wage growth came to a halt, 
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this time also including ‗core‘ male workers. The regime responded clumsily by jailing 
Kim Young-sam, NDP‘s new leader, accusing him of ‗instigating against the nation‘.248 
Instead of declining, popular discontent mounted further, notably in the industrial city 
of Pusan, Kim‘s place of origin, where thousands of students and workers, demanding 
Park‘s resignation, clashed with police forces. The government declared martial law in 
Pusan to no avail. It then planned to send the military in large numbers. Park was shot 
dead by the head of the KCIA on October 26
th
, before he could issue the order to the 
troops. At his trial, the KCIA chief claimed that he acted to avoid a major bloodbath.
249
 
At the turn of decade, the Korea economy was, as it had been at its beginning, in 
a deep economic and political crisis. Was this a consequence of a ‗policy mistake‘, 
embodied in the HCI Plan, that reintroduced a development strategy based on ISI which 
not only contrasted to the EOI model of the second half of the 1960s but also reversed 
much of the liberalisation reforms taking then place? Had the HCI Plan been 
overambitious and over-dimensioned, as some authors suggested? Could better and 
most efficient results in terms of industrial development have been achieved without 
extended government intervention, as critics claimed?
250
 Though interesting, these are 
abstract questions. In the first place, the allegedly ISI policies implemented during the 
1970s were not the abstract opposite of the policies implemented in the 1960s. They 
continued the structural transformation started then as a form of realising the global 
integration of capitalism through the international division of labour. They did so by 
incorporating HCIs into Korea‘s manufacturing base. Secondly, extensive state 
intervention was a condition for the development of HCIs in Korea. No internationally 
competitive HCI could have been rapidly developed there without wide-reaching state 
actions fostering the concentration of industrial capital and accelerating the maturation 
of learning processes.
251
 Thirdly, the Korean government could have not known in 
advance which industries or sub-sectors would turn profitable in the long run. It did 
what most developing country states, notably the Brazilian, were doing during the 
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period: it promoted most, if not all, HCIs. As argued above, it had been promoting these 
industries unsuccessfully since the First Five-year Plan was launched in the early 
1960s.
252
 The only singularity of the Korean HCI Plan vis-à-vis those implemented 
elsewhere was that, as the Korean economy was already oriented towards the global 
markets, the state there promoted, in general, and against the advice of international 
cooperation agencies (e.g. the World Bank), the construction of industrial plants with 
the scale necessary to produce for world markets through the introduction of vanguard 
technology.
253
 Nevertheless, POSCO‘s first steel plant was expanded twice until it 
reached the ‗theoretical‘ minimum efficient scale and twice more until it reached the 
average Japanese steel mill capacity. It is doubtful that these expansions would have 
ever taken place had the first stages not been commercially viable. Moreover, the first 
ethylene cracker built in the Ulsan petrochemical complex was half the world-market-
scale and it was only in the late 1970s that a plant of such size would be constructed in 
Yochun.
254
 Conversely, as it will be seen below, industries where overcapacity existed 
would be streamlined subsequently. 
 
End of chapter conclusions 
 
During the 1970s, notably the period 1973-1979, the Brazilian and Korean 
economies underwent a process of high, though irregular, growth and rapid industrial 
‗deepening.‘ The latter was led, in both countries, by ambitious state programmes 
implemented to develop heavy and chemicals industries. After the first ‗oil shock‘ 
manifested itself in the increase in the prices of raw materials and the global supply of 
credit, the Brazilian economy used the enlarged land rent and inflows of interest-bearing 
capital to fund the further development of the local process of import-substituting 
industrialisation. The Korean economy, on the contrary, used available financial 
resources to build-up a heavy industry which tended to have, unlike its Brazilian 
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counterpart, the scale necessary to introduce state-of-the-art technologies and compete 
successfully in global markets after a relatively short period of maturation under state 
protection and subsidisation. Unlike in Brazil, industrial capital had access in Korea to a 
workforce which was not only internationally cheap but also had the skills and 
characteristics that made it highly productive when combined with the increasingly 
automated equipment available in these sectors of industrial production (i.e. the 
attributes of the local labour-force matched the skills required by the emerging 
technological base). 
These distinct characteristics resulted in two other essential differences between 
the ISI policies allegedly implemented in both countries during their ‗big push‘ into 
HCIs. First, in contrast to the Brazilian experience, post-1970 ‗import-substitution‘ 
policies in Korea did not involve any transfer of resources from the primary sector to 
the rest of the economy. Related to this is, usually unnoticed, that the Korean HCI Plan 
was launched before the first ‗oil shock‘ manifested itself in a new commodities boom 
and an expansion of global land rent, while the Brazilian NDP II was launched after that 
event. Secondly, the Korean ‗import-substituting‘ effort during the 1970s did not 
directly affect light industry exports. Korean light manufacturers were not forced to 
purchase their inputs locally as was the case in Brazil. 
Despite the common absence of democratically elected governments, political 
institutions also began to diverge throughout the 1970s, expressing the different 
underlying content of the Korean HCI Plan and the Brazilian NDP II. While the 
Brazilian ‗big push‘ into heavy industry was accompanied by a process of political 
opening, the Korean came about through increased state repression and political closure. 
The former required across-the-board increases in real wages to expand the domestic 
markets in order to absorb the increased output and to reproduce normally an industrial 
workforce performing increasingly complex activities. The latter required the control 
over the evolution of wages paid to semiskilled and unskilled workers and their 
acquiescence over the worsening of working conditions (i.e. the lengthening of the 
working-day and the increase in industrial accidents).  
By the turn of the decade, however, both economies were, despite their specific 
differences, heading for their most severe crisis of the post-war period. The second ‗oil 
shock‘ was followed by the sharp contraction of global credit supply and the slowdown 
of international economic growth. This severely limited the amount financial resources 
available to developing country economies, such as Brazil and Korea, and resulted in 
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the contraction of the global demand for Korean productions and the fall of commodity 
prices and therefore of the Brazilian land rent. 
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Chapter 8 
Brazil and Korea between the Early 1980s and the Early 1990s 
 
Brazil: The ‘lost’ decade (1980-1992) 
 
 During the second half of the 1970s, the Brazilian process of capitalist 
development reproduced itself under enlarging but increasingly unstable bases. The land 
rent and the net inflow of interest-bearing capital expanded strongly but with spasmodic 
movements. The specific limitations of this form of capital accumulation became 
openly evident from 1979 onwards as these bases reduced and policy-makers attempted 
to avoid the inevitable crisis by moving forward. During most of the period between the 
early 1980s and the early 1990s, these bases collapsed almost completely. The clash of 
the Brazilian process of capital accumulation against its specific barrier, given by the 
magnitude of the land rent and complementary sources of extraordinary social wealth 
available for appropriation, became ever more obvious. This was thus a period of 
recurrent economic crises. The Brazilian economy came out of it significantly 
transformed, with its industrial sector in a critical state. The process of industrial 
‗deepening‘, largely accomplished during the 1970s, started to be reversed. 
 In 1981, as the short-lived ‗sugar boom‘ began to recede, the sharp further 
contraction of the land rent available for appropriation was added to that of external 
credits. With these extraordinary sources of social wealth contracting, some policies that 
had mediated their appropriation by industrial capital were watered down while others 
were phased out altogether. As economic policies became increasingly contractive, the 
economy entered into a profound crisis. The military government finally abandoned any 
attempt to hide the real essence of the new economic orientation. Credit was restricted 
on all activities except those related to exports, energy and agriculture. Domestic 
interest rates were increased allegedly to ‗induce‘ Brazilian firms to step-up their 
external borrowing activities. Public sector expenditures, especially investments by state 
enterprises, were curtailed while taxes were increased.
1
 Industrial production, 
consequently, fell sharply and formal employment in the sector contracted. The move, 
however, was not enough to eliminate the public sector deficit, which kept being 
covered through increase in the money supply. Unable to catch up fully with the 
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mounting inflation, real wages in the industrial sector fell slightly after having grown 
8% annual average during 1976-80. In effect, when in 1982 the international crisis 
openly manifested itself in the sharp contraction of aggregate demand (and therefore of 
commodity prices) on a global scale and of credit supply to developing countries, the 
Brazilian economy was already in a profound recession.
2
  
In the midst of the economic crisis, a new wave of social unrest and widespread 
opposition to the military regime emerged. Apart from trade union actions, the regime 
found a new, unforeseen source of active political opposition. Representatives of 
domestically-owned capital were this time not only initiating a new ‗anti-statism‘ 
campaign, but were also openly calling for the restoration of democratic institutions of 
government. The contraction of the economy caused by the collapse of its main bases of 
support, however, could not yet be represented politically by a democratically elected 
government. There was no space for real wage increases and the enlargement of the 
domestic market. On the contrary, the economic crisis was rapidly manifesting itself in 
the opposite needs and the process of political ‗opening‘ would come to a halt. Thanks 
to a creative move reforming yet again the political system and restoring its multi-party 
structure, the regime managed to win marginally legislative, federal and local elections 
held in November 1982. Nevertheless, the opposition, though no longer united under a 
single party banner, won in Brazil‘s industrial heartland, the states of Sao Paulo, Minas 
Gerais and Rio de Janeiro.
3
 
The absolute retraction of the flow of foreign loan capital (which had begun in 
1982 as the ‗debt crisis‘ exploded) enlarged considerably during 1983-1984 when 
commercial banks stopped lending voluntarily to the Brazilian state. The mild recovery 
of the magnitude of land rent, following the weak increase in international commodity 
prices from 1983 onwards, was, in this context, not enough to offset the sharp reversion 
of the flow of interest-bearing capital. The contractive, orthodox ‗stabilisation‘ program 
designed with the agreement of the IMF once the November 1982 elections had passed 
was thus prolonged through 1984.
4
 With no extraordinary social wealth to transfer to 
industrial capital, subsidies granted through public banks and SOEs were cut further as 
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were public sector investments in infrastructure and capital formation.
5
 The currency 
was sharply devalued, thus eliminating another form of direct transference of a portion 
of the land rent to industrial capital. Taxes were imposed on main raw material exports 
in order to reduce the effect of the devaluation on the domestic cost of primary goods 
and to allow the state to capture a portion of the contracting land rent. In this context, 
GDP fell by a further 7.1% (9.3% in per capita terms) in 1983.
6
 Nevertheless, despite its 
‗orthodox‘ rhetoric, the public sector consolidated budget remained in deficit as 
revenues contracted and the increase in external debt servicing could not be 
compensated for by cuts in operational expenditures and capital investment, even if 
commercial debt was partly rescheduled under the umbrella of the agreement with the 
IMF.
7
 Though a portion of the deficit was covered through borrowing in the domestic 
capital markets (i.e. replacing foreign with domestic debt), the rest of it was monetized 
and thus fuelled the inflation rate which reached 200% in 1984.
8
 With the economy in 
deep recession, labour‘s bargaining power weakened and nominal wage increases 
remained unable to catch up with escalating price inflation. As real wages collapsed, 
poverty incidence increased rapidly. The ‗debt crisis‘ manifested itself in an inflationary 
and social crisis.
9
 
Nevertheless, by 1984, led by the sharp expansion of exports, notably of 
intermediate industrial goods benefiting from a renewed US demand, the Brazilian 
economy began to grow again.
10
 This ‗export-led‘ recovery, however, was not the result 
of a sustained increase in raw materials prices, and thus in the magnitude of the land 
rent, or, as it was argued elsewhere, of the improved efficiency of Brazilian industry 
after the ‗structural‘ transformation allegedly undertaken through the NDP II.11 Neither 
did the export-led recovery result simply from the compression of domestic 
‗absorption‘, as suggested by some authors.12 It resulted largely from three other 
factors: the strong ‗promotion‘ of export activities though the undervaluation of the 
currency and export subsidies; the sharp fall in real wages; and, the expansion of rents 
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of mining lands and water resources available for appropriation by industrial capital. 
Each of these factors is analysed immediately below. 
First, in the early 1980s, around 80% of the Brazilian external debt was owed by 
the public sector as it had been contracted mainly by SOEs during the implementation 
of the NDP II or nationalised during the ‗debt crisis.‘13 The state, however, did not 
directly generate enough foreign exchange resources to cover the enlarged external 
public debt. Even SOEs sold most of their output in the domestic markets. In order to 
service its external liabilities, therefore, the state had to buy foreign exchange from 
private sector sources. One part of this foreign exchange was bought using the primary 
budget surpluses generated after the ‗adjustment‘ policies were introduced. Another 
portion was purchased using funds borrowed in the domestic capital market, namely, 
increasing the public sector debt in domestic currency. A third part was acquired 
through the (inflation boosting) method of expanding the monetary base.
14
 The second 
method, unlike the third, artificially expanded the demand for foreign currency and thus 
pushed up its price in the domestic markets, without fuelling the inflation rate. The 
resulting undervaluation of the currency (30% average during 1983-86) ‗subsidised‘, 
and thus helped increase, exports while it acted as a ‗tax‘ on imports, restricting them 
further. In this form, the undervaluation of the exchange rate helped sustain the large 
current account surpluses necessary to pay for the external debts. Moreover, as 
mentioned before, export subsidies remained in effect for several sectors, crucially for 
the motor-vehicles and auto-parts industries.
15
 
Secondly, sharp real wage falls also helped improve the profitability of 
industrial capital in general and softened the impact on their profits of the fiscal 
adjustment required to service the public sector external debt and to accommodate to the 
contraction of the land rent. In effect, after three years of economic crisis, mounting 
unemployment, a new systematic manipulation of the wage adjustment formula and 
tightened political control over trade union activities, in early 1984 both average wages 
in the industrial sector and economy-wide minimum wages were 36% below their late 
1980 peak.
16
 In other words, labour financed another portion of the government and 
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private sector external debts and facilitated private accumulation despite the withdrawal 
of the sources of extraordinary social wealth that had been sustaining it. The 
compression in domestic absorption was the other side of the expansion of exports 
based on a sharp wage compression.  
Thirdly, by then, most of the massive investments in social overhead capital and 
industrial inputs production made under the NDP II, especially in energy generation and 
oil exploration were beginning to come on stream. New infrastructure was expanding 
the energy and mining land rents available for appropriation by industrial capital. 
Favourable natural conditions prevailing in Brazil to generate hydro-electricity implied 
that local production costs of electric energy were below international levels.
17
 These 
extraordinary profits were transferred to industrial capital through the provision of 
electricity at prices below their international levels.
18
 This transfer was of substantial 
importance for energy-intensive industries, such as metal making, aluminium 
production (where electricity accounts for one-third of total costs), cellulose and 
chemicals, which expanded their exports and were leading the recovery.
19
 Furthermore, 
a portion of the land rent, and of foreign loans, which had been used to finance the NDP 
II and to expand the productive capacities of SOEs and the provision of social overhead 
capital, were now being transferred to industrial capital. Despite the administration‘s 
‗orthodox‘ rhetoric, real prices of SOE output fell continuously during the first half of 
the 1980s under the, rather ‗heterodox‘, argument of being a way to control spiralling 
inflation. In other words, the implicit subsidy consisted of the previously invested 
capital.
20
  
 The economic recovery initiated throughout 1984, and the related improvements 
in labour market conditions as the year went by, brought about a new wave of 
demonstrations for the re-establishment of democratic political institutions. The military 
had been losing support consistently during the period of austerity and were thus 
relatively handicapped to represent politically the improvement in economic 
circumstances.
21
 The recently formed Workers‘ Party (PT) related to the independent 
confederation of trade unions, Unified Workers‘ Central (CUT), started rallying for 
immediate, direct presidential elections. The main opposition parties eventually joined 
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the campaign. Despite a succession of massive demonstrations and the widespread 
support it received, the campaign was finally defeated in the government-controlled 
Congress.
22
 
Contrary to the wishes of the vast majority of the population, the transition to a 
democratic regime continued as a gradual and relatively smooth government-controlled 
process. To the surprise of many in the political establishment, perhaps not the military 
in command, Tancredo Neves, the moderate leader of the Party of the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (MDB‘s successor) and ex-Justice Minister of Vargas‘s last 
presidency and ex-Prime Minister in Goulart‘s first parliamentary cabinet, allied with 
members of the ruling party, defeated the official party‘s candidate in an Electoral 
College dominated by representatives of the latter. In only a couple of months the 
official party faded away as the Democratic Social Party (the successor of the ARENA) 
split over the candidate for the presidency, and the military government did not do much 
to avoid the collapse of the regime.
23
 Though a civilian would assume the presidency of 
Brazil for the first time since 1964, the direct election of the head of state and 
government would had to wait until 1990. President-elect Neves unexpectedly died 
before being sworn in. He was replaced by his deputy, Jose Sarney, a right-of-the-centre 
politician from the poverty-stricken northeast of the country who, six months before the 
election, had been a top member of party of the military. Sarney, nevertheless, 
introduced no changes and formed a government with the ministers already selected by 
Neves.
24
 
When the Sarney government assumed the presidency in 1985, economic 
recovery was well underway and the expansion of exports was already resulting in the 
revitalisation of domestic demand for equipment and labour. This, in turn, was bringing 
about a substantial recovery of real wages, notably in the most dynamic parts of the 
manufacturing sector where, helped by the political opening, they grew by 13% and 
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partly compensated the previous drop.
25
 As the domestic markets revitalized, in 
particular the demand for durable-consumer goods, economic growth accelerated 
markedly.
 26
 The bases of this expansion were, however, weaker than ever before. With 
land rent and net interest-bearing capital inflows dropping to a new minimums, as 
global economic growth slowed sharply in 1985, fiscal austerity and tight credit policies 
continued through the beginning of the new government. The inflation rate, 
nevertheless, remained high and growing as an increasing part of the public sector 
deficit was being monetised. In a desperate effort to bring inflation down, in March 
prices were frozen by decree of the Minister of Finance, Francisco Dornelles. Though 
timid, this would be the first of a long series of unsuccessful experiments with 
‗heterodox‘ methods of inflation control.27 
Inflation rates went down momentarily. As soon as prices were unfrozen in 
June, they sped up again. As would become common thereafter, the failure of the 
stabilisation programme cost the head of the Minister of Finance his job. In August, 
Dornelles was replaced by Dilson Funaro, an economist strongly identified with João 
Sayad, the Minister of Planning, who favoured a full-fledged ‗heterodox‘ approach to 
the problem of inflation. Echoing Furtado‘s structuralist hopes in the early 1960s, this, it 
was claimed, would stop the inflationary process without a recession. By early 1986, 
economic policies began to recover some of their pre-debt-crisis shape when the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (due to the expansion of exports and the 
reduction of international interest rates and oil prices) gave way to the implementation 
of the ‗heterodox‘ Cruzado Plan in order to curb the spiralling inflation without 
contractive measures.
28
 Under the then fashionable argument that inflation was ‗inertial‘ 
(i.e. self-reproducing and perpetuating), prices were frozen at their February level in 
order to ‗change‘ the general public‘s ‗expectations‘ about their future evolution. 
However, while the price of foreign exchange and most SOE output were immediately 
frozen (the sole exception being electricity for industrial use which was thought to be 
grossly misaligned), wages received a previous boost of up to 23%. Domestic 
consumption thus increased sharply, notably of durable-consumer goods, while 
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industrial production costs fell. Public investments in infrastructure and capital 
formation grew again for the first time in years.
29
 
 Economic growth continued strongly during the first half of 1986 while inflation 
decreased substantially.
30
 The latter, however, was only due to the unsustainable price 
freeze. Controls on prices, especially of SOE output, were eliminated as soon as the 
November state and legislative elections had passed and the governing party, the 
PMDB, secured a landslide. Inflation rocketed as the government had not stopped 
monetizing deficits, further increased during the period of price freeze.
31
 Moreover, the 
net outflow of interest-bearing capital remained significant, amounting, as in 1985, to 
more than 6% of all surpluses produced in the Brazilian economy.
32
 
By the end of 1986, inflation was out of control again and the government had to 
prepare a fiscal adjustment package. The process of economic growth begun in 1984 
was coming to a halt as a consequence of its own limited bases. Sharp increases in real 
wages (33% average in the industrial sector) occurred during 1984-86, partially fed by 
the adjustment mechanism included in the Cruzado Plan and allowed by the new 
political institutions, were undermining the international competitiveness of industrial 
exports and hurting the profitability of industrial capital in general.
33
 In effect, after 
recovering in 1984, the rate of profit of industrial capital fell continuously thereafter.
34
 
In addition, harvest failure was reducing exports of agrarian goods,
35
 and the agrarian 
land rent in general, while the sharp fall in the price of oil reduced the international cost 
of producing energy and, therefore, the rent springing from the monopoly of water 
resources (i.e. the advantage of having access to low-cost electricity). The trade surplus 
shrank sharply. Under these conditions, the Brazilian state could no longer service its 
massive external debt. In February 1987, the unilateral moratorium on interest payments 
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due to commercial banks was declared, further expressing the limits of the Brazilian 
process of capitalist development. Funaro, the Minister of Finance, was replaced by 
Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, one the intellectual fathers of the theory of ‗inertial 
inflation‘.36 
In June 1987, Bresser Pereira launched yet another attempt to control inflation, 
the Plan for Economic Stabilisation, mixing ‗orthodox‘ and ‗heterodox‘ measures. This 
time, unlike in early 1986, the economy was already in a deep recession. Export growth 
was only slowly recovering while domestic demand was falling. The Bresser Plan was 
indeed a recessionary version of the Cruzado Plan. Wages and rents were frozen. The 
former not only did not receive any previous real increase, as was the case when the 
Cruzado Plan was launched, but they were subsequently adjusted by a specific 
indexation method that in practise fell behind the inflation rate. Consequently, real 
wages in the industrial sector fell 7% during 1987. Public services and state-controlled 
prices were frozen for a period of three months after being realigned allegedly to avoid 
the residual inflationary pressures that had supposedly occurred during the Cruzado 
Plan. Moreover, unlike during the latter, public sector deficit was to be cut as real prices 
of goods and services provided by SOEs were increased sharply, and money supply 
tightened (interest rates were kept at relatively high positive levels to control aggregate 
demand).
37
 Additionally, the Bresser Plan also included a moderate reduction of import 
tariffs,
38
 further expressing the strangulation of the process of accumulation of industrial 
capital (through import-substitution) as its limited bases of support collapsed. As its 
predecessor, the Bresser Plan ended prematurely as the economy contracted and 
inflation exploded as soon as prices were unfrozen.
39
 
By 1988, the shape of the Brazilian economy had gone from bad to worse. 
Though primary goods prices had slightly recovered, and agrarian production remained 
strong, the new tightening of international credit supply that followed the 1987 crashes 
in the US and European financial markets was increasing the magnitude of capital 
outflows from the Brazilian economy.
40
 During 1988, as external debt servicing was re-
established, interest-bearing capital outflows amounted to around 15% of all surpluses 
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produced in the local economy and were far larger than (almost three times as much as) 
the magnitude of the land rent appropriated by economic ‗agents‘ other than 
landowners.
41
 To channel these resources out of the country, economic policies became 
increasingly recessive. Mailson Ferreira da Nobrega replaced Bresser Pereira and 
implemented a broad adjustment plan, euphemistically called ‗policy of beans and rice‘ 
(the two basic staple foods in Brazil). The main goal of the plan was to cut the 
consolidated public sector deficit from 8% of GDP to 4% in order to reduce money 
supply growth and to bring down the inflation rate to 15% per month. Wages of public 
sector employees were frozen while state-firm prices increased.
42
 The annual rate of 
inflation, nevertheless, jumped to 682%. GDP and industrial value-added collapsed by 
7% while average real wages in the manufacturing sector fell a further 8%.
43
 
 In the middle of the recession, and after two years of legislative work, a new 
Constitution was promulgated in order to consolidate the political, economic and social 
institutions of the democratic system that was taking shape. When it emerged, the 1988 
Constitution was an expression of a bygone time. Its writers had been elected in 1986 
when the democratisation process reached a climax and the economy boomed. This was 
no longer the case when it came to light. The Constitution set new responsibilities for 
the state in terms of economic development promotion, impose limits to foreign capital 
involvement in the economy, and introduced new (or reinstated old) employment 
regulations that increased the price of labour-power. All of these would be changed 
speedily a few years later. Moreover, the Constitution also aimed at correcting the 
patterns of income inequality and widespread poverty developed during the military 
regime (1964-1985) through the universalisation of access to social security.
44
 In reality, 
despite its ambitious goals in this regard, the 1988 Constitution would merely provide 
the institutional framework for the emergence of diverse ‗safety nets‘. These would 
become necessary to avoid the worsening of these patterns of social exclusion rather 
than to reverse them. The Brazilian democratic opening would not express, and mediate 
politically, the long-term improvements in the conditions of reproduction of the labour-
force, as would the case in Korea. On the contrary, it would administer the long-term 
deterioration of these conditions. 
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Like its predecessors, Ferreira da Nobrega‘s plan never managed to control 
inflation or, its underlying causes, namely, the large public sector deficit caused by the 
contraction of the land rent and, crucially, the servicing of the massive external debt 
accumulated during the 1970s. In January 1989, it was replaced by the Summer Plan 
which attempted, again, to combine ‗orthodox‘ and ‗heterodox‘ measures. Spending 
cuts and tight monetary policy were implemented together with a new price freeze that 
produced a fall in the real prices of SOE output.
45
 For the first time since 1982, the 
payment of the external debt did not require a portion of the normal surpluses produced 
in the economy. The magnitude of the land rent expanded strongly as primary 
production increased by more than 12% and international prices of primary goods 
recovered further.
46
 The net outflow of interest-bearing capital remained, however, 
substantial, equivalent to almost all the land rent appropriated with other economic 
actors than landowners (8.6% of the economy‘s surpluses). The economy, then, 
managed to recover, growing 4.5% (2.5% in per capita terms) after two years of deep 
recession. Value-added in manufacturing increased 2% and real wages in that sector 
recovered by 3%.
47
 This mild recovery, however, would not last long. The global 
economy was then entering into a new phase of slow growth which would manifest 
itself in a violent contraction of economic activity in Brazil. 
Already through the latter part of 1989, the bases of support of the Brazilian 
process of capital accumulation would severely weaken again. As the international 
recession deepened further, global demand slowed and the prices of raw materials 
produced in Brazil began to fall rapidly after their short-lived recovery. Consequently, 
much like the previous ‗stabilisation‘ programs, the Summer Plan failed to control 
inflation. After more than two years of negative real interest rates on the domestic 
public debt, the Brazilian state was finding it increasingly difficult to finance its deficit 
with fresh loans. As a consequence, the maturity of the public debt shortened 
substantially, most of it was renewed overnight.
48
 Moreover, government attempts to 
cut public sector expenditures by reducing its workforce and closing down SOEs were 
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met with fierce political and trade union opposition.
49
 The expansion of the momentary 
base necessary to compensate for the lack of funding reached massive values, 1754% in 
1989; the inflationary process became then a full blown hyperinflation.
50
 In the middle 
of the crisis, Fernando Collor de Melo, a businessman from a oligarchic family from the 
poverty-stricken Northeast and ex-mayor for ARENA, ex-deputy for PSD and ex-
governor for PMDB, representing a coalition of right-of-the-centre parties, including 
Sarney‘s PFL, defeated PT‘s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva on the promise to ‗reform‘ the 
Brazilian state by cutting waste and eliminating inefficiency and endemic corruption. 
Echoing Quadros, the last democratically-elected President, corruption and inefficiency 
were signal by Collor as the structural causes of the rampant inflation rate. Ironically, 
much like Quadros, Collor presented himself as an ‗outsider‘ against the traditional 
political elite, despite being supported, though for a brief period, by its most entrenched 
elements. The support of mainstream mass media was, as always, vital in securing his 
electoral victory.
51
 
In 1990, when Collor assumed office, the economy was in the worst of all 
possible worlds. After the short-lived recovery of 1988-1989, the magnitude of the land 
rent available for appropriation in Brazil was failing together with international 
commodity prices. Global demand for raw materials was weakening as world economic 
growth slowed sharply. External credit markets were still closed to Brazil and, as 
international financial markets tightened further, the outflow of interest-bearing capital 
remained substantial. In 1990, it was equivalent to 3.5% of all surpluses produced in the 
economy, taking a third of the land rent appropriated by others than landowners.
52
 
Domestic credit markets were not willing to continue financing a portion of the public 
sector operational deficit either, as real interest rates on the public debt issued in local 
currency remained on negative grounds.
53
 Recourse to money printing was then fuelling 
the hyperinflationary process and eroding the undervaluation of the exchange rate, thus 
reducing the capacity of the economy to generate current account surpluses and service 
its external liabilities. 
The 1980s had witnessed the dramatic clash of the Brazilian process of capital 
accumulation against its specific quantitative limit given by the magnitude of land rent 
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available for appropriation. This clash manifested itself in the impossibility of the 
economy to return to its previous path of rapid growth under pre-1980 bases. Moreover, 
as had been the case in the industrially advanced countries during the 1970s, during the 
1980s the Brazilian economy increasingly found itself with a structure (at least in the 
mainstream industrial sector) of relatively undifferentiated remunerations and 
conditions of labour-force reproduction that no longer corresponded to the composition 
of skills being required. Though lagging behind world markets standards, the 
introduction of automated and computerised technologies also accelerated in Brazil 
during the 1980s.
54
 As always in a process of social reproduction autonomously 
regulated through market transactions and forces, where the norm realises through 
deviations from the trend, the adjustment of the Brazilian economy to its new conditions 
was avoided as much as it was possible. During the short tenure of Collor de Melo 
(1990-1992), most of the adjustments that had been postponed during the 1980s would 
be undertaken or set in motion. In terms of economic activity, this process would be 
more disruptive than any other since the crisis of the early 1930s. The adjustment of the 
economy would mean that the scale of accumulation of industrial capital (i.e. the sheer 
size and ‗depth‘ of the industrial sector) would be reduced and that it would thereafter 
be permanently sustained by a third source of extraordinary social wealth, namely, the 
general payment of labour-power below its value. Collor‘s economic programme had 
several parts, realizing together these transformations. The Collor Plan included a new 
price freeze, the compulsory nationalisation of private bank deposits, trade 
liberalisation, and a program to ‗reform‘ the state.55 
First, all prices, including wages, were frozen at the level of 12
th
 March 1990. 
They would be adjusted at a later date according to the ‗expected‘ rate of inflation, to be 
set by the government. In the case of wages, it was specified that if the inflation rate 
differed from the government-set ‗expected‘ one, workers and employers could 
negotiate wage adjustments accordingly. 
Secondly, a monetary reform was included in the Collor Plan through which not 
only the unit of account was replaced, as in several other ‗stabilisation‘ plans 
implemented throughout the 1980s, but also bank assets were frozen and de facto 
nationalised. By presidential decree all private and business bank accounts were frozen 
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for a period of 18 months, and stringent restrictions were applied to their use. The 
frozen funds were then deposited in the Central Bank. As the interest paid on these 
loans was lower than the inflation rate, still high as part of the deficit continued being 
monetized, this ‗reform‘ brought about a massive transfer of social wealth to the public 
sector and helped reduce, at in least in the short term, its operating deficit.
56
 Moreover, 
in this way, the state managed to reduce substantially its previously accumulated stock 
of internal debt, which it had found increasingly difficult to refinance voluntarily.
57
 
 Thirdly, measures were taken to transform a fiscal deficit of 8% of GDP into a 
surplus of 1-2% by the end of 1990. Specific measures included: a new tax on financial 
transactions; a three-day bank holiday during which the public debt was not indexed; 
increases in the prices of goods and services provided by SOEs; cuts on state subsidies 
to private companies; sharp reductions on state expenditures in universal public 
services; a drastic reduction on public sector employment; and the privatisation of 
publicly-owned companies in the steel, petrochemical and fertilizers sectors which 
raised US$ 5.1 billion during 1990-92.
58
 Furthermore, the Brazilian state also 
unilaterally limited, once more, its foreign debt service payments, thus partly defaulting 
on the debt.
59
 
Fourthly, a fully-fledged trade opening programme was implemented under the 
claim that cheaper imports and increased foreign competition in the domestic markets 
would both improve local firms‘ international competitiveness and help reduce the 
inflation rate. This contrasted with the timid liberalisation efforts begun in 1987. The 
average tariff was to be reduced from 32.2% in 1990 to 14.2% at the beginning of 
1994.
60
 Between 1990 and 1992, the effective average tariff on industrial imports was 
reduced from 47.9% to 31.5%, and would be reduced further to 23.3% in 1993. More 
important, non-tariff protection was fully eliminated.
61
 From then onwards, industrial 
policy would allegedly be focused on increasing industrial competitiveness through soft 
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loans and tax credits financing technological upgrading and R&D investments.
62
 The 
land rent was no longer sufficient to sustain a highly diversified but inefficient (for 
world markets standards) industrial sector. 
The recessionary impact of the Collor Plan was sharp, immediate, and 
widespread. The National Confederation of Industries, representing Brazil‘s largest 
private firms, estimated that in the two weeks following its introduction, economic 
activity declined by 24% while the industrial workforce was reduced by half a million 
in four weeks. In only one month capital goods production fell by 36% while the 
demand for non-durable consumer goods collapsed, negatively affecting their 
production and thus reducing the capacity utilisation rate in that sector from 81% in 
January to 53% in April. Capital utilisation rate in the transportation and capital goods 
sectors also dropped substantially, declining by 46% and 26%, respectively.
63
 
Against this backdrop, GDP and industrial value-added contracted by 11.5% and 
31%, respectively. Employment in the industrial sector collapsed and real wages fell 
sharply (around 17% in 1990) as the government expected rate of inflation constantly 
underestimated the real one.
64
 In reaction to this, trade union militancy and strike 
activities increased, though without much success. Furthermore, despite this massive 
contraction in aggregate demand, inflation was not tamed. As soon as price controls 
were lifted in July 1990, the inflation rate spiked again as the continuous monetisation 
of public sector‘s budget deficit had kept reducing the purchasing power of the Cruzado 
Novo. On 31
st
 January 1991, in the face of a monthly inflation rate of 20%, the widely 
anticipated Collor Plan II was finally implemented. The heart of the Plan was yet 
another price freeze and the introduction of regulations for wage adjustments and 
interest paid on the public sector domestic debt that would, again, underestimate the rate 
of inflation. The Plan also required private banks to use part of their deposits to 
purchase government debt. In conjunction, these measures accomplished the second de 
facto nationalisation of financial assets by the Collor government. As the first Collor 
Plan, the second also included a further fiscal adjustment, increasing the prices of goods 
and services provided by state-owned companies and cutting subsidies granted to the 
private sector. As the previous plan, the Collor II drove the economy deeper into 
recession without stopping the inflationary process. By May the Plan was already 
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widely regarded as finished. Collor replaced Finance Minister Celia Cardoso do Mello 
(no connection with the President) with Marques Moreira, who promised to end the 
‗heterodox‘ experiments and return to more ‗orthodox‘ prescriptions for fighting 
inflation.
65
 
Time, however, was running out for Collor de Melo. In the middle of a new 
economic crisis, Collor was removed from office in late September 1992 and impeached 
at the end of that year on charges of corruption (first denounced by his own brother), 
something he had promised to eradicate. As had happened with Quadros, the other 
‗maverick‘ President, very few stood up to defend him in Congress or anywhere else. 
Collor was replaced by his deputy, Itamar Franco who continued with the various 
reforms initiated under Collor‘s leadership.66 When Collor de Melo left office, the 
Brazilian economy was again on a downward path; growth was substantially negative, 
wages‘ purchasing power collapsing and hyperinflation spiralling again. 
During 1980-92, the Brazilian economy underwent a period of recurrent crises 
which manifested themselves in an out-of-control inflationary process. The combined 
mass of land rent and net interest-bearing capital inflows available for appropriation 
were then contracting as international commodity prices collapsed and capital markets 
remained closed for Latin American countries like Brazil. The contraction of land rent 
severely affected the profitability of domestic-markets-oriented industrial capital and 
state resources, while the large-scale outflow of capital resulted in a strong increase in 
public sector expenditures. As a result, the dismantling of state-led ISI policies that had 
started at the beginning of the decade, and had been partly reversed in 1985-86, 
accelerated after the 1987 balance-of-payments crisis, crucially during 1990-92. The 
partial, though increasing, monetisation of the massive public sector deficit, in turn, fed 
the ill-contained inflationary process. As will be seen below, inflation would only be 
tamed in the mid-1990s, when its structural determining factor, the servicing of the 
public sector debt, was managed either through fresh external loans, increased taxation, 
expenditure cuts or a combination of them. Nevertheless, during the 1980s, the 
inflationary process was instrumental in reducing real wages and increasing profits, thus 
passing the burden of debt-servicing onto the working-class. The crucial problem was 
that the external debt contracted during the 1970s had been used to complement the land 
rent in sustaining the process of accumulation (i.e. valorisation on an expanded scale) of 
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an industrial capital which was incapable of selling its output in the world market and 
thus genuinely generating, as in Korean, the flow of foreign exchange necessary to 
repay its external liabilities. 
 
Korea: From the economic crisis to the ‘growth recession’ (1980-1992)  
 
The assassination of President Park was followed by a period of political 
opening similar to the one that followed the end of Rhee‘s autocratic, repressive regime. 
Demonstrations for a democratic opening spread across the country, notably among 
university students.
67
 As in 1960-61, these proved to be ineffective and short-lived. As 
the global crisis worsened further, the Korean economy deteriorated fast and a 
democratically elected government was not quite suited to mediate politically the 
current moment in the process of capital accumulation. Real wage cuts and the 
extension of the working-day would be necessary to compensate for the negative effect 
on capital profitability of the cooling of export markets and the tightening of 
international credit markets. As many times before, the quick worsening in the 
conditions of purchase and use of labour-power would come about through increased 
political repression. 
In January 1980, a ‗stabilisation‘ package supported by a two-year IMF stand-by 
agreement was implemented. As external credit was drying up, crucially long-term 
commercial loans, the exchange rate was devalued and fiscal and credit policies became 
increasingly tight. The prevailing higher oil prices were passed through to consumers 
and the inflation rate increased to 28.7% despite the ensuing recession.
68
 The sharp 
reversal of economic policies, through the ‗stabilisation‘ program, thus resulted in the 
further deterioration of business activities.
69
 In mid-1980, one year and a half after the 
beginning the recession, the economy was facing its most severe downturn since the end 
of the Korean War. Political institutions would become increasingly authoritarian rather 
than democratic.
70
 
In May, General Chun Doo-Hwan, KCIA Director, led a military coup that 
removed from power Prime Minister Choi who, though in charge of the Presidency 
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according to the rules of succession dictated by the Yusin Constitution, had already 
became a puppet of the military. Like Park before him, in late May 1980, Chun set up 
the Special Committee for National Security, reformed the Constitution, maintaining the 
indirect election of the president, and got himself selected to the post soon after. The 
coup leaders also took over Park‘s DRP, changing its name to Democratic Justice Party 
(DJP). Pro-democracy movements erupted across the country, led by university students 
and ‗intellectual‘ (i.e. white-collar and highly skilled) workers. Manual labourer 
militancy also increased as the economic crisis was hurting pay and employment 
conditions across-the-board. In the end, Chun‘s government did what Park‘s had not 
managed to do a year earlier when the economic crisis was beginning to unfold. It 
openly, violently and decisively repressed the mounting civil opposition. In contrast to 
the October 1979 events, when Park was killed by the KCIA chief, nobody stood up to 
stop Chun.
71
   
As popular discontent with the government‘s anti-democratic move grew 
stronger, notably among university students, the Chun administration declared martial 
law in May 1980, as Park had done on many similar occasions. Demonstrations 
disappeared everywhere, except in the country‘s less prosperous region, the south-
western Cholla province. The government responded to the violation of martial law by 
isolating Cholla‘s capital, Kwangju, and sending Special Warfare troops rather than 
crowd control police forces. Some of these elite forces belonged to the units stationed in 
the frontier with North Korea under the joint command of the US Army. Repressive 
forces and demonstrators clashed several times. The conflict lasted a week and ended 
when the army, under presidential order, put forward the deadliest of its offensives on 
May 27, opening fire indiscriminately and bayoneting to death unarmed civilians. 
Estimates of the deaths occurring during the Kwangju massacre range from 200 to 2000 
according to the source. Organised opposition to the regime ended abruptly.
72
 
  The Kwangju massacre was followed by a ‗purification‘ campaign reminiscent 
of that pursued by Park as soon as he took power twenty years before Chung. National 
Assembly members, civil servants, businessmen and, crucially, non-compliant trade 
union leaders were charged with the alleged crime of having contributed to the current 
state of corruption and ‗social malaise‘. In practice, the campaign removed any 
remaining institutional opposition to the regime. The ‗purification‘ campaign was so 
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drastic that the World Bank complained that it could affect the normal functioning of 
the Korean state.
73
 Moreover, on late October, also like Park in 1961, the Chun 
government dissolved all political parties and replaced the National Assembly with the 
Legislative Council for National Security which soon after passed several bills banning 
opposition politicians and increasing press censorship.
74
 
As the violent reshuffle finished, a new team of economic policy-makers was 
brought in. Some of its members had already actively taken part in the stabilisation 
programmes of 1979. All were loyal believers of the ‗free markets‘ dogma and critical 
of the industrialisation programme of the 1970s. They argued that the type of state 
intervention behind the latter had severely distorted the allocation of Korea‘s limited 
resources and, consequently, created industries that were incapable of surviving 
commercially without strong and continuous support from the public sector. This 
situation, they claimed, amplified the effects of the international crisis on the Korean 
economy. To correct it, a liberalisation reform and restructuring programme, notably 
involving the chaebol, was recommended.
75
 
Effectively, crisis management included an ‗industrial restructuring‘ 
programme, which imposed forced mergers and market segmentations in the industries 
which were most seriously suffering from overcapacity: power-generating equipment, 
automobiles, diesel engine, heavy electrical machinery, electronic switching system, 
and copper smelting.
76
 Competing and overlapping product lines were eliminated, 
sometimes because of superior efficiency, in other occasions simply because of stronger 
lobby power.
77
 Though the early and, to lesser extent, the later Chun years are 
frequently considered as the complete opposite of the previous period in terms of 
economic policy-making,
78
 there was an intrinsic unity between both which further 
proves the argument presented above regarding the relationship between states and 
markets. Changes in policy-making, whether completely departing from past directions 
or simply correcting them, almost always come about throughout or after periods of 
economic hardship or crisis. In other words, the self-regulating process of capital 
accumulation through market transaction realises itself through ‗trial and error‘ 
interventions of nation-states. 
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Apart from continuing with the ‗stabilisation‘ and industrial restructuring 
programmes, the new government‘s economic agenda also included the partial 
liberalisation of the financial sector. The Fifth Five-year Economic and Social 
Development Plan for 1982-86, formulated during 1981, condensed and expressed the 
new direction in economic policy. The Plan would aim at ‗structural adjustment‘ in the 
HCIs by phasing out most support measures and opening up the domestic markets. 
Moreover, it was the first five-year plan to include the word ‗social‘ in its title. The Plan 
also aimed at expanding state investments in education and social welfare.
79
 
Starting in 1982, the financial sector was partly liberalised. Publicly-owned 
commercial banks were privatized and restrictions on the development of non-banking 
financial institutions (NBFIs) were relaxed. Though efforts were made to avoid 
concentrated ownership, the chaebol managed to gain control of the largest part of these 
financial institutions. There was also a related partial opening of the capital account of 
the balance-of-payments by increasing the number of industries that were allowed to 
borrow in international financial markets and allowing more foreign banks to establish 
subsidiaries in Korea.
80
 
As in the early 1970s, the change in the direction of state policies also included 
reshaping labour market institutions. Apart from the persecution of trade union leaders 
during the ‗purification‘ programme, in late 1980 labour-related laws were revised and 
trade unions were reorganised in order further to restrict their political power. The 
revised Trade Union and Labour Dispute Laws deepened the changes introduced during 
the Park regime. First, they limited the freedom of labour to organise unions by 
requiring them to be supported by 30 workers or 20% of the total workshop members, 
and by reinforcing state‘s power to refuse the establishment of unions. Secondly, the 
new laws de jure transformed the overall union structure from industry-level to 
individual firm-level; ‗third-party‘ interventions in labour disputes, including those by 
union federations, were banned. In addition, in order to ‗encourage‘ cooperation 
between employees and employers, a law was enacted, mandating the establishment of 
Labour-Management councils in individual enterprises with 100 or more employees. 
Although the law did not legally confer wage-negotiations functions to the councils, 
these gradually took them over, de facto replacing trade unions.
81
 Moreover, to keep 
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wage growth under control, the Chun government also introduced ‗guidelines‘ for 
private sector wage adjustments and pecuniary punishments for non-compliant firms.
82
 
The sharp increase in global interest rates between 1980 and 1982, and the 
concomitant tightening of the credit markets, resulted in the reduction of net inflows of 
loan capital to Korea, even when the country had access to ‗special‘ Japanese support.83 
Following the global trend, real interest rates for corporate loans in Korea increased 
from -10.7% in 1980 to 12.06% in 1982 (from -8.7% to 2.8% for state-controlled loans). 
The increase in the cost of credit was most pronounced in the informal ‗curb‘ market, 
where even large companies getting official support for their fixed capital investments 
had to borrow frequently to cover their requirements for current expenditures. Real 
interest rates there almost doubled between 1981 and 1982 to reach 26% p.a.
84
 As in 
1972, local firms began to default on their loans and the ‗curb‘ market went to yet 
another crisis, this time even involving cronies of the president and his family, who had 
been behind a massive fraudulent money lending scheme.
85
 
With limited resources to fund capital formation and export markets in 
recession, the Korean economy underwent a period of relatively slow growth. GDP per 
capita fell by 6.9% in 1980 and grew merely 1.7% in 1981. It only began to speed up 
through 1982, growing 5.5% in real terms. The crisis was particularly acute in the 
manufacturing sector. During 1980 and 1981, industrial employment fell by 10% while 
real wages in this sector dropped 9%, and working hours increased reversing the mild 
downward trend of the previous years.
86
 Increased political repression, together with the 
reformed labour laws, limited the emergence of any significant form of social unrest.
87
 
By 1983, however, the growth rate of the Korean economy was already shooting 
up again. Pulled by the strong recovery of industrially advanced economies, exports of 
manufactured goods, such as steel, ships, consumer electronics, and automobiles, 
expanded rapidly.
88
 In sharp contrast to the contemporary Brazilian experience, between 
1983 and 1988 the Korean economy grew at an average of 11.3% per year. This 
                                                 
82
 See Haggard and Moon (1900: 223-24); Kim (1994: 214-16). 
83
 See Hart-Landsberg (1993: 195-96) on Japan‘s financial help to Korea. 
84
 See table C.35 in Appendix C. 
85
 See Nam (1991: 218) on the increase in borrowing costs. See Haggard and Collins (1994: 85); Clifford 
(1998: 194-200) on the ‗curb‘ market crisis. 
86
 See graphs 4.4 and 4.10 in Chapter 4 on growth performance and real wage evolution, respectively. See 
Koo (2001: 48-50) on the evolution of hours worked in manufacturing. 
87
 See Kim (2000: 78-80). 
88
 See Clifford (1998: 241-3). On the expansion of ship exports during the 1980s, see Jonsson (1995: 86-
9). 
 360 
impressive performance mimicked the evolution of the global economy, notably the 
USA, as the Korean process of capital accumulation was heavily dependent on 
industrial exports. Indeed, economic growth only slowed in 1985, following the 
evolution of overseas markets, especially in the USA. So sensitive was the Korean 
process of capital accumulation to these developments that when US GDP growth fell 
from 6.6 % in 1984 to 3.6% in 1985, Korean industrial exports contracted by 4% and 
business failures spread across the national economy, including the collapse of the 
Kukje Group at the time the sixth largest chaebol.
89
 Nevertheless, despite the 1985 
slowdown, Korean exports almost trebled during the boom years of the 1980s. The rate 
of profit of industrial capital doubled between 1980 and 1987.
90
 This despite the decline 
in exports of construction services to the Middle East due to the sharp fall in the price of 
oil, and the increased cost of Korean labour.
91
  
This performance was more impressive when considering that, in contrast to the 
previous export-led growth experience, during the second part of the 1980s the Korean 
economy did not have access to foreign savings to finance capital formation. Global 
capital markets remained tight for developing countries, Korea included.
92
 Indeed, a 
portion of the domestic savings, which already averaged 36.5% of GDP during 1986-
90,
93
 was used to cancel part of the country‘s external liabilities.94 Without the 
permanent inflow of loan capital to finance a portion of capital formation, as it had been 
the case before 1983, the Won was devalued further. Exports then boomed and the trade 
account deficit was slowly reduced. In 1985-86 the Won was sold at a price that 
reflected its purchasing parity power for the first time and the trade account became 
positive.
95
 The stock of the Korean external debt fell by a massive 30% between 1985 
and 1989.
96
 
As economic growth accelerated, some of the policies or institutional changes 
implemented during the 1980-82 recession were partly or fully reversed, indicating that 
they had been a form of realising the economic crisis through the mediation of the state. 
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The group of ‗puritan‘ young officials that had gained prominence during the purges of 
the early days of Chun‘s government returned to the barracks and the economists in 
charge of the stabilisation programme regained authority within the bureaucracy.
97
 
Moreover, in 1986 the latter were replaced by less orthodox peers. Kim Mahn-Je, a 
proponent of more expansionist policies, took command of the EPB. Calls for stability 
were gradually replaced by a renewed emphasis on economic growth and 
employment.
98
 A process of political liberalisation slowly started in late 1983 and gave 
place to a period of increased mobilisation of different sectors of the ‗civil society‘, 
notably of white-collar and ‗intellectual‘ workers. These were increasingly demanding 
the restoration of democratic institutions of governments. Unions of male blue-collar 
HCI workers, though, remained relatively marginal in the process. In the 1985 National 
Assembly elections, called by the Chun government hoping the economic recovery 
would improve its chances of gaining popular support, the opposition parties obtained a 
substantial majority of the vote.
99
 Real wages recovered what they had lost during the 
years of recession. However, in contrast to the developments in other parts of the 
national economy, working hours in manufacturing kept growing until peaking in 
1986.
100
 Finally, the privatisation of non-banking public companies initiated in the early 
1980s was frozen until 1987, when the economic recovery was well under way and the 
Chun government was coming to an end. Even then only a small fraction of the shares 
of a few companies (e.g. POSCO, Korea Telecommunications) were offered for sale in 
a move which, unlike in the banking sector, seemed more a political gesture than a 
radical change in policy as was then the case in the industrially advanced countries.
101
  
Other policy shifts were maintained or even reinforced, indicating that they 
expressed a change in the forms of realisation of the Korean process of capitalist 
development that went beyond the crisis that triggered their implementation. These 
included the deepening of the import liberalisation programme and the devaluation of 
the exchange rate. Yet, these reforms did not entail a structural change in the underlying 
essential characteristics of the Korean economy. With the exchange rate no longer 
overvalued, the 1980s witnessed the almost continuous removal of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions to imports. This was now needed to make imports used in 
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exportable productions possible. Moreover, by then most of those sectors and 
companies promoted during the 1970s HCIs drive had shown their commercial 
potentialities and developed successfully, like the steel, electronics and shipbuilding 
industries, or failed altogether, like parts of the heavy industrial machinery, non-ferrous 
metals and chemical industries. In either case, they no longer required high protection 
from foreign competition. On the contrary, those industries that were still ‗maturing‘, 
notably the motor-vehicle sector and the microelectronics industry, kept being guarded 
from external competitors when necessary.
102
  
The deregulation of the local financial sector also continued throughout the 
1980s.
103
 Commercial banks were fully privatised and NBFIs were allowed to flourish 
rapidly. Interest rates in this latter branch of the financial sector were increasingly freed 
and, consequently, the share of total deposits it captured grew markedly, doubling from 
29% in 1980 to 46% in 1985 and 59% in 1990.
104
 These NBFIs became the main source 
of capital for those chaebol in sectors which had no longer access to soft ‗policy loans.‘ 
This marked the practical end of the ‗curb‘ financial market. On the contrary, much like 
during the 1970s ‗big push‘ into HCIs, ‗priority‘ sectors, kept receiving ‗policy loans‘ 
through state developmental banks and the now privately owned commercial banks. The 
government kept controlling and using the latter to channel resources at subsidised rates 
to ‗priority‘ industries and activities (i.e. exports, housing) until at least the early 
1990s.
105
 
Despite the overall ‗liberalising‘ and ‗neutral‘ profile of the programme, which 
included not only trade opening but also the shift to ‗functional‘ state support like 
competition and R&D promotion, some additional ‗interventionist‘ measures were also 
implemented during this period, crucially to accelerate the restructuring of particular 
industrial sectors.
106
 In 1986, seven industry-specific Promotional Laws were merged 
into the Industrial Development Law, centred on the so-called ‗rationalisation 
programmes.‘ These were tailored to the needs of individual industries and aimed to 
provide temporary boosts for ‗nascent‘ industries requiring capacity upgrading and 
improvements in their international competitiveness or temporary protection for 
‗declining‘ sectors requiring a smooth phasing-out. Three main types of temporary 
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policies were employed for these purposes: protective measures to ease adjustment 
processes; measures related to the attainment of optimal production scales and the 
prevention of ‗excessive‘ competition; and, measures attempting to increase 
productivity. The latter included the provision of subsidies for such activities as 
capacity upgrading, R&D investments and worker training programmes. As was seen 
above for the case of the microelectronics industry, it also included the implementation 
of joint research programmes between private firms and government-funded 
institutes.
107
 Moreover, the electronics and machinery industries (which included motor-
vehicles) kept receiving special tax treatment (though benefits were reduced) despite tax 
incentives to HCIs were phased out in 1983.
108
 
 In contrast to the trade and financial sector reforms, the capital account was not 
yet liberalized. Restrictions on direct overseas borrowing by firms, banks and other 
financial institutions, though relaxed, remained largely in effect.
109
 So did most existing 
restrictions to the inflow of foreign direct investments. In any case, during the 1980s 
international credit was not flowing to developing countries and the Korean economy 
was no exception. Nevertheless, despite these restrictions, by the late 1980s certain parts 
of Korea‘s non-banking financial sector (e.g. the life insurance market) were already 
largely opened to foreign participation.
110
 
The strong increase in industrial production for world markets from 1983 
onwards not only manifested itself in the quantitative expansion of the previous scale of 
capital accumulation. It was also evident in the further ‗deepening‘ of the Korean 
manufacturing sector, through the same, unchanged specific form as hitherto, namely, 
the use by capital of a relatively cheap and disciplined workforce to perform industrial 
activities that had been simplified and standardised further as a result of the continuous 
process of machinery automation and computerisation. The expansion of industrial 
activity strongly pulled demand for labour and full employment was virtually attained 
during the second half of the decade. Real wage growth accelerated, notably during the 
1987-88 when industrial wages grew more than 10% per year. As the previous period of 
fast wage growth (i.e. 1976-79), the increase in real wages during the 1980s was faster 
for production than for office workers and relatively undifferentiated among the 
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former.
111
 This abrupt realignment of the purchasing power of industrial wages in Korea 
to levels compatible with the normal reproduction of the local labour-force was a 
necessary condition to attain the level productivity required by industrial capital in the 
new spheres in which it was concentrating. Surplus peasant populations were then 
exhausted and not even unskilled workers could then be paid below their value (i.e. the 
cost of their long-term normal reproduction).
112
 Nevertheless, Korean capital, and its 
political representative, the state, would not grant this realignment without any 
resistance. On the contrary, it came about through a ferocious, though short-lived, 
political conflict between those selling and those buying the commodity whose price 
was being realigned, labour-power. 
In 1987, after several years of strong economic growth and slow political 
opening, demands for the restoration of democratic institutions, especially direct 
presidential elections, were gathering momentum, notably among white-collar and 
‗intellectual‘ workers. A trigger was only needed to transform that into effective wide-
reaching political action. When the Chun government announced that it would reform 
the Constitution again and call for an election, an immediate conflict arose over the 
form of selection of the future president. As in Brazil in 1984, the regime pushed for the 
use of the Electoral College under its control and opposition parties lobbied strongly for 
the direct election of the future president. A new wave of social unrest, notably among 
students and white-collar workers, took place as the Korean population immediately 
related the regime‘s proposal with its attempt to control the election of the next head of 
government.
113
 This time, however, the military government decided not to pursue 
repressive actions; those supporting this political option were defeated. The context was 
radically different from that of 1980. Not only the government‘s popularity was 
collapsing for the continuity of political closure and the constant surfacing of corruption 
scandals (that itself did not seemed to be a problem before), but now, after five years of 
strong growth and tightening of the labour market, society at large would have not 
remained entirely acquiescent to that initiative. Neither capital needed real wage cuts for 
its normal valorisation nor did these appear in the ‗public opinion‘ as necessary to solve 
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an ensuing economic crisis as had been the case in the early 1980s.
114
 Apparently 
contradicting his superior, Roh Tae-woo, a military leader in the 1980 coup and the 
regime‘s candidate in the forthcoming elections, presented an ultimatum to the 
government saying that he would withdraw from the electoral contest if the regime did 
not back down from its attempt. Roh‘s declaration also included a commitment to 
guarantee human and political rights. It is unknown whether that move was staged or 
not. In any case, Chun had no option but to accept the popular demand. Surprisingly, the 
move paid off for the DJP as Roh was subsequently elected president in late 1987 with 
only 36% of the votes as the main opposition split in the run up to the elections.
115
 
Nevertheless, as soon as Roh asserted his commitment to the democratic 
opening, a wave of spontaneous and unorganised, but decisive, industrial actions 
erupted among those semi-skilled ‗core‘ male workers in large-scale heavy and 
consumer-durable goods industries dominated by the chaebols. The intervention of this 
sector of the Korean industrial working-class, which had been almost fully acquiescent 
during the previous thirty years, occurred overnight, as if manual workers had been 
waiting for ‗permission‘ to protest against the poor working conditions, harsh treatment 
by management and low payments. The wave of labour unrest lasted for almost three 
years. Between 1987 and 1989, the number of labour conflicts in Korea averaged 2,400 
per year. This sharply contrasted with the 168 averaged during the previous five years. 
As democratic (i.e. independent) trade unions were formed, membership increased 
dramatically during this period to reach 1.93 million workers or 23.4% of the industrial 
workforce in 1989. Though concentrated in the large-scale heavy and chemical 
industrial sector, most of the gains labour obtained during the ‗Great Workers‘ 
Struggle‘, as this period came to be known to sympathisers, were spread across the rest 
of Korea‘s blue-collar workers.116 
Interestingly, despite its relatively universal immediate impact, this working-
class political offensive would also mark the end of the trend to the relatively 
undifferentiated reproduction of the Korean industrial labour-force. One of its major 
outcomes would become a key factor reversing that trend: the emergence of company 
trade unions in the large-scale industrial sector dominated by the chaebols where they 
had been previously blocked by management and owners. Unions in the chaebol sector 
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would, from then onwards, negotiate welfare packages, wages and working conditions 
for their members, sometimes even at plant level. Industry-wide unions and nationwide 
federations would, in general, remain weak and marginal in the process of collective 
bargaining. Workers in light industries and in small and medium sized companies would 
negotiate their payment and working conditions independently, usually at company 
level, with less success given their weaker collective organisation. A new umbrella 
association, the National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU), was formed in 1990, 
representing mainly workers in small- and medium-size manufacturing firms.
117
 
Moreover, though labour laws were partly amended in late 1987, lifting some 
limitations to form trade unions, their involvement in national politics remained 
banned.
118
 
The ‗Great Workers‘ Struggle‘ not only resulted in large, relatively universal 
wage increases, improvements in working conditions and trade union rights. It also gave 
place to a reform in the welfare system, thus streamlining the overall process of 
reproduction of the labour-force. In 1988-89 two key reforms were introduced to the 
social security system in response to unions‘ pressure. First, the coverage of the Medical 
Insurance Programme (MIP) was extended substantially. Secondly, the National 
Pension System (NPS), created in 1973, was finally put into practice. In the long run, 
however, these changes did not transform structurally the process of labour‘s 
reproduction. To begin with, both the MIP and NPS were based on contributions made 
by employers and employees (i.e. the social insurance model) with limited state 
participation, apart from its administration, and, therefore, negligible horizontal 
redistribution of income. State contributions only covered those corresponding to its 
employees and to wage-labourers and self-employed in the primary sector. Moreover, 
the MIP involved a co-payment scheme with such high contribution from users that, in 
practice, constituted a considerable barrier for the universal consumption of healthcare 
services. Consequently, per capita health expenditure in Korea remained low by 
international standards (one-fifth of Japanese and German levels in 1990), and also 
almost 60% remained privately funded (25-27% in Japan and Germany where social 
insurance models were also used). The NPS, in its turn, required 20 years of 
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contributions and thus only became effective in 2008.
119
 Neither scheme was universal. 
They covered workplaces with more than ten employees and were expanded to cover all 
workplaces with five or more employees only in 1992. Hence, in practice, the reshaped 
social security system largely implied the formalisation under state management of 
previous arrangements based on private institutions (in most of the cases meaning no 
insurance beyond the family). In this way, the social security system continued 
mediating the differentiated reproduction of the Korean labour-force (i.e. the dual 
labour market structure). Nevertheless, they proved useful to concentrate financial 
resources under state control.
120
 
This process of working-class relatively universal advance, however, could not 
continue much further without beginning to hurt the normal long-run profitability and 
reproduction of Korean industrial capital. The self-regulation of the process of social 
life through market forces - the process of capital accumulation - then came about 
through new, violent political struggles. By the turn of the decade, as the global 
economy entered a period of decelerating growth that culminated in the 1991-92 
recession, the Korean process of capital accumulation would go into another phase of 
economic crisis and political tensions. In the USA, still the main single market for 
Korean industrial products, economic growth decelerated rapidly from 3.5% in 1988 to 
2.5% in 1989, 0.4% in 1990 and -0.9% in 1991.
121
 European economies followed a 
similar, though slightly lagged, pattern. Consequently, the growth of Korean industrial 
exports fell sharply from 27.1% yearly average during 1986-88 to -1% in 1989 and -0.8 
in 1990. It only rebounded marginally in 1991-92 to 4.85% annual average.
122
 Thus 
Korean industrial GDP growth slowed sharply (from 13% in 1988 to 1.6% and 3.8% in 
1989 and 1990, respectively) and, though it recovered during 1991, it fell again in 1992, 
the year that came to be known locally as the ‗growth recession.‘123 
The worsening economic environment lifted an objective barrier to what could 
be granted by industrial capital and brought the ‗Great Workers‘ Struggles‘ to an abrupt 
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end. Hitherto sympathetic public opinion turned rapidly against blue-collar worker 
stance and the state flexed it repressive muscle.
124
 The rapid increases in real wages and 
workers‘ constant belligerency to achieve these and other benefits, as well as new 
labour rights, were worsening Korean international competitiveness, crucially in the 
current global environment. They were signalled now almost everywhere as the main 
cause behind prevailing economic woes.
125
 While workers‘ demands had not been met 
with state repression during the years of economic boom, this was no longer the case 
when the ‗recession‘ ensued. A massive and violent police involvement in industrial 
conflicts took place to bring them to an end, while opposition parties, all of them 
appealing to white-collar worker constituencies and funded by chaebol contributions, 
closed ranks with the governing party in the National Assembly to form the so-called 
‗Grand Conservative Coalition.‘126 
Labour policies became, again, restrictive and were complemented, as many 
times before, with the passing of the Law for National Security to crack down on union 
leaders. Under harsh political repression and weak labour market conditions, in 1992 
the number of labour disputes and union membership returned to pre-1987 levels. As in 
the early 1980s, the government set ‗guidelines‘ to reduce the speed of wage 
adjustments. Again, those private companies not complying with them were threatened 
with tighter credit conditions and tax inspections.
127
 Wage growth in the industrial 
sector thus fell from 18% in 1989 to 7% in 1991, more in line with the changing 
consumption patterns of the Korean working-class and the related increases in labour 
productivity.
128
 
  Not only labour policies changed their direction as the crisis began to bite. 
Economic policies in general also shifted to accommodate to the new global conditions 
and thus mediate the local economy slowdown. Credit expansion was curtailed and all 
policy loans were stopped except those used to buy machinery for export activities.
129
 
Between 1989 and 1994, while capital outflows increased, the exchange rate was 
devalued 20%. The average tariff rate was thus decreased from 18.1% to 7.9%. Non-
tariff restrictions were also largely removed by shifting imports to the automatic 
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approval list. With exports no longer increasing fast, in 1990, the current account turned 
into deficit again.
130
 
As had already become, and would remain, common in Korea, the economic 
crisis triggered the surfacing of several corruption scandals directly or indirectly 
involving the President, his closest advisors and some chaebol. The extended and 
pervasive involvement of the state in the allocation of resources, crucially to accelerate 
the concentration of industrial capital, inevitable led to a close, not entirely legal, 
relationship between bureaucrats and private firms. Nevertheless, in 1992, Kim Young-
Sam, one of the historic leaders of the opposition, was elected as the candidate for the 
official Democratic Liberal Party (DPL), recently founded by Roh to replace the DJP. 
Kim Young-Sam had joined it only in 1990 when the ‗Grand Conservative Coalition‘, 
which also included Park‘s right-hand, Kim-Jong Pil, emerged. With the control of state 
resources and institutions, he defeated a divided opposition headed by Kim Dae-Jung, 
the other historic leader of the NDP turned DP, and Chung Ju-Yung, the chairman of 
Hyundai Group, the largest conglomerate in Korea.
131
 
 
End of chapter conclusions 
 
During the 1980s, the specific difference of the Brazilian and Korean processes 
of capitalist development finally became openly evident and manifest in divergent 
growth and developmental performances. Cut off from new credit during much of the 
decade, both economies were forced to turn their current account deficits into surpluses 
and cancel part of their external debts. The forms of doing so were, however, 
significantly different. So were the long-term growth and developmental consequences 
of the process.  
During this period, the Korean economy managed to grow strongly despite 
cancelling a large part of the debts it had contracted during the 1970s ‗big push‘ into the 
HCIs. Production of increasingly higher value-added goods from the industrial branches 
implanted during the previous decade became then internationally competitive and 
overseas sales thus expanded strongly. This process of continual and extended industrial 
upgrading manifested itself in strong and universal wage increases, necessary to 
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reproduce normally the local workforce, and came about through a process of 
democratic opening to make them effective. 
The experience of the Brazilian economy during this decade was radically 
different. As the land rent contracted, domestic demand slackened.  The growth of 
industrial productions for the domestic market thus stagnated. Nevertheless, exports, 
notably of industrial goods, expanded sharply, allowing the economy to get through its 
balance-of-payments crisis. Exports growth was, however, based on grounds different 
from the ones that were beneath the Korean export-led industrialisation in general, and 
the post-1982 recovery, in particular. As international commodity prices fell strongly 
and the heavy industries built during the 1970s were, as the rest of the local industrial 
sector, far from internationally competitive, the expansion of exports was based, 
originally, on the reduction of local wages and, later, on the strong undervaluation of the 
currency. The economic recovery initiated in 1984 manifested itself in a 
democratisation process which brought a civilian government to power. This, like in 
Korea, gave place to a sharp increase in real wages which, in contrast to the Korean 
experience, was short-lived.  
At the end of the decade, global economic growth decelerated again and 
international credit markets tightened, negatively affecting the performance of both 
economies. The global recession, however, manifested itself differently. While the 
Korean economy merely slowed its pace of growth, its Brazilian counterpart went 
through a crisis which was far deeper than the one at the beginning of the decade. While 
real wage growth in Korea merely slowed, wages fell substantially in Brazil. Moreover, 
while the crisis in Korea accelerated the subsequent deepening of the industrial sector, it 
resulted in the opposite trend in Brazil. 
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Chapter 9 
Brazil and Korea between the Early 1990s and the Mid-2000s 
 
Brazil: The era of ‘neoliberalism’ (1993-2005)  
 
In early 1993, despite the acceleration of global growth, the Brazilian economy 
was again in the middle of a hyperinflationary crisis. GDP and industrial value-added 
were 30% and 45% below its 1986 peak, respectively. The participation of industrial 
value-added in total GDP had fallen from 30-32% in 1985-86 to 23-26% in 1992-93.
1
 
The manufacturing sector had shed around one-fourth of its employees in formal 
contracts.
2
 In May Fernando Henrique Cardoso was appointed as the fourth Minister of 
Finance of Franco‘s embattled government. By bringing such a heavyweight figure into 
the economic team, President Franco not only ceased to interfere in the implementation 
of economic policy but also, and more important given the fragmented structure of the 
Brazilian multiparty system in the national Congress, succeeded in finally bringing the 
Party of Brazilian Social-democracy (PSDB, a splinter from the PMDB) and the rightist 
PFL into the government‘s support base.3 
Aided by a group of leading mainstream economists, Cardoso embarked on a 
stabilisation programme which, like most of its ‗heterodox‘ predecessors, included a 
monetary reform but, in contrast to them, did not incorporate a price freeze. Under the 
claim that it was needed to ‗anchor‘ domestic prices, a new currency was created, the 
Real, whose unitary price was equal to one US dollar.
4
 The replacement of the old 
currency by the new, and the conversion of domestic prices into the latter, was done 
over a period of one month rather than instantaneously as had been done in previous 
stabilisation plans.
5
 The Real was, from the moment it was launched as a ‗theoretical‘ 
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unit of account, substantially overvalued.
6
 The recovery of primary goods international 
prices, resulting from the acceleration of global demand for them, was giving place to 
an expansion of the Brazilian land rent and thus allowing an increase in the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate to transfer it to industrial capital.
7
 In addition, 
liquidity in international credit markets was expanding strongly and Brazil, as many 
other developing countries, managed finally to renegotiate its external liabilities. In 
1993, Brazil reached an agreement with its foreign creditors under the framework of the 
Brady Plan and new foreign loans began flowing soon after.
8
 This time, however, the 
mechanisms through which the state used interest-bearing capital inflows (i.e. the 
external debt) to complement the land rent, in supporting capital‘s profitability, would 
contrast from those in practice during the 1970s when most loans had been directly 
procured by SOEs to fund their operations and investments. 
During the life of the Plan Real (1994-98), the Brazilian state sustained the strong, 
though decreasing, overvaluation of the exchange rate by borrowing funds in excess of 
its financial requirements, notably from domestic financial institutions that had, in turn, 
funded their operations in the international markets.
9
 In this way, the government 
managed to sustain, and even increase, the level of international reserves held by the 
Central Bank, despite the massive current account deficits resulting from the 
overvaluation of the national currency.
10
 As many times before, the latter acted as an 
implicit ‗tax‘ on exports, most of them raw or semi-processed materials, and as a 
‗subsidy‘ to imports. It also reduced the price of raw materials in the domestic market 
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 During the duration of the Plan Real (1994-98), the Brazilian currency was, on average, 65% 
overvalued. The overvaluation of the Real reached its maximum level, around 90%, during late 1994 and 
early 1995. See graph 2.1 in Chapter 2. 
7
 Taxes on commodity exports (ICM) were reduced and then eliminated altogether. See Abreu (2008c: 
450).  
8
 See Carneiro (2002: 250-3); Abreu (2008b: 423).   
9
 See Carneiro (2002: 280-91); Lanzarini Casa (2009). 
10 The Brazilian government was not sterilising the inflow of capital resulting from high local interest 
rates and the exchange rate stability as is frequently argued (see e.g. Carneiro, 2002: 394). Capital inflows 
resulted largely from the government‘s desperate attempt to rebuild falling international reserves and thus 
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prevent oscillations in the economy‘s cash flow from jeopardizing the stabilisation effort under 
construction. The word ‗sterilisation,‘ though, gives the wrong timing idea; it suggests that after the funds 
entered the country, and have been converted into domestic currency, government securities were sold to 
mop up liquidity and avoid the inflationary consequences of monetary expansion. That was not the case in 
Brazil. The word sterilisation also suggests that the government has to raise interest rates in order to sell 
its securities. That is also false for the Brazilian case. Had the Central Bank not intervened by selling 
securities at low prices (high yields), the domestic interest rate would have fallen and the capital inflows 
would have been smaller.‖ (Dias Carneiro et al., 2001: 20). See also Lanzarini Casa (2009).  
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and strongly subsidised, and thus stimulated, the repatriation of profits by foreign-
invested capitals, now structurally enlarged as the privatisation of SOEs, timidly 
initiated during the previous period, accelerated.
11
 Export taxes and state restriction to 
commodity trade were phased out as forms of land rent appropriation by capital. 
The Real stabilisation plan was complemented with further trade opening and 
tight fiscal and monetary policies. Substantial expenditure cuts at all levels of 
government and tax increases were implemented in the so-called Immediate Action Plan 
and the Emergency Social Fund.
12
 For the longer term, the government announced it 
plans to reform the 1988 Constitution in order to transfer to state and municipal 
governments certain responsibilities in the provision of healthcare, education, social 
services, housing, basic sanitation and irrigation, while decreasing the automatic 
transfers of federal tax receipts to them. As the public sector deficit shrank and funds to 
finance the state again became available, the government was able to control money 
supply growth. The inflation rate thus dropped significantly during the Plan Real.
13
 
With the magnitude of the two sources of extraordinary social wealth that had 
been sustaining the process of capital valorisation (land rent and loan inflows) 
expanding, the local economy not only stabilised through 1994, but also started growing 
strongly during the second part of the year. Credit supply then boomed in the domestic 
market, boosting the demand for consumer-durable goods.
14
 In this context, Cardoso, 
the ‗successful‘ Minister of Finance had no difficulty in defeating PT‘s Lula in the late 
1994 Presidential election on a ticket to continue with the ‗modernisation‘ of the 
economy that was allegedly the reason behind the fall in the inflation rate and the return 
of growth after more than a decade of economic difficulties.
15
 The problem, however, 
was that behind the superficial transformations in its form of realisation, the specific 
characteristic of the Brazilian process of capitalist development remained unchanged, 
as limited and contradictory as ever before.  
Public debt was not, however, the only source of money-capital enlarging the 
inflows of extraordinary social wealth to Brazil during the 1990s. In effect, throughout 
the Plan Real, resources borrowed externally were complemented, in sustaining the 
overvaluation of the currency and thus capital valorisation, by funds raised through the 
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 See Baer and Coes (2001); Castelar Pinheiro (2002) on SOEs privatisation during the 1990s. 
12
 See Abreu (2008b: 426). 
13
 See Amann and Baer (2000: 1806-7). 
14
 See Amann and Baer (2000: 1815); Carneiro (2002: 379-83) on expansion of credit to domestic 
consumers. 
15
 See Spanakos and Renno (2006: 12-4); Bethell and Nicolau (2008: 257-9). 
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sale of state-owned assets. These were used to service the public sector debt and thus 
reduced the financial requirements of the state.
16
 Under the ideological argument that it 
was needed to root out the legacy of the ‗old‘ model of development from the ‗new‘ 
one, the 1988 Constitution was reformed to end state monopolies in the production and 
provision of public utilities, and to allow for the participation of foreign capital in the 
privatisation process.
17
 In effect, the privatisation programme initiated during Collor‘s 
presidency was substantially extended under Cardoso, to include companies owned by 
state and municipal administrations, as well as those in the hands of the federal 
government. During Cardoso‘s first term (1994-98) around US$ 90 billion were raised 
from the sale of SOEs. Foreign capital was responsible for around one-half of the 
acquisitions. This was of large importance during 1997 and 1998 when obtaining fresh 
loans was becoming increasingly difficult as international credit markets tightened 
again. These two years witnessed the largest privatisations, including Brazilian Tele-
communications (Telebras), Vale do Rio Doce (one of the world‘s largest mining 
enterprises), and part of the oil industry (including 45% of Petrobras).
18
 
The privatisation of state-owned utilities and banks not only enlarged capital 
inflows. It also eliminated several of the forms of land rent appropriation by industrial 
capital previously in force. Privatised companies would no longer sell their output at 
subsidised prices and purchase their equipment at inflated values or sustain an oversized 
workforce. On the contrary, privatisation increased the demand for land rent as newly 
privatised firms began to appropriate a portion of it. Not only were charges of public 
services substantially increased in real terms as companies entered the privatisation 
process, but also the legal framework that began to regulate their operations moved 
substantially in favour of their new private owners.
19
 In terms of the process of capital 
accumulation through the appropriation of land rent, the privatisation programme was 
thus double edged. On the one hand, and mainly in the short run, it generated resources 
that complemented the land rent and the inflow of interest-bearing capital in sustaining 
the profitability of local industrial capital. On the other hand, the programme increased 
competition for these resources. 
Between 1994 and 1998, the land rent appropriated by social sectors other than 
landowners was equalled to approximately 8.25% of all surpluses produced in the 
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 See Carneiro (2002: 396). 
17
 See Novelli and Galvao (2001-2: 11, 22). 
18
 See Baer and Coes (2001: 612); Castelar Pinhero (2002). 
19
 See Amann and Baer (2001: 648). For the evolution of public utility prices, see graph C.40. 
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Brazilian economy, and the portion appropriated by industrial capital accounted to 
around 8.5% of its profits. During the same period, the net inflow of credit amounted to 
4.7% of all surpluses available for appropriation in the local economy.
20
 The funds 
collected through the privatisation programme equalled approximately a further 6% of 
those surpluses; one-half of which were paid by foreign investors and thus constituted a 
complement to the net inflow of foreign loans.
21
 
Nevertheless, though enlarged relative to the 1980s, the land rent and its 
complementary sources of extraordinary social wealth remained incapable of sustaining 
the pre-1980 scale of accumulation in the highly diversified industrial sector, not even 
when complemented with a third source of extra profits, namely, the payment of wages 
well below levels of the late 1970s and the value of labour-power. Large increases in 
labour productivity in the industrially advanced countries associated with the spread of 
robotisation and computerisation, and the emergence of new sources of cheap labour-
power in Asia, increased the requirement of land rent in Brazil to sustain the relatively 
low level of labour productivity prevailing in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, 
now capitals invested in public utilities began to appropriate a portion of land rent. In 
the industrial and service sectors, the appropriation of land rent would now be mainly 
done by the largest individual firms.
22
 Tariff and tax structures (as well as the legal 
frameworks regulating the privatized sector) changed in order to channel the land rent 
directly to these capitals. As a result, many nationally-owned small firms would 
disappear, a process that increased capital centralisation and internationalisation.
23
 
In effect, after the ‗radical‘ 1990-94 liberalisation experiment, market protection 
was somehow reinstated. The inflow of imports purchased with an overvalued currency 
had been hurting the valorisation capacities of industrial capital and, as was seen above 
for the case of the automobile industry, had prompted strong lobbies (by capital and 
labour) for the re-establishment of some kind of market protection.
24
 From 1995 
onwards, market protection was strengthened for some parts of the industrial sector, 
notably the final stages of the different ‗value chains‘, while it was eliminated for 
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 See graph 2.13 in Chapter 2 and table C.31. 
21
 See BNDES (2011) on the country origin of foreign buyers of privatised companies. 
22
 ―In 1995 about two-thirds of FDI stock in Brazil was in the industrial sector and one-third in services. 
In 2000, the shares had been reversed.‖ Abreu (2008c: 450). 
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 See Carneiro (2002: 355-40) on the increased internalisation of capital‘s ownership during the 1990s. 
24
 In August 1994, the Brazilian government reduced tariffs on imports further. Average and maximum 
rates of effective protection to the industrial sector then fell to 15.4% and 44.6%, respectively. See 
Carneiro (2002: 314). The exchange rate was then 90% overvalued, implying a subsidy to imports 
equivalent to 45% of the price.  
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others. The former sectors included the assembly of automobiles, white-goods, 
consumer electronics and some parts of the capital goods industries.
25
 Industrial capital 
in these sectors and in the privatised public utilities, which enjoyed a ‗natural‘ market 
protection, became the main partners of landowners in the appropriation of land rent. 
Specific subsidies, tax exemptions and lax regulatory frameworks were added to the 
combination of an overvalued currency and market protection as forms of appropriation. 
In contrast to previous periods, the appropriation of land rent by industrial capital 
became sector-specific. 
While market protection was eliminated for some industrial branches, 
commercial integration with neighbouring countries, timidly initiated during the late 
1980s, accelerated through the creation of the Common Market of the South 
(Mercosur). This has liberalised regional trade, while setting a common external tariff, 
thus in practice enlarging the ‗domestic‘ markets for those firms that have remained 
protected from foreign competition.
26
 The experience, however, has not been uniform. 
While some sector of regional trade have been fully liberalised, others, notably 
automobile and consumer electronics, have been strictly regulated according to the 
necessities of MNCs in member countries. Industrial exports beyond regional markets 
remained limited to semi-processed materials or, generally, possible only with state 
support. 
During the 1990s, the Brazilian economy underwent a strong process of 
deindustrialisation as the land rent became incapable of sustaining the process of 
accumulation of large portions of industrial capital.
27
 In general terms, the smaller the 
scale of production relatively to world markets norms, or the more complex the 
production process, the more the capital involved suffered from the slow growth of the 
land rent, relatively to its requirement, and the consequent dismantling of policies 
mediating its appropriation. For instance, while producers of electronics components 
almost completely disappeared during this period, assemblers of electronic goods using 
them (e.g. cellular phones) remained in production while their markets expanded to 
include Brazil‘s regional neighbours.28 As subsidies and protection were withdrawn, the 
shipbuilding industry, in its turn, stopped assembling ships altogether by the mid-1990s, 
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 See Abreu (2008c: 450).  
26
 See Baer et al. (2002). This has been termed trade ‗diversion‘ rather than ‗creation‘. See Yeats (1998). 
See also Krugman and Obstfeld (2006: 232-5) with special reference to the Mercosur. 
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 On the deindustrialisation trend, see IEDI (2007); Oreiro and Feijo (2010).  
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 For an analysis of sectorial policy, see Bonelli and Veiga (2003).  
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and would only recover in the following decade.
29
 The Brazilian aerospace industry, 
usually vaunted as a successful case emerging from the 1990s liberalisation reforms,
30
 
has actually specialised in assembling imported parts, few of them designed or 
manufactured locally.
31
 Moreover, as many claims presented at the World Trade 
Organisation testify, the international competitiveness of the Brazilian aerospace 
industry is partly explained by the subsidised loans granted by the BNDES to foreign 
clients.
32
 On the other hand, the sharp overvaluation of the exchange rate strongly 
subsidised the importation of machinery and equipment, giving place, together with the 
considerable elimination of small firms, to an important increase in average productivity 
of labour in the industrial sector. This process partly limited capital‘s need for land rent 
to valorise normally.
33
 
The reduction of the magnitude of the land rent relative to its requirement by 
industrial capital also manifested itself in the dismantling or restraining of other forms 
under which its transference had been realised, such as the employment and 
remuneration conditions of the public sector workforce. As part of its effort to cut the 
public sector deficit, the Cardoso government fostered the downsizing of the state 
apparatus and the restructuring of the social security system. For that purpose, the 
government took then advantage of an on-going ideological campaign mounted to 
emphasise the disparities between wages and retirement plans of public sector officials 
and those of workers in the private sector.
34
 
 Under these weakened bases, economic growth, though accelerated, was 
relatively poor for Brazilian standards. GDP per capita growth averaged only 1.7% 
between 1995 and 1998, most of it taking place during the first eighteen months of life 
of the Real Plan.
35
 The production of value-added in the industrial sector contracted 
sharply during that period. The sector‘s participation in GDP fell further from 26% in 
1993 to 14% in 1998. Investment rates were low even when compared with those 
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 During the same period, the Korean shipbuilding industry, which emerged much later and was until the 
mid-1980s less advanced than the Brazilian, would become the largest in the world. Unlike its Korean 
counterpart, the Brazilian shipbuilding industry had always been internationally uncompetitive and only 
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prevailing during the 1980s, let alone with those of the second part of the 1970s. They 
averaged 17.4% as large masses of industrial capital disappeared and recently privatised 
public utilities, except for the telecommunications industry which was undergoing a 
rapid process of technological change, underinvested.
36
  
The disappearance of large segments of the industrial sector, notably those 
where small firms prevailed, resulted in the increased precariousness of the Brazilian 
labour market. Between 1989 and 1999, wage-labour employment fell by 3.2 million, of 
which 2 million job losses were in the industrial sector. By 1998, 1.675 million jobs had 
disappeared in the formal part of the manufacturing sector while the level of informality 
increased from 34% in 1989 to 41% in 1998.
37
 Employment in the tertiary, mostly 
informal, sector, on the contrary, grew, notably in domestic services which increased 
from 8.5% to 10% of the urban working population between 1980 and 2000. Most of 
this growth took place during the 1990s.
38
 The total (‗open‘ plus ‗hidden‘) 
unemployment rate in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo, Brazil‘s industrial heartland, 
increased from 8.7% in 1989 to 19.3% in 1999. This evolution of employment 
weakened labour‘s bargaining power and resulted in sharp real wage contractions. After 
dropping 37% between the peak of 1986 and 1991, real average wages in manufacturing 
fell a further 20% during 1992-98.
39
 This process expanded the mass of extraordinary 
profits arising from the payment of the local labour-force below its value. Indeed, 
labour market informality and social marginality increased in Brazil despite the wide-
reaching social rights incorporated in the 1988 Constitution.
40
 Social policies became 
increasingly concentrated on providing ‗safety nets‘ for those falling out of the labour 
markets or not being absorbed by them altogether.
41
 
In effect, during the 1990s, state expenditures on social security increased in real 
per capita terms while expenditures in such universal ‗public services‘ as healthcare, 
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education, culture and housing followed an opposite trend.
42
 The post-1994-98 
expansion of state expenditures on most of these services produced only a partial 
recovery from the sharp cuts of 1990-93. They were thus unable to stop the acceleration 
of the process of differentiation in the conditions of reproduction of the Brazilian 
working-class. Furthermore, following the dictums of the 1988 Constitution, 
expenditures on universal social services became increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of sub-national administrative levels (i.e. states and municipalities), while social 
security and assistance (the now extended ‗safety‘ nets) came to be undertaken almost 
exclusively by the Federal government. As the resource gap between regions widened, 
the unintended result of the decentralisation process was to increase, rather than reduce, 
interregional differentiations.
43
 
Despite its success in ending hyperinflation and restoring growth, the 
contradictions of the Plan Real would become evident as soon as its weak bases began 
to erode. Its demise, however, would not be straightforward. As many times before, 
capital and its political representative, the state, attempted to postpone its abandonment 
until it was no longer possible to sustain the Plan. By 1997, international credit markets 
were, again, becoming increasingly tight. In the USA, the real interest rate on Fed 
Funds and on loans for large firms had increased three percentage points between 1993 
and 1997, jumping respectively from 0.1% to 3.1% and 3% to 6.1%. Both would peak 
in 1998 at 3.72 and 6.8%, respectively, and began to fall thereafter steadily until 
bottoming in 2004.
44
 A similar trend was observed in Europe. As interest-bearing 
capital, especially the so-called ‗hot money‘, moved to the industrially advanced 
countries to take advantage of higher interest rates there, developing country economies 
began to find restrictions to access to new loans at affordable conditions.
45
 
Nevertheless, unlike its East Asian counterparts, notably Korea, the Brazilian economy 
still had access to foreign loans needed to sustain the overvaluation of the Real, though 
at a significantly higher cost.
46
 Premiums on Brazilian public debt, vis-à-vis its US 
equivalent, increased from about 4% in real terms in 1996 to around 14% in 1997 as 
                                                 
42
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Brazil found it increasingly difficult to borrow overseas.
47
 As financial conditions 
tightened, the Cardoso administration put forward another programme of fiscal 
adjustment, the so-called Package 51, implementing across-the-board cuts in public 
sector expenditures and increases in taxes. Brazil managed to resist a run on its 
currency. It could not avoid going into recession.
48
 
In 1998, however, the story would be radically different. International interest 
rates peaked by the middle of the year. The increased cost and scarcity of credit was 
beginning to affect global economic activity and, consequently, the prices of raw 
materials. Exporters of primary goods began to feel the impact of world economy 
developments in the same way as exporters of ‗industrial commodities‘ had done the 
previous year. Brazil was no exception. The still substantial inflow of long-term debt, 
attracted at an unsustainably high cost, barely compensated for the massive outflow of 
short-term capital.
49
 The difference between both, however, was not enough to 
compensate for the large current account deficit, in turn worsened by the prevailing 
exchange rate overvaluation. Central Bank international reserves fell sharply, even 
when privatisation funds peaked, increasing the amount of foreign exchange that could 
be used to support the overvaluation of the Real. Through 1998, the considerable 
economic growth of the previous year (3.1%) turned into a contraction (-1.1%).
50
 Job 
losses in the industrial sector expanded and, in order to make them and the further fall in 
real wages possible, the Cardoso administration accelerated the programme of labour 
market ‗reform‘ (i.e. flexibilisation).51   
By the end of the year, the situation became unbearable, even when the country 
had received massive financial and political support from an IMF-led consortium.
52
 
Governments in such large states as Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do 
Sul declared a moratorium on the service of their debts with the Federal administration, 
weakening the fiscal stance of the state further.
53
 As soon incumbent president Cardoso 
had been re-elected, the government pursued, against the will of the IMF who thought it 
would trigger a region-wide currency and banking crisis, the unpopular task of 
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devaluing the Real.
54
 After four and a half years, the ‗exchange rate targeting‘ regime 
was replaced by one ‗targeting‘ the inflation rate, as part of a new ‗understanding‘ with 
the Fund. There is no doubt that Cardoso‘s re-election was helped by the timing of the 
devaluation.
55
 It is doubtful, however, that his main rival, PT‘s Party leader Lula Da 
Silva allied with Goulart‘s brother-in-law Brizola, would have been able to administer 
the further wage contraction that would result from the deterioration of the Brazilian 
economic conditions.
56
 
Cardoso‘s second term in office (from January 1999 to December 2002) was 
concurrent with a period of relatively slow global economic growth. In 1999, net 
interest-bearing capital outflows from Brazil became significant, for the first time since 
the early 1990s. Part of these outflows was financed with a portion of the foreign 
exchange reserves accumulated during the previous, ‗credit-abundant‘ years. Most of 
the rest was paid with a portion of the value of labour-power and of the normal 
surpluses (surplus value) produced in the economy. FDI in the industrial sector 
increased substantially as foreign capital took advantage of the reduction in the prices of 
Brazilian industrial assets resulting from the sharp devaluation of the exchange rate and 
the ensuing domestic recession. On the other hand, the trade and current account deficits 
decreased substantially as the end of the overvaluation of the Brazilian currency helped 
expand exports, while reducing imports and profits remittances.
57
 
Interestingly, economic growth during Cardoso‘s second term in office was 
slightly stronger than during his first four years in office. Brazilian GDP grew 3.3% 
during 1995-98 and 3.4% between 1999 and 2002.
58
 This was most surprising as 
international prices of raw materials kept falling until 2002, one year after the US 
economy had bottomed out, and outflows of interest-bearing capital were substantial as 
global credit markets tightened markedly for developing economies. The combined 
mass of extraordinary social wealth in the form of land rent and net loan inflows 
available for appropriation then became negative.
59
 
How could, then, the Brazilian economy grow without these sources of 
extraordinary wealth complementing the surplus value normally produced? Was it that 
                                                 
54
 See Lopes (2003); Amann and Baer (2000: 1817-8); Abreu (2008c: 439-40). 
55
 Exchange rate devaluations have always been unpopular in Brazil because they result in increases in 
tradable goods prices, which include food, and therefore in real wage falls. 
56
 See Bethell and Nicolau (2008: 263-4) on the 1998 general elections. 
57
 See tables C.16, C.37 and C.38 in Appendix C. 
58
 See graph 4.4 in Chapter 4. 
59
 See graph 2.17 in Chapter 2. 
 382 
the ‗structural‘ transformation of the economy allegedly undertaken through the 1990s 
was finally paying off and the industrial sector had finally become internationally 
competitive? Or, was it that the ‗model of accumulation‘ implemented during the 1990s 
was being partly or fully reversed through the flexibilisation of foreign exchange market 
and the adoption of a tight fiscal policy? Far from these; the 1999-2003 growth process 
resulted from, and reproduced, the specifically limited, essentially unchanged type of 
capital accumulation that had always characterised the Brazilian economy. First, 
industrial real wages had fallen significantly during the second part of the 1990s and 
dropped a further 5.2% per year average during 1999-2003, thus partly compensating 
for the contraction of the land rent and helping sustain capital‘s profitability. In 2003, 
the year before they began to recover, average real wages in manufacturing were 
already 24% below their 1998 level and only 37.5% of their 1986 peak value.
60
 
Secondly, there was installed capacity in the industrial sector, largely financed during 
the period of relatively abundant land rent and large interest-bearing capital inflows (i.e. 
1994-98). Thirdly, the exchange rate was on its parity during 1999-2000 and became 
circumstantially undervalued (15% average) in 2001-02. During these periods (i.e. until 
early 2002), Argentina‘s currency, the largest export market for Brazilian durable-
consumer and capital goods, was kept strongly overvalued.
61
 Despite Argentina‘s 
economic recession, this helped expand the market for Brazilian industrial goods, 
notably of those of higher value-added, and partly compensated the contraction of 
domestic demand.
62
 Indeed, in 2003, economic growth in Brazil stalled as the Argentine 
currency was massively devalued. Fourthly, the inflow of FDI searching for cheap 
industrial and public sector assets in Brazil helped sustain the economy‘s import 
capacity (and expand the scale of accumulation).
63
 
Through 2002, the cycle of the global process of capital accumulation began to 
turn around. Stimulated by the prevailing low interest rates, credit markets in the 
industrially advanced economies were finally regaining liquidity. As global demand 
accelerated, international commodity prices also started to recover. Though slowly, the 
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Brazilian land rent thus began to expand in 2003-04. Inflows of loan capital, however, 
would only exceed outflows, resulting from external debts servicing, in 2006, when the 
global financial markets were already booming for some time.
64
 
In late 2002, when the presidential election was held, the Brazilian economy was 
confronting another currency crisis.
65
 Though the situation would begin to change in the 
following years, the availability of credit for developing countries was still at its lowest 
levels in many years. As in 1994 and 1999, the candidates of the incumbent PSDB and 
the PT contended for the presidency. This time, however, the context was markedly 
different. Cardoso‘s administration was highly compromised by the continuing fiscal 
adjustment programmes, the fall in real wages and the emerging currency crisis, 
aggravated by the sharp contraction of the Argentinian economy. Moreover, Cardoso‘s 
party, the PSDB, could hardly be transformed into a political organisation that would 
administer the post-2002 strong recovery of the land rent, even if led by its left wing. As 
always, the political forms of the process of capital accumulation would change in order 
to express and mediate its economic transformations. In the elections held in late 2002, 
Lula Da Silva was elected in his fourth attempt to win the presidency, defeating PSDB‘s 
candidate, ex-dependency theory economist, Jose Serra.
66
 Corporate media support was 
instrumental for Lula‘s victory.67 
Lula‘s electoral manifesto, however, was far less radical than the one the PT 
defended when it had been founded in 1980, at the highest point of the Brazilian process 
of capital accumulation. Indeed, when in the final stages of the campaign, Lula was 
blackmailed by the incumbent authorities, the mainstream press and the IMF to reassert 
his neoliberal credentials, he not only radically softened his stance on economic policy 
but also wrote a Letter to the Brazilian People claiming he would honour Brazil‘s 
external debt commitments and continue with the economic legacy left by the Cardoso 
administration.
68
 Lula also distanced himself from the various social movements and 
‗radical‘ left groups that had formed and supported the PT, such as the Landless 
Workers‘ Movement, which had grown considerably from the 1970s. The PT leadership 
                                                 
64
 See graph 2.13 in Chapter 2.  
65
 See Abreu (2008c: 444-47) on the 2002 ‗currency‘ crisis. This author, however, partly attributes the 
turmoil to the prospects of a PT victory in the upcoming elections.  
66
 See Spanakos and Renno (2006: 15-20); Bethell and Nicolau (2008: 274-5). 
67
 See Oliveira (2006: 12). 
68
 Abreu (2008c: 448-9) suggests that Lula‘s change of opinion regarding an IMF bail-out involved 
‗subtle games‘ as the one that made him ―feel constrained to publicly pledge to honour the general terms 
of the agreement […].‖    
 384 
also distanced himself from the trade union movement.
69
 Moreover, to reassure the 
business sector of his intentions, Lula somehow recreated the populist alliance of the 
1950s by picking José Alencar as deputy, a well-known businessman, ex-Honorary 
President of the PFL and current member of the Brazilian Republican Party related to 
the rapidly growing Evangelic Church.
70
 The fact that Lula‘s first economic team, 
including the incumbent president of the Central Bank, was formed by openly neoliberal 
economists shows, however, that his stance was far from a simple electoral trick.
71
 
In practice, the new Lula administration fulfilled its latest campaign promises. 
With the land rent only slowly recovering and its use diverted to service the public 
external debt, the adjustment of the public sector budget went further than during 
Cardoso‘s second term. Foreign lenders were not willing fully to finance the service of 
Brazil‘s external liabilities, most of it indirectly falling on the state through its domestic 
borrowing from economic agents issuing debt in international markets. Primary 
surpluses had to be expanded in order to pay an increasingly larger portion of the 
interest on the massive public debt. The Brazilian state was then paying one of the 
world‘s largest interest rate premiums (11.2% average in real terms above the cost of 
the US government debt during 2002-05) and was still unable to fully finance debt 
servicing requirements.
72
  
From 2004 onwards, nevertheless, Brazilian economic growth accelerated to 
levels not experienced for a long period of time. During 2004-07, the economy grew at 
an average of 5.7% (4.2% in per capita terms).
73
 The strong recovery of international 
commodity prices, together with productivity and output increases in the agrarian 
sector, yielded a solid expansion of the land rent available for appropriation, notably 
after 2005. As many times before, the currency became increasingly overvalued to 
allow capital to appropriate directly a portion of the enlarged land rent. Portraying it as a 
policy to ‗target‘ (i.e. control) inflation, itself resulting from its own reserve 
accumulation strategy and the increasingly expansionary fiscal and credit policies, the 
Central Bank kept interest rates at high levels, even when international liquidity was 
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rising and global interest rates falling.
74
 As interest rates set by the Central Bank to 
control inflation also affect directly the return on public debt bonds, this policy had 
attracted large sums of ‗hot money‘.75 The artificially increased supply of foreign 
exchange, resulting from the massive inflows of capital to purchase public sector debt, 
thus depressed the price of foreign exchange in the domestic market, despite the 
prevailing ‗free floating‘ exchange rate regime. In 2007, the degree of overvaluation of 
the currency reached 70% and helped channel a portion of the expanding land rent 
equivalent to 6% of GDP (approximately 12% all surpluses available for appropriation 
in the national economy) to social subjects other than landowners, notably industrial 
capital.
76
 
The expansion of land rent resulted in the increase of state resources. First, a 
portion of land rent was, in a first instance, appropriated by the state through import 
taxes paid with an increasingly overvalued currency. Secondly, the expansion of 
economic activity allowed by the increased land rent (appropriated through the 
combination of an overvalued currency and selective market protection) enlarged fiscal 
revenues in general. Moreover, the expansion of Brazilian exports (resulting from 
increases in international commodity prices and primary sector productions) improved 
the creditworthiness of the country‘s public debt and allowed Brazil to take advantage 
of the increased liquidity in international credit markets. Together, these new conditions 
needed another change in the direction of public policies. The conservative first 
economic team was then partly replaced by a more ‗developmentalist‘ group of policy-
makers. Finance Minister Antonio Palocci, from the PT‘s right-wing, was replaced by 
ex-Marxist economist Guido Mantega, while ex-guerrilla member Dilma Rousseff was 
appointed Chief of Staff. Nevertheless, as the commitment to sustain a ‗strong‘ and 
‗stable‘ currency, the euphemisms usually used in Brazil to defend the overvaluation of 
the currency, remained state policy. Ex-Bank Boston president and PSDB member 
Henrique Meirelles continued in his position as head of the Central Bank.
77
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Economic and social policies became thus increasingly expansionist and began 
to regain some of their features during the pre-neoliberal years. Interest rates on state 
bank loans were cut while their supply expanded. Economic growth proceeded strongly 
while public sector expenditures increased, including those in infrastructure and social 
welfare.
78
 The latter were not only needed to compensate for some of the negative 
consequences of the previous decade ‗market reforms‘ on the conditions of reproduction 
of the labour-force, but also to create or reinforce the political conditions needed for the 
normal reproduction of the process of capital accumulation under its new economic 
forms. These new social policies also contributed to enlarge the domestic markets for 
consumer goods. Foreign policies also recovered some of their past characteristics. This 
not only came about through a new reaffirmation of Brazil‘s international leadership 
and ‗independent‘ foreign policy, but also through its alliance with Mercosur partners in 
rejecting US free trade projects for the region.
79
 As many times before, the former was 
no more than a political (and ideological) form of realisation of the expansion of the 
land rent and, thus, the limited process of capital accumulation in Brazil. The latter was 
necessary to sustain and reinforced the protection of the markets where capital realised 
the appropriation of land rent.
80
 Manufacturing valued-added expanded rapidly, as the 
increasing land rent permitted the transfer of resources to industry while also promoting 
market growth.
81
 Employment growth accelerated and real industrial wages began to 
increase strongly in 2004, while minimum wages accelerated their post-2000 recovery.
82
 
Unlike the 1990s, economic growth now produced noticeable improvements in the 
conditions of reproduction of unskilled manual workers and therefore in the reduction 
of income inequality and poverty.
83
 Furthermore, the recovery of the mining rent, 
expanding due to the increase in oil production, gave place, notably through Vale‘s (ex-
Vale do Rio Doce) and Petrobras‘ purchases, to the re-emergence of some capital goods 
and heavy engineering sectors, like the shipbuilding industry, that had collapsed 
completely during the 1990s.
84
 In 2007, at the peak of the expansion of the land rent, the 
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government launched the Growth Acceleration Programme to improve, much like the 
NDP II before it, the provision of infrastructure.
85
 
As was the case during the 1970s commodities boom, the strong post-2003 
expansion of the land rent and the consequent improvement in the performance of the 
Brazilian economy created the impression that, after the ‗fine tuning‘ of the 1990s, 
Brazil is poised finally to fulfil all its untapped potential. This impression, however, 
might be misleading. This strong growth did not result from the ‗reforms‘ introduced 
during Cardoso‘s administration and reinforced during Lula‘s, as argued by some 
authors,
86
 or from the ‗corrections‘ (i.e. tighter fiscal policy and flexible exchange rates) 
introduced during the Lula presidency to the course set during Cardoso‘s, as other 
authors claimed.
87
 Despite all the changes in public policies introduced since the early 
1990s and the impressive 2004-08 growth performance, the underlying structure of the 
economy was not transformed. Capital has still accumulated in Brazil mainly producing 
goods or services for protected domestic (or regional) markets. Capital has still 
compensated its higher (by international norms) production costs, resulting from the 
low local level of labour productivity, by appropriating a portion of land rent, 
complemented with inflows of interest-bearing capital and the payment of labour-power 
below its value. Moreover, though significantly enlarged after 2006, the land rent has 
been enough to support only a relatively mild process of reindustrialisation. In 2008, 
after five years of fast industrial expansion, manufacturing value-added and wages 
were, in real terms, still around 53% of the 1986 values. Moreover, by the mid-2000s, 
Brazilian GDP and GDP per capita were only 5.5% and 9% of US levels, respectively. 
They had been 8.7% and 17% in 1980 before the land rent available for appropriation 
became unable to sustain an extended ISI process.
88
 
 
Korea: The era of ‘neoliberal globalisation’ (1993-2005) 
 
In 1993, when Kim Young-Sam became president, the Korean economy was 
slowly coming out of the so-called ‗growth recession‘. Like most new administrations 
before it, the Kim government commenced its term with a purge, allegedly to combat 
endemic and institutionally ingrained corruption. For Kim this was particularly 
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necessary to distance himself from Roh‘s party and regime, with whom he had joined 
forces to win the election. Kim‘s electoral partners were among, at least, 3,000 
government officials who were removed and, eventually, judged on corruption related 
charges. Ex-presidents, Generals Chun and Roh were amongst those receiving the 
harshest punishments.
89
 As the previous administration, the new one would also launch 
a policy initiative to break down the chaebols and force them to specialise in their core 
activities. As before, this would yield only limited success.
90
 
By 1993, the global economy was already in its second year of accelerating 
growth after the business cycle bottomed out during the 1991 US recession. As with the 
expansion of the period 1983-88, the recovery was being fuelled by a rapid expansion of 
credit supply at low interest rates. Unlike in the 1980s, however, the expansion of global 
credit supply was so large during the 1990s that loans were becoming available, in 
significant amounts, to ‗developing‘ countries, Korea among them.91 
As soon it took power, the new administration announced the ‗100-Days New 
Economic Reform Package‘, including expansionary fiscal and monetary measures to 
‗revitalise‘ the local economy. In tune with the global trend, interest rates were lowered 
to boost private sector investments while planned public sector investment programmes 
were brought forward.
92
 In addition, under the argument that it was necessary to boost 
economic recovery, the Kim government continued with the process of wage 
containment initiated by its predecessor. A state-orchestrated campaign of ‗pain 
sharing‘ was mounted while a wage freeze was imposed on public sector employees and 
private companies were ‗encouraged‘ to follow suit.93  
The new global expansion of credit supply required the modification of several 
aspects of Korea‘s financial sector institutions if domestic industrial capital was to take 
full advantage of it. The increased credit ratings of Korean industrial firms and 
commercial banks meant that the private sector began to regard government 
involvement in their foreign borrowing transactions as a burden rather than a necessity 
as had been the case before when they simply had not had the creditworthiness to 
borrow in international capital markets without government guarantees.
94
 Moreover, as 
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an expression of the high liquidity of international credit markets, the US government, 
the political representative of US capital, was stepping up its pressure on Korea to lift 
restrictions on financial inflows.
95
 In tune with this new global financial ‗order‘, in July 
1993, the Kim government announced the Five-year Plan, a Blueprint for Financial 
Liberalisation and Internationalisation. Despite much fanfare, this Plan was, to a large 
extent, nothing other than the normal continuation of the liberalisation policies 
implemented since the early 1980s and speeded up since 1991, now adorned with a 
‗globalizing‘ ideological justification.96 
First, the capital account of the balance-of-payments was partially opened and 
short-term borrowing in foreign currencies by industrial capital (either directly or 
indirectly through Korean banks) was now openly permitted without state approval. The 
issuing of long-term debt in foreign currency, however, was still highly restricted to 
‗control‘ foreign capital inflows. This two-speed opening would stimulate a massive 
increase in short-term borrowing to finance long-term projects and thus create a 
maturation mismatch between assets and liabilities. Effectively, the share of short-term 
debt (i.e. loans with maturity of less than a year) in total net external debt rose from 
26% in 1993 to 57% at the end of 1996.
97
 
Secondly, domestic financial markets were further liberalized. The Plan aimed at 
additional interest rate deregulation, increasing the managerial independence of private 
banks and lifting entry barriers to the financial sector.
98
 In practice, however, credit 
markets were not fully decontrolled immediately. Though all lending rates on loans 
made by banks and NBFIs were completely freed by the end of 1993, those on the so-
called policy loans, which still accounted for around 25% of total bank loans in 1993, 
remained regulated. The latter and those paid to demand deposits were planned to be 
fully liberalized only in 1997. The same would happen with ceilings and targets related 
to loans allocations to ‗priority‘ industrial sectors. Furthermore, allocations of financial 
resources to small and medium-sized firms were, in principle, ensured by new 
regulations.
99
 
Finally, the Plan was complemented with the Special Law for Deregulation 
Concerning Business Activities, passed to reduce the involvement of the state in the 
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economy. This was no longer necessary to support actively the process of accumulation 
of private capital in most segments of the industrial sector. While the Roh government 
had shown a mixed attitude towards industrial policy, the Kim administration was 
decisively opposed to it. Nevertheless, in the rapidly emerging high-technology 
industries, state support to R&D efforts and technology acquisition remained in 
effect.
100
 This change in the direction of economic policies found its expression in a 
new institutional reshuffling. The EPB, the symbol of Korean industrial planning, was 
merged with the Ministry of Finance to form the Ministry of Finance and Economics 
(MoFE). The status of the hitherto largely decorative Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) was upgraded. Through the application of the Korea Antimonopoly and Fair 
Trade Act (KAA), originally passed in 1980 but never fully enforced, the KFTC could 
potentially block the entrance of the chaebol into specific sectors if it deemed that this 
would ‗harm‘ competition.101 
By 1994, with growing global consumption pulling the demand for its industrial 
exports, and increasing credit supply in the international markets financing capital 
formation, the Korean economy entered into a new period of strong growth and high 
investments rates. Exports of consumer electronics, memory chips, low-end 
automobiles and ships accelerated, helped by the rapid increases in labour productivity 
in these sectors and the appreciation of the Japanese Yen. Both improved the price 
competitiveness of Korean firms‘ industrial exports vis-à-vis their main overseas 
competitors. Under these conditions, overseas sales of manufactured goods grew by a 
massive 14.7% and 28.5% in real terms in 1994 and 1995, respectively.
102
 Inflows of 
foreign interest-bearing capital also accelerated sharply as global financial markets 
boomed and liquidity increased. Net credit inflows thus increased from US$ 1 billion in 
1993 to US$ 23 billion in 1994 and US$ 11 billion in 1995. Most of these resources 
were directly captured by the private sector with no state involvement in the matter, and 
were used to finance capital formation in leading export industries, such as automobiles, 
semiconductors, shipbuilding and steel.
103
 
In this favourable context, industrial value-added grew 13% annual average 
during 1994-95. Pulled by this impressive performance, Korean GDP grew at an 
                                                 
100
 See Chang et al. (1998: 740). 
101
 See Graham (2003: 92); Shin (2003: 144-5); Pirie (2008: 96). On the weak enforcement of the KAA 
during the 1980s, see Graham (2003: 56-9).  
102
 See table C.16 in Appendix C. 
103
 See Graham (2003: 94) on exports and investment expansion. See Haggard and Ma (2000: 200-2); 
Noland (2000: 195-6) on foreign capital inflows financing domestic investments industrial facilities. 
 391 
average rate of 11%, three and one-half percentage points above the level of 1992-93. 
The demand for labour-power remained strong and average real wages in the industrial 
sector increased 11% per year average.
104
 Furthermore, to accelerate the upgrading of 
industrial worker skills, required for the development of increasingly complex 
productions, and to conserve skills when work is circumstantially interrupted, in July 
1995, the Korean state implemented the Employment Insurance Programme (EIP). The 
EIP would fund retraining and skills acquisition as well as provide income for the 
unemployed. Nevertheless, though unique among East Asian NICs, the Korean 
programme of unemployment benefits was hardly universal. It only covered workers in 
medium- and large-size companies and thus, in practice, helped reproduce the dual 
structure of the labour market. Furthermore, as the rest of the social security system, 
based on contributions, unemployment and retraining benefit was proportional to 
previous income, and incorporated very strict entitlement rules. Vocational training 
programmes also received a great impulse from the Kim administration while higher 
education enrolment expanded strongly despite limited state support.
105
 
Despite these impressive results, which in late 1996 granted Korea its access to 
the OECD, this prosperous situation would not last much longer. As early as 1996 the 
performance of the Korean economy began to deteriorate. The same factors that had 
facilitated its growth a few years before were then hurting it. Throughout the 1990s, 
Korean industrial capital had been suffering increased competitive pressure in relatively 
simple and low value-added productions from firms located in ASEAN countries, 
Mexico and China. In these countries, industrial capital had access to a much cheaper 
and equally disciplined labour-force, crucially after the substantial post-1987 real wages 
increase in Korea and the 1994/95 devaluations of the Chinese Yuan and the Mexican 
Peso. This was putting pressure on Korean exports of textiles, garments and consumer 
electronics.
106
 Equally, the mid-1995 devaluation of the Japanese Yen was putting extra 
competitive pressure on Korean exports of relatively more complex industrial goods 
like ships, cars, memory chips and steel. Lacking the resource base to do otherwise, 
Korean capital had been competing in all these markets on the basis of price rather than 
product innovation or technological features.
107
 In effect, Korean industrial capital was 
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already responding to both developments following a twofold strategy. First, firms were 
accelerating the relocation of large parts of their unskilled-labour intensive production, 
through FDI, to low-wage countries in the region, to Mexico, India and the European 
periphery,
108
 or increasing the use of ‗temporary‘ and immigrant (sometimes illegal) 
labour in Korea.
109
 Secondly, they were also investing in high-wage countries (i.e. 
Western Europe and the USA) to acquire technological and design capabilities either by 
setting R&D centres employing local high-skilled workers or by purchasing domestic 
firms specialised in these activities.
110
 To make things worse, during 1996 international 
prices of Korea‘s main exports, electronic components and steel and chemical products 
fell significantly. The price of semiconductors, for instance, collapsed by as much as 
70% due to a glut of supply and a slowing global economy. This widened the current 
account gap and put extra pressure on the Korean currency.
111
  
Already in mid-1996, as export growth stagnated and the economy decelerated 
rapidly, some mid-sized chaebol began to go under and thus hurt the position of the 
local banking sector. The government responded, orchestrating a ‗voluntary‘ stand-by 
agreement by which domestic banks would bail-in firms that were deemed sustainable 
in the long run. The government, in exchange, committed to purchase non-performing 
loans from banks, thus injecting some capital into the embattled banking system. The 
agreement, however, was short-lived. By the last quarter of 1997, several firms included 
in the programme were already in receivership, including Kia, the third largest 
conglomerate.
112
 
In late 1996, in a desperate attempt to reduce labour costs, which kept increasing 
despite the ensuing difficulties, and to improve the international competitiveness of 
industry, the government passed, through a parliamentary trick resembling those used 
by Park and that seemed more like a fraud than a legitimate resource, a law reforming 
labour market institutions. Without giving time for proper legislative debate, and with 
no opposition members in the floor, the National Assembly ‗unanimously‘ and 
hurriedly approved the labour market reform on Christmas Eve. The new law attempted 
to make the labour market more ‗flexible‘ by different means. First, it fully allowed lay-
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offs without a ‗just‘ cause, hitherto ‗prohibited‘ though practised. Secondly, it 
facilitated the transformation of permanent workers into temporary employees with the 
consequent reduction in wages and fringe benefits, a process that had been slowly but 
steadily occurring since the late 1980s. Thirdly, it reduced overtime and holiday pay. 
Fourthly, it limited trade union bargaining power by various means and postponed for 
three years the long-awaited project introducing multiple trade unions at industry and 
confederation levels and for six years at company level. Fifthly, it further restricted the 
access to meagre unemployment insurance.
113
  
The response was prompt. The recently formed unofficial, and hitherto illegal, 
but independent and democratic, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), 
representing mainly workers in marginal industries but also those in a few core sectors 
like motor-vehicles and public sector employees, called for a general strike, the first 
since the mid-1940s.
114
 Surprisingly, the official, and state-sponsored, Korean 
Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU), the largest in terms of membership and 
representing mainly workers from core industries, supported the measure. After two 
months of uninterrupted general strike and vociferous opposition from members of the 
National Assembly, the government was forced to back down and renegotiate the new 
labour law. In the end, however, the original law was passed with few practical 
amendments restricting lay-offs and the use of ‗temporary‘ workers. In exchange the 
KCTU, the more combative of the two union confederations, was finally granted legal 
status.
115
 
If the aforementioned problems were not severe enough, things got worse in 
1997 when global financial markets began to tighten again. Despite its new OECD 
membership, high credit ratings and strong export performance, the Korean economy 
was not spared the difficulties subsequently suffered by most developing country 
economies. In effect, already in 1997, Korean banks and NBFIs were finding it 
increasingly difficult to get their external short-term debts rolled over, notably by their 
Japanese creditors who were attempting to stabilize their own local banking sector.
116
  
The transmission of the tensions prevailing in the global credit markets to the 
Korean economy was straightforward. First, as stated above, the highly leveraged 
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Korean firms had become extremely dependent on foreign loans to fund their massive 
expansion programmes during the 1990s. Much of this capital was now excessive in the 
light of the aforementioned transformations in the global markets for industrial goods. 
Secondly, Korean financial institutions, notably the merchant banks that expanded 
thanks to the financial sector deregulation during the 1990s and the absence of state 
supervision over their activities, had borrowed largely short-term in international 
financial markets to lend for long-term investments.
117
 Furthermore, a large part of these 
loans went to highly risky borrowers in Russia and Southeast Asia. These economies 
were already collapsing in mid-1997, worsening the banking crisis in Korea.
118
 
As exports growth stagnated and external loans were not being fully rolled-over, 
the supply of dollars in the Korean foreign exchange market dried up rapidly. 
International reserves fell sharply and, despite the repeated efforts of the Korean Central 
Bank to sustain its value, by the end of the year the Won collapsed and the country was 
negotiating a substantial rescue package under the leadership of the IMF and the US 
Treasury.
119
 
With the crisis unfolding swiftly, it was no surprise that Kim Dae-Jung, the most 
entrenched critic of the so-called Korean Inc. model, finally managed to win the 
presidential elections held in late 1997, on a ticket to reform the chaebols, end their 
corrupt relationship with the state and to support small- and medium-sized companies 
instead. The chaebols were being signalled by many, abroad and at home, as the main 
culprits of what was becoming a crisis of large, previously unseen proportions. 
Incumbent Kim Young-Sam, in turn, was being hurt by the emergence of delicate 
corruption scandals, always surfacing in Korea under these circumstances, relating his 
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son to the irregular activities of one collapsing chaebol.
120
 So profound was the 
economic crisis that this was the first time in Korean history that the candidate of the 
incumbent party lost a presidential election. Interestingly, Kim Jong-Pil, Park‘s 
lieutenant, KCIA founder and DRP ex-president was a major electoral ally of Kim Dae-
Jung and became the prime minister during the subsequent period of wage compression 
(August 1998 to January 2000).
121
 
During the first half of 1998, liquidity in international credit markets dried up 
sharply for developing economies. Despite all the transformations of the previous years, 
the Korean economy was no exception. The net inflow of interest-bearing capital, which 
had been positive since the early 1990s, became largely negative in 1998. Not only were 
additional resources no longer available to fund part of capital formation, now a portion 
of the surpluses generated in the Korean economy were being exported. The short-term 
maturity of most of Korea‘s external debts then created a massive imbalance in the 
foreign exchange market, resulting in a substantial devaluation of the Won. This further 
restricted the capacity of Korean firms to service their debts in foreign currency, 
crucially those selling in the domestic markets and those suffering from sluggish 
external demand and falling prices. On 31
st
 March 1998, Korea finally managed to 
restructure and reschedule its external liabilities.
122
 
With few resources to do otherwise, in early 1998 a set of contractionary fiscal 
and monetary policies were implemented following the ‗advice‘ of the IMF and the US 
Treasury.
123
 In line with the worldwide trend, interest rates were increased further to 
reach a staggering 35%, bankrupting thousands of small- and medium-sized firms. By 
the middle of the year, however, these sharp recessionary policies began to be partly 
reversed. As a result of the debt restructuring programme, and the mid-1998 fall in 
global interest rates, the Korean state was then beginning to regain some access to 
external credit markets. It could thus afford to implement some countercyclical fiscal 
policies, such as tax reductions, increased unemployment subsidies and public 
employment programmes. Moreover, the unintended consequences of the adjustment on 
economic growth had been far worse than expected. The IMF gave its necessary 
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‗approval‘, allegedly admitting that the adjustment previously prescribed had gone too 
far.
124
 
Apart from the implementation of tight fiscal and monetary policies, the IMF-
led bail-out came with other extra ‗conditions‘ promptly accepted by the new Korean 
administration. Most of these reforms had either been attempted by the Kim Young-
Sam government or were suggested by current Korean policy-makers.
125
 As in other 
developing countries, ‗orthodox‘ macroeconomic management was merely the form of 
realisation of the international ‗liquidity‘ crisis in the Korean economy. The deeper 
institutional changes that were required as a condition for the bail-out, though triggered 
by the crisis and relatively similar to other national experiences, expressed more 
fundamental transformations in the Korean process of capitalist development. These 
included reforms in the financial, corporate and state sectors and in the labour market. 
They also included the complete opening of trade and capital accounts.
126
 
The reform of the financial system involved several key institutions. First, the 
Korean Central Bank (KCB) was made independent and would thereafter concentrate 
on ‗targeting‘ the inflation rate through the manipulation of interest rates rather than by 
trying to control money supply. Secondly, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) 
was created to regulate and supervise the entire financial sector, introducing ‗prudential‘ 
and ‗oversight‘ regulations more in line with internationally accepted practises. Thirdly, 
Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) and the Korea Asset Management 
Corporation (KAMCO) were formed and became charged with buying non-performing 
bank loans, reimbursing depositors who had money in closed down banks and 
recapitalizing restructured financial institutions. To cover these new financial 
obligations, funds were raised by issuing public bonds, some of them bought by the 
National Pensions Fund (NPF). In other words, the Korean state nationalised part of the 
banking sector (one third in terms of assets), partly with social security funds.
127
 In 
1998, public and publicly-guaranteed debt almost doubled to reach 58 billion dollars. 
The total costs of the banking sector clean-up up to mid-2001 were estimated in the 
order of 15-22% of the GDP of 2000.
128
 Fourthly, the consolidation of the private 
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financial sector was pursued through closures of unprofitable institutions and mergers of 
inefficient but potentially viable ones.
129
 
Corporate sector reforms were mainly directed towards the chaebol. Repeating 
an old and already tried formula, these were stimulated, through different means 
including soft loans, tax credits and political pressure to concentrate on their core 
business activities by swapping assents and closing down unviable operations, to 
sharply reduce their debt-equity ratios, to improve the quality of their governance, and 
to avoid cross-guaranteeing their debts. The latter practice was considered as one of the 
main causes of the alleged chaebol overexpansion and over-borrowing in the period up 
to the financial crisis. As many times before, corporate sector reform slowed as soon as 
growth returned in 1999.
130
 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration also targeted the public sector for harsh 
restructuring. It downsized the state by reducing the number of central and local 
government departments as well as its workforce, and by accelerating the privatisation 
of SOEs.
131
 Around 10% of public sector jobs were shed during 1998-2000 and a 
number of companies were sold, including large ones like POSCO, Korea Telecom and 
Korea Electric Power Company.
132
 
Labour markets were made more ‗flexible‘, allegedly to help capital restructure 
its activities. To find political consensus for this conflictive measure, in 1998, the 
Tripartite Commission composed of government officials, representatives of the 
business sector and trade union leaders from both national confederations was formed to 
sign a ‗social pact‘ under which the burden of the crisis would supposedly be shared 
fairly by all sectors of Korean society. The proposals of the Commission, which in 1999 
became an advisory body, included diverse topics ranging from wage and tenure issues 
to social security policies. In the end, however, what was actually implemented was a 
combination of labour market ‗flexibilisation‘ and social security reform. Both together 
led to increased differentiation in the conditions of reproduction of different parts of the 
Korean industrial workforce. This was done with the acquiescence of all members of the 
Tripartite Commission except the combative KCTU who deserted it under pressure 
from its membership as soon as the Commission‘s real purpose became noticeable. 
Labour laws forbidding ‗unjustified‘ lay-offs and the transformation of regular workers 
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into temporary ones were completely scrapped to allow for ‗industrial restructuring.‘133 
The doors were now fully opened for the accelerated precariousness of the Korean 
labour market. The open economic crisis in late 1997 managed to accomplish fully what 
had been unsuccessfully attempted by Kim Young-Sam‘s government one year earlier, 
when the first manifestations of economic problems were becoming apparent. In 
exchange, trade unions got the right to take part in political activities. This time, labour 
organised reactions to these policies and the wave of lay-offs that followed were 
crushed and defeated through old-style violent state repression.
134
 On the other hand, 
partly as a result of the Commission‘s proposals, the limited welfare system was 
substantially enlarged and deepened. A relatively wide web of ‗safety nets‘ was created, 
crucially to avoid the loss of ‗human capital‘ during periods of unemployment and to 
soften the impact of the crisis. First, unemployment benefits were increased, though still 
to internationally low levels, while coverage was expanded to around 50% of the 
workforce and entitlement regulations softened.
135
 Secondly, income support 
allowances were granted to those on low wages and subsidies were given to firms 
retaining workers. Thirdly, the coverage of the NPS and the MIP was expanded. 
Moreover, programmes of public works and vocational training were launched in 1998-
99 to provide jobs and retraining opportunities for the unemployed.
136
 State 
expenditures in social security, nevertheless, remained limited by international 
comparison as a large part of welfare services continued to be provided by employers at 
enterprise levels. As a consequence, those self-employed and those working on non-
regular contracts or for small firms were usually not covered by such systems.
137
 
Lastly, the trade and capital accounts were, finally, fully opened. Import 
restrictions and tariffs were completely removed and most limits on long-term overseas 
borrowing and FDI inflows were lifted. As in Brazil during those years, this led to 
large-scale purchases of industrial assets by foreign companies. The crisis, and the 
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related strong exchange rate devaluation, resulted in the reduction of the price of Korean 
assets and thus made them particularly attractive to foreign investors.
138
 
Different explanations have been advanced to account for the sharp 1997-98 
economic crisis. Some authors have emphasised the role of state intervention in the 
foreign exchange market in generating the overvaluation of the Won and the emergence 
of current account deficits.
139
 This account, however, fails to acknowledge that the 
exchange rate was hardly overvalued before the 1997 financial crisis and that current 
account deficits were not only not new in Korea but had been falling during 1997, 
before the open manifestation of difficulties.
140
 Other authors have criticised the former 
account, pointing at the way in which premature, incomplete and poorly regulated 
capital account liberalisation increased Korea‘s vulnerability to external shocks. They 
have also highlighted how initial problems were compounded by ‗self-fulfilling‘ 
speculative attacks and ‗contagion‘ from neighbouring countries to create a liquidity, 
rather than an insolvency, problem that could have been avoided had the ‗international 
community‘ been more supportive.141 This account fails to understand that Korean 
economic growth slowed markedly already in 1996, before capital inflows reversed and 
liquidity problems arose. Moreover, it also fails to acknowledge that Korea had faced a 
massive outflow of capital during the second part of the 1980s without going into a 
recession, let alone a crisis. A third group of authors have claimed that it was poor state 
policies restricting the disciplinary power of markets, and increasing ‗moral hazard‘, 
that created the conditions for the crisis to occur. These, it is argued, led to 
unsustainably high debt-equity ratios and extreme vulnerability to shocks in the chaebol 
sector.
142
 The problem with this explanation is that state intervention in the allocation of 
credit and in support of large firms in trouble predated the 1990s. Indeed, both types of 
state actions had been behind the previous strong growth periods. A fourth group has 
argued that, on the contrary, the crisis resulted largely from the lack of investment co-
ordination as state planning was phased out during the reckless liberalisation spree of 
the 1990s.
143
 The problem with this explanation is that Korean firms were producing for 
world markets and that, even if non-marginal players, it is doubtful that their over-
expansion could have resulted in price drops as large as those occurring in the 
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semiconductors industry. Finally, other authors have claimed that the crisis resulted 
from a fall in the rate of return of industrial capital resulting from the slow growth of 
value-added per worker due to ‗poor governance of both industrial and financial 
institutions.‘144 These authors, however, fail to explain why these institutions became an 
obstacle for productivity growth only through the 1990s when they had been present 
since at least the 1970s.    
The period 1998-2001 was one of relatively low global growth. As credit supply 
slowed, the world economy began, in 1998, a process of deceleration that bottomed out 
during the 2001 recession. Global rates of economic growth began to accelerate only in 
2002. The manifestation of this process in Korea, including its particularly severe 
acuteness, expressed the specificities of the form under which capital accumulates there. 
In other words, the general trend took a specific form. This has been different from the 
one taken in the industrially advanced economies of Western Europe and North 
America, where capital accumulates through the vanguard development of science and 
technology. It has also been different from the one taken in ‗developing‘ economies, 
such as the Brazilian, where capital accumulates through the appropriation of a portion 
of land rent. 
The 1997-98 financial-cum-economic crisis in Korea expressed and made 
evident some of the limitations and contradictions of a process of capitalist development 
based on the use of a relatively cheap and disciplined labour-force, which was 
particularly productive when performing certain ‗simplified‘ and ‗routinized‘ tasks but 
incapable of performing competitively the most knowledge-intensive, and thus higher 
value adding, industrial activities. First, as a result of this specificity, industrial capital 
in Korea has tended to concentrate in the production, for world markets, of standardised 
(i.e. ‗commoditised‘) goods. The prices of this type of goods tend to be particularly 
sensitive to the movements of the business cycle, crucially to slowdowns in economic 
activity. Secondly, the continual process of workforce skill upgrading, itself resulting 
from the dynamics of this specific form of capitalist development, has unavoidably 
resulted in the increase of the local costs of labour-power. This process has hurt the 
profitability of those industries competing with industrial capital in other national 
spaces of accumulation with access to a much cheaper, equally disciplined and almost 
as productive labour-force, as those located in the ASEAN and China. In this sense, the 
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Korean economy suffered during the second part of the 1990s what the Japanese did ten 
years earlier when Korea and Taiwan began to emerge as competitors in world markets 
of semiconductors, consumer electronics, cars and ships. During the 1993-1997, these 
weaknesses manifested themselves in the increased recourse to external loans to fund 
investment projects. Unlike in the second half of the 1980s, net surpluses available in 
the Korean industrial sector were no longer sufficient to sustain the rapid process of 
capital formation. 
By early 1999, when the Korean economic crisis bottomed out after a negative 
grow of 9% during 1998, eleven of the largest 30 chaebols had gone bankrupt, while 16 
of the 30 existing merchant banks had been shut down. Many other financial institutions 
followed the same fate. There was further consolidation through 1999 and 2000, when 
the number of financial institutions fell again.
145
 Unemployed and underemployed 
added up to 10% of the labour force.
146
 Urban poverty increased to 24% of the 
population.
147
 Average real wages in manufacturing fell 14% between 1997 and 2001/2 
when the global recession ended and the external demand for Korean industrial goods 
began to speed up again.
148
 
Despite the many reforms implemented in the aftermath of the 1997-98 
economic crisis, the post-1999 growth of the Korean economy has been sustained on the 
same specific bases as the previous period. Yet, the reproduction of these bases has 
taken new forms that further express not only the potentialities of this process of 
capitalist development but also its limits and contradictions. First, though relatively fast 
during 1999-2002, despite the weak international environment, economic growth has 
been increasingly fragile thereafter, even when the global economy and thus the 
external demand for Korean industrial goods were accelerating. While exports grew 
15% average per year between 2002 and 2005, GDP and industrial value-added growth 
averaged 2.4% and 4%, respectively.
149
 
Secondly, this strong growth of industrial exports was, unlike in any previous 
period, partly supported by a strongly undervalued exchange rate and the accumulation 
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of foreign assets by the country‘s monetary authority.150 To fund purchases of foreign 
exchange earned by exporters above its value, the Korean government has borrowed 
resources from domestic economic agents, selling Exchange Stabilisation Bonds that 
engross the Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund (FESF), or from the Bank of Korea 
(BoK) that, in turn, has sterilised the expansion of the monetary base by issuing 
Monetary Stabilisation Bonds (MSBs).
151
 The accumulated foreign exchange reserves 
have been subsequently used to buy foreign securities –i.e. lent to foreign governments 
and firms. Though it has helped the export-led recovery, this policy option is not free 
from problems. To sustain it the Korean government has had to find financial resources 
in the domestic markets. A portion of these has been made of pension savings. By mid-
2000s, around 15% of MSBs issued by the BoK had been bought by the NPF.
152
 The 
rest of the resources used to sustain the undervaluation of the exchange rate and the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves have been raised from private sources that 
have consequently needed to extend their own borrowing activities to fund their normal 
operations. Indeed, since this exchange rate policy was implemented, domestic credit 
increased substantially jumping from 60% to 110% of GDP.
153
 This, however, is hardly 
a sustainable source of long-term economic growth; it cannot reproduce indefinitely. To 
begin with, as the financial cost of local resources used by the BoK to purchase foreign 
exchange has been higher than the interest earned on its foreign assets, this policy has 
an immediate negative fiscal impact. In addition, when BoK‘s interventions do not keep 
up with the inflow of foreign exchange and the Won appreciates, this strategy results in 
capital losses as the value in domestic currency of FESF‘s liabilities increase together 
with the dollar value of MNBs.
154
 Effectively, if the BoK stops intervening in the 
foreign exchange market, artificially increasing the demand for foreign exchange, the 
Won would appreciate strongly, to reach its purchasing power parity, and BoK‘s and 
FESF‘s assets would be insufficient to cover their liabilities. Moreover, this exchange 
rate policy also forces the private sector to extend its borrowing activities to compensate 
for its financing of the government‘s exchange rate policy. Korean private capital has 
been lending resources to the state to fund the subsidies received from the government 
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when exporting. Nevertheless, this exchange rate policy has helped reproduce two 
related fictions: it has artificially sustained the profitability of Korean exports and thus 
helped reduce their prices and increase their demand in global markets; it has artificially 
sustained the full purchase capacity of foreign buyers. 
Thirdly, as a result of the reforms introduced in the labour market and the further 
weakening of inter-industry union solidarity, the process of wage growth differentiation 
among blue-collar workers, initiated in the early 1990s, accelerated after the 1997-98 
economic crisis. Korea reinforced its Japanese-style ‗dual‘ labour market structure. 
Historically, labour market segmentation had been based on gender characteristics. 
While male labourers worked in large companies in the heavy and durable-consumer 
goods industries, their female counterparts worked in smaller companies in the textile, 
garments and electronics sectors. From the early 1990s onwards, and notably after the 
1997-98 economic crisis, the differentiation has taken new forms, no longer being 
mainly gender-based. Wages paid to ‗irregular‘ (daily and temporary) workers fell from 
60.7% of those paid to their ‗regular‘ (permanent) colleagues in 1998 to 56.7% in 
2004.
155
 Working conditions have also been worse for the former, as discrimination and 
stigmatisation by their ‗regular‘ colleagues - to the point of denying union membership - 
have reinforced the hierarchical structure of Korean labour relations.
156
 In some case, 
temporary workers were simply ex-permanent employees who had been dismissed and 
re-contracted to perform the same job under worse payment conditions.
157
 In other 
cases, they were new entrants to the labour market who perform marginal, more risky or 
less skilled jobs.
158
 Moreover, while the chaebol were beginning to concentrate on their 
core activities, wage disparities between those working for small- and medium-size 
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companies and those employed by large firms increased sharply. In 1986, one year 
before the period of social unrest started, wages paid to workers in the former sector 
were 90% of those earned in the latter, falling to 70% during the 1987-90 labour 
upheaval, a figure around which they remained until 1998. Thereafter, wages paid in 
small and medium size companies fell continuously to reach 58% of those paid in large 
companies in 2004.
159
 The payment system has also become more flexible. Between 
1996 and early 2002, the number of firms employing more than 100 full-time workers 
that used an annual salary system increased from a mere 1.8% to 32.3% of the 4,998 
companies surveyed by the Ministry of Labour. This system spread particularly rapidly 
among large companies. More than 45% of firms listed in the stock market had 
introduced merit pay systems by 2000. In addition to the annual salary system, an 
increasing number of firms have also introduced various forms of performance-based 
pay system, such as profit-sharing, team incentive and stock option systems.
160
 Thanks 
to these transformations, average wages paid in the industrial sector remained 
practically stagnant between 1996 and 2003 and recovered only thereafter.
161
 Moreover, 
employer contributions to social security fell from 42% of direct wages in 1999 to 20% 
in 2005, further reducing labour costs at the expense of labour‘s post-retirement 
consumption.
162
    
Fourthly, the export-led recovery has been riding on the expansion of high 
value-added sectors, sub-sectors and productions. Although the post-1998 process of 
industrial deepening has manifested itself in a sharp increase in the levels of R&D 
expenditure and personnel, this process has taken a form different from the experiences 
of those countries where vanguard scientific and technological development tales place. 
The proportion of industrial sector workers employed in R&D activities has gone up 
from 3.7 out of 1000 in 1995 to 7.84 per 1000 in 2006. In this way, Korea has 
substantially narrowed the gap with the industrially advanced economies. In Japan and 
the USA, for instance, the proportion decreased slightly from 8.31 and 8.19 to 10.92 and 
10.54, respectively. Korea‘s R&D expenditures increased from 2.39% of industrial 
sector GDP in 1995 to 3.63% in 2006, the same ratio as in Japan. However, like in 
Japan, and in contrast to other OECD members, most Korean R&D expenditures are 
privately undertaken, largely in the electronics industry. They have thus tended to be 
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concentrated in the development of applied technologies rather than in the generation of 
basic scientific knowledge, which is an essential condition for a national economy to be 
at the vanguard of the development of global society‘s productive forces and to thus 
have access to a permanent flow of those knowledge-based quasi-rents that are 
necessary to sustain the normal valorisation of capital in the long-run. In 2006, 78% of 
Korean researchers were employed in the private sector, which accounted for 77% of 
the expenditures. In Japan the corresponding figures were 68% and 77%, whereas in the 
EU they were 49% and 63%, respectively. Nevertheless, significant improvements have 
occurred in the field of basic scientific research in post-crisis Korea. Investments in 
activities increased from 0.30% to 0.49% of GDP between 1995 and 2006, while in 
Japan and the USA they went from 0.41% and 0.40% of GDP to 0.40% and 0.47%, 
respectively. Moreover, while only 134 (natural) scientific and technical journal articles 
were published by Koreans every one million of employed individuals in 1995, the 
figure was 535 in 2005; a massive catch-up with Japan where the numbers increased 
much more modestly, going from 541 to 625. Yet, in the USA, the UK and France, the 
three countries that are the world‘s vanguard in scientific development, the amount of 
this type of scientific publications per million of employed persons remained around 
900-1000 throughout that period, presumably of higher quality.
163
 Effectively, despite 
this impressive catching-up process occurred since 1997, it still remains to be seen 
whether or not the global process of capital accumulation will ever determine Korea as a 
producer of vanguard scientific knowledge and technology. The experience of the 
Japanese economy shows that the transformation of a process of capital accumulation 
based on the use of relatively cheap and disciplined labour-force into one that is based 
on the vanguard development of basic scientific knowledge is not a straightforward 
process. It requires not only massive investments in research equipment and the 
widespread and extensive upgrading of labour‘s skills. It also requires the 
transformation of other of the latter‘s underlying productive characteristics. Workers 
performing vanguard research in basic sciences and frontier technologies (e.g. 
microchips logic structures and software languages) need to perceive themselves as 
completely free individuals who are not closely tied to any hierarchy and who are able 
to express their entire unrestricted creative individuality in the labour process they 
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perform. These characteristics are in contradiction to the ones that made the Korean 
economic ‗miracle‘ possible.164 
 
End of chapter conclusions 
 
During the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the developmental patterns of 
the Brazilian and Korean economies grew further apart. Following the evolution of the 
global economy, both national processes of capital accumulation recovered during 
1993-1996/7, contracted during 1997/8-1998/9, and returned to a growth path thereafter.  
Following a global trend, during the 1990s, both economies underwent a process 
of market liberalisation, including trade and capital accounts opening and SOEs 
privatisation. Behind these similarities, sharp differences were hidden. While market 
liberalisation reforms in Korea largely expressed the further increases in industrial 
sector international competitiveness, in Brazil they expressed the inability of land rent 
to sustain a diversified domestic-markets-oriented manufacturing base. In effect, while 
economic and industrial growth in Brazil during this period remained dependent on the 
expansion of land rent and its complementary sources of extraordinary social wealth, in 
Korea it resulted from the expansion of the possibilities for capital to produce 
increasingly complex industrial goods for global markets using the relatively cheap and 
disciplined labour-force available there. By the end of the decade, as global growth 
slowed, both national economies went into a new period of crisis.  
Despite their superficial similarities, the 1997-99 Korean and Brazilian crises 
also expressed the specific contradictions and limitations of both processes of capitalist 
development. At this point, the Brazilian economy suffered the contraction of land rent 
and the decline of interest-bearing capital inflows, both of which had been supporting 
the local process of capital accumulation. The Korean economy, for its turn, suffered 
from the fall in global demand for its exports, partly due to the increased competition it 
faced from capital with access to new sources of cheap and disciplined labour-power in 
the region, and from the retraction of those inflows of interest-bearing capital that, since 
the early 1990s, had been co-funding the investment wave pursued to accelerate the 
process of industrial upgrading. 
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After these crises subdued, growth returned to the Korean and Brazilian 
economies. Yet, both processes of capitalist development reproduced thereafter under 
the same unchanged specific bases as before. In Korea this has taken new forms of 
realisation which have further expressed the contradictions of the local process of 
economic development. On one hand, post-crisis growth has resulted in the increased 
differentiation of the wage structure and the recourse to a strongly undervalued 
currency, in order to improve industrial capital‘s international competitiveness. On the 
other hand, it has involved a leap forward in the process of industrial deepening that 
realised through substantial increases in R&D investments and skills upgrading. In 
Brazil, post-crisis growth has largely resulted from real wages compression during 
2000-03 and from a strong expansion of land rent since 2004. The latter has been so 
strong that has given place to the reintroduction of some of the previously dismantled 
‗developmentalist‘ policies to mediate its appropriation by industrial capital and has 
also revitalised the 1970s dream of Brasil potência. Neither of these economies seems 
to have superseded recently the structural limitations for long-term development that 
arise from their respective specific forms of accumulation. 
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Summary and Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
This thesis presented a study of the Brazilian and South Korean processes of 
industrialisation, economic growth and social development, and of the institutional 
transformations associated with them. This study demonstrates that these countries‘ 
distinctive integration into the global economy explains their different developmental 
patterns since the mid-1960s and their dissimilar growth performance since the late-
1970s. The thesis shows that Brazil‘s and Korea‘s patterns of integration into the 
evolving international division of labour resulted not from national public policies and 
state institutions, as often argued, but from the interaction between global-economy 
processes and local-economy factors that particularly affect the conditions for the 
valorisation of capital in different branches of production. These patterns of integration 
determined the type of industrialisation, growth and developmental experience. The 
emergence and consolidation of the New International Division of Labour and the 
concomitant fragmentation of industrial labour-processes explain, together with the 
characteristics and costs of local labour, Korea‘s transformation in less than forty years 
from a poor agrarian society into a global industrial power. The existence of a large 
mass of land rent available for appropriation, creating the conditions for industrial 
capital to valorise through small-scale production for domestic markets, together with 
the absence of a sufficiently cheap and disciplined labour-force, explain Brazil‘s 
inability to undergo a similar structural transformation and, thus, its much weaker post-
1980 growth record. State policies and institutions in these countries mediated the 
global integration of capitalism through the specific determination of the Brazilian and 
Korean processes of capitalist development. 
In order to support these arguments, this thesis was divided in two parts, 
following the introductory chapter. The introduction critically reviewed mainstream 
debates on state policies/institutions and economic development in Korea/East Asia and 
Brazil/Latin America, presenting an alternative theoretical approach to the topic. This 
approach has two main tenets. First, the process of capitalist development is essentially 
global, and only national in its form of realisation. Secondly, state policies are forms of 
realisation of the autonomously regulated process of capital accumulation. This 
alternative theoretical approach framed the account of the comparative development of 
Korea and Brazil pursued throughout the rest of the thesis.  
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Chapter 1 of Part I offered a schematic analysis of the specific characteristics of 
the processes of capitalist development in Korea and Brazil and of the main 
transformations in their economic, political and ideological forms of realisation since 
the 1950s. In doing so, it advanced the main arguments developed in more detail 
throughout the thesis. First, that capital accumulation in Brazil revolved around the 
appropriation of land rent throughout the entire period studied. Secondly, that capital 
accumulated in Korea in a relative similar manner until the mid-1960s, though land rent 
was complemented extensively with foreign aid inflows. Thirdly, that after the mid-
1960s, capital accumulation in Korea became centred on the production of industrial 
goods for world markets, taking advantage of the continual simplification and 
standardisation of productive activities, including relative complex ones, and the local 
availability of relative cheap, disciplined and increasingly skilled labour-power. The 
analysis pursued in Chapter 1 also furthered elements in support of one of the main 
underlying theoretical arguments advanced in the introduction, namely, that political, 
institutional and ideological developments in both countries realised the transformations 
in their specific economic formations and thus mediated the global integration and unity 
of capitalism. 
Chapter 2 of Part I presented evidence in support of the main arguments 
advanced in the preceding chapter. It developed a model to measure the magnitude of 
intersectoral income transfers and to assess their relevance in supporting the process of 
capital accumulation in each of the countries studied. In doing so, the model also 
measured the evolution of capital profitability economy-wide and in the agrarian and 
industrial sectors as well as the total magnitude of land rent. The chapter also put 
forward some measurements of the size of aid and credit inflows, and assessed their 
importance in supporting the process of capital accumulation in each country both in 
absolute and relative terms. It was shown there that the land rent appropriated by social 
actors other than landowners helped sustained the process of capital accumulation in 
Brazil throughout the period studied and in Korea until the late-1960s. The chapter also 
showed that inflows of money-capital (i.e. foreign aid and loans) were also important in 
both countries. In Korea, foreign aid complemented the land rent until the mid-1960s 
while loans supplemented normal surpluses in funding a rapid process of capital 
formation thereafter. In Brazil, interest-bearing capital inflows, directly or indirectly, 
lent to the state complemented the land rent, as junior partner, in sustaining the process 
of capital valorisation and accumulation. 
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Chapter 3 of Part I summarised main trends in the post-1950s processes of 
technological development on a global scale and traced their impact upon the structure 
of skills required from the industrial workforce. The chapter also examined the specific 
cases of the global steel, automobile and semiconductors industries and followed their 
development in Korea and Brazil, analysing and comparing the specific bases for the 
valorisation of individual capitals there. This chapter provided support for some of the 
main arguments advanced in the thesis. First, the chapter identified technological 
changes related to the emergence and consolidation of world-market-oriented industrial 
sectors in Korea. It was shown that the continual development of skill-replacing 
technological changes associated with computerisation and electronics-based 
automation, together with the relatively low cost and specific characteristics of the local 
labour-force, was the main driving force behind the emergence and successful long-term 
consolidation of the industrial sectors analysed. Secondly, the chapter identified 
mechanisms by which industrial capital in Brazil accumulated through the appropriation 
of land rent and, also, the specific characteristics of this limited form of capital 
accumulation and industrial development. It was shown that Brazilian industrial capital 
has been unable to sustain world-market levels of productivity and thus remained 
dependent on the evolution of the land rent available to complement normal surplus-
value and thus sustain its valorisation. 
Chapter 4 of Part I presented a group of time-series expressing together the 
transformations in the processes of capitalist development in both countries throughout 
the period studied. These included time-series showing the evolution of the integration 
of the Brazilian and Korean industrial sectors in the global economy and others showing 
the evolution of the individual and collective characteristics of these countries‘ labour-
forces. The chapter also included a brief discussion of the specific evolution of labour 
market institutions and of their role in mediating the transformation of the conditions of 
purchase, consumption and reproduction of these national labour-forces, and thus of the 
specific forms of capitalist development. Chapter 4 presented extra analytical and 
empirical economy-wide support for the conclusions reached in the previous chapter 
which permitted their generalisation. 
In light of the findings presented in the first part, the second part of the thesis put 
forward a political-economy analysis of the historical development of social and 
political processes, and their role in shaping the evolution of economic, welfare and 
labour state policies and institutions. This part of the thesis showed the intrinsic unity of 
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these processes, revealing specific transformations in Korea and Brazil as part of the 
realisation of the globally integrated process of capitalist development. This historical 
analysis supported not only the main hypothesis about the Brazilian and Korean 
processes of capitalist development but also of the more general arguments presented in 
the introductory chapter about state-market relations and global-national integration. 
This second part of the thesis was divided in five chapters, each covering a period of 
approximately ten years. 
Three appendices closed the thesis. Appendix A discussed the determination of 
land rent in capitalism. Appendix B presented the methodology followed to assemble 
and construct the time-series used throughout the thesis. Appendix C presented tables 
with these time-series.  
The analysis of the Brazilian and Korean economies presented in this thesis not 
only offers an original explanation of the specific characteristics of these processes of 
capitalist development between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s. It also provided 
support for the main theoretical claims advanced at the beginning of the thesis. First, 
through this analysis it was shown that developments and transformations of national 
processes of capital accumulation cannot be understood fully by focusing on the 
examination of nation-state policies and institutions. The long-term specific 
development of national capitalisms mediates and realises the reproduction of the 
essentially global process of capital accumulation. In other words, national 
markets/economies are integral parts of a single world market/economy. The analysis of 
the latter should therefore be the starting-point for the understanding of the former. 
Secondly, it was shown that in capitalism state policies and political/economic 
institutions are forms of realisation of the self-regulated process of ‗resource‘ allocation 
through capital accumulation and therefore the specific determination of national 
capitalisms as form of realising the integration of the global economy. In this way, the 
thesis offered original insights on the contemporary process of globalisation and on the 
political economy of state-market relations. 
Moreover, the study of the Brazilian and Korean processes of capitalist 
development presented in this thesis also sheds some extra light on the experiences of 
other Latin American and East Asian societies, and thus on the process of late-
industrialisation in general. These two countries have been paradigmatic in their 
respective regions. Their developmental and growth experiences not only have been 
essentially similar to their neighbours‘. Brazil and Korea have arguably enjoyed the 
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strongest and deepest processes of industrial development among Latin America‘s and 
East Asia‘s NICs, respectively. The analysis presented here thus provides a key insight 
on the potentialities and limitations of the specifically different processes of capital 
accumulation and industrialisation in both regions.  
Finally, the arguments and evidence presented in this thesis can be used as a 
starting-point for the research on the historical genesis of these processes of capital 
accumulation in their respective and specifically different pre-WWII experiences, and to 
speculate on the future developmental and growth prospects of these nations/regions. In 
terms of latter point, this thesis raises serious doubts over recent claims about Brazil‘s 
and Korea‘s long-term growth prospects. The thesis not only challenges broadly 
accepted perceptions of Brazil‘s present role and weight in the global economy but also 
those related to the strength of its most recent growth and (re)industrialisation 
experience. As shown in graph 4.3 in Chapter 4, in 2005 the Brazilian economy was 
only around 6% of its US counterpart and half the size of the Korean. With respect to 
Korea, the thesis problematizes its alleged capacity finally to become a ‗new Japan‘ as 
argued elsewhere, even though income per capita has been rapidly approaching US 
levels.  
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Appendix A 
On the Nature and Magnitude of Land Rent in Capitalism
1
 
 
The commercial value of primary goods is not, as that of industrial goods, 
regulated by normal conditions of production but by marginal ones. If at any given time, 
agrarian and mining lands of worse quality than those in use need to be brought into 
production to satisfy social demand for these goods, commercial prices would need to 
increase proportionally in order to allow marginal portions of capital to valorise at the 
general rate of profit. In these circumstances, the rate of profit would be potentially 
higher for individual capital operating on intra-marginal lands, where relatively 
favourable and irreproducible natural conditions particularly enhance labour 
productivity and thus lower production costs. Although extremely attractive for agrarian 
and mining individual capital, their competition for the use of lands in which the 
differentially favourable natural conditions prevail increases their rental prices, and 
therefore allows landowners to appropriate these surplus profits under the form of rent 
paid for the use of the land.
2
 Moreover, if, existing lands of different quality, successive 
discrete applications of capital of equal magnitude, each yielding a different output, 
need to be undertaken on plots of land already under production to satisfy solvent 
demand for agrarian and mining products, intra-marginal portions of capital will also 
yield a surplus profit, even those applied to lands of worst quality.
3
 Competition will 
also transform these surplus profits into rent.
4
 Both the extensive and intensive type of 
differential rent spring from the monopoly by landowners over portions of the planet 
that yield differential output, and thus profits, for capitals of equal magnitude. Their 
existence is thus a concrete form of realisation of the equalisation of the rate of profit. 
Moreover, since owners of marginal lands also receive a rent as a condition to allow 
their productive use by capital, commercial prices of primary goods must be set further 
above their prices of production (i.e. above those that cover for normal costs and profits) 
to include this rent springing from the absolute monopoly by landowners of a means of 
production that cannot be produced by human labour. By charging for the use of land, 
                                                 
1
 The goal of this section is to clarify the definition of land rent used in this thesis. The section does not 
aim at providing an extensive discussion on alternative theories of rent or of different interpretations of 
these theories. For a discussion of that type see, for instance, Murray (1977, 1978).   
2
 See Marx (1981: 779-811); Iñigo Carrera (2007: 11-3). 
3
 See Marx (1981: 812-23). 
4
 For different understanding of the second type of differential rent, see Fine (1979). 
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as a condition for not withdrawing it from the market, landowners are able to 
appropriate a portion of social production without contributing to its creation. In 
contrast to what occurs in the industrial sector, the conditions that allow landowners to 
appropriate surplus profits cannot be reproduced by capital and thus generalised. They 
become rent.  
Unlike the differential part of the rent, the magnitude of the rent of absolute 
monopoly varies not according to soil quality but to landowner bargaining power vis-à-
vis productive capital. With the exception of circumstances when the demand is 
particularly strong, the absolute rent tends to be small in agrarian lands vis-à-vis the 
differential rent. The characteristics of mining productions (i.e. the possibility of 
withdrawing land from the market without losing the scarce natural resource) give 
mining landowners a relatively stronger bargaining power. Consequently, the absolute 
rent is relatively larger in the mining than in the agrarian sector.
5
 
Though integral parts of the land rent, the social wealth that constitutes the 
differential and absolute rents originates in different branches of production. The 
differential part of the rent is formed of surplus-value produced outside the primary 
sector. The portion of social wealth materialised in the differential rent is paid by those 
capitals directly or indirectly consuming primary goods, and through competitive, 
profit-rate-equalising forces, by social capital. Intra-marginal portion of agrarian and 
mining capital, and through them landowners, receive a portion of social wealth in 
which more socially necessary labour-time is materialised than what was involved in 
the production of their output. In other words, in order to be able to consume 
commodities produced in lowest quality lands, social capital is forced to pay individual 
capitals producing in intra-marginal lands in excess of their cost of production and 
normal profits. On the contrary, the absolute rent is formed of surplus-value produced in 
the primary sector. The absolute monopoly over an irreproducible means of production 
gives landowners the power to appropriate a portion (or the whole depending on their 
strength) of surplus-value produced in the primary sector in the cases when, due to the 
lower than average organic composition of capital (i.e. labour to non-wage-capital ratio) 
prevailing there, it would otherwise be appropriated in other sectors of the economy. 
Without a limiting monopoly, such as landed property, competition among individual 
capitals of equal magnitude forces surplus-value to be redistributed from branches of 
                                                 
5
 See Marx (1981: 882-907); Iñigo Carrera (2007: 13-4). 
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economic activity with lower than average organic composition of capital, and thus 
higher than average proportion of wealth-creating living labour, to individual capitals in 
the sectors of production with the opposite characteristics. Competitive pressures thus 
equalise the rate of profit among capitals in different industries despite producing 
different amounts of surplus-value per capital advanced for valorisation. This process of 
equalisation of rates of profit into a general rate constitutes social capital, rather than 
individual capitals, as the active subject of the process of valorisation. Moreover, if 
landowner bargaining power vis-à-vis capital is sufficiently strong, commercial prices 
of primary goods can be set further above their price of production, allowing them to 
appropriate another portion of social wealth produced in other sectors of the economy. 
That is the case of simple absolute monopoly rent (‗genuine monopoly price‘). Both 
parts of the land rent, that springing from the monopoly over portions of land that yield 
a differential output for applications of capital of equal magnitude and that coming from 
the absolute monopoly over portions of the planet, are materialised in the price of 
primary goods. Their existence rests directly or indirectly from the surpluses available 
for capital‘s valorisation and accumulation.6 
The price of land is equal to the rent received by the landowner capitalised at the 
going rate of interest. The rent thus appears as an interest on capital invested in landed 
property. If the rent is circumstantially higher than its normal value, the price of land 
would also be so and vice versa. If state actions (e.g. taxes, regulations, exchange rate 
policy) affect the magnitude of land rent received by landowners, the price of land is 
proportionally affected too.
7
 If the individual capitalist (i.e. the owner of the means of 
production and the ‗wage fund‘) also owns the land used to produce primary goods, 
both forms of income (profit and rent) would be melted into one, even if they are 
qualitatively different. If the individual capitalist also works in the production of 
primary goods, both forms of income (profit and wages) would be merged into one. If 
their capital is not large enough to implement the normal production techniques, 
however, his profit rate would be, as any small productive capitalist, below the average 
one since his unitary costs would tend to be higher than the normal ones.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 See Marx (1981: 779-907); Iñigo Carrera (2007: 15-6) 
7
 See Marx (1981: 908-16). 
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Appendix B 
Methodological bases and sources 
 
B.1) Consumer Price Indices (Table C.1) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
For two reasons, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) produced by the independent Getulio 
Vargas Foundation (FGV) is used in this thesis instead of the Augmented Consumer 
Price Index (IPCA) produced by the state-run Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE). First, the former is the first CPI produced in Brazil and, for that 
reason, the only one that covers the entire period under study keeping methodological 
consistency. Its origins date back to the early 1940s, when it was calculated for the city 
of Rio de Janeiro. A correction, using the re-estimation available in Correa do Lago 
(1989: 248) and Abreu (2008a: 373), was made on the original time-series for 1973. 
That year, the inflation rate measured by the FGV was grossly underestimated, under 
pressure from the military who wanted to keep readings low for political and policy 
purposes. The original reading of 13.7% was changed for the subsequent re-estimation 
of 26.6%. Secondly, the IPCA, produced by the IBGE since 1980, suffered several, 
often spurious, manipulations and methodological changes with the purpose of reducing 
the official inflation readings, crucially in 1990-92, when the Collor Plan was 
implemented, and during July-August 1994, when the Plan Real was launched.  
Korea 
a) 1955-1960: The time-series was constructed using the CPI of Seoul. 
b) 1961-2007: The time-series of the national CPI was obtained from various issues of 
the Economic Statistics Yearbook (ESY) produced by the Bank of Korea (BoK).  
USA 
a) 1950-2007: The time-series of US CPI was obtained from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
 
B.2) GDP Deflators (Table C.1) 
Sources 
Brazil 
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a) 1950-2007: This time-series is produced by the IBGE. It was obtained from Ipeadata, 
the database assembled by the Applied Economics Research Institute (IPEA) dependent 
on the Ministry of Planning. 
USA 
a) 1950-2007: The time-series was taken from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) Tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  
 
B.3) Gross Fixed Capital Formation Deflators (Table C.2)  
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
They were computed dividing the time-series of gross fixed capital formation in current 
prices for those in constant prices. They were computed for total gross fixed capital 
formation, ‗constructions‘ and ‗machinery and equipment‘.  
a) 1950-2005: The time-series of gross fixed capital formation are estimated by the 
IBGE. They are available in Ipeadata. 
Korea 
A single time-series was constructed averaging price indices of ‗equipment‘ and 
‗construction‘. 
a) 1950-1998: The base time-series were taken from various issues of the ESY. 
 
B.4) GDP at current prices (Table C.3) 
Sources 
Brazil 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series is estimated by the IBGE (available in Ipeadata). 
Korea 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from various issues of the Korea Statistical 
Yearbook (KSY) published by the Korea National Statistical Office. 
USA 
a) 1953-2005: The time-series was taken from NIPA Tables. 
   
B.5) Industrial value-added at current prices (Table C.3) 
Sources 
Brazil 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata. 
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Korea 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from various issues of the KSY. 
   
B.6) Agrarian value-added at current prices (Table C.3) 
Sources 
Brazil 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata. 
Korea 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from various issues of the KSY. 
 
B.7) Total labour costs – Industrial sector (Tables C.11 and C.14) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
The time-series of the total cost of industrial labour-power was constructed by adding-
up the annual cost of the labour-force in formal employment contracts and the annual 
cost of those informally employed. The former was obtained by multiplying the average 
(direct) wage in the sector plus employer contributions to social security (i.e. indirect 
wages) by the total amount of the formally employed labour force. The latter was 
calculated multiplying the average wage by the quantity of informal workers, obtained 
by ducting the amount of formally employed industrial labour from the total industrial 
labour-force. 
Korea 
The time-series of the total cost of the industrial labour-force was computed by 
multiplying average wages (plus employer contributions) by the number of wage-
earners and self-employed in the sector.  
USA 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) database. 
 
B.8) Direct and indirect wages – Industrial sector (Tables C.4 and C.5) 
Methodology and sources 
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Industrial wages were computed by dividing the wage mass with the number of workers 
employed during the relevant year. Indirect wages were calculated by multiplying direct 
wages with the rate of employer contribution to social security. 
Wages 
Brazil 
a) 1955-1975: Base time-series were obtained from the Annual Industrial Survey (PIA) 
produced by the IBGE.  
b) 1976-2008: Values were estimated using an index of nominal wages for industrial 
workers in the metropolitan area of São Paulo, Brazil‘s largest industrial district, 
produced by the Federation of São Paulo Industrial Companies (FIESP). 
Korea 
a) 1970-2007: Base time-series were obtained from the National Accounts available in 
Kosis. 
 b) 1955-1969: The rest of the time-series was estimated using the rate of growth of 
wages paid to manual workers with permanent employment contracts (see below). 
Rate of employer contributions to social security 
Brazil 
a) 1954-1969: It was obtained from Bacha, et al. (1972: 165). 
b) 1975: It was obtained from Conjuntura Econômica, June, 1975. 
c) 1980: It was obtained from Conjuntura Econômica, April, 1980. 
d) 1976-1979: It was estimated taking the weighted average of 1975 and 1980 values. 
e) 1988-1990, 1992-1993 and 1997-2007: It was computed by dividing the value of 
total contributions by the value of total wages published in the PIA. 
f) 1991: It was estimated taking the average of 1990 and 1992 values. 
g) 1994-1995: It was estimated taking the average of 1993 and 1996 values. 
Korea 
a) 1975-2006: Values were obtained from the BLS database.  
b) 1955-1974: The rate of 1975 was used as a proxy. 
 
B.9) Industrial Employment (Table C.6) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
Total industrial labour force 
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a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken obtained from the ‗10-sector‘ database 
produced by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC). This 
information is compatible with that compiled in the Demographic Censuses and the 
National Household Sample Survey (PNAD). 
Industrial workers with formal employment contracts  
a) 1950-1985: It was taken from the PIA.  
b) 1986-2005: It was taken from the Ministry of Labour RAIS database.  
Korea 
Total industrial employment  
a) 1955-1958: It was obtained from the 1960 Mining and Industrial Census and 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) publications.   
b) 1959-1979: The time-series was taken from Michell (1988).  
c) 1980-2005: It was obtained from various issues of the ESY.  
USA 
a) 1950-2005: It was taken from the NIPA Tables. 
 
B.10) Total labour costs – Rural sector (Tables C.10 and C.13) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
The total cost of the rural labour-force (employees, self-employed and family workers) 
was computed using available estimations of ‗labour‘s share‘ in agrarian valued-added, 
and multiplying these values by the valued-added in the sector. Multiplying rural wages 
by rural workforce overestimates ‗labour‘s share‘ as it does not account for large 
underemployment in the sector.   
‗Labour‘s share‘ 
a) 1962-1963: It was taken from Chacel (1967) based on a FGV study. 
b) 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1995/6: It was obtained from Prado Lima (2007) based 
on Rural Census data. 
c) The rest of the time-series was estimated taking weighted averages of values 
available. 
Korea 
a) 1962-2005: The cost of the rural labour-force was computed multiplying the total 
annual number of hours worked in the agrarian sector by the average wage paid to 
hourly rural workers. The former was calculated by multiplying the number of hours 
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worked per household (by family members, paid workers or unpaid non-family 
workers) by the number of households. This value was used as a proxy for ‗rural 
employment‘ in the calculation of total labour costs. The hourly wage rate was 
estimated by dividing the average daily rural wage by 8. 
b) 1955-1961: They were estimated using the evolution of total rural employment and 
wages available in the ESY.  
 
B.11) Daily rural worker wages (Tables C.4 and C.5) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
a) 1952-1971: The time-series were taken from the database of the São Paulo Agrarian 
Economy Institute (IEA). Daily wages in this time-series correspond to workers in the 
state of São Paulo and therefore overestimate the national average. 
b) 1972-1990: It was generated using an index of rural wages available in Bacha and 
Greenhill (1992). 
c) 1991-2008: It was generated using an index of rural wages produced by the FGV 
(available in Ipeadata).   
Korea 
a) 1950-1970: Wage rates for daily farm workers were obtained from in Lee (1979).  
a) 1970-2005: The time-series was constructed using the index of farm wages published 
in various issues of the ESY. 
 
B.12) Rural Employment (Table C.6) 
Sources 
Brazil 
a) 1973-1995: The time-series was taken from Mendonça de Barros (1999). This author 
corrects Census data taking account for the participation of female and under-aged 
labour.  
b) 1950-1972: The data was constructed using the rate of growth of the time-series 
estimated by the GGDC (10-sector database). 
c) 1996-2005: The same criteria as for 1950-1972. 
Korea 
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a) 1961-2005: Values of average hours worked per household and of the number of 
rural households were taken from several issues of the Statistical Yearbook of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry.  
 
B.13) Total Urban labour costs (Tables C.12 and C.15) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
a) 1952-1969: The time-series was taken from Langoni (1970). This author uses 
unpublished IBGE material.  
b) 1970-1976: The time-series was generated using the evolution of non-rural 
employment estimated by the GGDC (‘10-sector‘ database) and an index of average 
urban wages available in Bacha (1986: 111). 
c) 1977-2005: The same methodology as the previous period, using the index of 
industrial wages in São Paulo mentioned above. 
Korea 
The urban labour-force was calculated by deducting the rural labour-force from the total 
labour-force. This total was multiplied by average labour costs in the industrial sector 
estimated above in order to estimate the total cost of the urban labour-force. 
Urban employment 
a) 1955-1969: The time-series of total employment was obtained from various issues of 
the ESY. 
b) 1970-2005: The time-series of total employment was obtained from the Korean 
Statistical Information Service (Kosis). 
 
B.14) Index of real industrial wages (Tables C.4 and C.5) 
Methodology 
Nominal wages were deflated using the relevant CPI. In the Brazilian case, two 
different methods were used for the periods 1950-1975 and 1976-2008. For the former 
period, annual average nominal wages in the industrial sector (see above) were deflated 
using the CPI produced by the FGV. For the latter period, a monthly index of nominal 
wages in the São Paulo manufacturing sector (produced by FIESP) was corrected using 
a monthly CPI. The increase in nominal wages between months y-1 and y was deflated 
by the average of price index increases between months y-1 and y and months y and 
y+1. It was assumed that half of worker wages were spent on rent payments at the 
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beginning of the month and the other half was spent uniformly throughout the month. 
This method fully captures the impact of high and volatile inflation rates on wages‘ 
purchasing power.   
 
B.15) Stock of fixed capital – Industrial sector (Tables C.7 and C.8) 
Methodology and sources 
Different methodologies were used to estimate the stock of fixed capital in the Brazilian 
and Korean industrial sectors.  
Brazil 
Due to the lack of information on gross capital formation in the sector, the time-series 
of total fixed capital annually advanced for valorisation in the industrial sector was 
calculated by applying to the original value the rate of growth of different estimations 
available for different periods. The value for 1954 was estimated using the capital to 
output ratio calculated in CEPAL/BNDES (1956) for those industrial sectors directly or 
indirectly producing consumer goods in 1954.
1
 An annual average depreciation rate of 
3.7% of the net value of the capital stock estimated in Morandi and Reis (2004) was 
used to calculate the consumption of fixed capital.  
a) 1955-2003: The time-series was generated using the rate of growth of the following 
estimations of the stock of fixed capital in the industrial sector: 
a.1) Serra (1982) for the period 1955-1980 
a.2) Fonseca and Mendes (2002) for the period 1970-1996 
a.3) Alves and Mesa Silva (2008) for the period 1996-2003 
b) 2003-2005: It was estimated using the rate of growth of total fixed capital stocks. 
Korea 
There is no official estimation of the stock of capital economy-wide and in the industrial 
sector. There are several independent estimations.
2
 Two of the most widely used are 
Timmer and van Ark (2002) and Pyo (2003), covering most of the post-WWII period. 
Timmer and van Ark (2002) estimate the stock of fixed capital in the industrial sector 
and economy-wide using the perpetual inventory method and a depreciation rate that 
includes a correction for technical obsolesce. The problem with this approach is 
                                                 
1
 This study, conducted by the UN Commission of Latin America and the newly created Brazilian 
National Development Bank, was part of region-wide project coordinated by CEPAL/ECLA. This project 
developed for the first time a uniform methodology to undertake a wide and exhaustive study of Latin 
American economies‘ contemporary state and growth potentialities. In some sense, this project informed 
the subsequent wave of developmentalist policies across the region. 
2
 See Choi (2001). 
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twofold. First, there are no time-series for gross fixed capital formation between 1940 
and 1953. As a consequence, Timmer and van Ark (2002) are forced to put forward all 
sorts of assumptions about it and the impact of the Second World and Korean Wars on 
them. Secondly, the use of non-linear depreciation rates is also questionable for 
representing accurately the form in which the value of an instrument of production is 
transferred to the goods it is used to produce. Pyo (2003) generates the time-series using 
national wealth survey data for 1968, 1977, 1987 and 1997. He estimates pre-1968 and 
post-1987 values through the perpetual inventory method and inter-survey values using 
investments flows and a polynomial equation that generates non-linear depreciation 
rates. Besides the problematical use of non-lineal depreciation rates, this estimation, as 
Timmer and van Ark (2002) noticed for previous versions of Pyo‘s study, is plagued 
with short-run inconsistencies, such as negative depreciation rates, necessary to make 
all surveys compatible with the investments time-series available in the national 
accounts.  
In this thesis, the stock of fixed capital in the Korean industrial sector is estimated by 
adding to an original value the flow of investments and deducting the flow of fixed 
capital consumption. The value for 1958 reported in the Manufacturing and mining 
census conducted by the Economic Planning Board was used as starting point for the 
time-series. The value of capital stocks during the precedent period (1955-57) was 
estimated by deducting investment flows and adding up depreciation costs. For the 
estimation of fixed capital consumption, the original stock was assumed to be in the 
middle of its useful life. The 25-years average useful life estimated by Timmer and van 
Ark (2002), based on OECD averages and the composition of fixed capital in Korea, for 
the manufacturing sector was used to calculate the consumption of fixed capital. The 
time-series of gross fixed capital formation was taken from various issues of the ESY. 
This information is produced by the Bank of Korea.  
 
B.16) Stock of fixed capital – Agrarian sector (Tables C.7 and C.8) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
There is no official publication of the time-series of gross capital formation in the 
agrarian sector. Data specific to the agrarian sector is included in the aggregated ‗private 
sector‘ gross capital formation account. There is no ‗unofficial‘ estimation either. For 
this reason, the estimation of the annual stock of fixed capital in the sector (i.e. 
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machinery, buildings, plantations and livestock) had to be done following a different 
methodology than for the industrial sector. 
The stocks of fixed capital in the form of machinery were estimated through the 
perpetual inventory method.
3
 The apparent consumption of the different types of 
machinery (tractors, cultivators and harvesters) was used as a measure of investments 
flows. Due to the lack of information, only imported milking machines were computed 
as investments in this type of instrument of production. Data from ANFAVEA (2008) 
was used for domestic production of tractors, cultivators and harvesters. Data from 
FAOSTAT was used for the number of tractors imported between 1950 and 2005. 
Information from UN Comtrade database was used for imports in domestic currency of 
other types of agricultural machinery. Prices of agricultural machinery published by 
IEA for 2005 and an index of prices of rural tractors (see below) were used to generate 
the time-series for 1955-2005. For imports before 1960, data published in the Statistics 
on Foreign Trade by the IBGE was used. A 5% depreciation rate (i.e. 20 years of useful 
life) was used to calculate the annual consumption of this type of fixed capital. 
The estimation of the stocks of fixed capital in the form of rural buildings was done 
adding the flow of investments and deducting the consumption (depreciation) of fixed 
capital to an original stock. Langoni‘s estimation of the total stocks of rural 
constructions for 1953 was used for the first value of the time-series. The estimation of 
annual investments in rural constructions for 1950-1969 was done by the IBGE 
(unpublished material) and reproduced in Langoni (1974). For 1970-2005, information 
on investments in rural commercial buildings is only available for the census years of 
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1995/6. The rest of the time-series was estimated using the 
weighted averages of the sector‘s investments-to-value-added ratios. Only 63% of the 
original stock and investments in rural buildings were considered as part of the stock of 
fixed capital advanced for valorisations in the form of commercial buildings in the 
agrarian sector. The other 37% was considered to be residential buildings. The 
relationship between residential and non-residential constructions was published in the 
Agrarian Censuses. The 63% mentioned above is an average of the values of the 
different census years.  
                                                 
3
 This method consists of generating the first value of the time-series by adding the flow of investments 
on a specific instrument of production and deducting its annual consumption for a period of time 
equivalent to its useful life. See Timmer and van Ark (2002) for a detailed explanation of this 
methodology.  
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The annual value of the stock of fixed capital in the form of perennial plantations was 
estimated using the following methodology. The number of trees of coffee, cocoa, 
oranges and banana, the four main perennial plantations in Brazil, in existence every 
year between 1940 and 2005 was estimated using the information of the number of trees 
per harvested area presented in the different agrarian census and the information annual 
harvested area published by the IBGE. For the case of coffee, direct information 
produced by the Brazilian Coffee Institute (1976) was used for the period 1950-1970. In 
order to calculate the value of the trees in existence, the cost of implantation and the 
average remaining useful life of each tree had to be estimated. The former was done 
using information on costs of implantation for coffee in 2003, cocoa in 1987, oranges in 
2003 and banana in 2005 presented in Rodrigues Vegro (2004), Santana Ferreira 
(1992), Ghilardi (2005) and Paiva Badiz Furlaneto (2005), respectively. The rest of the 
time-series was estimated using the prices implicit in fixed gross capital formation. The 
useful life of each tree was estimated using an iterative model that considers that if tree 
populations remain constant (i.e. new plantations only replace worn out ones), the 
average life of each tree is equal to the average of its useful life. Increases or decreases 
in the stock of trees is then factored in the equation, modifying the average age of each 
tree, downwards when new plantations exceed retirements and vice versa. The average 
remaining life of each tree is calculated by deducting the average age from the average 
useful life. The following useful life periods of full productive capacity were used: 15 
years for coffee, banana and orange trees, and 40 years for cacao. These are used in the 
sources mentioned above. 
Korea 
Agrarian assets apart from land and buildings were considered part of the stock of fixed 
capital in the sector. Buildings were regarded as used for residential purposes. The time-
series of fixed capital consumption was taken from the national accounts.   
a) 1955-2005: The time-series of fixed agrarian capital and consumption of fixed capital 
were taken from various issues of the KYS. 
 
B.17) Livestock capital (Table C.7) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
The annual value of the stock of animals was computed by multiplying the number of 
animals by their prices. As livestock reproduces itself indefinitely, a turnover speed 
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equal to infinity was used to represent the annual consumption of this type of fixed 
capital. In other words, livestock is always considered to be worth its full face value. 
Stock of animals 
a) 1950-2005: The number of animals for livestock production was gathered from 
FAOSTAT. 
Prices 
a) 1950-1990: Prices for the different types of animals were obtained from various 
issues of the SY produced by the IBGE.  
b) 1991-2005: They were estimated using price indices constructed for each type of 
animal. This information was obtained from the database of the São Paulo IEA. When 
no specific information was available (i.e. birds and sheep) a composite index of 
animals prices was used instead. 
Korea 
It is included in the time-series of fixed capital stock published in the KSY. 
 
B.18) Total stock of fixed capital (Tables C.7 and C.8)  
Methodology and sources 
As for the industrial sector, different methodologies were used to estimate the total 
stock of fixed capital in the Brazilian and Korean economies. 
Brazil 
a) 1950-2005: The time-series was obtained from Morandi and Reis (2004). Only 
breeding (store) animals are included in the stock of fixed capital estimated by the 
authors. For this reason, the annual value of the remaining stock of animals is computed 
by deducting the amount of breeding (store) animals from the total stock of animals 
estimated above. The former was estimated using the average relationship between 
breeding animals and total stocks presented in the 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1995/6 
Agrarian Census. These are 37.3% for cattle, 20% for pigs and 55% sheep. The average 
annual depreciation rate of 3.7% of the net value of the stock of capital estimated in this 
source was used to calculate the consumption of fixed capital. 
Korea 
The evolution of the total stock of fixed capital was estimated using the same 
methodology as for the industrial sector. The value and composition of the stock of 
capital in 1955 was taken from Pyo (2003). Flows of investment and consumption of 
fixed capital were estimated for non-residential buildings and equipment (transport and 
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machinery). Both time-series were taken from various issues of the ESY. Useful lives of 
45 and 17 years were used for buildings and equipment, respectively. These values were 
estimated in Timmer and van Ark (2002) based on OECD averages.  
  
B.19) Agrarian circulating capital (excluding livestock) (Tables C.7 and C.8) 
Methodology and sources 
The value of circulating capital advanced for valorisation was calculated by dividing the 
annual value of wages and of non-wage expenditures (i.e. intermediate consumption) by 
the number of times that this type of capital turns over per year. 
Brazil 
Turnover speed 
The average turnover speed of 2 times a year estimated in Iñigo Carrera (2007), using 
the model presented in the Appendix 3.1, for agrarian productions in Argentina is used 
here as a proxy of the rate of turnover of circulating capital in the Brazilian agrarian 
sector. This average includes almost all the most important agrarian productions 
undertaken in Brazil under relatively similar conditions.  
Non-wage production costs 
a) 1955-2005: Values were estimated using the relationship between intermediate 
consumption and value-added in the sector published in the input-output tables of 1959, 
1970, 1985, 1995 and 1996. The rest of the information was generated using weighted 
averages of that relationship and the time-series of agrarian value-added.  
Korea 
Turnover speed 
The rate of turnover of circulating capital in the agrarian sector was assumed to be equal 
to 1.5, the average number of annual harvests in Korea throughout the period.  
Non-wage production costs 
a) 1955-2005: Values were obtained from various issues of the KSY. 
 
B.20) Industrial circulating capital (Tables C.7 and C.8) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
Turnover speed 
The turnover speed of inventory stocks was used as a proxy for the turnover speed of 
circulating capital in the industrial sector. The data of the former for a sample of 665 
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medium and large size industrial companies during 1981-1987 was published in 
Conjuntura Econômica (1988). The average of those years, 6.18 times a year, was used 
for the entire period 1955-2005. 
Non-wage production costs 
a) 1955-2005: Values were estimated using the relationship between intermediate 
consumption and value-added published in the input-output tables of 1959, 1970, 1985, 
1995 and 1996. The rest of the information was generated using weighted averages of 
that relationship and the time-series of the sector‘s value-added.  
Korea 
Turnover speed 
a) 1955-1965 and 1980-2005: The rates of inventories turnover were taken from several 
issues of the SY.  
b) 1966-1979: Values were estimated taking the weighted average of previous and 
subsequent periods. 
Non-wage production costs 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series of non-wage production costs were obtained from 
various issues of the ESY. 
 
B.21) Total circulating capital (excluding livestock) (Tables C.7 and C.8) 
Methodology and sources 
Labour and non-labour costs were added up and divided by the number of times this 
type of capital turns over per year. 
Brazil 
Turnover speed 
The turnover speed of circulating capital in the industrial sector was used for all non-
agrarian productions. 
Non-labour production costs 
a) 1955-2005: Total annual consumption of raw and auxiliary materials (i.e. non-wage 
production costs) was calculated using the same methodology as in the case of industrial 
and agrarian circulating capital. 
Labour costs 
Rural and urban labour costs (see above) were added up.  
Korea 
Turnover speed  
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The average turnover speed of inventories in urban economic activities published in the 
ESY was used to calculate the amount circulating capital advanced.  
Non-labour production costs 
They were calculated by adding up rural and urban intermediate consumption.  
a) 1955-1969: They were estimated through the input-output tables published in various 
issues of the ESY. 
b) 1970-2005: They were taken from Kosis.  
Labour costs 
Rural and urban labour costs (see above) were added up.  
 
 
B.22) Exports (Table C.16) 
Sources 
Brazil 
Total exports 
a) 1947-2005: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata (produced by the Central Bank). 
Industrial exports 
a) 1962-1973: The time-series was calculated using the ratio of manufactures exports to 
merchandise exports published in World Development Indicators. 
b) 1974-2007: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata. 
Primary and semi-industrialised exports  
a) 1974-2007: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata. 
Korea  
Total exports 
a) 1955-2007: The time-series was taken from the IFS database. 
Industrial exports 
a) 1962-2005: The time-series was calculated using the ratio of manufactures exports to 
merchandise exports published in the World Development Indicators. 
Primary goods exports: 
a) 1953-1975: The time-series of total, industrial and primary goods exports was taken 
from Krueger (1979).  
b) 1976-1999: The data was obtained from various issues of the ESY. 
 
B.23) Exchange rates (Table C.17) 
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Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
Exchange rates for exports and imports were calculated by dividing the value of exports 
in current US$ by the value of exports registered in national currency. Black market 
exchange rates were also included.  
Exports exchange rates 
a) 1955-2007: The values of exports in local and foreign currency were obtained from 
various issues of the Statistical Yearbook. 
Black market exchange rates 
a) 1948-2006: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata. 
Korea  
Exchange rates for exports were calculated by adding the ‗export premium‘ to the 
official exchange rate. Export premiums were in place between 1958 and 1964.   
Export premiums 
a) 1958-1964: Values were taken from Krueger (1979). 
Official exchange rates 
a) 1955-2007: The time-series was taken from the IFS database.   
 
B.24) Taxes on primary goods exports (Brazil) (Table C.18) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
Three types of taxes on primary goods exports were implemented during the period 
under study: the ICM on exports collected by regional states, federal export taxes and 
Contribution quotas on coffee and cocoa exports. 
Rate of ICM on exports 
a) 1966-1984: The rate of ICM levied on primary goods exports was taken from 
Brandão and Carvalho (1991). 
b) 1985-1993: The rate of 13% from Cardoso de Melo et al. (1994) and Helfand (2000), 
who independently estimated it reaching the same value. This export tax was suspended 
in August 1997. 
c) 1994-1996: From Kume and Piani (1997: 9-10). 
Rate of export taxes 
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The tax rate was calculated dividing the amount of resources collected in the form of 
federal export taxes by the value of primary goods exports. Export taxes were 
exclusively levied on commodity exports. 
a) 1978-1984: The value in local currency of export taxes was obtained from Brandão 
and Carvalho (1991). 
Contribution quotas 
a) 1960-1984: The value of resources collected in the form of contribution quotas levied 
on coffee and cocoa exports was obtained from Brandão and Carvalho (1991)  
b) 1984-2005: The value of contribution quotas was taken from the Bulletin of the 
Central Bank of Brazil. 
Korea 
Export taxes were not applied to the international trade of primary goods during the 
period under study. 
 
B.25) Rural credit subsidies (Brazil) (Table C.18) 
Methodology and sources 
Subsidies granted to the agrarian sector through the credit system were only considered 
for working capital. 
Brazil 
a) 1967-1990: The base data was taken from Helfand (1994). 
 
B.26) Net income of the Brazilian Coffee Institute (Table C.18)  
Methodology and sources 
The net financial results of the Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) operations were 
obtained by deducting the monetary value of IBC annual purchases and expenditures 
from the resources raised through the sale of stocks. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the net 
losses of the state-run IBC were considered as a recovery of land rent by landowners.  
a) 1952-1966: Values were obtained from Bacha (1972). 
 
 B.27) International Commodity Prices (Table C.20) 
Methodology and sources 
International prices were used for all commodities studied here. For the case of rice in 
Korea, import Border prices were used as a proxy for international prices.   
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a) 1950-2007: Time-series of international of commodity prices were constructed with 
data published in the IMF Primary Commodity Prices and UN Comtrade databases.  
Korea  
a) 1960-1984: Border prices presented in Moon and Kang (1989) were used. 
b) 1985-2005: The time-series was constructed using the evolution of Thai FOB prices 
available in the IMF Commodity Prices database. 
 
B.28 Domestic farm-gate prices received of agrarian goods (Table C.21)  
Methodology and Sources 
Farm-gate prices were used for the cases of cotton, rice and soybeans in Brazil and for 
barley in Korea. For rice in Korea, weighted averages, according to their participation in 
total supply, of marketed and state purchases were calculated.    
Brazil 
a) 1960-1984: Values were taken from Brandão and Carvalho (1991). 
b) 1984-2007: The rest of the time-series was estimated using an index of Prices Paid to 
Producers published by the FGV (available in Ipeadata).  
Korea  
a) 1960-1984: Values were taken from Moon and Kang (1989). 
b) 1984-2005: Values were estimated using the Index of Prices Received by Farmers 
published in various issues of the ESY. 
  
B.29) Prices of sugar paid by the Sugar and Alcohol Institute (IAA) in Brazil 
(Table C.21) 
Methodology and sources 
The price paid by the IAA was estimated as the simple average of prices paid to sugar 
producers in the Northeast and Southeast of the country.  
a) 1960-1984: Values were taken from Brandão and Carvalho (1991). 
b) 1984-1990: The rest of the time-series was estimated using an index of Prices Paid to 
Producers published by the FGV (available in Ipeadata).  
 
B.30) Free Alongside Ship (FAS) prices (Table C.22) 
Methodology and sources 
Theoretical FAS prices were constructed by adding the costs of transport (to ports) and 
administrative expenses (at ports) to the farm-gate price received by local agrarian 
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producers. They were computed for the cases of soybeans, rice and cotton in Brazil. 
Due to a lack of information, FAS prices were not estimated for Korea. Domestic prices 
were simply compared with Border (i.e. import) prices. 
Brazil 
a) 1967-1983: FAS prices were taken from Brandão and Carvalho (1991). 
b) 1984-1989: They were estimated using the evolution of international and producer 
prices and the evolution of port and transport costs available in Helfand (1994).  
 
B.31) Apparent consumption of primary goods (Tables C.23 and C.24) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
The time-series of domestic consumption of locally produced primary goods was 
calculated by deducting the quantities exported of each commodity from total 
productions. It was computed for the most widely consumed agrarian and mining 
productions: rice, corn, beans, manioc, sugar, cotton, soybeans, beef and iron ore. 
Total production and exports 
a) 1955-2007: The time-series were taken from Ipeadata (produced by the IBGE). 
Korea  
The time-series of primary goods domestic consumption was computed for rice and 
barley only. In the case of rice, it was only computed for the portion of national 
production that was marketed (i.e. consumed outside the rural sector). In the case of 
barley, it was assumed to be equal to total output. Only a small fraction of barley 
production was occasionally exported.  
a) 1961-1970: The data on domestic consumption was obtained from Brown (1973).  
b) 1955-1960: It was assumed equal to the value of 1961. 
c) 1971-2005: The marketed portion was assumed to be equal to the production of each 
year minus the consumption in the rural sector in 1970. The data on domestic 
production of rice and barley was obtained from different issues of the ESY. 
 
B.32) Apparent consumption of agrarian inputs (Table C.25) 
Methodology and sources 
It was computed by adding up imports and deducting exports from the values of local 
productions.  
Brazil 
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It was computed for fertilizers, fuel-oil and tractors. 
Fertilizers  
a) 1966-2007: The time-series was taken from various issues of the Statistical 
Yearbook. 
b) 1950-1965: It was estimated using information on the prices of different types of 
fertilizers available in Veiga (1974: 396). 
Tractors 
a) 1955-2007: The time-series was taken from ANFAVEA (2008). 
Fuel-oil 
Following Iñigo Carrera (2007: 168-69), an average consumption of 0.16 litres/hour per 
HP was estimated for tractors and harvesters. Based on the usual estimation of 12,000 
hours of use during 20 years of useful life for agrarian machinery, an average of 600 
hours of use per year was estimated for both types of agrarian equipment. An average of 
50 HP was assumed for every tractor and harvester in use. The amount of diesel oil used 
per tractor and harvester was then multiplied by the amount of these means of 
production used per year, which was assumed to be equal to their stock. The annual 
stock of tractors and harvesters was obtained from the Statistical Database of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.  
Korea 
It was computed only for fertilizers. 
Fertilizers 
a) 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from the SYs. 
 
B.33) International prices of agrarian inputs (Table C.26) 
Methodology and sources 
Brazil 
Fertilizers 
a) 1955-1966: It was taken from Veiga (1974: 460-2). 
b) 1967-2007: It was estimated using the ‗Fertilizer price indexes‘ available in the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) database. 
Fuel-oil  
a) 1964-2005: The time-series was taken from Iñigo Carrera (2007: 253-4). The original 
time-series (Prices Paid Index: Fuel-oil) appeared in various issues of USDA‘s 
Agricultural Prices Annual Summary. 
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Tractors 60-80HP 
a) For 1955-2005: The time-series was taken from Iñigo Carrera (2007: 259-60) based 
on USDA. This source estimates the price of 60-80HP tractors for 1993-2004 as an 
average of the price of 60-69HP and 70-79HP tractors, being the former itself an 
average of the prices of 50-59HP and 70-79HP tractors. The values for 1950-1993 were 
estimated using the Prices Paid Index: motor-vehicles (1950-1964); tractors and self-
propelled (1965-1989); tractors (1990-1992). These indices appeared in various issues 
of the Agricultural Prices Annual Summary. 
Korea  
Fertilizers 
a) 1963-2005: Import prices were obtained from the UN Comtrade database.  
b) 1955-1962: Values were calculated using indexes of potash and phosphate prices 
from IMF Commodity Prices database.  
 
B.34) Domestic Prices of agrarian inputs (Table C.27) 
Sources 
Brazil  
Fertilizers  
a) 1966-2007: The time-series was obtained from the IEA database.  
b) 1955-1965: It was estimated using values presented in Veiga (1974: 395). 
Fuel-oil 
a) 1966-2007: The time-series was obtained from the IEA database.  
Tractors  
The price of 60-80HP tractors was estimated taking the average of the prices of 60-
70HP and 70-80HP tractors. 
a) 1990-2007: Prices were obtained from the IEA database.  
b) 1970-1990: Values were estimated using the average price of tractors of different 
power available in Mendonça de Barros (1999). 
c) 1955-1969: Values were estimated using the prices implicit in gross fixed capital 
formation in the form machinery.   
Korea 
Fertilizers  
a) 1970-1984: The values were taken from Moon and Kang (1991).  
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b) 1955-1969; 1985-2007: They were calculated using the indexes of Prices Paid by 
Farmers published in various issues of the ESY.   
 
B.35) Indices of labour productivity (Table C.28) 
Methodology and sources 
Two indices were constructed. The index of industrial labour productivity was 
constructed relating the evolution of physical output and production workers. For 
Korea, this index was corrected by the evolution of hours worked per year in the sector. 
In contrast to the Brazilian experience, the annual number of hours worked in Korea 
evolved differently from the USA. The index of general labour productivity was 
constructed relating the evolution of physical output and total employment in the 
economy. 
Brazil 
a) 1950-2007: Time-series of industrial output and production worker employment were 
obtained from the annual surveys undertaken by the IBGE. The time-series of GDP 
volume was taken from the IFS database. For total employment time-series see above. 
Korea 
a) 1955-2005: Time-series of physical output were taken from the various issues of the 
ESY. The number of industrial production workers was estimated multiplying the time-
series of total industrial employment presented above by the proportion of production 
workers taken from International Labour Organisation (ILO) Laborsta. The proportion 
of production workers during 1955-1959 and 1961-1969 was estimated as a weighted 
average of preceding and subsequent values. The time-series of GDP volume was taken 
from the IFS database. For total employment time-series see above. 
 
USA 
Three indices were constructed using the different methodologies just explained. 
a) 1950-2007: All time-series were taken from the NIPA Tables and the IFS database. 
 
B.36) Industrial labour productivity relative to US levels (Table C.28) 
Methodology  
Brazilian and Korean industrial value-added per worker in 2000 were converted into 
US$ at the PPP exchange rates (see Chapter 2 for the methodology) and compared with 
the US value in order to obtain a measure of relative productivity. Both Brazilian and 
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Korean national accounts systems changed their bases in 2000. The time-series in 
constant and current prices are therefore equal that year. The figure of the current value-
added per worker relative to US levels can thus be used as a measure of relative 
physical productive. The rest of the time-series was generated using the evolution of 
indices of labour productivity in the three countries. In order to assure computational 
consistency, values of ―gross manufacturing value-added‖ and employment in 2000 for 
Brazil, Korea and USA were taken from the GGDC ‘10-Sector‘ Database. For Korea, it 
was also calculated for hourly value-added. For Brazil, it was also calculated for value-
added per worker in the mainstream manufacturing sector (i.e. companies included in 
the Pesquisa Industrial Anual Empresa (Annual Industrial Survey) conducted by the 
IBGE. 
 
B.37) Absolute gap with US level of industrial labour productivity (Table C.28) 
Methodology 
The values of output per worker in the Brazilian and Korean industrial sectors in US$ 
were estimated using 2000 values of value-added in US$ and generating the rest of the 
time-series with the respective indices of physical labour productivity. The absolute 
difference between US levels of output per worker and the estimated Brazilian and 
Korean values was then taken as a measure of the absolute productivity gap.   
 
B.38) Hourly industrial wages and compensation costs in US$ (Table C.29) 
Methodology and sources 
Wages and compensation costs were calculated for manual workers and all employees 
in the industrial sector. 
Brazil 
1) 1996-2005: Values estimated by the US BLS were used. 
2) 1955-1995: The rest of the time-series was estimated using the rate of growth of 
average industrial wages calculated above in US$ at market exchange rates. 
Korea  
Manual workers with permanent employment contract 
1) 1955-2005: The base time-series of wages was taken from various issues of the ESY. 
The rate of employer contributions to social security and exchange rates was provided 
above.  
All employees 
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1) 1970-2005: The time-series was constructed with the information on average 
industrial wages, employer contributions and exchange rates provided above.  
USA 
a) 1955-2005: All time-series were obtained from BLS database and the NIPA Tables.   
 
B.39) Real purchasing power of industrial wages in PPP US$ (Table C.30) 
Methodology  
In order to obtain internationally comparable figures, the purchasing power of industrial 
wages in Brazil and Korea was expressed in US dollars of constant purchasing power. 
For that purpose, industrial wages in national currency were transformed into US$ using 
PPP exchange rates for private consumption calculated by the World Bank for 2005. 
The rest of the time-series were estimated using indices of real wage evolution. The 
conversion into US$ was done for 2005 because that was the last benchmark year for 
the calculation of PPP exchange rates by the Bank. Values estimated by the World Bank 
for the rest of the time-series were discarded due to the problems with the Brazilian 
official CPI mentioned above. World Bank‘s PPP exchange rates for non-benchmark 
years are calculated using the evolution of national CPIs.  
 
B.40) Net inflows of foreign interest-bearing capital and aid (Tables C.31 and C.32) 
Methodology and sources 
The net inflow of foreign capital in the form of credit was computed in two different 
ways. The first method consisted of deducting the annual amortisation (principal and 
interest payments) of debt contracted in foreign currency from the inflow of new loans 
contracted in the relevant year. In the Korean case, aid inflows were also included. The 
second method deducted the value of interest payments from the net increase in the 
stock of external debts. For Brazil, net inflows were computed using both methods. For 
Korea, the first method was used for the period up to 1975 and the second one 
thereafter. 
Brazil 
a) 1950-2007: The time-series of inflows and outflows are registered by the Central 
Bank (available in Ipeadata). 
Korea 
a) 1955-1975: Aid inflows were taken from Frank et al. (1975). The data on net 
borrowing was obtained from Krueger (1979). 
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b) 1976-1981: Annual credit inflows minus principal payments were computed taking 
the difference between stock of external debts in the relevant year and the preceding 
one. The stock of foreign debt was taken from the IFS database. Interest payments were 
taken from World Bank (1986: 166). For 1976, they were assumed to be the same 
portion of the stock of external debt as in 1977. 
c) 1982-1998: The same method as the previous period was used. Interest payments 
were taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators database. 
 
B.41) External debt and foreign exchange reserves (Tables C.31 and C.32) 
Sources 
Brazil  
a) 1947-2007: The times-series were obtained from Ipeadata (produced originally by the 
Central Bank). 
Korea 
a) 1955-2007: The times-series were obtained from the IFS database. 
  
B.42) Rate of profit of US industrial capital (Table C.33) 
Sources 
a) 1950-2004: The values were taken from Iñigo Carrera (2007). The time-series in this 
source is based on the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 
(for the period 1950-1970) and on several issues of the ‗Quarterly Financial Report for 
Manufacturing, Mining and Trade Corporations‘ (for 1971-2004). Both publications 
were produced by the US Bureau of Census. 
 
B.43) Nominal and real interest rates (Tables C.34 and C.35) 
Methodology and sources 
Nominal interest rates were deflated using national CPIs 
Brazil  
Money market and Treasury bills 
a) 1948-2007: The times-series were obtained from the IFS database. 
Korea 
Investment, trade and ‗curb‘ market loans 
a) 1953-1995: The times-series were taken from Cheung (2004). 
Corporate bonds 
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a) 1980-2007: The time-series was taken from the IFS database. 
USA 
Treasury bills, Fed funds and Prime loans 
a) 1949-2007: The time-series was taken from the IFS database. 
 
B.44) Total debts outstanding (Table C.36)  
Methodology and sources 
Claims in the domestic market against all types of public and private sector actors were 
considered  
Brazil and Korea 
a) 1950-2007: The times-series were obtained from the IFS database. 
USA (includes external debts) 
a) 1950-2007: The time-series was taken from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
Account of the United Stated. 
 
B.45) Capital inflows in the form of Foreign Direct Investments (Table C.37) 
Sources 
Brazil 
a) 1950-2007: The time-series was taken from Ipeadata. This information is originally 
registered by the Central Bank of Brazil. 
Korea 
a) 1962-2004: The time-series was taken from Chung (2007: 275). 
 
B.46) Trade and current account results (Table C.38) 
Sources 
Brazil  
a) 1947-2007: The times-series were obtained from Ipeadata. 
Korea 
a) 1952-2007: The times-series were obtained from the IFS database. 
 
B.47) Investment rates (Table C.39) 
Sources 
Brazil 
a) 1950-2005: The times-series was obtained from Ipeadata.  
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Korea 
a) 1953-1998: The time-series was taken from Cheung (2004) 
b) 1999-2005: From Kosis 
 
B.48) Price index of public utility prices in Brazil (Table C.40) 
Methodology and sources 
The index of public utility prices in Rio de Janeiro was used 
a) 1950-2005: The time-series produced by the FGV was used (available in Ipeadata). 
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Table C.1         
Price indices         
          
 Consumer Price Indices GDP Deflators 
 Brazil Korea USA Brazil Korea USA 
 Index % Index % Index % Index Index Index 
1944 0.000000000000078    10.1  0.01065   
1945 0.000000000000091 16.8   10.3 2.3 0.01224   
1946 0.000000000000106 16.5   11.2 8.3 0.01403   
1947 0.000000000000129 21.9   12.8 14.4 0.01529  13.7 
1948 0.000000000000133 3.4   13.8 8.1 0.01618  14.5 
1949 0.000000000000139 4.2   14.2 2.4 0.01752  14.5 
1950 0.000000000000152 9.4 0.03  14.0  -1.4 0.01911  14.6 
1951 0.000000000000170 12.1 0.13 300.5 15.1 8.0 0.02257  15.7 
1952 0.000000000000200 17.3 0.31 146.4 15.4 2.2 0.02473  16.0 
1953 0.000000000000229 14.3 0.45 45.3 15.5 0.8 0.02818 0.2 16.2 
1954 0.000000000000280 22.5 0.61 35.4 15.6 0.4 0.03586 0.3 16.3 
1955 0.000000000000345 23.1 1.04 69.4 15.6   -0.3 0.03999 0.4 16.6 
1956 0.000000000000417 21.0 1.27 22.5 15.8 1.5 0.04909 0.6 17.2 
1957 0.000000000000484 16.0 1.56 23.1 16.3 3.4 0.05535 0.7 17.7 
1958 0.000000000000556 14.8 1.51 -3.1 16.8 2.7 0.06217 0.7 18.1 
1959 0.000000000000773 39.2 1.58 4.3 16.9 0.9 0.08446 0.7 18.3 
1960 0.000000000001001 29.5 1.71 8.3 17.2 1.5 0.10591 0.8 18.6 
1961 0.000000000001334 33.2 1.85 8.2 17.4 1.1 0.14259 0.9 18.8 
1962 0.000000000001994 49.5 1.99 7.6 17.6 1.1 0.21425 1.1 19.1 
1963 0.000000000003445 72.8 2.39 19.7 17.8 1.2 0.38225 1.4 19.3 
1964 0.000000000006606 91.7 3.09 29.4 18.0 1.3 0.72450 1.8 19.6 
1965 0.000000000010945 65.7 3.51 13.6 18.3 1.7 1.15147 1.9 19.9 
1966 0.000000000015465 41.3 3.90 11.3 18.9 3.0 1.58829 2.2 20.5 
1967 0.000000000020174 30.4 4.33 10.9 19.4 2.8 2.00964 2.5 21.1 
1968 0.000000000024615 22.0 4.80 10.8 20.2 4.2 2.54636 2.9 22.0 
1969 0.000000000030188 22.6 5.39 12.4 21.3 5.4 3.05694 3.4 23.1 
1970 0.000000000036950 22.4 6.25 16.0 22.5 5.9 3.55385 3.9 24.3 
1971 0.000000000044394 20.1 7.09 13.5 23.5 4.3 4.24275 4.5 25.5 
1972 0.000000000051747 16.6 7.92 11.7 24.3 3.3 5.08567 5.3 26.6 
1973 0.000000000065512 26.6 8.18 3.2 25.8 6.2 6.59002 6.1 28.1 
1974 0.000000000083592 27.6 10.16 24.3 28.6 11.0 8.87056 8.1 30.7 
1975 0.000000000107803 29.0 12.73 25.3 31.3 9.1 11.88029 10.3 33.6 
1976 0.000000000152945 41.9 14.68 15.3 33.1 5.7 16.77540 12.7 35.5 
1977 0.000000000219838 43.7 16.16 10.1 35.2 6.5 24.39111 14.9 37.7 
1978 0.000000000304920 38.7 18.50 14.5 37.9 7.6 33.71524 18.4 40.4 
1979 0.000000000465597 52.7 21.89 18.3 42.2 11.3 52.04486 22.0 43.8 
1980 0.000000000851084 82.8 28.17 28.7 47.9 13.5 100.0000 27.2 47.8 
1981 0.000000001749585 105.6 34.19 21.4 52.8 10.3 200.5289 32.1 52.2 
1982 0.000000003463994 98.0 36.65 7.2 56.0 6.2 403.1320 34.4 55.4 
1983 0.000000008382201 142.0 37.90 3.4 57.8 3.2 933.1863 36.4 57.6 
1984 0.000000024873510 196.7 38.76 2.3 60.3 4.3 2,815.799 38.5 59.8 
1985 0.000000081328234 227.0 39.72 2.5 62.5 3.6 9,814.289 40.2 61.6 
1986 0.000000198228942 143.7 40.81 2.8 63.6 1.9 24,455.18 42.4 62.9 
1987 0.000000657499341 231.7 42.05 3.0 66.0 3.7 74,883.88 44.7 64.8 
1988 0.000005143624577 682.3 45.06 7.1 68.7 4.0 545,118.3 48.0 67.0 
1989 0.000071341023633 1,287 47.63 5.7 72.0 4.8 7,655,774 50.4 69.5 
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Table C.1         
Price indices         
          
 Consumer Price Indices GDP Deflators 
 Brazil Korea USA Brazil Korea USA 
 Index % Index % Index % Index Index Index 
1990 0.002189 2,968 51.7 8.6 75.9 5.4 217,192,059 55.8 72.2 
1991 0.011668 433 56.5 9.3 79.1 4.2 1,122,191,612 61.7 74.8 
1992 0.128483 1,001 60.1 6.2 81.5 3.0 11,987,073,864 66.1 76.5 
1993 2.83 2,105 62.9 4.8 83.9 3.0 251,890,159,911 73.7 78.2 
1994 77.51 2,636 66.9 6.3 86.1 2.6 5,923,671,664,172 79.5 79.9 
1995 141.23 82.2 69.9 4.5 88.5 2.8 11,463,682,575,285 85.4 81.5 
1996 168.63 19.4 73.3 4.9 91.1 2.9 13,422,230,142,404 89.8 83.1 
1997 181.96 7.9 76.6 4.4 93.2 2.3 14,448,293,114,198 93.9 84.6 
1998 191.88 5.5 82.3 7.5 94.7 1.6 15,060,336,225,041 99.4 85.5 
1999 202.46 5.5 83.0 0.8 96.7 2.2 16,337,180,587,900 99.3 86.8 
2000 218.56 7.9 84.9 2.3 100.0 3.4 17,346,380,471,274 100.0 88.6 
2001 233.71 6.9 88.3 4.1 102.8 2.8 18,902,019,700,363 103.5 90.6 
2002 252.90 8.2 90.8 2.8 104.5 1.6 20,896,848,588,986 106.5 92.1 
2003 290.30 14.8 93.9 3.5 106.8 2.3 23,765,279,782,835 109.4 94.1 
2004 308.74 6.4 97.3 3.6 109.7 2.7 25,675,490,646,255 112.3 96.8 
2005 327.37 6.0 100.0 2.8 113.4 3.4 27,526,578,398,693 112.1 100.0 
2006 339.06 3.6 102.2 2.2 117.1 3.2 29,219,430,057,284 111.5 103.3 
2007 350.70 3.4 104.8 2.5 120.4 2.9 30,934,190,117,257 112.9 106.3 
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Table C.2      
Gross fixed capital formation deflators    
      
 Brazil Korea 
 Fixed Capital Machinery Construction Equipment Construction 
1930 0.0039 0.0042    
1931 0.0049 0.0051    
1932 0.0045 0.0045    
1933 0.0047 0.0045    
1934 0.0051 0.0047    
1935 0.0059 0.0060    
1936 0.0063 0.0063    
1937 0.0064 0.0064    
1938 0.0067 0.0066    
1939 0.0068 0.0067    
1940 0.0083 0.0118    
1941 0.0079 0.0082    
1942 0.0092 0.0095    
1943 0.0102 0.0098    
1944 0.0102 0.0087    
1945 0.0111 0.0080    
1946 0.0112 0.0088    
1947 0.0125 0.0097 0.0138   
1948 0.0122 0.0104 0.0145   
1949 0.0131 0.0112 0.0154   
1950 0.0138 0.0119 0.0162   
1951 0.0164 0.0141 0.0179   
1952 0.0170 0.0145 0.0194   
1953 0.0218 0.0211 0.0214   
1954 0.0294 0.0266 0.0261   
1955 0.0315 0.0305 0.0306 4.7 2.0 
1956 0.0387 0.0388 0.0370 5.8 2.5 
1957 0.0419 0.0407 0.0439 7.0 2.8 
1958 0.0543 0.0587 0.0497 7.5 2.9 
1959 0.0746 0.0843 0.0666 7.7 3.4 
1960 0.0909 0.0893 0.0782 8.2 3.9 
1961 0.1292 0.1159 0.1124 8.3 4.2 
1962 0.2123 0.1789 0.1598 8.7 4.6 
1963 0.3884 0.3496 0.3009 10.0 4.9 
1964 0.6870 0.6206 0.5483 12.8 6.5 
1965 1.0018 1.0569 0.9312 14.5 7.7 
1966 1.3337 1.3686 1.2718 15.8 8.7 
1967 1.7352 1.6396 1.7925 16.7 8.9 
1968 2.2401 2.1410 2.3691 18.8 9.7 
1969 2.7535 2.6423 2.7919 18.9 10.1 
1970 3.2835 3.3199 3.2585 21.2 11.6 
1971 3.9783 3.9598 3.9196 22.5 11.7 
1972 4.6589 4.6539 4.7216 25.0 12.8 
1973 5.7441 5.5633 5.9129 26.1 14.5 
1974 7.8923 7.3822 8.4934 31.7 20.2 
1975 10.8577 10.1847 11.3709 37.2 24.8 
1976 15.1364 14.1641 16.0118 38.9 26.7 
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Table C.2      
Gross fixed capital formation deflators    
      
 Brazil Korea 
 Fixed Capital Machinery Construction Equipment Construction 
1977 22.2414 21.6345 22.73 40.7 29.3 
1978 32.1835 32.7030 31.75 42.8 31.4 
1979 53.8723 51.3529 55.52 48.2 41.8 
1980 100.14 99.36 100.61 57.5 61.0 
1981 225.84 236.24 220.82 64.1 69.6 
1982 462.40 495.84 447.15 70.1 73.0 
1983 1,086.23 1,232.74 1,028 72.3 73.6 
1984 3,275.89 3,502.00 3,180 74.1 74.5 
1985 12,500 11,036 10,610 76.1 74.7 
1986 30,612 22,244 28,075 78.4 74.8 
1987 93,750 82,900 103,223 80.8 75.9 
1988 771,739 806,037 759,349 83.9 80.3 
1989 12,290,323 11,575,000 12,475,385 87.4 82.2 
1990 287,518,072 454,545,455 344,827,586 89.3 86.4 
1991 1,381,924,051 1,666,666,667 1,228,070,175 92.1 93.4 
1992 16,176,095,890 18,823,529,412 14,905,660,377 94.7 95.9 
1993 348,508,064,103 395,555,555,556 327,678,571,429 96.7 96.7 
1994 8,140,818,202,247 8,419,600,000,000 7,948,813,559,322 98.4 95.5 
1995 13,468,406,770,833 20,048,064,516,129 9,599,830,508,475 100.0 100.0 
1996 14,678,538,762,887 20,200,000,000,000 10,992,063,492,064 100.0 102.6 
1997 15,389,986,018,868 20,757,647,058,824 11,921,176,470,588 102.1 106.1 
1998 15,826,100,571,429 20,620,909,090,909 12,554,347,826,087 123.9 125.4 
1999 17,190,346,587,629 23,171,428,571,429 13,177,462,686,567   
2000 19,426,568,627,451 28,213,666,666,667 14,456,617,647,059   
2001 21,742,352,941,177 32,794,193,548,387 15,383,582,089,552   
2002 24,965,154,639,175 37,013,448,275,862 17,893,281,250,000   
2003 28,229,782,608,696 43,410,714,285,714 19,128,000,000,000   
2004 30,942,178,217,822 48,290,645,161,290 21,354,843,750,000   
2005 32,907,403,846,154 51,713,939,393,939 22,262,923,076,923   
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Table C.3       
GDP, industrial value-added and agrarian value-added  
        
 Brazil Korea USA 
 GDP Industrial VA Agrarian VA GDP Ind. VA Agr. VA GDP 
 million R$ billion W$ bill. US$ 
1953 0.00000000018 0.000000000032 0.000000000039 48.3 3.8 - 379 
1954 0.00000000024 0.000000000045 0.000000000054 66.8 6.9 - 380 
1955 0.00000000030 0.000000000057 0.000000000065 115 11.7 - 415 
1956 0.00000000037 0.000000000074 0.000000000073 153 15.7 71.9 437 
1957 0.00000000045 0.000000000091 0.000000000086 199 19.0 89.7 461 
1958 0.00000000057 0.000000000123 0.000000000095 207 22.3 84.2 467 
1959 0.00000000084 0.000000000198 0.000000000131 220 26.4 74.2 507 
1960 0.00000000116 0.000000000269 0.000000000187 248 29.3 91.1 526 
1961 0.00000000169 0.000000000424 0.000000000266 297 36.8 116.1 545 
1962 0.00000000271 0.000000000662 0.000000000440 359 43.4 132.9 586 
1963 0.00000000486 0.000000001201 0.000000000722 509 66.4 221.4 618 
1964 0.00000000953 0.000000002304 0.000000001433 724 104.8 340.2 664 
1965 0.00000001551 0.000000003532 0.000000002246 813 138.5 309.6 719 
1966 0.00000002283 0.000000005191 0.000000002885 1,042 173.4 364.1 788 
1967 0.00000003010 0.000000006637 0.000000003726 1,282 208.7 394.4 833 
1968 0.00000004188 0.000000009812 0.000000004348 1,660 270.6 477.8 910 
1969 0.00000005505 0.000000013042 0.000000005494 2,169 356.0 607.9 985 
1970 0.00000007066 0.000000017407 0.000000007330 2,775 444.7 735.9 1,039 
1971 0.00000009393 0.000000023728 0.000000010436 3,435 549.5 926.1 1,127 
1972 0.00000012603 0.000000032598 0.000000014042 4,241 749.9 1,120.8 1,238 
1973 0.00000018612 0.000000053136 0.000000020311 5,499 1,114 1,347.0 1,383 
1974 0.00000027096 0.000000080058 0.000000028895 7,845 1,526 1,890.5 1,500 
1975 0.00000038164 0.000000113841 0.000000039036 10,478 2,023 2,551.9 1,638 
1976 0.00000059417 0.000000174915 0.000000061259 14,411 3,030 3,292.1 1,825 
1977 0.00000090654 0.000000256345 0.000000108918 18,502 3,856 4,000.9 2,031 
1978 0.00000131536 0.000000385454 0.000000130233 24,945 5,256 4,944.0 2,295 
1979 0.00000216772 0.000000644508 0.000000209573 32,049 6,838 5,924.1 2,563 
1980 0.00000454829 0.000001386273 0.000000448036 39,110 8,340 5,553.3 2,790 
1981 0.00000873301 0.000002595162 0.000000875097 49,306 10,749 7,311 3,128 
1982 0.00001770208 0.000005443638 0.000001535945 56,677 12,349 7,841 3,255 
1983 0.00003977685 0.000011727648 0.000004419659 66,685 15,099 8,390 3,537 
1984 0.00012650401 0.000038684706 0.000015733337 76,524 18,356 9,100 3,933 
1985 0.00047553404 0.000154414096 0.000054286874 85,699 20,343 10,129 4,220 
1986 0.00127368393 0.000390722824 0.000136266177 100,254 25,273 10,489 4,463 
1987 0.00403780574 0.001206571128 0.000391411715 117,938 30,963 11,072 4,739 
1988 0.02937563025 0.008806393317 0.003000443213 140,525 37,491 13,167 5,104 
1989 0.42559531039 0.124653188008 0.037696954942 158,620 40,253 13,828 5,484 
1990 11.54879 2.63637 0.80419 191,383 45,363 14,845 5,803 
1991 60.28600 13.16594 4.12435 231,428 55,511 16,002 5,996 
1992 640.9588 149.3985 43.62424 263,993 61,452 17,743 6,338 
1993 14,097.11 3,672.26 955.5179 298,762 69,903 17,951 6,657 
1994 349,204.68 82,835.65 30,457.60 349,973 82,765 20,313 7,072 
1995 705,640.89 114,685.73 35,554.58 409,654 98,530 22,392 7,398 
1996 843,965.63 124,769.00 40,958.49 460,953 106,339 23,528 7,817 
1997 939,146.62 138,459.00 44,823.84 506,314 114,363 23,450 8,304 
1998 979,275.75 136,100.00 47,844.73 501,027 119,066 21,940 8,747 
 
 
 449 
Table C.3       
GDP, industrial value-added and agrarian value-added  
        
 Brazil Korea USA 
 GDP Industrial VA Agrarian VA GDP Ind. VA Agr. VA GDP 
 million R$ billion W$ bill. US$ 
1999 1,064,999.71 149,554.00 50,782.03 549,005 132,143 24,393 9,268.4 
2000 1,179,482.00 175,934.00 57,241.00 603,236 150,331 24,603 9,817.0 
2001 1,302,136.00 191,646.00 66,819.00 651,415 150,870 24,374 10,128.0 
2002 1,477,822.00 214,562.00 84,251.00 720,539 161,057 24,207 10,469.6 
2003 1,699,948.00 264,955.00 108,619.00 767,114 168,246 23,725 10,960.8 
2004 1,941,498.00 320,223.00 115,194.00 826,893 197,481 25,764 11,685.9 
2005 2,147,239.00 333,296.00 105,163.00 865,241 203,681 24,111 12,421.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 450 
Table C.4        
Direct and indirect wages (Brazil)       
         
 Brazil Sao Paulo Brazil Brazil 
                                           Manufacturing Urban Agriculture MW 
 Monthly wages  Contr. Wages Wages Daily wages LC/VA Monthly 
 R$ 2004 
R$ 
% 2006 = 100 1952 = 100 R$ % 2004 R$ 
1952 0.0000000000005 830 0.12  100 0.000000000000011 0.29 601 
1953 0.0000000000006 824 0.12  103 0.000000000000012 0.29 526 
1954 0.0000000000008 894 0.12  151 0.000000000000014 0.29 633 
1955 0.0000000000010 888 0.11  199 0.000000000000017 0.29 698 
1956 0.0000000000013 953 0.11  234 0.000000000000020 0.29 709 
1957 0.0000000000016 1,028 0.16  334 0.000000000000023 0.29 785 
1958 0.0000000000019 1,035 0.17  343 0.000000000000025 0.29 685 
1959 0.0000000000025 1,011 0.18  475 0.000000000000032 0.29 785 
1960 0.0000000000034 1,042 0.18  601 0.000000000000041 0.29 683 
1961 0.0000000000045 1,044 0.18  779 0.000000000000054 0.29 790 
1962 0.0000000000074 1,146 0.18  1,152 0.000000000000081 0.29 684 
1963 0.0000000000143 1,276 0.23  1,862 0.000000000000132 0.29 629 
1964 0.0000000000264 1,233 0.25  3,255 0.000000000000278 0.28 616 
1965 0.0000000000410 1,154 0.27  5,455 0.000000000000498 0.27 565 
1966 0.0000000000618 1,232 0.28  7,586 0.000000000000650 0.26 525 
1967 0.0000000000788 1,204 0.36  10,897 0.000000000000906 0.25 503 
1968 0.0000000001028 1,287 0.35  11,862 0.000000000001195 0.25 510 
1969 0.0000000001344 1,372 0.34  14,897 0.000000000001444 0.24 487 
1970 0.0000000001541 1,285 0.35  18,069 0.000000000001867 0.23 478 
1971 0.0000000001969 1,367 0.36  21,862 0.000000000002344 0.23 479 
1972 0.0000000002597 1,547 0.37  26,138 0.000000000003045 0.22 491 
1973 0.0000000003001 1,412 0.38  32,345 0.000000000004124 0.22 510 
1974 0.0000000004108 1,515 0.39  45,310 0.000000000005759 0.21 481 
1975 0.0000000004884 1,396 0.40 0.00000000004 60,621 0.000000000007503 0.21 514 
1976 0.0000000007613 1,532 0.40 0.00000000007 80,207 0.000000000010120 0.22 504 
1977 0.0000000011429 1,601 0.40 0.00000000010 119,724 0.000000000016424 0.23 505 
1978 0.0000000017678 1,784 0.40 0.00000000016  0.000000000019040 0.23 517 
1979 0.0000000028590 1,897 0.40 0.00000000026  0.000000000026589 0.24 513 
1980 0.0000000055554 2,002 0.41 0.00000000050  0.000000000048145 0.25 527 
1981 0.0000000109702 1,931 0.41 0.00000000099  0.000000000098773 0.24 520 
1982 0.0000000220800 1,956 0.41 0.00000000199  0.000000000208460 0.23 523 
1983 0.0000000448008 1,674 0.41 0.00000000403  0.000000000443265 0.23 470 
1984 0.0000001303091 1,589 0.41 0.00000001172  0.000000001190728 0.22 428 
1985 0.0000004812331 1,794 0.41 0.00000004327  0.000000004504589 0.21 436 
1986 0.0000013662193 2,121 0.41 0.00000012285  0.000000011935276 0.21 436 
1987 0.0000041039383 1,974 0.41 0.00000036903  0.000000031159421 0.22 353 
1988 0.0000309396776 1,821 0.42 0.00000278212  0.000000200885924 0.22 337 
1989 0.0004684403587 1,876 0.45 0.00004212249  0.000003330089393 0.23 353 
1990 0.0107656949979 1,563 0.49 0.00096805894  0.000068684321630 0.23 262 
1991 0.0513178173580 1,326 0.49 0.00461453459  0.000383097896575 0.23 247 
1992 0.5906284273312 1,382 0.49 0.05310972775  0.003452732528169 0.24 260 
1993 12.627761261959 1,378 0.50 1.13549726311  0.070955246190611 0.24 270 
1994 301.13258225462 1,247 0.51 27.0780557132  1.844107980339280 0.25 205 
1995 532.03246057669 1,166 0.51 47.8407367972  4.670314723191010 0.25 196 
1996 597.65663652086 1,095 0.52 53.7417093159  5.707887839639200 0.25 198 
 
 451 
Table C.4        
Direct and indirect wages (Brazil)       
         
 Brazil Sao Paulo Brazil Brazil 
 Manufacturing Urban Agriculture MW 
 Monthly 
wages 
 Contr. Wages Wages Daily 
wages 
LC/VA Monthly 
 R$ 2004 R$ % 2006 = 100 1952 = 100 R$ % 2004 R$ 
1998 644.026 1,093 0.51 57.911  6.108 0.25 199 
1999 647.498 1,042 0.51 58.223  6.369 0.25 204 
2000 615.103 939 0.49 55.310  6.577 0.25 204 
2001 680.926 962 0.48 61.229  6.910 0.25 208 
2002 686.563 908 0.49 61.736  7.173 0.25 228 
2003 703.776 860 0.48 63.284  8.166 0.25 238 
2004 747.339 795 0.49 67.201  9.318 0.25 244 
2005 851.037 851 0.43 76.526  10.239 0.25 253 
2006 953.750 900 0.43 85.762  11.690 0.25 270 
2007 1,112.091 1,013 0.43 100.000  13.073 0.25 307 
2008 1,205.586 1,062  108.407  14.268  328 
 
Note: Contr. = employer contributions to social security; LC/VA = labour cost over value-added; MW = minimum 
wage 
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Table C.5         
Direct and indirect wages (Korea)       
          
 Manufacturing Non-agriculture Agriculture 
 MW (prod workers) Average MW Contr. Monthly wages Daily wages 
 W$ 2004 W$ W$ 2004 W$ % W$ 2004 W$ W$ 2004 
W$ 
1952 283 88,599   0.11     
1953 464 99,980   0.11     
1954 834 132,709   0.11     
1955 1,384 129,993   0.11     
1956 1,664 127,567   0.11     
1957 2,030 126,421   0.11     
1958 2,170 139,413   0.11     
1959 2,350 144,687   0.11     
1960 2,330 132,420   0.11     
1961 2,610 137,096   0.11     
1962 2,780 135,742   0.11     
1963 3,180 129,699   0.11   167 6,811 
1964 3,880 122,283   0.11   199 6,272 
1965 4,600 127,578   0.11   221 6,129 
1966 5,420 135,111   0.11   256 6,382 
1967 6,640 149,273   0.11   307 6,902 
1968 8,400 170,488   0.11   381 7,733 
1969 11,270 203,525   0.11 11,610 209,665 463 8,361 
1970 14,150 220,368 16,163 251,717 0.11 17,830 277,679 579 9,017 
1971 17,349 238,038 20,890 286,628 0.11 20,580 282,369 695 9,536 
1972 20,104 246,973 22,081 271,256 0.11 21,180 260,192 803 9,865 
1973 22,330 265,764 26,925 320,447 0.11 26,950 320,750 885 10,533 
1974 30,209 289,250 32,526 311,438 0.11 35,540 340,294 1,141 10,925 
1975 38,378 293,374 37,164 284,096 0.11 46,020 351,792 1,467 11,214 
1976 51,685 342,595 48,733 323,028 0.11 62,187 412,208 1,905 12,628 
1977 69,168 416,446 61,891 372,632 0.11 82,041 493,953 2,363 14,228 
1978 92,907 488,688 82,093 431,806 0.11 110,977 583,738 3,452 18,156 
1979 119,515 531,299 105,350 468,328 0.11 142,880 635,168 5,211 23,165 
1980 146,684 506,683 141,356 488,277 0.11 176,350 609,158 6,605 22,815 
1981 176,176 501,476 181,952 517,918 0.11 212,369 604,497 7,501 21,351 
1982 202,117 536,714 194,628 516,828 0.11 246,013 653,279 8,364 22,210 
1983 226,790 582,323 217,742 559,090 0.11 272,912 700,750 8,829 22,669 
1984 245,261 615,747 249,185 625,598 0.11 296,992 745,621 9,194 23,081 
1985 269,652 660,738 253,001 619,937 0.11 324,425 794,950 9,691 23,747 
1986 294,485 702,261 293,621 700,201 0.11 350,716 836,355 10,123 24,140 
1987 328,696 760,658 312,147 722,361 0.11 386,283 893,923 10,621 24,578 
1988 393,056 848,936 379,327 819,283 0.10 446,536 964,444 12,280 26,523 
1989 491,632 1,004,569 383,492 783,602 0.12 540,306 1,104,026 15,035 30,722 
1990 590,760 1,111,809 436,031 820,610 0.14 642,799 1,209,746 18,487 34,792 
1991 690,310 1,188,245 504,910 869,111 0.17 753,767 1,297,474 24,229 41,705 
1992 798,548 1,294,166 577,330 935,650 0.20 869,961 1,409,902 28,344 45,936 
1993 885,398 1,369,185 652,757 1,009,427 0.22 975,437 1,508,423 30,037 46,449 
1994 1,022,496 1,487,967 759,453 1,105,179 0.19 1,098,894 1,599,144 31,066 45,208 
1995 1,123,895 1,565,375 927,949 1,292,459 0.19 1,221,983 1,701,993 33,190 46,228 
1996 1,261,168 1,674,126 1,048,414 1,391,708 0.21 1,367,893 1,815,797 36,409 48,331 
1997 1,326,241 1,685,666 1,018,674 1,294,746 0.30 1,463,962 1,860,711 38,666 49,145 
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Table C.5         
Direct and indirect wages (Korea)       
          
 Manufacturing Non-agriculture Agriculture 
 MW (prod workers) Average MW Contr. Monthly wages Daily wages 
 W$ 2004 W$ W$ 2004 W$ % W$ 2004 W$ W$ 2004 
W$ 
1998 1,284,477 1,518,492 1,023,384 1,209,831 0.36 1,427,238 1,687,262 36,675 43,357 
1999 1,475,500 1,730,256 1,039,687 1,219,196 0.42 1,598,250 1,874,199 41,207 48,321 
2000 1,601,469 1,836,483 1,161,438 1,331,878 0.37 1,726,833 1,980,244 46,720 53,576 
2001 1,702,350 1,875,887 1,046,899 1,153,620 0.35 1,825,583 2,011,683 49,523 54,571 
2002 1,907,117 2,045,028 1,162,118 1,246,155 0.32 2,036,000 2,183,231 51,111 54,807 
2003 2,073,992 2,148,478 1,275,471 1,321,278 0.28 2,228,000 2,308,017 55,269 57,254 
2004 2,279,724 2,279,724 1,463,327 1,463,327 0.24 2,373,000 2,373,000 55,690 55,690 
2005 2,458,022 2,392,147 1,637,955 1,594,057 0.20 2,524,917 2,457,249 57,605 56,062 
2006 2,594,830 2,470,928 1,727,209 1,644,736 0.20 2,666,600 2,539,271 -  
 
Note: MW = monthly wage; Contr. = employer contributions to social security; prod workers = production workers 
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Table C.6        
Employment        
         
 Brazil Korea 
 Industrial Rural Industrial Rural 
 Formal Informal Total Total Total Total Households 
 Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers H Number 
1952 1,332,028 907,351 2,239,379 8,504,251     
1953 1,453,891 852,910 2,306,801 8,658,768     
1954 1,504,421 871,832 2,376,253 8,816,093     
1955 1,540,056 907,739 2,447,796 8,976,276 335,668  2,116  
1956 1,541,749 979,744 2,521,492 9,139,369 362,443 6,131,247 2,116 2,200,549 
1957 1,461,339 1,136,069 2,597,408 9,305,426 383,034 6,050,000 2,116 2,210,914 
1958 1,582,125 1,093,485 2,675,609 9,474,500 384,366 6,184,356 2,116 2,218,323 
1959 1,738,452 1,017,713 2,756,165 9,646,646 395,194 6,318,712 2,116 2,267,419 
1960 1,791,694 1,047,452 2,839,146 9,821,920 417,694 6,128,654 2,116 2,349,506 
1961 1,893,249 1,052,919 2,946,169 9,888,116 450,063 5,938,597 2,116 2,327,116 
1962 1,994,804 1,062,421 3,057,226 9,954,758 462,173 5,748,539 2,116 2,469,453 
1963 1,898,062 1,274,408 3,172,469 10,021,849 610,000 4,813,598 2,116 2,415,593 
1964 2,012,267 1,279,790 3,292,057 10,089,392 637,000 4,825,000 2,116 2,450,308 
1965 1,938,608 1,477,544 3,416,152 10,157,391 772,000 4,810,000 2,087 2,506,899 
1966 1,927,896 1,617,029 3,544,926 10,225,848 833,000 4,876,000 2,064 2,540,274 
1967 1,945,700 1,732,853 3,678,553 10,294,766 1,021,000 4,811,000 2,016 2,586,864 
1968 2,072,348 1,744,870 3,817,218 10,364,148 1,170,000 4,801,000 1,883 2,578,526 
1969 2,093,638 1,867,472 3,961,110 10,433,999 1,232,000 4,825,000 1,844 2,546,244 
1970 2,146,539 1,963,887 4,110,425 10,504,320 1,268,000 4,916,000 1,810 2,483,318 
1971 2,321,630 1,782,162 4,103,793 10,784,678 1,336,000 4,876,000 1,833 2,481,525 
1972 2,525,073 1,572,087 4,097,160 11,065,037 1,445,000 5,346,000 1,767 2,451,844 
1973 3,271,963 1,552,233 4,824,196 11,998,339 1,774,000 5,569,000 1,752 2,450,277 
1974 3,473,926 1,604,058 5,077,984 11,819,751 2,012,000 5,584,000 1,433 2,381,200 
1975 3,720,216 1,624,908 5,345,124 11,641,163 2,205,000 5,425,000 1,530 2,379,058 
1976 3,871,399 1,754,917 5,626,317 11,462,575 2,678,000 5,601,000 1,603 2,335,856 
1977 4,040,468 2,228,666 6,269,133 12,083,387 2,798,000 5,430,539 1,569 2,303,930 
1978 4,297,787 1,941,059 6,238,846 11,563,849 3,016,000 5,176,953 1,585 2,223,807 
1979 4,474,735 1,906,025 6,380,760 11,489,322 3,126,000 4,884,434 1,654 2,161,821 
1980 4,755,991 962,113 5,718,104 10,128,814 2,972,000 4,664,519 1,654 2,155,073 
1981 4,403,735 2,163,364 6,567,099 10,639,870 2,859,000 4,793,943 1,703 2,029,626 
1982 4,537,111 2,231,906 6,769,016 11,311,566 3,033,000 4,539,304 1,630 1,995,769 
1983 4,464,307 2,069,570 6,533,878 10,492,118 3,266,000 4,255,203 1,904 2,000,433 
1984 4,657,673 2,214,074 6,871,747 11,979,553 3,348,000 3,925,856 1,898 1,973,539 
1985 5,099,153 2,752,644 7,851,797 12,152,314 3,504,000 3,739,612 1,921 1,925,869 
1986 5,711,285 2,936,566 8,647,851 11,464,504 3,826,000 3,662,000 1,900 1,905,984 
1987 5,743,318 2,928,071 8,671,389 11,292,924 4,416,000 3,580,000 1,777 1,871,455 
1988 5,813,792 3,169,566 8,983,358 11,386,646 4,667,000 3,483,000 1,778 1,826,344 
1989 6,151,600 3,143,727 9,295,327 11,227,906 4,882,000 3,438,000 1,744 1,771,856 
1990 5,464,400 3,625,100 9,089,500 11,344,415 4,911,000 3,237,000 1,535 1,767,033 
1991 5,106,000 3,530,400 8,636,400 10,044,623 5,026,000 3,064,000 1,398 1,702,307 
1992 4,713,300 3,534,400 8,247,700 11,960,671 4,860,000 2,998,000 1,367 1,640,853 
1993 4,771,400 3,491,900 8,263,300 11,733,462 4,677,000 2,849,000 1,447 1,592,478 
1994 5,056,600 3,269,900 8,326,500 11,315,373 4,714,000 2,731,000 1,439 1,557,989 
1995 4,897,402 3,394,198 8,291,600 11,625,138 4,797,000 2,534,000 1,414 1,500,745 
1996 4,797,283 3,196,917 7,994,200 13,935,935 4,692,000 2,429,000 1,316 1,479,602 
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Table C.6        
Employment        
         
 Brazil Korea 
 Industrial Rural Industrial Rural 
 Formal Informal Total Total Total Total Households 
 Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers Workers H Number 
1997 4,703,654 3,101,646 7,805,300 13,708,643 4,482,000 2,385,000 1,239 1,439,676 
1998 4,476,967 3,152,533 7,629,500 13,321,707 3,898,000 2,480,000 1,241 1,413,017 
1999 4,603,882 3,122,518 7,726,400 13,423,527 4,006,000 2,302,000 1,265 1,381,637 
2000 4,885,361 3,576,939 8,462,300 13,525,347 4,293,000 2,243,000 1,266 1,383,468 
2001 4,976,462 3,479,738 8,456,200 12,192,465 4,267,000 2,148,000 1,269 1,353,687 
2002 5,209,774 3,332,026 8,541,800 12,535,507 4,241,000 2,069,000 1,196 1,280,462 
2003 5,356,159 3,135,141 8,491,300 12,738,746 4,205,000 1,950,000 1,505 1,264,431 
2004 5,926,857 3,225,048 9,151,905 13,635,001 4,290,000 1,825,000 1,530 1,240,406 
2005 6,133,461 3,485,768 9,619,229 13,696,485 4,234,000 1,815,000 1,487 1,272,908 
 
Note: H = annual hours worked per household 
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Table C.7          
Capital advanced in Brazil in million R$       
           
 Brazil 
 Social Industrial Agrarian 
 FK CK LS T FK CK T FK* CK T 
1953 2.00E-10 3.75E-11    1.12E-11 1.12E-11  8.99E-12  
1954 2.96E-10 5.06E-11    1.58E-11 1.58E-11  1.25E-11  
1955 3.40E-10 6.32E-11 4.70E-11 4.50E-10 9.51E-11 1.98E-11 1.15E-10 9.91E-11 1.49E-11 1.14E-10 
1956 4.50E-10 7.95E-11 6.06E-11 5.90E-10 1.25E-10 2.60E-11 1.51E-10 1.24E-10 1.68E-11 1.40E-10 
1957 5.32E-10 9.69E-11 6.82E-11 6.97E-10 1.46E-10 3.26E-11 1.79E-10 1.44E-10 1.98E-11 1.64E-10 
1958 7.49E-10 1.16E-10 8.02E-11 9.45E-10 2.06E-10 4.28E-11 2.49E-10 1.70E-10 2.17E-11 1.92E-10 
1959 1.13E-09 1.64E-10 1.16E-10 1.41E-09 3.14E-10 6.69E-11 3.81E-10 2.72E-10 3.01E-11 3.02E-10 
1960 1.49E-09 2.32E-10 1.84E-10 1.91E-09 4.26E-10 9.01E-11 5.16E-10 3.63E-10 4.43E-11 4.08E-10 
1961 2.24E-09 3.53E-10 2.95E-10 2.88E-09 6.70E-10 1.37E-10 8.07E-10 5.37E-10 6.51E-11 6.03E-10 
1962 3.92E-09 5.72E-10 4.75E-10 4.96E-09 1.24E-09 2.16E-10 1.45E-09 8.95E-10 1.11E-10 1.01E-09 
1963 7.65E-09 1.05E-09 7.90E-10 9.49E-09 2.48E-09 3.98E-10 2.88E-09 1.62E-09 1.88E-10 1.81E-09 
1964 1.43E-08 2.06E-09 1.92E-09 1.83E-08 4.73E-09 7.59E-10 5.48E-09 3.57E-09 3.78E-10 3.95E-09 
1965 2.22E-08 3.39E-09 2.67E-09 2.82E-08 7.41E-09 1.17E-09 8.57E-09 5.16E-09 6.00E-10 5.76E-09 
1966 3.17E-08 4.79E-09 4.01E-09 4.05E-08 1.06E-08 1.73E-09 1.23E-08 7.11E-09 7.81E-10 7.89E-09 
1967 4.41E-08 6.60E-09 4.53E-09 5.52E-08 1.47E-08 2.23E-09 1.70E-08 8.87E-09 1.02E-09 9.89E-09 
1968 6.19E-08 9.09E-09 5.16E-09 7.61E-08 2.04E-08 3.18E-09 2.36E-08 1.07E-08 1.21E-09 1.19E-08 
1969 8.28E-08 1.20E-08 6.32E-09 1.01E-07 2.71E-08 4.21E-09 3.13E-08 1.32E-08 1.55E-09 1.47E-08 
1970 1.07E-07 9.11E-09 9.06E-09 1.25E-07 3.51E-08 5.38E-09 4.05E-08 1.68E-08 2.09E-09 1.89E-08 
1971 1.42E-07 1.22E-08 1.30E-08 1.67E-07 4.66E-08 7.44E-09 5.40E-08 2.26E-08 3.05E-09 2.57E-08 
1972 1.83E-07 1.61E-08 1.68E-08 2.16E-07 6.30E-08 1.04E-08 7.34E-08 2.91E-08 4.21E-09 3.33E-08 
1973 2.52E-07 2.35E-08 2.51E-08 3.01E-07 9.03E-08 1.69E-08 1.07E-07 4.05E-08 6.24E-09 4.67E-08 
1974 3.88E-07 3.45E-08 3.71E-08 4.60E-07 1.43E-07 2.59E-08 1.69E-07 5.99E-08 9.09E-09 6.90E-08 
1975 5.96E-07 5.25E-08 4.14E-08 6.90E-07 2.20E-07 3.70E-08 2.57E-07 7.39E-08 1.26E-08 8.65E-08 
1976 9.21E-07 7.34E-08 5.53E-08 1.05E-06 3.51E-07 5.89E-08 4.10E-07 1.01E-07 2.05E-08 1.22E-07 
1977 1.48E-06 1.17E-07 8.00E-08 1.67E-06 5.79E-07 9.05E-08 6.70E-07 1.52E-07 3.80E-08 1.90E-07 
1978 2.32E-06 1.71E-07 1.31E-07 2.62E-06 9.33E-07 1.40E-07 1.07E-06 2.35E-07 4.72E-08 2.83E-07 
1979 4.18E-06 2.80E-07 2.69E-07 4.73E-06 1.73E-06 2.40E-07 1.97E-06 4.62E-07 7.87E-08 5.40E-07 
1980 8.45E-06 6.01E-07 5.66E-07 9.61E-06 3.53E-06 5.12E-07 4.04E-06 9.47E-07 1.74E-07 1.12E-06 
1981 2.02E-05 1.23E-06 8.61E-07 2.23E-05 7.73E-06 1.01E-06 8.73E-06 1.81E-06 3.45E-07 2.16E-06 
1982 4.33E-05 2.51E-06 1.44E-06 4.73E-05 1.55E-05 2.15E-06 1.77E-05 3.45E-06 6.14E-07 4.07E-06 
1983 1.05E-04 5.56E-06 4.18E-06 1.14E-04 3.87E-05 4.39E-06 4.31E-05 9.35E-06 1.70E-06 1.10E-05 
1984 3.24E-04 1.72E-05 1.56E-05 3.57E-04 1.18E-04 1.55E-05 1.34E-04 3.12E-05 6.47E-06 3.76E-05 
1985 1.28E-03 6.61E-05 4.58E-05 1.39E-03 4.72E-04 6.37E-05 5.35E-04 1.04E-04 2.26E-05 1.26E-04 
1986 3.28E-03 1.85E-04 1.33E-04 3.59E-03 1.23E-03 1.67E-04 1.40E-03 2.77E-04 5.90E-05 3.36E-04 
1987 1.05E-02 5.77E-04 3.75E-04 1.14E-02 3.88E-03 5.15E-04 4.40E-03 9.61E-04 1.76E-04 1.14E-03 
1988 8.90E-02 4.35E-03 2.51E-03 9.58E-02 3.18E-02 3.81E-03 3.56E-02 7.16E-03 1.40E-03 8.56E-03 
1989 1.46E+00 6.74E-02 3.50E-02 1.57E+00 4.94E-01 5.53E-02 5.49E-01 1.08E-01 1.82E-02 1.27E-01 
1990 3.49E+01 1.60E+00 9.62E-01 3.75E+01 1.15E+01 1.19E+00 1.27E+01 2.80E+00 4.03E-01 3.21E+00 
1991 1.71E+02 8.08E+00 4.86E+00 1.84E+02 5.37E+01 5.67E+00 5.94E+01 1.30E+01 2.01E+00 1.50E+01 
1992 2.02E+03 8.93E+01 4.94E+01 2.16E+03 5.99E+02 6.24E+01 6.61E+02 1.54E+02 2.07E+01 1.74E+02 
1993 4.41E+04 1.96E+03 1.17E+03 4.73E+04 1.25E+04 1.46E+03 1.40E+04 3.40E+03 4.40E+02 3.84E+03 
1994 1.05E+06 4.87E+04 2.90E+04 1.13E+06 2.87E+05 3.26E+04 3.19E+05 7.04E+04 1.36E+04 8.41E+04 
1995 1.79E+06 8.98E+04 3.99E+04 1.92E+06 4.71E+05 4.63E+04 5.17E+05 9.31E+04 1.54E+04 1.08E+05 
1996 1.99E+06 1.05E+05 3.69E+04 2.13E+06 5.31E+05 5.33E+04 5.84E+05 9.59E+04 1.87E+04 1.15E+05 
1997 2.15E+06 1.15E+05 4.12E+04 2.31E+06 5.64E+05 5.83E+04 6.22E+05 1.05E+05 2.05E+04 1.25E+05 
1998 2.27E+06 1.20E+05 4.50E+04 2.43E+06 6.01E+05 5.73E+04 6.58E+05 1.13E+05 2.18E+04 1.35E+05 
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Table C.7          
Capital advanced in Brazil in million R$         
           
 Brazil 
 Social Industrial Agrarian 
 FK CK LS T FK CK T FK* CK T 
1999 2.51E+06 1.22E+05 5.38E+04 2.69E+06 6.37E+05 6.12E+04 6.98E+05 1.27E+05 2.32E+04 1.50E+05 
2000 2.90E+06 1.38E+05 6.59E+04 3.10E+06 6.46E+05 7.23E+04 7.18E+05 1.48E+05 2.61E+04 1.74E+05 
2001 3.31E+06 1.53E+05 7.50E+04 3.54E+06 6.81E+05 7.76E+04 7.59E+05 1.66E+05 3.05E+04 1.96E+05 
2002 3.87E+06 1.75E+05 8.72E+04 4.13E+06 7.08E+05 8.58E+04 7.94E+05 1.94E+05 3.85E+04 2.33E+05 
2003 4.43E+06 1.97E+05 1.08E+05 4.74E+06 7.36E+05 1.03E+05 8.39E+05 2.38E+05 4.96E+04 2.87E+05 
2004 4.95E+06 2.25E+05 1.17E+05 5.29E+06 8.22E+05 1.25E+05 9.46E+05 2.71E+05 5.26E+04 3.23E+05 
2005 5.37E+06 2.52E+05 1.14E+05 5.73E+06 8.90E+05 1.33E+05 1.02E+06 2.79E+05 4.80E+04 3.27E+05 
 
Note: FK = fixed capital; CK = circulating capital; LS = livestock; T = total capital; FK* = fixed capital including livestock 
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Table C.8         
Capital advanced in Korea in billion W$       
          
 South Korea 
 Social Industrial Agrarian 
 FK CK TK FK CK TK FK CK TK 
1955 113   12 6 17    
1956 134 93 228 16 7 23 42 51 93 
1957 188 117 305 21 9 30 54 63 117 
1958 215 123 338 31 11 42 59 67 126 
1959 235 132 368 35 12 48 65 73 138 
1960 244 135 379 40 12 52 71 76 147 
1961 281 169 451 44 20 64 87 74 160 
1962 327 200 527 50 21 71 103 102 205 
1963 401 269 670 60 33 94 126 132 258 
1964 573 362 936 87 53 140 166 169 335 
1965 734 414 1,148 111 74 186 174 199 373 
1966 844 508 1,352 139 99 238 209 239 448 
1967 1,023 604 1,628 185 129 315 247 268 515 
1968 1,374 737 2,110 251 181 433 335 301 636 
1969 1,814 935 2,749 314 258 572 396 361 757 
1970 2,468 1,169 3,637 424 350 773 448 450 897 
1971 2,937 1,466 4,403 510 460 970 671 536 1,208 
1972 3,784 1,680 5,464 682 573 1,255 947 575 1,522 
1973 4,669 2,147 6,816 824 823 1,647 1,062 656 1,718 
1974 6,658 3,023 9,680 1,342 1,287 2,629 1,316 796 2,112 
1975 9,693 3,924 13,617 2,029 1,646 3,675 1,589 1,040 2,629 
1976 12,839 5,180 18,019 2,759 2,302 5,061 2,110 1,345 3,455 
1977 16,019 6,377 22,396 3,797 2,842 6,639 2,565 1,566 4,131 
1978 19,734 8,724 28,458 5,365 3,827 9,192 2,953 2,172 5,124 
1979 31,862 11,638 43,500 9,018 5,212 14,230 3,228 2,850 6,079 
1980 51,933 15,732 67,664 15,099 7,064 22,163 3,531 3,643 7,174 
1981 68,470 19,596 88,067 19,260 8,815 28,075 4,739 4,396 9,135 
1982 78,557 21,562 100,119 22,573 9,709 32,282 6,105 4,520 10,625 
1983 87,486 23,415 110,902 25,191 10,187 35,379 8,751 5,509 14,260 
1984 101,361 25,064 126,425 28,031 11,026 39,057 8,832 5,887 14,719 
1985 119,729 27,972 147,701 31,933 12,436 44,369 8,015 6,186 14,201 
1986 134,848 31,365 166,213 36,790 14,386 51,176 7,279 6,634 13,912 
1987 155,380 34,867 190,247 43,604 16,913 60,517 7,862 6,741 14,603 
1988 180,892 41,107 221,998 54,669 19,885 74,554 9,564 7,487 17,051 
1989 209,465 47,948 257,413 66,871 22,850 89,721 10,905 8,550 19,455 
1990 231,779 54,127 285,905 81,514 25,132 106,646 12,629 9,192 21,821 
1991 283,167 63,756 346,923 103,547 29,114 132,660 14,228 10,091 24,319 
1992 347,612 74,976 422,588 125,293 33,822 159,115 15,366 10,991 26,356 
1993 402,355 80,472 482,827 142,750 35,074 177,824 17,280 12,047 29,327 
1994 475,034 90,153 565,186 157,655 39,176 196,830 19,063 12,650 31,713 
1995 564,628 104,690 669,318 182,962 45,700 228,663 20,534 13,253 33,787 
1996 665,900 123,090 788,989 212,296 52,869 265,165 21,995 13,949 35,944 
1997 788,580 131,387 919,966 247,509 55,651 303,160 20,260 14,441 34,701 
1998 1,018,560 128,981 1,147,542 338,388 55,006 393,395 21,295 15,409 36,703 
1999 1,085,309 125,203 1,210,512 363,748 54,099 417,847 21,049 15,795 36,844 
2000 1,172,411 125,148 1,297,558 381,846 54,013 435,859 22,305 16,659 38,963 
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Table C.8         
Capital advanced in Korea in 
billion W$ 
       
          
 South Korea 
 Social Industrial Agrarian 
 FK CK TK FK CK TK FK CK TK 
2001 1,296,840 134,500 1,431,340 400,997 56,009 457,006 22,034 17,841 39,875 
2002 1,406,229 175,116 1,581,345 404,030 73,556 477,586 21,018 17,386 38,404 
2003 1,537,663 189,290 1,726,953 420,040 78,508 498,548 37,514 20,137 57,651 
2004 1,682,130 215,611 1,897,741 440,716 92,345 533,061 38,572 21,751 60,323 
2005 1,821,491 234,592 2,056,083 489,699 101,310 591,009 42,397 22,905 65,302 
 
Note: FK = fixed capital; CK = circulating capital; T = total capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 460 
Table C.9     
Composition of the stock of fixed agrarian capital in Brazil 
     
 Machinery Buildings Plantations Livestock 
 million R$ 
1950  5.385E-12 5.991E-12  
1951  6.647E-12 7.342E-12  
1952  7.961E-12 8.001E-12  
1953  9.617E-12 9.522E-12  
1954  1.270E-11 1.164E-11  
1955 2.169E-11 1.610E-11 1.425E-11 4.702E-11 
1956 2.464E-11 2.082E-11 1.758E-11 6.060E-11 
1957 2.809E-11 2.629E-11 2.169E-11 6.816E-11 
1958 3.156E-11 3.161E-11 2.679E-11 8.016E-11 
1959 7.529E-11 4.475E-11 3.615E-11 1.161E-10 
1960 8.561E-11 5.528E-11 3.888E-11 1.837E-10 
1961 1.055E-10 8.341E-11 5.395E-11 2.945E-10 
1962 2.222E-10 1.240E-10 7.400E-11 4.746E-10 
1963 4.581E-10 2.437E-10 1.308E-10 7.905E-10 
1964 9.727E-10 4.622E-10 2.206E-10 1.919E-09 
1965 1.341E-09 8.154E-10 3.310E-10 2.675E-09 
1966 1.568E-09 1.154E-09 3.763E-10 4.011E-09 
1967 2.157E-09 1.683E-09 4.988E-10 4.529E-09 
1968 2.629E-09 2.298E-09 6.210E-10 5.158E-09 
1969 3.276E-09 2.826E-09 7.554E-10 6.317E-09 
1970 3.296E-09 3.481E-09 9.240E-10 9.062E-09 
1971 3.926E-09 4.443E-09 1.242E-09 1.300E-08 
1972 4.776E-09 5.763E-09 1.728E-09 1.684E-08 
1973 5.212E-09 7.841E-09 2.359E-09 2.507E-08 
1974 6.361E-09 1.239E-08 3.993E-09 3.713E-08 
1975 9.035E-09 1.812E-08 5.394E-09 4.138E-08 
1976 1.131E-08 2.778E-08 7.106E-09 5.528E-08 
1977 1.870E-08 4.309E-08 9.902E-09 8.005E-08 
1978 2.205E-08 6.689E-08 1.529E-08 1.312E-07 
1979 3.768E-08 1.263E-07 2.909E-08 2.686E-07 
1980 8.264E-08 2.436E-07 5.565E-08 5.656E-07 
1981 2.530E-07 5.748E-07 1.228E-07 8.613E-07 
1982 5.502E-07 1.228E-06 2.345E-07 1.441E-06 
1983 1.699E-06 2.927E-06 5.367E-07 4.183E-06 
1984 4.372E-06 9.501E-06 1.667E-06 1.562E-05 
1985 1.823E-05 3.343E-05 6.174E-06 4.584E-05 
1986 3.432E-05 9.290E-05 1.727E-05 1.328E-04 
1987 0.000160 0.000355 0.000071 0.000375 
1988 0.001412 0.002661 0.000579 0.002510 
1989 0.019285 0.044491 0.009709 0.034978 
1990 0.344957 1.232885 0.263212 0.961606 
1991 2.9068 4.3551 0.8749 4.8551 
1992 41.6180 52.9829 9.7028 49.4452 
1993 876.642 1,159.259 195.447 1,170.139 
1994 9,149.025 27,932.994 4,351.043 29,001.251 
1995 14,247.585 33,767.287 5,175.681 39,877.315 
1996 15,353.611 38,558.337 5,067.028 36,946.528 
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Table C.9     
Composition of the stock of fixed agrarian Capital in Brazil 
     
 Machinery Buildings Plantations Livestock 
 million R$ 
1997 16,421.510 41,669.688 5,702.844 41,182.666 
1998 17,831.921 43,697.848 6,320.538 44,956.593 
1999 20,977.945 45,649.300 6,550.378 53,768.597 
2000 24,499.192 49,812.246 8,104.490 65,915.262 
2001 28,590.841 52,720.736 9,397.382 75,045.888 
2002 34,427.610 61,148.779 11,610.335 87,226.325 
2003 50,461.112 65,331.099 13,671.780 108,098.682 
2004 63,762.638 73,456.314 16,250.301 117,185.078 
2005 71,911.054 76,803.264 16,857.316 113,897.909 
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Table C.10       
Valorisation of agrarian capital in Brazil     
        
 VA FKC LC P RoP NP LR 
 R$ millions % R$ millions 
1953 3.916E-11 1.326E-12 1.124E-11 2.660E-11    
1954 5.436E-11 3.183E-12 1.560E-11 3.558E-11    
1955 6.505E-11 2.538E-12 1.867E-11 4.385E-11 38.47   
1956 7.309E-11 3.057E-12 2.097E-11 4.906E-11 34.94 2.550E-11 2.356E-11 
1957 8.615E-11 3.680E-12 2.472E-11 5.775E-11 35.21 2.802E-11 2.973E-11 
1958 9.465E-11 4.372E-12 2.716E-11 6.313E-11 32.90 3.826E-11 2.486E-11 
1959 1.313E-10 7.704E-12 3.766E-11 8.590E-11 28.40 7.402E-11 1.188E-11 
1960 1.868E-10 8.770E-12 5.359E-11 1.244E-10 30.51 9.860E-11 2.581E-11 
1961 2.659E-10 1.172E-11 7.628E-11 1.779E-10 29.52 1.646E-10 1.330E-11 
1962 4.404E-10 2.050E-11 1.264E-10 2.936E-10 29.18 2.159E-10 7.763E-11 
1963 7.221E-10 4.057E-11 2.072E-10 4.743E-10 26.19 3.093E-10 1.650E-10 
1964 1.433E-09 8.083E-11 3.996E-10 9.530E-10 24.11 6.672E-10 2.858E-10 
1965 2.246E-09 1.194E-10 6.079E-10 1.519E-09 26.35 8.870E-10 6.316E-10 
1966 2.885E-09 1.461E-10 7.575E-10 1.982E-09 25.12 1.132E-09 8.503E-10 
1967 3.726E-09 2.039E-10 9.477E-10 2.574E-09 26.03 1.139E-09 1.435E-09 
1968 4.348E-09 2.598E-10 1.071E-09 3.018E-09 25.33 1.742E-09 1.276E-09 
1969 5.494E-09 3.235E-10 1.308E-09 3.862E-09 26.24 2.115E-09 1.748E-09 
1970 7.330E-09 3.334E-10 1.686E-09 5.311E-09 28.17 3.314E-09 1.997E-09 
1971 1.044E-08 4.194E-10 2.358E-09 7.658E-09 29.85 4.913E-09 2.744E-09 
1972 1.404E-08 5.400E-10 3.117E-09 1.038E-08 31.17 6.628E-09 3.757E-09 
1973 2.031E-08 6.743E-10 4.428E-09 1.521E-08 32.55 1.220E-08 3.012E-09 
1974 2.889E-08 9.882E-10 6.184E-09 2.172E-08 31.50 1.759E-08 4.129E-09 
1975 3.904E-08 1.408E-09 8.198E-09 2.943E-08 34.02 2.213E-08 7.301E-09 
1976 6.126E-08 1.962E-09 1.335E-08 4.594E-08 37.65 2.871E-08 1.723E-08 
1977 1.089E-07 3.068E-09 2.462E-08 8.123E-08 42.81 3.592E-08 4.531E-08 
1978 1.302E-07 4.356E-09 3.047E-08 9.540E-08 33.75 4.789E-08 4.751E-08 
1979 2.096E-07 8.033E-09 5.072E-08 1.508E-07 27.91 8.235E-08 6.848E-08 
1980 4.480E-07 1.617E-08 1.120E-07 3.199E-07 28.51 2.071E-07 1.127E-07 
1981 8.751E-07 4.057E-08 2.118E-07 6.228E-07 28.87 2.979E-07 3.249E-07 
1982 1.536E-06 8.536E-08 3.594E-07 1.091E-06 26.83 5.929E-07 4.983E-07 
1983 4.420E-06 2.250E-07 9.988E-07 3.196E-06 28.93 1.485E-06 1.711E-06 
1984 1.573E-05 6.712E-07 3.430E-06 1.163E-05 30.91 5.775E-06 5.857E-06 
1985 5.429E-05 2.544E-06 1.140E-05 4.034E-05 31.95 1.875E-05 2.160E-05 
1986 1.363E-04 6.233E-06 2.916E-05 1.009E-04 30.00 3.958E-05 6.129E-05 
1987 3.914E-04 2.568E-05 8.533E-05 2.804E-04 24.65 1.343E-04 1.461E-04 
1988 3.000E-03 2.087E-04 6.661E-04 2.126E-03 24.82 8.162E-04 1.310E-03 
1989 3.770E-02 3.278E-03 8.520E-03 2.590E-02 20.44 8.920E-03 1.698E-02 
1990 8.042E-01 8.124E-02 1.850E-01 5.380E-01 16.78 1.737E-01 3.642E-01 
1991 4.124E+00 3.764E-01 9.651E-01 2.783E+00 18.55 1.088E+00 1.695E+00 
1992 4.362E+01 4.867E+00 1.038E+01 2.838E+01 16.27 1.382E+01 1.456E+01 
1993 9.555E+02 1.043E+02 2.312E+02 6.200E+02 16.14 4.400E+02 1.799E+02 
1994 3.046E+04 1.885E+03 7.493E+03 2.108E+04 25.08 8.657E+03 1.242E+04 
1995 3.555E+04 2.459E+03 8.889E+03 2.421E+04 22.31 5.979E+03 1.823E+04 
1996 4.096E+04 2.729E+03 1.024E+04 2.799E+04 24.42 5.881E+03 2.211E+04 
1997 4.482E+04 2.985E+03 1.121E+04 3.063E+04 24.42 7.846E+03 2.279E+04 
1998 4.784E+04 3.217E+03 1.196E+04 3.267E+04 24.26 7.523E+03 2.514E+04 
1999 5.078E+04 3.515E+03 1.270E+04 3.457E+04 23.03 1.124E+04 2.333E+04 
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Table C.10 
Valorisation of agrarian capital in Brazil     
        
 VA FKC LC P RoP NP LR 
 R$ millions % R$ millions 
2000 5.724E+04 4.023E+03 1.431E+04 3.891E+04 22.30 1.544E+04 2.347E+04 
2001 6.682E+04 4.499E+03 1.670E+04 4.562E+04 23.24 1.985E+04 2.577E+04 
2002 8.425E+04 5.383E+03 2.106E+04 5.781E+04 24.82 2.786E+04 2.995E+04 
2003 1.086E+05 6.617E+03 2.715E+04 7.485E+04 26.07 4.727E+04 2.757E+04 
2004 1.152E+05 7.904E+03 2.880E+04 7.849E+04 24.28 5.825E+04 2.024E+04 
2005 1.052E+05 8.570E+03 2.629E+04 7.030E+04 21.47 5.117E+04 1.913E+04 
 
Note: VA = value-added; FKC = fixed capital consumption; LC = labour costs; P = profits; RoP = rate 
of profit; NP = normal profits; LR = land rent 
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Table C.11     
Valorisation of industrial capital in Brazil   
      
 VA FKC LC P RoP 
 R$ millions % 
1953 3.167E-11  1.820E-11 1.347E-11  
1954 4.524E-11  2.492E-11 2.031E-11  
1955 5.658E-11 3.517E-12 3.119E-11 2.187E-11 19.04 
1956 7.378E-11 4.635E-12 4.167E-11 2.748E-11 18.16 
1957 9.084E-11 5.413E-12 5.486E-11 3.056E-11 17.09 
1958 1.231E-10 7.619E-12 6.591E-11 4.960E-11 19.94 
1959 1.984E-10 1.163E-11 9.345E-11 9.329E-11 24.48 
1960 2.689E-10 1.577E-11 1.284E-10 1.248E-10 24.18 
1961 4.235E-10 2.481E-11 1.783E-10 2.204E-10 27.31 
1962 6.620E-10 4.581E-11 3.041E-10 3.121E-10 21.47 
1963 1.201E-09 9.181E-11 6.176E-10 4.918E-10 17.08 
1964 2.304E-09 1.748E-10 1.204E-09 9.258E-10 16.88 
1965 3.532E-09 2.741E-10 1.938E-09 1.320E-09 15.39 
1966 5.191E-09 3.924E-10 3.029E-09 1.769E-09 14.34 
1967 6.637E-09 5.446E-10 4.141E-09 1.951E-09 11.51 
1968 9.812E-09 7.562E-10 5.603E-09 3.453E-09 14.62 
1969 1.304E-08 1.003E-09 7.538E-09 4.500E-09 14.37 
1970 1.741E-08 1.300E-09 8.985E-09 7.122E-09 17.58 
1971 2.373E-08 1.723E-09 1.166E-08 1.034E-08 19.15 
1972 3.260E-08 2.330E-09 1.566E-08 1.461E-08 19.90 
1973 5.314E-08 3.342E-09 2.181E-08 2.798E-08 26.11 
1974 8.006E-08 5.296E-09 3.164E-08 4.312E-08 25.51 
1975 1.138E-07 8.143E-09 3.994E-08 6.576E-08 25.58 
1976 1.749E-07 1.299E-08 6.544E-08 9.648E-08 23.53 
1977 2.563E-07 2.143E-08 1.081E-07 1.268E-07 18.93 
1978 3.855E-07 3.454E-08 1.690E-07 1.820E-07 16.94 
1979 6.445E-07 6.390E-08 2.809E-07 2.997E-07 15.24 
1980 1.386E-06 1.305E-07 5.099E-07 7.458E-07 18.46 
1981 2.595E-06 2.859E-07 1.103E-06 1.206E-06 13.81 
1982 5.444E-06 5.752E-07 2.289E-06 2.580E-06 14.58 
1983 1.173E-05 1.432E-06 4.502E-06 5.793E-06 13.44 
1984 3.868E-05 4.381E-06 1.375E-05 2.056E-05 15.35 
1985 1.544E-04 1.745E-05 5.748E-05 7.948E-05 14.84 
1986 3.907E-04 4.560E-05 1.804E-04 1.648E-04 11.77 
1987 1.207E-03 1.437E-04 5.436E-04 5.193E-04 11.81 
1988 8.806E-03 1.176E-03 4.238E-03 3.392E-03 9.53 
1989 1.247E-01 1.828E-02 6.770E-02 3.867E-02 7.04 
1990 2.636E+00 4.254E-01 1.524E+00 6.874E-01 5.42 
1991 1.317E+01 1.988E+00 6.869E+00 4.308E+00 7.25 
1992 1.494E+02 2.215E+01 7.488E+01 5.236E+01 7.92 
1993 3.672E+03 4.625E+02 1.611E+03 1.599E+03 11.45 
1994 8.284E+04 1.060E+04 3.936E+04 3.287E+04 10.30 
1995 1.147E+05 1.742E+04 6.876E+04 2.850E+04 5.51 
1996 1.248E+05 1.964E+04 7.517E+04 2.996E+04 5.13 
1997 1.385E+05 2.086E+04 7.868E+04 3.892E+04 6.25 
1998 1.361E+05 2.222E+04 7.712E+04 3.676E+04 5.59 
1999 1.496E+05 2.356E+04 7.375E+04 5.224E+04 7.49 
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Table C.11     
Valorisation of industrial capital in Brazil   
      
 VA FKC LC P RoP 
 R$ millions % 
2000 1.759E+05 2.390E+04 8.848E+04 6.356E+04 8.85 
2001 1.916E+05 2.520E+04 8.972E+04 7.673E+04 10.11 
2002 2.146E+05 2.620E+04 9.338E+04 9.498E+04 11.96 
2003 2.650E+05 2.722E+04 9.960E+04 1.381E+05 16.46 
2004 3.202E+05 3.040E+04 1.193E+05 1.705E+05 18.02 
2005 3.333E+05 3.295E+04 1.405E+05 1.599E+05 15.63 
 
Note: VA = value-added; FKC = fixed capital consumption; LC = labour costs; 
P = profits; RoP = rate of profit; NP = normal profits 
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Table C.12      
Valorisation of total capital in Brazil    
       
 VA FKC LC LC P RoP 
   Urban Rural   
 R$ millions % 
1953 1.780E-10 7.407E-12 6.033E-11 1.124E-11 9.903E-11  
1954 2.441E-10 1.093E-11 8.106E-11 1.560E-11 1.365E-10  
1955 2.963E-10 1.259E-11 1.054E-10 1.867E-11 1.596E-10 35.42 
1956 3.742E-10 1.666E-11 1.438E-10 2.097E-11 1.928E-10 32.66 
1957 4.544E-10 1.967E-11 1.819E-10 2.472E-11 2.281E-10 32.75 
1958 5.655E-10 2.770E-11 2.111E-10 2.716E-11 2.995E-10 31.70 
1959 8.435E-10 4.178E-11 2.772E-10 3.766E-11 4.868E-10 34.55 
1960 1.157E-09 5.515E-11 4.009E-10 5.359E-11 6.475E-10 33.97 
1961 1.692E-09 8.275E-11 6.374E-10 7.628E-11 8.955E-10 31.05 
1962 2.710E-09 1.449E-10 1.003E-09 1.264E-10 1.436E-09 28.92 
1963 4.864E-09 2.830E-10 1.923E-09 2.072E-10 2.451E-09 25.84 
1964 9.532E-09 5.295E-10 3.612E-09 3.996E-10 4.991E-09 27.29 
1965 1.551E-08 8.198E-10 5.794E-09 6.079E-10 8.292E-09 29.38 
1966 2.283E-08 1.173E-09 8.289E-09 7.575E-10 1.261E-08 31.14 
1967 3.010E-08 1.630E-09 1.181E-08 9.477E-10 1.571E-08 28.47 
1968 4.188E-08 2.290E-09 1.603E-08 1.071E-09 2.249E-08 29.53 
1969 5.505E-08 3.065E-09 2.076E-08 1.308E-09 2.993E-08 29.60 
1970 7.066E-08 3.966E-09 2.255E-08 1.686E-09 4.246E-08 33.87 
1971 9.393E-08 5.252E-09 2.928E-08 2.358E-09 5.704E-08 34.12 
1972 1.260E-07 6.778E-09 3.739E-08 3.117E-09 7.874E-08 36.43 
1973 1.861E-07 9.342E-09 5.367E-08 4.428E-09 1.187E-07 39.42 
1974 2.710E-07 1.437E-08 7.936E-08 6.184E-09 1.710E-07 37.19 
1975 3.816E-07 2.205E-08 1.343E-07 8.198E-09 2.171E-07 31.47 
1976 5.942E-07 3.407E-08 1.569E-07 1.335E-08 3.898E-07 37.14 
1977 9.065E-07 5.458E-08 2.576E-07 2.462E-08 5.697E-07 34.06 
1978 1.315E-06 8.569E-08 4.240E-07 3.047E-08 7.752E-07 29.60 
1979 2.168E-06 1.547E-07 6.869E-07 5.072E-08 1.275E-06 26.96 
1980 4.548E-06 3.125E-07 1.538E-06 1.120E-07 2.586E-06 26.90 
1981 8.733E-06 7.474E-07 3.417E-06 2.118E-07 4.357E-06 19.54 
1982 1.770E-05 1.603E-06 7.195E-06 3.594E-07 8.545E-06 18.07 
1983 3.978E-05 3.874E-06 1.516E-05 9.988E-07 1.974E-05 17.25 
1984 1.265E-04 1.200E-05 4.435E-05 3.430E-06 6.672E-05 18.68 
1985 4.755E-04 4.727E-05 1.747E-04 1.140E-05 2.421E-04 17.43 
1986 1.274E-03 1.212E-04 5.393E-04 2.916E-05 5.840E-04 16.25 
1987 4.038E-03 3.869E-04 1.700E-03 8.533E-05 1.866E-03 16.35 
1988 2.938E-02 3.292E-03 1.339E-02 6.661E-04 1.203E-02 12.55 
1989 4.256E-01 5.412E-02 2.240E-01 8.520E-03 1.389E-01 8.88 
1990 1.155E+01 1.293E+00 5.097E+00 1.850E-01 4.974E+00 13.26 
1991 6.029E+01 6.317E+00 2.434E+01 9.651E-01 2.866E+01 15.61 
1992 6.410E+02 7.477E+01 2.790E+02 1.038E+01 2.769E+02 12.82 
1993 1.410E+04 1.633E+03 6.036E+03 2.312E+02 6.197E+03 13.11 
1994 3.492E+05 3.897E+04 1.476E+05 7.493E+03 1.552E+05 13.72 
1995 7.056E+05 6.608E+04 2.664E+05 8.889E+03 3.643E+05 19.02 
1996 8.440E+05 7.374E+04 2.990E+05 1.024E+04 4.610E+05 21.60 
1997 9.391E+05 7.958E+04 3.248E+05 1.121E+04 5.235E+05 22.69 
1998 9.793E+05 8.400E+04 3.348E+05 1.196E+04 5.485E+05 22.53 
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Table C.12      
Valorisation of total capital in Brazil    
       
 VA FKC LC LC P RoP 
   Urban Rural   
 R$ millions % 
1999 1.065E+06 9.293E+04 3.205E+05 1.270E+04 6.389E+05 23.77 
2000 1.179E+06 1.072E+05 3.787E+05 1.431E+04 6.793E+05 21.91 
2001 1.302E+06 1.225E+05 4.317E+05 1.670E+04 7.313E+05 20.67 
2002 1.478E+06 1.430E+05 4.887E+05 2.106E+04 8.251E+05 19.99 
2003 1.700E+06 1.640E+05 5.279E+05 2.715E+04 9.809E+05 20.70 
2004 1.941E+06 1.832E+05 6.164E+05 2.880E+04 1.113E+06 21.03 
2005 2.147E+06 1.985E+05 7.175E+05 2.629E+04 1.205E+06 21.02 
 
Note: VA = value-added; FKC = fixed capital consumption; LC = labour costs; P = profits; 
RoP = rate of profit; NP = normal profits 
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Table C.13       
Valorisation of agrarian capital in Korea    
        
 VA FKC LC P RoP NP LR 
 W$ billions       %             W$ billions 
1956 71.9 0.9 58.4 12.6 13.6 23.4 -10.8 
1957 89.7 1.0 71.6 17.0 14.6 23.4 -6.4 
1958 84.2 1.1 76.8 6.3 5.0 25.2 -18.9 
1959 74.2 1.1 85.1 -12.0 -8.7 31.6 -43.5 
1960 91.1 1.3 86.9 2.8 1.9 35.7 -32.9 
1961 116.1 1.4 96.3 18.3 11.4 42.7 -24.4 
1962 132.9 2.1 110.7 20.2 9.8 62.3 -42.1 
1963 221.4 2.0 144.1 75.2 29.2 93.9 -18.7 
1964 340.2 4.3 178.0 157.9 47.1 150.2 7.7 
1965 309.6 4.4 190.2 114.9 30.8 158.9 -44.0 
1966 364.1 6.0 222.2 135.9 30.4 184.5 -48.6 
1967 394.4 7.4 253.5 133.5 25.9 158.1 -24.5 
1968 477.8 9.8 281.7 186.3 29.3 160.1 26.2 
1969 607.9 12.5 325.9 269.5 35.6 171.2 98.3 
1970 735.9 16.2 409.0 310.7 34.6 175.4 135.4 
1971 926.1 22.2 492.7 411.2 34.1 195.4 215.8 
1972 1,120.8 25.1 513.9 581.8 38.2 359.4 222.4 
1973 1,347.0 38.2 551.9 756.9 44.0 461.1 295.8 
1974 1,890.5 48.8 543.7 1,298.0 61.5 478.7 819.4 
1975 2,551.9 60.0 717.2 1,774.7 67.5 601.9 1,172.7 
1976 3,292.1 74.5 895.6 2,322.0 67.2 797.9 1,524.2 
1977 4,000.9 115.5 1,088.9 2,796.5 67.7 858.2 1,938.3 
1978 4,944.0 143.0 1,523.8 3,277.2 64.0 958.1 2,319.1 
1979 5,924.1 179.1 2,357.5 3,387.5 55.7 875.0 2,512.5 
1980 5,553.3 192.6 3,048.4 2,312.3 32.2 667.6 1,644.7 
1981 7,310.6 249.4 3,405.6 3,655.6 40.0 954.1 2,701.5 
1982 7,841.1 289.3 3,374.5 4,177.3 39.3 1,125.5 3,051.8 
1983 8,390.3 450.5 4,093.9 3,845.9 27.0 1,777.4 2,068.4 
1984 9,100.3 487.3 4,209.8 4,403.2 29.9 2,209.4 2,193.8 
1985 10,128.8 547.1 4,355.7 5,226.0 36.8 2,225.4 3,000.6 
1986 10,489.1 604.1 4,550.9 5,334.1 38.3 2,298.7 3,035.4 
1987 11,071.6 658.9 4,266.2 6,146.5 42.1 2,494.0 3,652.5 
1988 13,166.8 782.6 4,790.7 7,593.5 44.5 2,569.2 5,024.3 
1989 13,828.0 854.9 5,693.2 7,279.9 37.4 2,510.8 4,769.1 
1990 14,845.3 937.4 6,251.0 7,656.9 35.1 2,437.6 5,219.4 
1991 16,002.2 1,078.3 7,231.3 7,692.6 31.6 2,661.7 5,030.9 
1992 17,742.9 1,201.8 8,038.0 8,503.1 32.3 2,431.8 6,071.3 
1993 17,951.4 1,520.5 8,773.5 7,657.4 26.1 2,972.3 4,685.1 
1994 20,312.7 1,773.6 8,834.1 9,705.0 30.6 3,775.8 5,929.2 
1995 22,391.7 1,904.0 8,881.2 11,606.5 34.4 3,758.9 7,847.6 
1996 23,528.2 2,155.4 8,965.7 12,407.1 34.5 3,216.7 9,190.4 
1997 23,450.1 2,463.8 8,907.7 12,078.6 34.8 3,441.2 8,637.4 
1998 21,939.7 2,869.9 8,617.2 10,452.6 28.5 3,382.1 7,070.6 
1999 24,393.0 2,951.2 9,619.4 11,822.4 32.1 3,841.6 7,980.8 
2000 24,602.9 3,106.9 10,839.9 10,656.1 27.3 4,492.6 6,163.4 
2001 24,374.2 3,100.9 11,324.2 9,949.1 25.0 3,915.8 6,033.3 
2002 24,207.4 3,264.1 10,587.3 10,356.0 27.0 3,877.5 6,478.5 
2003 23,725.2 3,550.1 14,409.0 5,766.1 10.0 5,761.9 4.2 
2004 25,763.7 3,808.8 14,723.3 7,231.6 12.0 7,358.1 -126.5 
2005 24,110.5 4,126.1 15,454.9 4,529.5 6.9 6,961.9 -2,432.4 
 
Note: VA = value-added; FKC = fixed capital consumption; LC = labour costs; P = 
profits; RoP = rate of profit; NP = normal profits; LR = land rent 
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Table C.14     
Valorisation of industrial capital in Korea   
      
 VA FKC LC P RoP 
 W$ billions % 
1955 11.69 0.55 7.06 4.08 23.84 
1956 15.69 0.69 9.16 5.83 25.29 
1957 18.98 1.05 11.82 6.12 20.10 
1958 22.30 1.25 12.67 8.38 20.04 
1959 26.43 1.46 14.11 10.85 22.82 
1960 29.28 1.74 14.79 12.75 24.30 
1961 36.83 1.96 17.85 17.02 26.63 
1962 43.38 2.28 19.52 21.57 30.30 
1963 66.43 2.85 29.48 34.11 36.45 
1964 104.76 4.20 37.56 63.00 44.86 
1965 138.53 5.45 53.97 79.11 42.63 
1966 173.43 6.91 68.61 97.91 41.22 
1967 208.68 9.11 103.02 96.54 30.67 
1968 270.59 12.34 149.35 108.90 25.17 
1969 355.97 15.41 211.00 129.57 22.63 
1970 444.70 20.87 272.66 151.18 19.55 
1971 549.50 21.26 371.30 156.94 16.18 
1972 749.90 29.16 424.48 296.27 23.61 
1973 1,113.50 36.21 635.44 441.85 26.83 
1974 1,526.20 59.70 870.64 595.86 22.67 
1975 2,022.90 91.21 1,090.21 841.48 22.90 
1976 3,029.70 124.84 1,736.23 1,168.62 23.09 
1977 3,855.80 172.71 2,303.82 1,379.27 20.77 
1978 5,256.40 243.96 3,293.91 1,718.53 18.70 
1979 6,837.70 408.18 4,381.24 2,048.28 14.39 
1980 8,339.50 687.96 5,589.03 2,062.52 9.31 
1981 10,749.20 896.22 6,920.65 2,932.33 10.44 
1982 12,348.70 1,075.97 7,853.32 3,419.41 10.59 
1983 15,098.80 1,227.97 9,460.91 4,409.92 12.46 
1984 18,355.60 1,393.85 11,098.96 5,862.79 15.01 
1985 20,342.70 1,608.85 11,780.93 6,952.92 15.67 
1986 25,272.80 1,871.83 14,945.37 8,455.59 16.52 
1987 30,962.70 2,227.74 18,399.68 10,335.28 17.08 
1988 37,491.00 2,783.63 23,473.82 11,233.55 15.07 
1989 40,252.50 3,401.81 25,271.63 11,579.06 12.91 
1990 45,363.40 4,149.83 29,300.12 11,913.46 11.17 
1991 55,511.10 5,249.16 35,741.91 14,520.03 10.95 
1992 61,451.80 6,351.01 40,420.05 14,680.74 9.23 
1993 69,902.50 7,311.71 44,568.52 18,022.28 10.13 
1994 82,764.70 8,186.46 51,143.70 23,434.54 11.91 
1995 98,530.00 9,574.78 63,515.42 25,439.80 11.13 
1996 106,339.10 11,143.90 71,464.77 23,730.44 8.95 
1997 114,362.50 13,052.50 71,246.27 30,063.73 9.92 
1998 119,065.60 17,598.25 65,217.70 36,249.65 9.21 
1999 132,143.40 17,682.74 70,893.35 43,567.30 10.43 
2000 150,331.00 17,999.64 82,074.96 50,256.40 11.53 
2001 150,869.70 18,615.73 87,375.08 44,878.89 9.82 
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Table C.14     
Valorisation of industrial capital in Korea   
      
 VA FKC LC P RoP 
 W$ billions % 
2002 161,056.80 18,975.79 93,860.11 48,220.90 10.10 
2003 168,246.00 19,408.60 99,010.02 49,827.38 9.99 
2004 197,480.60 19,737.37 112,721.60 65,021.62 12.20 
2005 203,680.50 19,896.54 120,775.56 63,008.40 10.66 
 
Note: VA = value-added; FKC = fixed capital consumption; LC = labour costs; P 
= profits; RoP = rate of profit; NP = normal profits 
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Table C.15      
Valorisation of total capital in Korea    
       
 VA FKC LC LC P RoP 
   Urban Rural   
 W$ billions     % 
1956 152.8 5.2 34.9 58.4 54.3 23.87 
1957 199.3 7.5 45.0 71.6 75.1 24.62 
1958 207.0 8.8 48.3 76.8 73.1 21.64 
1959 220.0 10.0 53.7 85.1 71.2 19.37 
1960 247.6 10.7 56.3 86.9 93.7 24.71 
1961 296.7 12.9 68.0 96.3 119.6 26.54 
1962 358.9 15.8 91.3 110.7 141.1 26.79 
1963 508.7 20.2 132.9 144.1 211.6 31.59 
1964 724.1 22.8 169.4 178.0 353.9 37.82 
1965 812.7 30.8 230.8 190.2 360.9 31.45 
1966 1,042.4 40.0 284.1 222.2 496.1 36.69 
1967 1,282.4 51.4 384.7 253.5 592.8 36.42 
1968 1,659.6 72.9 543.8 281.7 761.2 36.07 
1969 2,169.2 98.8 763.8 325.9 980.7 35.67 
1970 2,775.1 132.0 1,010.8 409.0 1,223.3 33.64 
1971 3,434.5 158.6 1,409.1 492.7 1,374.2 31.21 
1972 4,241.1 204.6 1,478.5 513.9 2,044.1 37.41 
1973 5,499.0 264.9 1,924.6 551.9 2,757.6 40.46 
1974 7,845.4 391.9 2,525.8 543.7 4,384.0 45.29 
1975 10,477.8 571.7 3,098.1 717.2 6,090.8 44.73 
1976 14,410.8 769.6 4,415.8 895.6 8,329.8 46.23 
1977 18,502.0 988.2 6,077.8 1,088.9 10,347.1 46.20 
1978 24,944.7 1,261.0 8,993.9 1,523.8 13,166.1 46.26 
1979 32,049.4 1,962.7 12,218.1 2,357.5 15,511.1 35.66 
1980 39,109.6 3,010.2 16,959.8 3,048.4 16,091.2 23.78 
1981 49,305.7 3,907.2 22,340.4 3,405.6 19,652.6 22.32 
1982 56,676.8 4,500.8 25,477.8 3,374.5 23,323.7 23.30 
1983 66,685.1 5,083.4 29,691.5 4,093.9 27,816.3 25.08 
1984 76,523.5 5,918.3 34,819.0 4,209.8 31,576.5 24.98 
1985 85,699.1 7,046.0 37,758.1 4,355.7 36,539.2 24.74 
1986 100,254.1 8,106.7 46,261.9 4,550.9 41,334.6 24.87 
1987 117,938.2 9,594.4 53,224.1 4,266.2 50,853.6 26.73 
1988 140,524.8 11,345.6 67,328.2 4,790.7 57,060.3 25.70 
1989 158,620.1 13,332.1 73,102.4 5,693.2 66,492.4 25.83 
1990 191,382.8 15,137.6 88,586.5 6,251.0 81,407.8 28.47 
1991 231,428.2 18,382.8 110,831.2 7,231.3 94,982.9 27.38 
1992 263,993.2 21,929.5 133,161.6 8,038.0 100,864.0 23.87 
1993 298,761.6 25,055.1 156,137.5 8,773.5 108,795.5 22.53 
1994 349,972.6 29,650.8 185,707.8 8,834.1 125,779.8 22.25 
1995 409,653.6 35,155.8 236,742.9 8,881.2 128,873.7 19.25 
1996 460,952.6 41,140.4 280,619.5 8,965.7 130,226.9 16.51 
1997 506,313.6 47,829.5 299,307.5 8,907.7 150,268.9 16.33 
1998 501,027.2 58,822.5 292,091.0 8,617.2 141,496.6 12.33 
1999 549,005.0 63,399.6 318,347.6 9,619.4 157,638.4 13.02 
2000 603,236.0 69,446.3 361,584.8 10,839.9 161,364.9 12.44 
2001 651,415.3 76,921.1 397,744.0 11,324.2 165,426.0 11.56 
 
 472 
Table C.15      
Valorisation of total capital in Korea    
       
 VA FKC LC LC P RoP 
   Urban Rural   
 W$ billions % 
2002 720,539.0 84,021.5 444,845.1 10,587.3 181,085.1 11.5 
2003 767,113.7 92,153.8 475,365.8 14,409.0 185,185.1 10.7 
2004 826,892.7 100,759.9 544,742.3 14,723.3 166,667.2 8.8 
2005 865,240.9 108,804.9 600,198.0 15,454.9 140,783.1 6.8 
 
Note: VA = value-added; FKC = fixed capital consumption; LC = labour costs; P = 
profits; RoP = rate of profit 
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Table C.16         
Exports in million US$       
          
 Brazil Korea 
 Primary     S-I Industrial Total Total* Primary Industrial Total Total* 
1947 1,095   1,152 9,871     
1948 1,121   1,180 9,357     
1949 1,042   1,096 8,487     
1950 1,288   1,355 10,642     
1951 1,681   1,769 12,860     
1952 1,347   1,418 10,086     
1953 1,462   1,539 10,866 34    
1954 1,484   1,562 10,978 19    
1955 1,352   1,423 10,036 13  18 127 
1956 1,408   1,482 10,296 20  25 174 
1957 1,322   1,392 9,348 17  23 154 
1958 1,181   1,243 8,128 11  14 92 
1959 1,218   1,282 8,305 14  20 130 
1960 1,205   1,269 8,098 21  32 204 
1961 1,333   1,403 8,859 23  41 259 
1962 1,153  37 1,214 7,582 29 10 56 350 
1963 1,336  42 1,406 8,678 27 39 87 537 
1964 1,221 115 205 1,430 8,708 33 55 118 719 
1965 1,301 154 284 1,595 9,557 41 103 173 1,036 
1966 1,445 141 293 1,741 10,129 57 152 251 1,460 
1967 1,302 147 343 1,654 9,360 61 214 321 1,817 
1968 1,492 178 381 1,881 10,216 72 338 457 2,482 
1969 1,796 211 495 2,311 11,905 85 475 624 3,214 
1970 2,049 249 665 2,739 13,323 101 641 836 4,067 
1971 1,989 241 822 2,904 13,550 100 872 1,067 4,978 
1972 2,725 399 1,222 3,991 18,025 113 1,360 1,625 7,339 
1973 4,097 574 1,942 6,199 26,358 169 2,706 3,221 13,696 
1974 4,577 917 2,263 7,951 30,448 244 3,777 4,462 17,087 
1975 5,027 849 2,585 8,670 30,423 92 4,025 4,945 17,352 
1976 6,129 842 2,776 10,128 33,611 130 6,747 7,716 25,606 
1977 6,957 1,044 3,840 12,119 37,769 222 8,525 10,048 31,314 
1978 5,977 1,421 5,083 12,658 36,646 249 11,229 12,722 36,831 
1979 6,553 1,887 6,645 15,244 39,664 268 13,385 15,057 39,177 
1980 8,488 2,349 9,028 20,132 46,148 240 15,684 17,512 40,142 
1981 8,920 2,116 11,884 23,293 48,401 196 19,146 21,268 44,193 
1982 8,238 1,433 10,253 20,175 39,489 181 19,920 21,853 42,774 
1983 8,535 1,782 11,276 21,899 41,530 186 22,222 24,446 46,360 
1984 8,706 2,872 15,132 27,005 49,093 246 26,678 29,245 53,165 
1985 8,538 2,758 14,063 25,639 45,007 233 27,651 30,282 53,157 
1986 7,280 2,491 12,404 22,349 38,516 253 31,909 34,715 59,827 
1987 8,022 3,175 14,839 26,224 43,564 355 43,664 47,281 78,545 
1988 9,411 4,892 19,188 33,789 53,968 577 56,494 60,696 96,944 
1989 9,549 5,807 18,634 34,383 52,388 749 57,964 62,377 95,041 
1990 8,746 5,108 17,011 31,414 45,413 826 60,805 65,016 93,989 
1991 8,737 4,691 17,757 31,620 43,853 841 66,719 71,870 99,676 
1992 8,830 5,750 20,754 35,793 48,182 920 71,141 76,632 103,155 
1993 9,366 5,445 23,437 38,555 50,412 1,012 76,593 82,236 107,525 
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Table C.16         
Exports in million US$       
          
 Brazil Korea 
 Primary      S-I Industrial Total Total* Primary Industrial Total Total* 
1994 11,058 6,893 24,959 43,545 55,489 1,267 89,617 96,013 122,349 
1995 10,969 9,146 25,565 46,506 57,645 1,651 116,703 125,058 155,012 
1996 11,900 8,613 26,411 47,747 57,498 1,505 119,832 129,715 156,206 
1997 14,474 8,478 29,192 52,986 62,350 1,661 123,883 136,164 160,226 
1998 12,977 8,120 29,380 51,120 59,234 1,469 120,835 132,313 153,315 
1999 11,828 7,982 27,331 48,013 54,443 1,437 131,414 143,685 162,927 
2000 12,561 8,499 32,559 55,119 60,459  156,331 172,268 188,957 
2001 15,342 8,244 32,959 58,287 62,177  136,470 150,439 160,478 
2002 16,951 8,964 33,069 60,439 63,465  149,733 162,471 170,607 
2003 21,178 10,945 39,764 73,203 75,163  179,623 193,817 199,006 
2004 28,517 13,433 53,137 96,678 96,678  233,989 253,845 253,845 
2005 34,721 15,963 65,353 118,530 114,639  258,365 284,419 275,085 
2006 40,272 19,523 75,018 137,808 129,120   325,465 304,948 
2007 51,596 21,800 83,943 160,649 146,346   371,489 338,415 
 
Note: S-I. = semi-industrialised goods; * = in 2004 US$ 
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Table C.17       
Exchange rates       
        
 Brazil Korea 
 Exports Imports Black market PPP Exports Official PPP 
 R$ per US$ W$ per US$ 
1945 7.091E-15 7.000E-15      
1946 7.058E-15 6.895E-15      
1947 6.807E-15 6.684E-15  2.047E-14    
1948 6.807E-15 6.684E-15 9.868E-15 1.822E-14    
1949 6.807E-15 6.684E-15 1.071E-14 1.870E-14    
1950 6.807E-15 6.684E-15 1.178E-14 2.069E-14    
1951 6.807E-15 6.684E-15 1.097E-14 2.085E-14    
1952 6.807E-15 6.684E-15 1.247E-14 2.326E-14    
1953 7.571E-15 1.398E-14 1.551E-14 2.535E-14  10  
1954 1.000E-14 2.117E-14 2.222E-14 3.068E-14  18  
1955 1.393E-14 2.535E-14 2.577E-14 3.693E-14 88 50 155 
1956 1.459E-14 2.487E-14 2.558E-14 4.161E-14 107 50 212 
1957 1.585E-14 2.630E-14 2.772E-14 4.367E-14 112 50 247 
1958 1.865E-14 4.534E-14 4.718E-14 4.311E-14 114 50 237 
1959 3.105E-14 5.379E-14 5.558E-14 6.017E-14 135 50 221 
1960 4.217E-14 6.630E-14 6.794E-14 7.362E-14 147 63 220 
1961 6.354E-14 9.550E-14 1.075E-13 9.225E-14 139 125 232 
1962 9.198E-14 1.358E-13 1.902E-13 1.387E-13 130 130 251 
1963 1.421E-13 2.024E-13 3.245E-13 2.527E-13 170 130 270 
1964 2.995E-13 4.399E-13 5.568E-13 4.876E-13 254 214 316 
1965 5.048E-13 6.816E-13 7.003E-13 8.585E-13 266 266 372 
1966 7.963E-13 8.000E-13 8.081E-13 1.028E-12 271 271 373 
1967 9.685E-13 9.630E-13 1.047E-12 1.312E-12 271 271 411 
1968 1.235E-12 1.227E-12 1.214E-12 1.429E-12 277 277 430 
1969 1.482E-12 1.473E-12 1.614E-12 1.571E-12 288 288 434 
1970 1.670E-12 1.660E-12 1.821E-12 1.655E-12 311 311 449 
1971 1.923E-12 1.911E-12 2.136E-12 1.924E-12 347 347 486 
1972 2.158E-12 2.146E-12 2.389E-12 2.175E-12 393 393 561 
1973 2.228E-12 2.213E-12 2.411E-12 2.729E-12 398 398 541 
1974 2.462E-12 2.448E-12 2.711E-12 3.345E-12 404 404 621 
1975 2.955E-12 2.938E-12 3.409E-12 4.056E-12 484 484 697 
1976 3.881E-12 3.859E-12 4.918E-12 5.301E-12 484 484 779 
1977 5.143E-12 5.115E-12 6.152E-12 7.423E-12 484 484 774 
1978 6.571E-12 6.535E-12 7.897E-12 9.285E-12 484 484 826 
1979 9.798E-12 9.747E-12 1.217E-11 1.210E-11 484 484 853 
1980 1.917E-11 1.909E-11 2.185E-11 1.875E-11 607 607 992 
1981 3.386E-11 3.370E-11 4.095E-11 3.646E-11 681 681 1067 
1982 6.528E-11 6.495E-11 1.010E-10 6.690E-11 731 731 1071 
1983 2.098E-10 2.088E-10 3.394E-10 1.625E-10 776 776 976 
1984 6.720E-10 6.687E-10 8.106E-10 4.438E-10 806 806 902 
1985 2.255E-09 2.245E-09 3.080E-09 1.427E-09 870 870 882 
1986 4.965E-09 4.940E-09 8.206E-09 3.570E-09 881 881 843 
1987 1.427E-08 1.420E-08 1.934E-08 1.177E-08 823 823 837 
1988 9.541E-08 9.494E-08 1.638E-07 9.058E-08 731 731 820 
1989 1.031E-06 1.025E-06 2.463E-06 1.194E-06 671 671 800 
1990 2.484E-05 2.469E-05 3.434E-05 3.741E-05 708 708 782 
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Table C.17       
Exchange rates       
        
 Brazil Korea 
 Exports Imports Black market PPP Exports Official PPP 
 R$ per US$ W$ per US$ 
1991 1.479E-04 1.476E-04 1.813E-04 1.800E-04 733 733 765 
1992 1.641E-03 1.641E-03 1.997E-03 1.964E-03 781 781 762 
1993 3.216E-02 3.216E-02 3.799E-02 3.936E-02 803 803 745 
1994 6.393E-01 6.376E-01 6.800E-01 1.013E+00 803 803 743 
1995 9.176E-01 9.159E-01 9.237E-01 1.781E+00 771 771 720 
1996 1.005E+00 1.004E+00 1.039E+00 1.877E+00 804 804 709 
1997 1.078E+00 1.077E+00 1.143E+00 1.878E+00 951 951 698 
1998 1.161E+00 1.160E+00 1.234E+00 1.904E+00 1,401 1,401 728 
1999 1.815E+00 1.814E+00 1.902E+00 1.938E+00 1,189 1,189 678 
2000 1.830E+00 1.829E+00 1.962E+00 1.994E+00 1,131 1,131 667 
2001 2.350E+00 2.350E+00 2.490E+00 2.103E+00 1,291 1,291 669 
2002 2.921E+00 2.920E+00 3.023E+00 2.402E+00 1,251 1,251 644 
2003 3.078E+00 3.077E+00 3.143E+00 2.794E+00 1,192 1,192 637 
2004 2.926E+00 2.925E+00 3.086E+00 2.947E+00 1,145 1,145 622 
2005 2.435E+00 2.434E+00 2.678E+00 3.200E+00 1,024 1,024 603 
2006 2.176E+00 2.175E+00 2.353E+00 3.380E+00 955 955 574 
2007 1.948E+00 1.947E+00  3.488E+00 929 929 572 
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Table C.18         
Land rent appropriated by others than landowners (Brazil)    
          
 ER ICM ET CQ MC RC AI IBC MT 
 millions of R$ 
1947 4.28E-11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1948 2.70E-11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1949 3.31E-11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1950 4.64E-11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1951 5.33E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -1.46E-14 0 0 
1952 5.81E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -2.76E-14 -3.06E-14 0 
1953 6.88E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -4.59E-14 -3.70E-14 0 
1954 6.77E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -7.42E-14 -1.04E-12 0 
1955 7.35E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -8.83E-14 -1.81E-12 0 
1956 8.03E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -5.71E-14 -2.91E-13 0 
1957 8.71E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -2.13E-13 -2.82E-12 0 
1958 6.13E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -2.61E-13 -6.63E-12 0 
1959 7.96E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -1.66E-13 -1.39E-11 0 
1960 8.06E-11 0 0 0 0 0 -1.10E-12 -1.19E-11 0 
1961 6.20E-11 0 0 3.16E-11 0 0 -1.46E-13 -3.92E-12 0 
1962 8.97E-11 0 0 4.27E-11 0 0 5.97E-13 -2.91E-11 0 
1963 3.36E-10 0 0 8.13E-11 0 0 1.82E-13 -1.09E-11 0 
1964 5.15E-10 0 0 1.51E-10 0 0 -6.04E-12 1.15E-11 0 
1965 1.25E-09 0 0 4.30E-10 2.20E-10 0 -1.23E-11 -1.98E-10 0 
1966 1.35E-09 5.24E-10 0 6.96E-10 3.80E-10 0 -1.31E-11 -8.97E-12 0 
1967 2.32E-09 6.39E-10 0 9.72E-10 4.45E-10 0 -2.56E-11 0 0 
1968 1.43E-09 9.51E-10 0 1.29E-09 7.31E-10 0 -1.72E-11 0 0 
1969 7.12E-10 1.19E-09 0 1.79E-09 6.35E-10 -1.02E-11 -1.20E-11 0 0 
1970 7.32E-10 1.23E-09 0 2.24E-09 3.99E-10 -3.62E-11 3.84E-11 0 0 
1971 3.12E-11 1.84E-09 0 2.62E-09 2.45E-10 -3.31E-11 5.28E-11 0 0 
1972 2.82E-10 2.53E-09 0 3.16E-09 4.71E-10 -5.58E-11 1.02E-10 0 0 
1973 6.45E-09 4.33E-09 0 4.13E-09 5.74E-09 -5.91E-10 9.72E-12 0 0 
1974 1.65E-08 7.16E-09 0 4.55E-09 1.53E-08 -1.09E-09 1.80E-11 0 0 
1975 2.04E-08 8.40E-09 0 4.93E-09 1.07E-08 -2.63E-09 -5.49E-10 0 0 
1976 2.60E-08 1.16E-08 0 5.26E-09 3.53E-09 -4.82E-09 -8.63E-10 0 0 
1977 4.29E-08 1.62E-08 0 8.65E-09 1.59E-09 -5.64E-09 -1.59E-09 0 0 
1978 4.80E-08 1.76E-08 1.16E-10 1.17E-08 4.06E-09 -9.11E-09 -5.78E-10 0 0 
1979 5.06E-08 3.13E-08 1.27E-10 5.89E-09 6.95E-09 -2.90E-08 9.00E-10 0 0 
1980 -2.48E-08 6.63E-08 1.72E-08 2.68E-09 9.24E-08 -5.76E-08 6.64E-09 0 0 
1981 7.18E-08 1.16E-07 1.09E-08 2.70E-09 1.05E-07 -6.92E-08 1.62E-08 0 0 
1982 4.04E-08 1.84E-07 8.16E-08 7.80E-09 -2.92E-08 -1.67E-07 4.76E-08 0 0 
1983 -1.21E-06 4.79E-07 4.45E-07 1.77E-07 1.63E-07 -2.24E-07 1.26E-07 0 0 
1984 -6.85E-06 1.38E-06 1.14E-06 5.26E-07 1.50E-06 -4.39E-08 6.48E-07 0 0 
1985 -2.18E-05 4.13E-06 1.47E-06 0 1.31E-06 -5.71E-07 1.75E-06 0 0 
1986 -3.48E-05 8.51E-06 7.77E-07 0 6.16E-06 -1.57E-05 2.14E-06 0 0 
1987 -6.09E-05 3.14E-05 1.13E-05 4.33E-06 1.93E-05 -1.64E-05 1.27E-05 0 0 
1988 - 0.00041 0.00033 0.00015 5.56E-05 0.000315 -0.00015 0.000141 0 0 
1989 0.00562 0.00427 0.00055 1.56E-04 0.004369 -0.00016 0.002068 0 0.0002 
1990 0.36315 0.11961 0.00347 4.91E-05 0 -0.00279 0.003177 0 0.0054 
1991 0.88029 0.57170 0.00398 0 0 0 - 0.00363 0 0.0330 
1992 8.97799 5.16052 0.15023 0 0 0 0.84582 0 0.3202 
1993 202.919 107.163 0.00074 0 0 0 20.834 0 5.8501 
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Table C.18         
Land rent appropriated by others than landowners (Brazil)    
          
 ER ICM ET CQ MC RC AI IBC MT 
 millions of R$ 
1994 14,084 2,103 0.6 0 0 0 145.3 0 107.1 
1995 38,587 3,533 338.4 0 0 0 - 772.5 0 178.0 
1996 37,689 2,489 4.0 0 0 0 - 574.7 0 189.6 
1997 34,876 0 29.0 0 0 0 10.0 0 215.6 
1998 29,982 0 2.6 0 0 0 49.6 0 258.9 
1999 3,144 0 1.6 0 0 0 1,079.4 0 344.3 
2000 4,811 0 3.7 0 0 0 1,273.9 0 390.5 
2001 - 11,836 0 1,074.2 0 0 0 1,842.2 0 495.0 
2002 - 24,848 0 1,029.3 0 0 0 3,097.5 0 592.2 
2003 - 18,683 0 642.1 0 0 0 4,836.5 0 714.7 
2004 - 1,950 0 901.6 0 0 0 5,540.9 0 871.0 
2005 54,953 0 - 0 0 0 2,453.4 0 1,335.9 
2006 106,512 0 - 0 0 0 950.0 0 1,526.8 
2007 171,611 0 - 0 0 0 832.2 0 1,600.6 
 
Note: ER = through exchange rate over/undervaluation; ICM = through ICM (state government export taxes); ET = 
through export taxes; CQ = through contribution quotas; through monopoly controls; RC = through subsidised rural 
credit; AI = through agrarian input prices; IBC = through IBC activities; MT = through mining taxes 
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Table C.19   
Land rent appropriated by others than landowners (Korea) 
    
 ER Max/Min prices Fertilizers 
 billion W$ 
1955 15.2 -0.7 -5.1 
1956 20.1 -4.9 -1.9 
1957 28.3 -3.9 -1.2 
1958 27.3 -2.5 -0.6 
1959 22.3 -4.8 0.9 
1960 19.7 -5.8 1.9 
1961 11.4 -3.7 1.1 
1962 21.4 -2.4 0.1 
1963 25.4 -15.4 0.8 
1964 29.4 -6.4 -6.4 
1965 42.2 10.2 -0.6 
1966 40.8 7.3 -14.0 
1967 68.6 11.3 -8.5 
1968 69.1 -4.6 1.5 
1969 62.4 -14.1 10.7 
1970 71.6 -29.5 6.5 
1971 54.1 -79.3 -3.0 
1972 58.3 -119.9 -8.3 
1973 90.6 -46.8 -18.9 
1974 260.6 -1.2 -114.9 
1975 252.8 -64.1 -283.7 
1976 292.2 -448.0 31.8 
1977 313.3 -692.4 25.2 
1978 485.8 -780.7 32.9 
1979 439.6 -994.7 27.0 
1980 247.3 -479.5 -22.6 
1981 527.6 -1,038.1 29.5 
1982 491.2 -1,081.8 94.4 
1983 324.6 -1,014.8 155.5 
1984 160.4 -1,000.4 173.5 
1985 -5.4 -1,311.4 229.0 
1986 -111.8 -1,635.5 245.6 
1987 -31.7 -1,664.4 331.7 
1988 161.5 -1,987.7 136.8 
1989 282.3 -2,017.5 167.6 
1990 67.4 -2,205.2 157.4 
1991 -32.4 -2,019.8 133.1 
1992 -211.0 -2,152.4 175.2 
1993 -373.6 -2,017.9 194.2 
1994 -441.1 -2,180.8 203.6 
1995 -543.5 -2,033.3 187.2 
1996 -731.7 -2,981.3 179.0 
1997 -1,141.9 -3,064.9 232.5 
1998 -2,559.7 -2,164.7 399.1 
1999 -1,834.5 -3,447.5 521.4 
2000 -1,622.5 -4,182.4 595.6 
2001 -1,760.2 -4,374.7 562.2 
 
 480 
Table C.19   
Land rent appropriated by others than landowners 
(Korea) 
    
 ER Max/Min prices Fertilizers 
 billion W$ 
2002 -1,681.4  -3,396.0  646.3  
2003 -1,535.7  -3,003.8  665.8  
2004 -1,773.9  -3,454.2  684.3  
2005 -1,670.0  -2,639.7  708.0  
 
Note: ER = through exchange rate over/undervaluation; Max/Min prices = 
through maximum and minimum prices; Fertilizers = through fertilizer 
prices 
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Table C.20       
International commodity prices in US$ per ton  
        
 Coffee Cacao Corn Beans Soy Cotton Manioc 
1953 1,166 692 56 197 - 931 49 
1954 1,447 1,121 55 117 - 827 48 
1955 1,027 746 46 150 112 752 40 
1956 1,021 534 48 222 99 747 42 
1957 984 635 45 143 101 748 39 
1958 890 865 45 152 88 601 39 
1959 701 747 43 186 87 668 38 
1960 706 551 41 199 85 616 35 
1961 698 441 43 203 103 458 38 
1962 654 438 48 207 93 478 42 
1963 639 510 51 212 102 533 45 
1964 847 466 52 233 102 519 46 
1965 873 301 52 202 109 515 45 
1966 756 451 56 142 117 499 49 
1967 702 517 47 186 104 488 41 
1968 699 608 46 149 98 471 40 
1969 725 882 51 175 95 480 44 
1970 976 649 55 209 109 528 48 
1971 747 518 55 227 117 446 48 
1972 942 579 53 220 130 450 46 
1973 1,161 1,069 92 471 270 605 80 
1974 1,264 1,617 124 544 257 664 108 
1975 1,093 1,248 112 556 203 771 98 
1976 2,698 1,698 106 414 219 1,093 92 
1977 4,487 4,046 89 411 264 912 78 
1978 3,133 3,385 95 423 245 1,247 82 
1979 3,420 3,102 108 498 267 1,177 94 
1980 3,169 2,360 118 770 268 1,185 103 
1981 1,839 1,929 123 872 264 1,359 107 
1982 2,080 1,505 103 654 224 1,298 89 
1983 2,226 1,832 128 531 262 1,371 111 
1984 2,485 2,322 128 568 260 1,094 111 
1985 2,292 2,094 105 537 205 1,046 92 
1986 4,197 2,029 84 466 191 1,288 73 
1987 1,984 1,851 81 365 198 887 71 
1988 2,221 1,602 100 581 283 460 88 
1989 1,644 1,253 104 868 250 920 91 
1990 1,269 1,082 94 582 223 901 105 
1991 1,177 1,048 93 456 222 904 122 
1992 985 991 89 360 216 1,177 114 
1993 1,172 981 89 450 225 1,212 101 
1994 2,536 1,233 93 460 244 931 102 
1995 2,750 1,339 107 481 221 855 128 
1996 2,243 1,399 134 595 279 1,445 131 
1997 3,170 1,600 100 584 294 1,787 90 
1998 2,342 1,661 86 705 235 1,560 83 
1999 1,754 1,214 82 346 179 1,269 77 
2000 1,613 1,055 81 310 190 1,368 60 
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Table C.20       
International commodity prices in US$ per ton  
        
 Coffee Cacao Corn Beans Soy Cotton Manioc 
2001 964 1,157 88 402 174 1,192 56 
2002 770 1,950 97 203 190 1,122 66 
2003 951 1,660 105 317 216 1,047 69 
2004 1,240 1,687 112 319 280 856 74 
2005 1,861 1,677 98 271 238 1,075 27 
2006 1,985 1,819 122 258 227 1,227 108 
2007 2,270 2,379 163 322 283 1,091 122 
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Table C.20        
International commodity prices in US$ per ton   
         
 Orange Beef Sugar* Rice* Rice** Rice*** Barley Iron 
ore 
1953 - 64  175  203  20 
1954 - 61  158  184  17 
1955 - 73  142  165 89 18 
1956 - 125  137  159 89 21 
1957 - 110  137  160 80 22 
1958 - 117  145  169 82 21 
1959 - 130  132  154 85 17 
1960 - 132 123 125  145 84 17 
1961 - 122 130 137  131 52 18 
1962 - 128 136 153  150 107 17 
1963 - 120 201 143  150 99 16 
1964 - 151 202 138  177 111 16 
1965 - 158 104 136  171 81 16 
1966 - 183 81 166  171 137 15 
1967 - 187 80 221  193 144 14 
1968 - 195 99 205  189 114 13 
1969 - 219 105 185 159 205 105 12 
1970 - 234 112 143 109 203 130 15 
1971 - 241 123 130 106 160 102 13 
1972 - 266 153 150 139 148 100 13 
1973 - 361 193 297 237 270 165 17 
1974 - 284 555 542 378 458 256 19 
1975 228 238 623 363 433 434 297 17 
1976 216 284 254 254 383 282 222 23 
1977 254 270 180 272 367 236 182 23 
1978 300 384 168 369 378 353 186 21 
1979 398 517 192 334 411 309 199 24 
1980 400 495 450 434 444 393 262 28 
1981 406 443 371 483 437 452 294 28 
1982 385 429 213 293 388 458 227 33 
1983 373 438 211 277 376 494 211 29 
1984 352 408 193 252 361 529 291 26 
1985 398 386 145 217 316 456 - 27 
1986 394 376 158 196 292 410 - 26 
1987 456 428 149 214 332 450 - 25 
1988 453 452 196 277 435 581 - 24 
1989 445 461 292 300 475 628 - 28 
1990 531 420 343 271  568 - 33 
1991 521 582 270 294  616 - 35 
1992 489 612 249 268  561 - 33 
1993 432 561 258 237  497 - 29 
1994 411 701 290 269  565 - 26 
1995 531 992 309 321  673 - 28 
1996 492 857 301 338  709 - 30 
1997 459 770 279 302  634 - 30 
1998 442 704 233 305  640 - 31 
1999 438 606 159 249  522 - 28 
2000 363 549 185 204  427 - 29 
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Table C.20        
International commodity prices in US$ per ton   
         
 Orange Beef Sugar* Rice* Rice** Rice*** Barley Iron 
ore 
2001 595 413 205 173  362 - 30 
2002 565 371 157 192  402 - 29 
2003 683 383 166 199  418 - 32 
2004 855 437 168 246  515 - 38 
2005 842 458 217 288  603 - 65 
2006 825 526 328 304  636 - 77 
2007 958 558  332  - - 85 
 
Note: Rice * = FOB Thai; Rice** = CIF Brazil; Rice *** = Korea Border Price; 
Sugar * = Brazil Exporting Price  
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Table C.21       
Domestic farm-gate prices (1000 lcu per ton)     
        
 Corn Soybeans Cotton Sugar (IAA) Rice* Rice** Barley 
 R$ W$ 
1955      9.1 4.5 
1956      15.3 7.5 
1957      12.8 12.3 
1958      11.4 10.2 
1959      13.3 9.0 
1960      16.2 10.6 
1961      20.3 14.5 
1962      21.5 16.2 
1963      33.8 28.3 
1964      42.5 37.0 
1965      40.1 27.9 
1966 0.000000032 - 0.000000086 - - 42.2 26.5 
1967 0.000000041 0.000000078 0.000000123 - 0.000000094 46.4 30.6 
1968 0.000000042 0.000000101 0.000000166 - 0.000000105 54.7 33.5 
1969 0.000000060 0.000000124 0.000000185 0.000000127 0.000000113 67.8 38.9 
1970 0.000000070 0.000000121 0.000000238 0.000000139 0.000000129 77.2 42.4 
1971 0.000000089 0.000000166 0.000000330 0.000000158 0.000000194 97.1 58.8 
1972 0.000000118 0.000000188 0.000000379 0.000000179 0.000000243 122.0 75.2 
1973 0.000000156 0.000000387 0.000000528 0.000000208 0.000000264 129.4 77.0 
1974 0.000000204 0.000000403 0.000000810 0.000000271 0.000000417 185.8 97.3 
1975 0.000000274 0.000000452 0.000000834 0.000000365 0.000000660 234.9 136.4 
1976 0.000000380 0.000000617 0.000001880 0.000000681 0.000000606 279.8 138.9 
1977 0.000000441 0.000000945 0.000002153 0.000001017 0.000000606 290.6 188.7 
1978 0.000000740 0.000001190 0.000002581 0.000001369 0.000001247 381.0 214.6 
1979 0.000001222 0.000002005 0.000003959 0.000001974 0.000002154 435.5 247.6 
1980 0.000002486 0.000003396 0.000007902 0.000003707 0.000004189 566.0 317.7 
1981 0.000004722 0.000006058 0.000015162 0.000009030 0.000006797 656.2 368.3 
1982 0.000007199 0.000011040 0.000024925 0.000017570 0.000014977 685.2 417.7 
1983 0.000027151 0.000042555 0.000086034 0.000040067 0.000039221 689.4 430.2 
1984 0.000071487 0.000130525 0.000277945 0.000116080 0.000092250 704.5 443.6 
1985 0.000212348 0.000348826 0.000663115 0.000343822 0.000349518 767.1 483.0 
1986 0.000539947 0.000758145 0.001732526 0.000661597 0.000856247 826.1 520.2 
1987 0.001160909 0.002271818 0.005268788 0.002232575 0.001460305 858.3 540.4 
1988 0.010682121 0.022296364 0.028693030 0.014282033 0.010904317 926.2 583.2 
1989 0.107272727 0.174242424 0.383030303 0.165080757 0.106415583 951.3 599.0 
1990 3.400000000 3.820000000 9.103030303 4.819566450 3.983330833 1,028.1 647.4 
1991 17.28787879 24.04545455 46.07515152 25.01290464 25.37641667 1,063.9 669.9 
1992 174.4363636 278.5484848 480.6818182 280.9553060 154.6571667 1,101.5 693.5 
1993 3,993.84848 6,022.57576 10,603.2424 5,814.79670 3,916.66667 1,156.9 728.4 
1994 79,975.7576 121,557.273 286,063.636 144,331.204 112,416.667 1,187.3 747.6 
1995 112,500.000 161,666.667 421,666.667 221,292.584 178,333.333 1,298.1 817.4 
1996 144,166.667 231,666.667 488,333.333 268,418.480 203,333.333 1,491.3 939.0 
1997 125,000.000 268,333.333 570,000.000 295,514.026 227,500.000 1,514.5 953.6 
1998 143,333.333 225,000.000 503,333.333 299,466.996 281,666.667 1,616.4 1,017.8 
1999 170,000.000 263,333.333 575,000.000 266,471.494 289,166.667 1,705.8 1,074.1 
2000 201,666.667 285,833.333 636,666.667 330,559.762 252,500.000 1,788.1 1,125.9 
2001 162,500.000 354,166.667 608,333.333 446,759.387 284,166.667 1,743.4 1,097.7 
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Table C.21       
Domestic farm-gate prices (1000 lcu per ton)     
        
 Corn Soybeans Cotton Sugar (IAA) Rice* Rice** Barley 
 R$ W$ 
2002 260,833.333 501,666.667 700,833.3 462,822.016 376,666.667 1,698.7 1,069.6 
2003 316,666.667 616,666.667 1,107,500.0 532,161.244 570,000.000 1,768.4 1,113.5 
2004 302,500.000 660,833.333 1,250,000.0 503,679.209 644,166.667 1,775.6 1,118.0 
2005 288,333.333 484,166.667 990,833.333 560,864.528 - 1,602.1 1,008.8 
2006 262,500.000 420,000.000 939,166.667 694,041.276 - 1,580.7 995.3 
2007 334,166.667 507,500.000 - 655,912.813 - - - 
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Table C.22    
Free Alongside Ship (FAS) prices (‘free market’ equivalents) 
     
 Corn Soybeans Cotton Rice 
 R$ per tn. R$ per tn. R$ per tn. R$ per tn. 
1966 0.000000000041  0.00000000010  
1967 0.000000000052 0.00000000009 0.00000000014  
1968 0.000000000055 0.00000000011 0.00000000019  
1969 0.000000000076 0.00000000014 0.00000000021 0.00000000023 
1970 0.000000000091 0.00000000014 0.00000000027 0.00000000027 
1971 0.000000000115 0.00000000019 0.00000000038 0.00000000036 
1972 0.000000000149 0.00000000022 0.00000000044 0.00000000046 
1973 0.000000000193 0.00000000042 0.00000000060 0.00000000054 
1974 0.000000000251 0.00000000044 0.00000000091 0.00000000080 
1975 0.000000000338 0.00000000051 0.00000000094 0.00000000118 
1976 0.000000000464 0.00000000069 0.00000000205 0.00000000127 
1977 0.000000000549 0.00000000104 0.00000000238 0.00000000147 
1978 0.000000000905 0.00000000133 0.00000000288 0.00000000238 
1979 0.000000001483 0.00000000225 0.00000000450 0.00000000403 
1980 0.000000003123 0.00000000381 0.00000000878 0.00000000786 
1981 0.000000005876 0.00000000688 0.00000001707 0.00000001296 
1982 0.000000009553 0.00000001278 0.00000002819 0.00000002585 
1983 0.000000033840 0.00000004612 0.00000009440 0.00000006951 
1984 0.000000090131 0.00000014045 0.00000030153 0.00000019556 
1985 0.000000277477 0.00000038274 0.00000073633 0.00000066581 
1986 0.000000704659 0.00000084321 0.00000189168 0.00000066621 
1987 0.000001681171 0.00000255294 0.00000589012 0.00000222218 
1988 0.000013769622 0.00002379287 0.00003391662 0.00001625621 
1989 0.000166708675 0.00020354098 0.00044764166 0.00019274509 
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Table C.23               
Apparent consumption of primary goods in million tons (Brazil)      
                
 Corn Rice Cotton Beans Manioc 
 C P X C P X C P X C P X C P X 
1950 6.01 6.02 0.01 3.14 3.22 0.08 0.26 0.39 0.13 1.25 1.25 0.00 12.53 12.53 0.00 
1951 5.92 6.22 0.30 3.06 3.18 0.12 0.21 0.35 0.14 1.24 1.24 0.00 11.92 11.92 0.00 
1952 5.88 5.91 0.03 2.77 2.93 0.16 0.49 0.52 0.03 1.15 1.15 0.00 12.81 12.81 0.00 
1953 5.98 5.98 0.00 3.07 3.07 0.00 0.24 0.37 0.14 1.39 1.39 0.00 13.44 13.44 0.00 
1954 6.78 6.79 0.01 3.37 3.37 0.00 0.09 0.40 0.31 1.54 1.54 0.00 14.49 14.49 0.00 
1955 6.61 6.69 0.08 3.73 3.74 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.18 1.47 1.47 0.00 14.86 14.86 0.00 
1956 7.00 7.00 0.00 3.39 3.49 0.10 0.26 0.40 0.14 1.38 1.38 0.00 15.32 15.32 0.00 
1957 7.76 7.76 0.00 4.07 4.07 0.00 0.33 0.40 0.07 1.58 1.58 0.00 15.44 15.44 0.00 
1958 7.37 7.37 0.00 3.78 3.83 0.05 0.35 0.39 0.04 1.45 1.45 0.00 15.35 15.35 0.00 
1959 7.79 7.79 0.00 4.09 4.10 0.01 0.39 0.47 0.08 1.55 1.55 0.00 16.58 16.58 0.00 
1960 8.66 8.67 0.01 4.79 4.79 0.00 0.33 0.42 0.10 1.73 1.73 0.00 17.61 17.61 0.00 
1961 9.04 9.04 0.00 5.24 5.39 0.15 0.34 0.55 0.21 1.74 1.74 0.00 18.06 18.06 0.00 
1962 9.59 9.59 0.00 5.51 5.56 0.04 0.28 0.50 0.22 1.71 1.71 0.00 19.84 19.84 0.00 
1963 9.72 10.42 0.70 5.74 5.74 0.00 0.28 0.50 0.22 1.94 1.94 0.00 22.25 22.25 0.00 
1964 9.35 9.41 0.06 6.33 6.34 0.01 0.24 0.46 0.22 1.95 1.95 0.00 24.36 24.36 0.00 
1965 11.55 12.11 0.56 7.34 7.58 0.24 0.35 0.54 0.20 2.29 2.29 0.00 24.99 24.99 0.00 
1966 10.75 11.37 0.62 5.51 5.80 0.29 0.19 0.43 0.24 2.15 2.15 0.00 24.71 24.71 0.00 
1967 12.39 12.82 0.43 6.76 6.79 0.03 0.39 0.58 0.19 2.55 2.55 0.00 27.27 27.27 0.00 
1968 11.58 12.81 1.24 6.49 6.65 0.16 0.47 0.72 0.25 2.42 2.42 0.00 29.20 29.20 0.00 
1969 12.04 12.69 0.65 6.28 6.39 0.11 0.14 0.58 0.44 2.20 2.20 0.00 30.07 30.07 0.00 
1970 12.75 14.22 1.47 7.46 7.55 0.10 0.25 0.60 0.34 2.21 2.21 0.00 29.46 29.46 0.00 
1971 12.85 14.13 1.28 6.44 6.59 0.15 0.45 0.68 0.23 2.69 2.69 0.00 30.23 30.23 0.00 
1972 14.72 14.89 0.17 7.82 7.82 0.00 0.37 0.65 0.28 2.68 2.68 0.00 29.83 29.83 0.00 
1973 14.14 14.19 0.04 7.13 7.16 0.03 0.25 0.54 0.28 2.23 2.23 0.00 26.53 26.53 0.00 
1974 15.16 16.27 1.11 6.71 6.76 0.06 0.45 0.53 0.08 2.24 2.24 0.00 24.80 24.80 0.00 
1975 15.19 16.33 1.15 7.78 7.78 0.00 0.29 0.40 0.11 2.28 2.28 0.00 26.12 26.12 0.00 
1976 16.38 17.75 1.37 9.68 9.76 0.08 0.58 0.59 0.01 1.84 1.84 0.00 25.44 25.44 0.00 
1977 17.84 19.26 1.42 8.58 8.99 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.03 2.29 2.29 0.00 25.93 25.93 0.00 
1978 13.55 13.57 0.01 7.11 7.30 0.18 0.50 0.54 0.04 2.19 2.19 0.00 25.46 25.46 0.00 
1979 16.30 16.31 0.01 7.59 7.60 0.00 0.57 0.57 0.00 2.19 2.19 0.00 24.96 24.96 0.00 
1980 20.37 20.37 0.01 9.77 9.78 0.00 0.59 0.59 0.01 1.97 1.97 0.00 23.47 23.47 0.00 
1981 21.11 21.12 0.01 8.18 8.23 0.05 0.65 0.68 0.03 2.34 2.34 0.00 24.52 24.52 0.00 
1982 21.30 21.84 0.54 9.72 9.73 0.01 0.53 0.59 0.06 2.90 2.90 0.00 24.07 24.07 0.00 
1983 17.97 18.73 0.77 7.73 7.74 0.01 0.49 0.67 0.18 1.58 1.58 0.00 21.85 21.85 0.00 
1984 20.99 21.16 0.18 9.03 9.03 0.00 0.94 0.97 0.03 2.63 2.63 0.00 21.47 21.47 0.00 
1985 22.02 22.02 0.00 9.02 9.02 0.00 0.71 0.79 0.09 2.55 2.55 0.00 23.12 23.12 0.00 
1986 20.53 20.53 0.00 10.37 10.37 0.00 0.60 0.63 0.04 2.21 2.21 0.00 25.62 25.62 0.00 
1987 26.80 26.80 0.00 10.42 10.42 0.00 0.69 0.86 0.17 2.01 2.01 0.00 23.46 23.46 0.00 
1988 24.75 24.75 0.00 11.79 11.81 0.02 0.67 0.71 0.03 2.81 2.81 0.00 21.67 21.67 0.00 
1989 26.57 26.57 0.00 11.04 11.04 0.01 0.49 0.67 0.17 2.31 2.31 0.00 23.67 23.67 0.00 
1990 21.35 21.35 0.00 7.42 7.42 0.00 0.61 0.72 0.11 2.23 2.23 0.00 24.32 24.32 0.00 
1991 23.74 23.74 0.00 9.49 9.50 0.00 0.55 0.67 0.12 2.74 2.74 0.00 24.54 24.54 0.00 
1992 30.51 30.51 0.00 10.00 10.01 0.00 0.39 0.42 0.03 2.80 2.80 0.00 21.92 21.92 0.00 
1993 30.05 30.06 0.00 10.10 10.11 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 2.48 2.48 0.00 21.86 21.86 0.00 
1994 32.48 32.49 0.00 10.54 10.54 0.00 0.53 0.54 0.00 3.37 3.37 0.00 24.46 24.46 0.00 
1995 36.26 36.27 0.01 11.21 11.23 0.02 0.36 0.41 0.05 2.95 2.95 0.00 25.42 25.42 0.00 
1996 29.24 29.59 0.35 8.62 8.64 0.02 0.30 0.31 0.00 2.45 2.45 0.00 17.74 17.74 0.00 
 
 
 489 
Table C.23               
Apparent consumption of primary goods in million tons (Brazil)      
                
 Corn Rice Cotton Beans Manioc 
 C P X C P X C P X C P X C P X 
1997 32.59 32.95 0.36 8.34 8.35 0.01 0.41 0.41 0.00 2.84 2.84 0.00 19.90 19.90 0.00 
1998 29.59 29.60 0.01 7.71 7.72 0.01 0.52 0.52 0.00 2.19 2.19 0.00 19.50 19.50 0.00 
1999 32.23 32.24 0.01 11.66 11.71 0.05 0.70 0.70 0.00 2.83 2.83 0.00 20.86 20.86 0.00 
2000 32.31 32.32 0.01 11.11 11.13 0.03 0.91 0.94 0.03 3.06 3.06 0.00 23.04 23.04 0.00 
2001 36.33 41.96 5.63 10.16 10.18 0.02 0.62 0.77 0.15 2.45 2.45 0.00 22.58 22.58 0.00 
2002 33.19 35.94 2.75 10.44 10.47 0.03 0.74 0.85 0.11 3.06 3.06 0.00 23.15 23.15 0.00 
2003 44.76 48.33 3.57 10.32 10.33 0.02 1.05 1.23 0.18 3.30 3.30 0.00 21.96 21.96 0.00 
2004 36.76 41.79 5.03 13.24 13.28 0.04 1.79 2.12 0.33 2.97 2.97 0.00 23.93 23.93 0.00 
2005 34.04 35.11 1.07 13.19 13.19 0.00 1.66 2.05 0.39 3.02 3.02 0.00 25.87 25.87 0.00 
2006 38.72 42.66 3.94 11.53 11.53 0.00 1.32 1.62 0.30 3.46 3.46 0.00 26.64 26.64 0.00 
2007 41.18 52.11 10.93 11.06 11.06 0.00 1.88 2.30 0.42 3.17 3.17 0.00 26.54 26.54 0.00 
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Table C.23            
Apparent consumption of primary goods in tons (Brazil)     
             
 Soybeans Beef Sugar Iron ore 
 C P X C P X C P X C P X 
1950    1.08 1.10 0.01 1.84 1.86 0.02 1.10 2.0 0.9 
1951    1.15 1.15 0.01 1.90 1.92 0.02 1.09 2.4 1.3 
1952 0.08 0.08 0.00 1.12 1.12 0.00 2.01 2.05 0.04 1.60 3.2 1.6 
1953 0.06 0.09 0.03 1.13 1.13 0.00 1.93 2.18 0.26 2.04 3.6 1.6 
1954 0.09 0.12 0.03 1.15 1.15 0.00 2.13 2.30 0.16 1.39 3.1 1.7 
1955 0.06 0.11 0.05 1.14 1.14 0.00 1.86 2.33 0.47 0.82 3.4 2.6 
1956 0.07 0.11 0.04 1.23 1.24 0.01 2.49 2.50 0.02 1.33 4.1 2.7 
1957 0.10 0.12 0.02 1.30 1.33 0.03 2.29 2.72 0.42 1.43 5.0 3.6 
1958 0.10 0.13 0.03 1.44 1.47 0.04 2.09 2.85 0.76 2.35 5.2 2.8 
1959 0.16 0.21 0.04 1.42 1.45 0.03 2.43 3.05 0.62 4.92 8.9 4.0 
1960 0.27 0.27 0.00 1.37 1.37 0.01 2.46 3.23 0.77 4.18 9.3 5.2 
1961 0.27 0.34 0.07 1.35 1.37 0.02 2.65 3.44 0.78 3.98 10.2 6.2 
1962 0.23 0.32 0.10 1.34 1.36 0.01 3.12 3.57 0.45 3.09 10.7 7.6 
1963 0.27 0.30 0.03 1.35 1.36 0.01 2.88 3.40 0.52 2.95 11.2 8.3 
1964 0.52 0.52 0.00 1.42 1.44 0.02 3.75 4.00 0.25 7.23 17.0 9.7 
1965 0.52 0.60 0.08 1.46 1.50 0.04 3.44 4.20 0.76 8.02 20.8 12.7 
1966 0.59 0.72 0.12 1.43 1.45 0.02 3.36 4.36 1.00 10.34 23.3 12.9 
1967 0.35 0.65 0.30 1.49 1.51 0.01 3.46 4.46 1.00 8.02 22.3 14.3 
1968 0.99 1.06 0.07 1.66 1.69 0.04 3.33 4.36 1.03 10.07 25.1 15.0 
1969 1.20 1.51 0.31 1.75 1.83 0.08 3.49 4.59 1.10 5.68 27.2 21.5 
1970 1.79 2.08 0.29 1.75 1.85 0.10 -2.61 5.12 7.73 8.32 36.4 28.1 
1971 3.45 3.67 0.21 1.71 1.79 0.09 4.39 5.65 1.26 6.47 37.5 31.0 
1972 3.97 5.01 1.04 1.94 2.10 0.16 3.63 6.16 2.53 15.96 46.5 30.5 
1973 6.09 7.88 1.79 2.10 2.20 0.10 4.12 6.94 2.82 10.06 55.0 45.0 
1974 7.16 9.89 2.73 2.01 2.03 0.02 4.63 6.99 2.36 32.05 91.5 59.4 
1975 7.89 11.23 3.33 2.15 2.16 0.01 4.45 6.18 1.73 35.64 108.2 72.5 
1976 8.87 12.51 3.64 2.36 2.37 0.01 6.43 7.60 1.17 40.31 107.4 67.1 
1977 6.95 9.54 2.59 2.42 2.45 0.02 6.30 8.76 2.45 42.28 100.8 58.5 
1978 9.58 10.24 0.66 2.56 2.57 0.01 -0.19 7.77 7.96 37.53 103.9 66.4 
1979 14.52 15.16 0.64 2.65 2.65 0.00 5.20 7.03 1.83 41.91 117.5 75.6 
1980 13.61 15.16 1.55 2.84 2.85 0.01 5.97 8.55 2.57 60.74 139.7 79.0 
1981 13.56 15.01 1.45 2.95 3.00 0.05 5.69 8.39 2.70 36.91 122.7 85.8 
1982 12.34 12.84 0.50 2.96 3.05 0.09 6.59 9.30 2.71 39.01 119.9 80.9 
1983 13.29 14.58 1.30 3.13 3.25 0.12 7.06 9.56 2.50 39.99 114.2 74.2 
1984 13.98 15.54 1.56 3.30 3.42 0.12 6.26 9.32 3.06 53.55 143.8 90.3 
1985 14.79 18.28 3.49 3.34 3.48 0.14 5.72 8.27 2.55 73.90 168.1 94.2 
1986 12.13 13.33 1.20 3.52 3.60 0.08 6.22 8.65 2.43 49.92 129.4 79.5 
1987 13.95 16.97 3.02 3.62 3.69 0.07 6.26 8.46 2.20 40.00 134.5 20.0 
1988 15.42 18.02 2.60 3.88 4.05 0.17 6.82 8.58 1.77 40.00 146.0 22.4 
1989 19.91 24.07 4.17 4.16 4.23 0.06 6.74 7.79 1.05 35.27 153.7 118.4 
1990 15.82 19.90 4.08 4.07 4.12 0.05 6.36 7.90 1.54 40.80 154.3 113.5 
1991 12.92 14.94 2.02 4.45 4.51 0.06 7.72 9.20 1.48 41.00 154.3 113.3 
1992 15.49 19.21 3.73 4.62 4.72 0.10 7.39 9.80 2.41 37.82 146.0 108.2 
1993 18.41 22.59 4.18 4.71 4.81 0.10 6.87 9.93 3.06 44.27 159.4 115.1 
1994 19.53 24.93 5.40 5.06 5.14 0.08 9.07 12.50 3.43 42.80 165.6 122.8 
1995 22.19 25.68 3.49 5.67 5.71 0.04 7.46 13.70 6.24 53.62 183.8 130.2 
1996 19.51 23.16 3.65 6.14 6.19 0.05 9.27 14.65 5.38 45.11 174.1 129.0 
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Table C.23            
Apparent consumption of primary goods in million tons (Brazil)    
             
 Soybeans Beef Sugar Iron ore 
 C P X C P X C P X C P X 
1997 18.05 26.39 8.34 5.87 5.92 0.05 9.32 15.70 6.38 53.81 187.9 134.1 
1998 22.03 31.31 9.27 5.71 5.79 0.08 9.93 18.30 8.37 56.87 207.0 150.1 
1999 22.07 30.99 8.92 6.26 6.41 0.15 8.00 20.10 12.10 50.50 202.2 139.8 
2000 21.30 32.82 11.52 6.39 6.58 0.19 10.60 17.10 6.50 53.21 225.2 156.9 
2001 22.21 37.88 15.68 6.46 6.82 0.37 9.23 20.40 11.17 54.25 219.2 155.7 
2002 26.06 42.03 15.97 6.71 7.14 0.43 10.46 23.81 13.35 53.47 219.4 166.5 
2003 32.03 51.92 19.89 6.61 7.23 0.62 12.62 25.53 12.91 61.07 235.9 174.8 
2004 30.30 49.55 19.25 6.85 7.77 0.93 11.79 27.55 15.76 43.28 261.8 218.5 
2005 28.75 51.18 22.44 6.69 7.77 1.09 9.92 28.06 18.15 66.70 290.9 224.2 
2006 27.51 52.46 24.96 6.55 7.77 1.23 12.81 31.68 18.87 80.18 322.7 242.5 
2007 34.12 57.86 23.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.12 36.47 19.36 96.38 365.8 269.4 
 
Note: C = consumption; P = production; X = exports 
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Table C.24      
Apparent consumption of primary goods (Korea)  
       
 Rice Barley   Rice Barley 
 million tons   million tons 
1950 2.79   1978 5.80 1.44 
1951 2.17   1979 5.57 1.39 
1952 1.77   1980 3.55 1.70 
1953 2.70   1981 5.06 1.76 
1954 2.87   1982 5.18 0.81 
1955 2.96 1.03  1983 5.40 1.35 
1956 2.44 0.61  1984 5.68 1.51 
1957 3.02 0.85  1985 5.63 1.06 
1958 3.17 0.98  1986 5.61 0.84 
1959 3.17 1.24  1987 5.49 0.96 
1960 3.05 1.04  1988 6.05 1.04 
1961 3.46 1.09  1989 5.90 0.96 
1962 3.02 0.95  1990 5.61 0.77 
1963 3.76 1.18  1991 5.38 0.63 
1964 3.95 1.36  1992 5.33 0.58 
1965 3.50 1.37  1993 4.75 0.59 
1966 3.92 1.48  1994 5.06 0.43 
1967 3.60 1.38  1995 4.69 0.52 
1968 3.20 0.92  1996 5.32 0.54 
1969 4.09 1.51  1997 5.45 0.35 
1970 3.94 1.81  1998 5.10 0.34 
1971 4.00 2.02  1999 5.26 0.44 
1972 3.96 1.92  2000 5.29 0.30 
1973 4.21 1.68  2001 5.51 0.51 
1974 4.45 1.67  2002 4.93 0.41 
1975 4.67 1.59  2003 4.45 0.33 
1976 5.22 1.51  2004 5.00 0.37 
1977 6.01 1.60  2005 4.77 0.38 
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Table C.25      
Apparent consumption of agrarian inputs    
       
 Brazil Korea 
 Fertilizers Fuel-oil Tractors Fertilizers 
 Nitrogenised Phosphate Potasic   All types 
 tons tons tons 1000 litres units metric tons 
1951 18,647 89,636 27,814    
1952 10,654 57,171 14,868    
1953 20,674 78,972 30,252    
1954 17,844 94,290 27,464    
1955 23,063 107,919 47,978  719 991,758 
1956 30,378 113,992 40,333  392 1,205,815 
1957 28,690 144,610 58,312  1,793 814,255 
1958 41,582 174,656 63,052  7,135 725,126 
1959 44,993 151,087 55,634  4,597 772,204 
1960 67,069 160,330 102,835  12,702 949,340 
1961 55,064 144,213 70,727 427,200 8,141 886,545 
1962 50,284 137,631 68,167 480,000 4,702 1,299,852 
1963 62,061 143,571 91,750 537,600 9,999 1,141,215 
1964 50,808 127,279 69,564 590,400 11,691 984,924 
1965 70,569 108,577 99,732 648,000 12,956 1,251,837 
1966 71,134 111,588 93,337 700,800 10,880 1,211,155 
1967 106,082 204,605 136,937 756,000 10,903 1,143,240 
1968 144,320 273,090 184,295 811,200 9,817 1,577,197 
1969 164,430 265,666 200,288 865,920 11,990 1,362,838 
1970 278,604 417,479 305,852 920,976 13,977 1,195,096 
1971 278,281 493,828 350,608 1,010,400 18,453 1,098,273 
1972 402,470 777,254 456,412 1,099,200 26,924 1,225,780 
1973 348,891 802,076 528,532 1,188,000 33,544 1,532,083 
1974 389,183 914,151 521,303 1,276,800 45,044 1,809,834 
1975 406,234 1,013,848 557,614 1,699,742 52,426 2,176,656 
1976 498,272 1,308,329 721,540 1,833,600 60,143 1,742,680 
1977 700,480 1,545,476 962,938 1,934,400 65,100 1,811,438 
1978 704,143 1,534,492 989,151 2,217,600 49,315 2,008,556 
1979 780,253 1,691,812 1,103,374 2,496,000 41,967 2,107,037 
1980 906,760 1,991,086 1,306,573 2,789,784 49,963 1,379,637 
1981 668,640 1,322,200 766,646 2,908,800 50,865 1,703,082 
1982 643,600 1,210,508 876,381 3,028,800 28,054 1,762,199 
1983 637,196 1,053,861 728,118 3,148,800 24,668 1,490,798 
1984 823,012 1,570,024 1,076,038 3,268,800 22,566 1,774,676 
1985 827,839 1,312,788 1,067,604 3,395,083 41,660 2,076,738 
1986 989,611 1,648,788 1,290,520 3,465,600 40,761 1,982,642 
1987 963,848 1,651,693 1,538,308 3,518,400 45,307 2,571,547 
1988 876,868 1,524,000 1,368,267 3,571,200 38,875 1,404,943 
1989 868,999 1,315,904 1,238,816 3,624,000 29,936 2,593,113 
1990 917,102 1,205,198 1,202,034 3,676,800 26,344 2,382,334 
1991 936,288 1,296,008 1,279,257 3,729,600 21,331 2,491,351 
1992 951,453 1,372,613 1,337,420 3,782,400 13,578 2,718,766 
1993 1,184,400 1,660,148 1,729,502 3,835,200 12,281 2,579,108 
1994 1,262,417 1,949,783 1,871,975 3,984,000 21,396 2,708,618 
1995 1,221,596 1,602,700 1,775,268 4,036,800 38,491 2,889,578 
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Table C.25      
Apparent consumption of agrarian inputs    
       
 Brazil Korea 
 Fertilizers Fuel-oil Tractors Fertilizers 
 Nitrogenised Phosphate Potasic   All types 
 tons tons tons 1000 litres units metric tons 
1996 1,273,548 1,750,921 2,079,243 4,107,562 17,584 2,535,864 
1997 1,494,957 2,056,740 2,416,239 4,104,830 10,291 2,598,282 
1998 1,574,880 2,060,394 2,301,057 4,102,099 15,731 2,329,668 
1999 1,690,844 1,978,908 2,266,108 4,094,568 18,158 2,751,468 
2000 2,034,341 2,615,832 2,919,721 4,087,037 18,788 2,985,394 
2001 1,738,099 2,596,287 2,883,816 4,079,510 24,291 2,600,604 
2002 1,928,140 2,777,425 3,068,443 4,071,979 28,090 2,750,049 
2003 2,299,556 3,312,438 3,659,514 4,064,448 33,186 2,790,524 
2004 2,296,656 3,308,261 3,654,900 4,056,917 29,405 2,825,673 
2005 2,037,131 2,934,423 3,241,891 4,049,386 28,636 3,182,371 
2006 2,116,519 3,048,780 3,368,230 4,041,854 17,729 - 
2007 2,482,417 3,575,844 3,950,520 - 20,141 - 
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Table C.26      
International prices of agrarian inputs    
       
 Fertilizers Fuel-oil Tractors Fertilizers 
 Nitrogenised Phosfatic Potasic   All types* 
 US$ per ton US$ per ton US$ per ton US$ per litre US$ per unit US$ per ton 
1950 78 28 75    
1951 82 33 81    
1952 99 41 74    
1953 70 41 62    
1954 91 39 69    
1955 71 38 60  3,410 54 
1956 64 39 59  3,496 54 
1957 56 42 57  3,763 48 
1958 55 40 53  3,924 47 
1959 50 37 46  4,048 45 
1960 45 39 45  4,000 46 
1961 44 35 54  3,972 48 
1962 43 36 50  4,124 54 
1963 43 31 50  4,257 49 
1964 47 38 49 0.048 4,324 75 
1965 53 38 52 0.052 4,419 67 
1966 47 40 45 0.052 4,628 97 
1967 48 42 41 0.053 4,819 70 
1968 43 43 37 0.053 5,047 48 
1969 35 38 29 0.054 5,360 35 
1970 33 33 41 0.055 5,607 41 
1971 34 33 42 0.056 5,883 53 
1972 34 31 42 0.057 6,187 52 
1973 36 31 44 0.061 6,605 68 
1974 61 49 55 0.083 7,755 153 
1975 86 98 69 0.093 9,409 260 
1976 73 78 69 0.098 10,473 97 
1977 75 74 64 0.106 11,452 94 
1978 74 75 68 0.111 12,498 89 
1979 76 85 81 0.145 13,933 93 
1980 92 112 98 0.199 15,587 141 
1981 104 121 113 0.226 17,402 151 
1982 102 121 111 0.222 18,837 131 
1983 94 113 102 0.214 19,959 94 
1984 101 113 111 0.213 20,709 121 
1985 98 111 95 0.213 20,358 109 
1986 81 109 87 0.171 19,911 91 
1987 81 115 99 0.171 19,940 81 
1988 95 125 125 0.174 20,671 99 
1989 97 128 126 0.187 22,049 122 
1990 94 117 121 0.225 23,199 127 
1991 101 118 121 0.234 23,924 147 
1992 97 112 117 0.216 25,133 141 
1993 101 100 115 0.217 26,099 132 
1994 114 115 115 0.207 26,749 133 
1995 131 132 123 0.202 27,942 159 
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Table C.26      
International prices of agrarian inputs    
       
 Fertilizers Fuel-oil Tractors Fertilizers 
 Nitrogenised Phosfatic Potasic   All types* 
 US$ per ton US$ per ton US$ per ton US$ per litre US$ per unit US$ per ton 
1996 133 140 122 0.243 28,233 154 
1997 134 133 121 0.231 29,055 144 
1998 110 136 130 0.196 29,949 134 
1999 97 135 134 0.192 29,621 130 
2000 120 117 131 0.285 30,594 134 
2001 145 115 135 0.285 31,012 139 
2002 108 121 130 0.255 31,197 135 
2003 149 132 131 0.327 30,375 155 
2004 172 146 144 0.346 30,649 189 
2005 200 155 195 - - 250 
2006 207 163 217 - - 258 
2007 236 223 223 - - - 
 
Note: * = Korean import price 
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Table C.27      
Domestic prices of agrarian inputs    
       
  Brazil    Korea 
 Fertilizers Fuel-oil Tractors Fertilizers 
 Nitrogenised Phosfatic Potasic   All types 
 R$ per ton R$ per ton R$ per ton R$ per litre R$ per unit W$ per ton 
1950 2.475E-12 4.873E-13 7.927E-13 1.589E-16   
1951 2.511E-12 6.000E-13 9.018E-13 1.865E-16   
1952 2.595E-12 6.400E-13 9.018E-13 2.694E-16   
1953 2.410E-12 5.709E-13 8.327E-13 3.627E-16   
1954 2.992E-12 6.691E-13 1.102E-12 3.662E-16   
1955 4.118E-12 9.273E-13 1.516E-12 4.836E-16 6.627E-11 3,280 
1956 4.506E-12 1.065E-12 1.753E-12 5.423E-16 8.423E-11 9,826 
1957 4.377E-12 1.153E-12 1.658E-12 1.233E-15 8.835E-11 10,292 
1958 5.152E-12 1.287E-12 1.764E-12 1.327E-15 1.275E-10 10,292 
1959 8.142E-12 1.585E-12 1.855E-12 2.200E-15 1.832E-10 11,066 
1960 7.488E-12 1.665E-12 2.967E-12 2.280E-15 1.941E-10 12,146 
1961 1.265E-11 4.364E-12 5.891E-12 4.484E-15 2.518E-10 12,342 
1962 2.373E-11 6.400E-12 1.105E-11 5.876E-15 3.888E-10 13,642 
1963 4.224E-11 1.168E-11 1.855E-11 1.038E-14 7.598E-10 13,986 
1964 4.224E-11 2.164E-11 3.240E-11 2.115E-14 1.349E-09 17,151 
1965 6.996E-11 3.915E-11 7.121E-11 4.140E-14 2.297E-09 24,536 
1966 7.131E-11 4.393E-11 7.267E-11 5.309E-14 2.974E-09 24,536 
1967 7.498E-11 4.578E-11 6.837E-11 6.936E-14 3.564E-09 21,396 
1968 7.547E-11 5.927E-11 7.407E-11 8.455E-14 4.653E-09 21,396 
1969 8.766E-11 7.267E-11 8.591E-11 1.128E-13 5.743E-09 22,942 
1970 8.747E-11 7.625E-11 1.019E-10 1.347E-13 7.216E-09 23,700 
1971 1.065E-10 8.439E-11 1.428E-10 1.685E-13 8.606E-09 22,900 
1972 1.377E-10 1.182E-10 1.586E-10 2.131E-13 1.011E-08 22,300 
1973 1.840E-10 1.494E-10 2.016E-10 2.382E-13 1.209E-08 24,700 
1974 6.178E-10 4.107E-10 4.085E-10 3.311E-13 1.378E-08 31,600 
1975 6.687E-10 4.544E-10 4.990E-10 4.537E-13 1.942E-08 51,100 
1976 5.295E-10 4.978E-10 5.663E-10 6.942E-13 3.065E-08 93,800 
1977 7.009E-10 5.738E-10 7.232E-10 9.618E-13 4.989E-08 87,000 
1978 9.836E-10 7.006E-10 1.024E-09 1.530E-12 7.020E-08 89,900 
1979 1.524E-09 1.141E-09 1.788E-09 2.564E-12 1.055E-07 92,300 
1980 3.592E-09 2.655E-09 4.899E-09 5.312E-12 2.023E-07 123,100 
1981 7.907E-09 5.525E-09 1.005E-08 1.350E-11 4.822E-07 178,200 
1982 1.347E-08 1.164E-08 1.479E-08 2.603E-11 1.222E-06 193,600 
1983 3.634E-08 2.610E-08 4.094E-08 6.590E-11 2.781E-06 195,800 
1984 1.259E-07 8.417E-08 1.483E-07 2.164E-10 1.028E-05 206,600 
1985 4.147E-07 2.797E-07 4.376E-07 6.216E-10 2.827E-05 206,600 
1986 7.091E-07 6.209E-07 8.604E-07 1.116E-09 4.404E-05 200,318 
1987 2.696E-06 1.883E-06 2.550E-06 3.260E-09 3.162E-04 197,087 
1988 1.513E-05 1.145E-05 1.626E-05 2.358E-08 4.479E-03 178,419 
1989 0.0003030 0.0002595 0.0002770 0.0000002 0.0807631 162,264 
1990 0.0060051 0.0055018 0.0081801 0.0000072 0.8616279 165,136 
1991 0.027014 0.024592 0.040256 0.000037 7.794801 165,495 
1992 0.291998 0.214250 0.445661 0.000537 114.7019 171,778 
1993 6.033750 4.226958 7.609040 0.011734 2,984.601 173,932 
1994 143.7651 112.7297 176.6378 0.237242 25,033.63 173,932 
1995 215.6933 161.1358 275.9333 0.350000 25,033.63 179,496 
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Table C.27      
Domestic prices of agrarian inputs    
       
  Brazil    Korea 
 Fertilizers Fuel-oil Tractors Fertilizers 
 Nitrogenised Phosfatic Potasic   All types 
 R$ per ton R$ per ton R$ per ton R$ per litre R$ per unit W$ per ton 
1996 264.457 193.244 327.427 0.381 26,523.487 180,035 
1997 300.688 221.939 359.137 0.411 27,523.250 189,907 
1998 269.517 219.429 352.805 0.416 28,564.747 268,706 
1999 327.357 316.962 515.688 0.514 32,218.418 277,364 
2000 361.165 336.852 554.708 0.657 36,432.411 288,620 
2001 463.943 397.678 638.364 0.798 41,124.755 308,824 
2002 559.516 466.264 766.994 0.993 47,543.068 322,100 
2003 648.883 564.407 903.373 1.456 66,924.667 337,397 
2004 907.926 678.325 1,072.244 1.494 81,432.321 359,621 
2005 859.398 623.079 1,134.624 1.743 90,778.938 372,898 
2006 735.137 558.503 996.789 1.923  373,763 
2007 832.790 677.443 1,083.674 1.927  382,133 
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Table C.28             
Labour productivity            
               
 Industrial sector Total economy 
 B U K* U* B/U B**/U K/U K*/U B K* B K* U U* 
 1947=100 1955=100 Relative to USA (in %) AG in 2000 US$ 1955=100 
1947 100 100   7 13         
1948 112 104   8 14         
1949 115 108   8 14         
1950 119 112   8 14         
1951 123 112   8 15         
1952 134 118   8 15         
1953 144 122   9 16         
1954 149 125   9 16         
1955 162 133 100 100 9 16 7 6 18,001 19,378 100 100 100 100 
1956 171 133 112 100 9 17 8 7 17,894 19,140 100 112 99 103 
1957 187 136 119 103 10 18 8 7 18,146 19,716 105 119 101 105 
1958 217 139 131 107 11 21 9 7 18,332 20,271 113 131 102 105 
1959 222 144 142 110 11 21 9 8 19,039 20,738 121 142 106 106 
1960 236 147 141 113 12 21 9 8 19,313 21,442 128 141 107 109 
1961 258 153 138 117 12 23 9 7 19,925 22,386 136 138 109 110 
1962 264 159 158 121 12 22 9 8 20,783 22,835 142 158 114 111 
1963 257 165 135 125 11 21 8 7 21,762 24,090 140 135 118 113 
1964 262 172 137 130 11 20 8 6 22,724 25,067 141 137 122 115 
1965 250 177 128 133 10 19 7 6 23,637 25,806 141 128 126 117 
1966 290 179 147 134 12 22 8 7 23,513 25,770 146 147 131 120 
1967 297 184 159 140 12 22 8 7 24,216 26,814 149 159 132 123 
1968 331 191 188 146 13 23 9 8 24,839 27,592 159 188 135 126 
1969 354 193 221 148 13 25 11 9 24,920 27,598 169 221 136 130 
1970 389 193 249 152 15 27 12 10 24,545 27,893 182 249 135 134 
1971 411 206 287 161 15 27 13 11 26,211 29,366 193 287 138 136 
1972 431 217 308 167 15 27 13 11 27,548 30,182 206 308 140 141 
1973 415 220 349 169 14 25 15 12 28,169 29,998 208 349 143 146 
1974 385 217 409 170 13 24 17 14 28,118 29,359 220 409 140 152 
1975 398 230 439 183 13 23 17 15 29,952 31,492 225 439 141 153 
1976 426 240 458 189 13 24 18 15 31,136 32,502 242 458 144 158 
1977 429 251 524 197 13 23 19 16 32,728 33,202 232 524 145 164 
1978 447 254 602 199 13 24 22 18 32,912 32,370 237 602 147 171 
1979 465 251 672 197 14 25 25 21 32,297 31,040 257 672 147 176 
1980 490 255 682 203 14 26 24 20 32,558 32,145 285 682 146 178 
1981 478 259 794 206 14 25 28 23 33,366 31,070 263 794 148 182 
1982 514 274 801 223 14 25 26 22 35,214 34,459 252 801 146 181 
1983 527 291 867 230 13 24 27 23 37,598 34,831 244 867 151 183 
1984 571 303 980 235 14 25 30 25 38,867 34,316 246 980 156 189 
1985 585 316 973 246 14 25 29 24 40,649 36,659 243 973 159 192 
1986 586 331 1,057 258 13 24 30 25 42,839 37,825 261 1,057 161 199 
1987 584 340 1,103 264 13 23 30 25 44,238 38,442 262 1,103 162 203 
1988 588 350 1,214 269 12 22 33 27 45,712 37,813 254 1,214 165 206 
1989 591 351 1,260 270 12 23 34 28 45,797 37,243 256 1,260 167 209 
1990 566 361 1,387 279 11 21 36 30 47,610 37,256 240 1,387 168 214 
1991 614 369 1,523 287 12 22 39 32 48,207 36,911 241 1,523 169 213 
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Table C.28              
Labour productivity            
               
 Industrial sector Total economy 
 B U K* U* B/U B**/U K/U K*/U B K* B K* U U* 
 1947=100 1955=100 Relative to USA (in %) AG in 2000 US$ 1955=100 
1992 638 391 1,755 301 12 22 42 35 51,285 36,176 239 1,755 174 216 
1993 701 402 1,926 305 13 23 46 38 52,251 34,527 248 1,926 176 217 
1994 772 428 2,011 322 13 24 45 38 55,253 36,652 258 2,011 179 220 
1995 800 440 2,192 333 13 24 48 40 56,757 36,357 266 2,192 181 222 
1996 911 455 2,438 346 15 27 51 43 57,780 35,139 278 2,438 185 225 
1997 1,001 475 2,698 357 16 28 55 46 59,707 33,652 286 2,698 189 229 
1998 1,067 494 3,212 351 16 29 67 55 61,832 24,453 283 3,212 194 231 
1999 1,133 517 3,435 365 16 29 68 57 64,541 24,016 280 3,435 199 234 
2000 1,193 536 3,751 382 16 30 71 59 66,782 22,808 276 3,751 201 240 
2001 1,195 545 3,910 421 16 29 67 56 68,030 28,637 283 3,910 203 243 
2002 1,201 587 4,365 453 15 27 70 58 74,278 28,374 282 4,365 207 245 
2003 1,225 620 4,650 479 15 26 71 58 78,958 29,500 281 4,650 210 250 
2004 1,268 654 5,125 501 14 26 74 62 83,528 26,824 282 5,125 215 253 
2005 1,225 669 5,475 512 13 24 78 64 86,164 23,822 282 5,475 218 258 
2006 1,186 682 6,064 523 13 23 84 70 88,578 17,021  6,064 220 263 
2007 1,203 709   12 23         
 
Note: B = Brazil; U = USA; K = Korea; * = corrected with the evolution of hours worked; ** = workers in the 
mainstream sector of manufacturing (i.e. firms covered by the Pesquisa Anual Industrial – Empresa; AG = absolute 
productivity gap 
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Table C.29            
Hourly industrial wages and compensation (labour) costs in US$    
             
 Korea Brazil USA 
 W LC W LC W LC 
 MW All MW All MW All MW All MW All MW All 
1955 0.07  0.07  0.43 0.53 0.47 0.59 1.85 2.20 2.04 2.38 
1956 0.07  0.07  0.53 0.66 0.59 0.73 1.96 2.33 2.16 2.53 
1957 0.08  0.09  0.62 0.77 0.72 0.89 2.07 2.46 2.29 2.69 
1958 0.08  0.09  0.62 0.77 0.73 0.90 2.17 2.57 2.41 2.82 
1959 0.07  0.08  0.50 0.62 0.59 0.73 2.24 2.66 2.49 2.93 
1960 0.07  0.07  0.50 0.61 0.59 0.72 2.32 2.75 2.59 3.05 
1961 0.08  0.09  0.44 0.54 0.52 0.64 2.39 2.83 2.67 3.14 
1962 0.09  0.10  0.50 0.62 0.59 0.73 2.46 2.92 2.77 3.25 
1963 0.08  0.09  0.62 0.77 0.76 0.94 2.53 3.01 2.84 3.36 
1964 0.06  0.07  0.54 0.67 0.68 0.84 2.64 3.14 2.97 3.51 
1965 0.07  0.08  0.50 0.62 0.64 0.79 2.71 3.21 3.02 3.59 
1966 0.08  0.09  0.48 0.59 0.61 0.76 2.80 3.33 3.17 3.75 
1967 0.10  0.11  0.52 0.64 0.70 0.87 2.95 3.49 3.34 3.94 
1968 0.13  0.14  0.53 0.66 0.72 0.88 3.16 3.75 3.60 4.25 
1969 0.16  0.18  0.57 0.71 0.76 0.95 3.36 3.99 3.85 4.54 
1970 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.66 0.81 0.89 1.10 3.61 4.28 4.12 4.89 
1971 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.33 0.63 0.78 0.86 1.06 3.82 4.53 4.37 5.21 
1972 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.75 0.93 1.03 1.28 4.00 4.75 4.60 5.50 
1973 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.37 0.85 1.05 1.17 1.45 4.24 5.03 4.93 5.89 
1974 0.34 0.41 0.38 0.45 1.06 1.31 1.47 1.82 4.67 5.54 5.48 6.53 
1975 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.43 1.08 1.34 1.51 1.87 5.16 6.12 6.16 7.28 
1976 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.54 1.27 1.57 1.77 2.19 5.58 6.57 6.71 7.90 
1977 0.62 0.62 0.69 0.68 1.46 1.80 2.04 2.52 6.10 7.08 7.38 8.59 
1978 0.83 0.82 0.92 0.90 1.76 2.17 2.46 3.04 6.64 7.62 8.08 9.26 
1979 1.09 1.07 1.21 1.18 1.95 2.41 2.73 3.38 7.21 8.34 8.81 10.15 
1980 1.05 1.12 1.16 1.24 1.89 2.34 2.66 3.29 7.84 9.33 9.63 11.41 
1981 1.11 1.27 1.23 1.41 2.19 2.70 3.09 3.82 8.61 10.17 10.62 12.50 
1982 1.18 1.26 1.31 1.40 2.33 2.88 3.28 4.06 9.18 11.11 11.43 13.75 
1983 1.24 1.32 1.37 1.46 1.48 1.83 2.09 2.59 9.50 11.43 11.84 14.12 
1984 1.29 1.45 1.43 1.61 1.25 1.55 1.77 2.19 9.87 11.90 12.27 14.60 
1985 1.32 1.37 1.46 1.52 1.46 1.81 2.06 2.55 10.24 12.64 12.71 15.43 
1986 1.39 1.54 1.55 1.71 1.68 2.08 2.37 2.94 10.50 13.20 12.99 16.14 
1987 1.69 1.78 1.88 1.99 2.00 2.47 2.82 3.48 10.72 13.57 13.30 16.62 
1988 2.33 2.49 2.58 2.75 1.70 2.10 2.41 2.98 10.95 14.05 13.61 17.20 
1989 3.30 2.90 3.71 3.26 3.15 3.90 4.56 5.64 11.26 14.50 14.04 17.79 
1990 3.83 3.22 4.37 3.68 2.80 3.46 4.18 5.17 11.80 15.19 14.81 18.58 
1991 4.36 3.75 5.12 4.40 2.21 2.73 3.30 4.08 12.24 15.90 15.52 19.70 
1992 4.80 4.16 5.76 5.00 2.28 2.82 3.40 4.21 12.49 16.50 15.95 20.67 
1993 5.17 4.64 6.29 5.64 2.46 3.04 3.68 4.55 12.78 16.71 16.37 21.12 
1994 5.96 5.27 7.10 6.28 2.99 3.70 4.51 5.58 13.16 17.19 16.78 21.66 
1995 6.76 6.64 8.04 7.90 3.71 4.59 5.59 6.92 13.56 17.92 17.17 22.15 
1996 7.40 7.45 8.96 9.02 3.80 4.70 5.76 7.13 14.05 18.59 17.74 22.52 
1997 6.66 6.65 8.66 8.65 3.84 4.68 5.77 7.03 14.42 19.33 18.20 23.05 
1998 4.55 4.93 6.19 6.72 3.63 4.42 5.50 6.70 14.73 20.48 18.52 22.22 
1999 6.16 6.13 8.73 8.70 2.29 2.83 3.40 4.19 15.12 21.38 18.90 23.27 
2000 7.02 6.91 9.63 9.48 2.37 2.91 3.51 4.31 15.69 23.01 19.65 24.95 
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Table C.29            
Hourly industrial wages and compensation (labour) costs in US$    
             
 Korea Brazil USA 
 W LC W LC W LC 
 MW All MW All MW All MW All MW All MW All 
2001 6.61 5.41 8.95 7.32 2.00 2.43 2.97 3.60 16.24 22.47 20.52 27.55 
2002 7.50 6.13 9.88 8.08 1.73 2.07 2.56 3.06 16.92 23.04 21.60 29.07 
2003 8.59 6.94 10.97 8.86 1.85 2.17 2.75 3.23 17.44 24.06 22.48 31.40 
2004 9.86 8.19 12.25 10.17 2.14 2.59 3.14 3.81 17.89 24.88 21.13 31.66 
2005 12.03 10.11 14.49 12.18 2.80 3.37 4.16 5.01 18.39 25.78 23.81 32.68 
 
Note: W = wage; LC = labour cost; MW = manual workers; All = all employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 503 
Table C.30      
Real purchasing power of hourly industrial wages  
       
 Korea Brazil USA 
 Manual* All Manual All Manual All 
 US$ PPP 2005 US$ PPP 2005 US$ PPP 2005 
1955 0.65  5.11 4.24 13.51 16.02 
1956 0.63  5.48 4.56 14.10 16.72 
1957 0.63  5.91 4.91 14.39 17.07 
1958 0.69  5.95 4.95 14.65 17.37 
1959 0.72  5.82 4.83 15.00 17.79 
1960 0.66  5.99 4.98 15.32 18.17 
1961 0.68  6.01 4.99 15.58 18.48 
1962 0.68  6.59 5.48 15.87 18.82 
1963 0.65  7.34 6.10 16.17 19.18 
1964 0.60  7.09 5.90 16.65 19.75 
1965 0.61  6.64 5.52 16.76 19.88 
1966 0.64  7.08 5.89 16.87 20.00 
1967 0.72  6.93 5.76 17.24 20.44 
1968 0.82  7.40 6.15 17.76 21.06 
1969 1.00  7.89 6.56 17.91 21.24 
1970 1.11 1.27 7.39 6.14 18.15 21.53 
1971 1.22 1.47 7.86 6.53 18.42 21.85 
1972 1.29 1.42 8.90 7.39 18.69 22.17 
1973 1.39 1.68 8.12 6.75 18.65 22.12 
1974 1.56 1.68 8.71 7.24 18.48 21.92 
1975 1.56 1.51 8.03 6.67 18.72 22.20 
1976 1.75 1.65 8.90 7.39 19.15 22.54 
1977 2.11 1.89 9.50 7.90 19.66 22.81 
1978 2.48 2.19 10.57 8.79 19.88 22.80 
1979 2.75 2.42 11.25 9.35 19.40 22.43 
1980 2.57 2.47 11.81 9.81 18.58 22.11 
1981 2.51 2.59 11.75 9.76 18.50 21.85 
1982 2.68 2.58 12.11 10.06 18.58 22.48 
1983 2.87 2.76 10.03 8.34 18.63 22.40 
1984 3.05 3.09 9.75 8.11 18.55 22.37 
1985 3.28 3.08 10.88 9.04 18.59 22.94 
1986 3.43 3.42 12.43 10.33 18.71 23.52 
1987 3.76 3.57 9.79 8.14 18.41 23.30 
1988 4.30 4.15 9.53 7.92 18.08 23.21 
1989 5.29 4.13 9.03 7.50 17.74 22.85 
1990 5.95 4.40 7.02 5.83 17.64 22.70 
1991 6.44 4.71 5.81 4.83 17.55 22.80 
1992 7.09 5.12 5.96 4.95 17.38 22.96 
1993 7.50 5.53 6.11 5.08 17.28 22.60 
1994 8.15 6.05 6.22 5.17 17.34 22.65 
1995 8.49 7.01 6.64 5.52 17.38 22.96 
1996 9.24 7.68 6.32 5.25 17.49 23.14 
1997 9.41 7.23 6.33 5.26 17.54 23.52 
1998 8.80 7.01 6.23 5.18 17.65 24.53 
1999 10.03 7.04 5.63 4.68 17.73 25.06 
2000 10.64 7.63 5.77 4.80 17.79 26.09 
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Table C.30      
Real purchasing power of hourly industrial wages  
       
 Korea Brazil USA 
 Manual* All Manual All Manual All 
 US$ PPP 2005 US$ PPP 2005 US$ PPP 2005 
2001 11.00 6.64 5.37 4.47 17.91 24.78 
2002 11.76 7.29 5.03 4.18 18.37 25.02 
2003 12.39 7.83 4.64 3.85 18.51 25.54 
2004 13.20 8.82 4.95 4.12 18.50 25.73 
2005 14.01 9.77 5.23 4.34 18.39 25.78 
 
Note: * = manual workers with permanent employment contract 
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Table C.31       
Inflows of interest-bearing capital, stock of external debts and foreign exchange 
reserves (Brazil) 
        
 LTL AK LCB NIP STL ED FXR 
 Million US$ 
1947 32 -48 80 13 221  929 
1948 9 -61 0 25 70  883 
1949 40 -107 38 21 153  875 
1950 28 -85 0 27 -105  821 
1951 38 -27 28 20 311  584 
1952 35 -33 -28 22 630  482 
1953 44 -46 486 34 -572  421 
1954 109 -134 200 48 21  372 
1955 84 -140 61 35 -37  442 
1956 231 -187 -28 67 51 2,736 608 
1957 319 -242 37 67 -153 2,491 474 
1958 373 -324 195 58 -137 2,870 465 
1959 439 -377 -21 91 121 3,160 366 
1960 348 -417 61 115 431 3,738 345 
1961 579 -327 260 114 -192 3,291 470 
1962 325 -310 120 118 88 3,533 285 
1963 250 -364 187 87 -11 3,612 215 
1964 221 -277 52 131 -243 3,294 244 
1965 363 -304 250 156 -308 3,823 483 
1966 508 -350 9 155 -87 3,771 421 
1967 530 -444 -33 184 -47 3,440 198 
1968 583 -484 -12 144 526 4,092 257 
1969 1,023 -493 0 182 126 4,635 656 
1970 1,440 -673 0 234 325 6,240 1,187 
1971 2,070 -855 0 302 659 8,284 1,723 
1972 4,375 -1,210 0 359 788 11,464 4,183 
1973 4,555 -1,674 0 514 836 14,857 6,416 
1974 7,058 -1,928 0 652 507 20,032 5,269 
1975 6,136 -2,185 0 1,498 761 25,115 4,040 
1976 8,042 -3,009 0 1,810 3,256 32,145 6,544 
1977 8,766 -4,135 0 2,104 -365 37,951 7,256 
1978 14,284 -5,440 0 2,696 1,625 52,187 11,895 
1979 11,992 -6,542 0 4,186 504 55,803 9,689 
1980 12,440 -6,824 0 6,311 2,640 64,259 6,913 
1981 18,123 -7,888 0 9,161 1,116 73,963 7,507 
1982 14,422 -8,470 4,177 11,353 -720 85,487 3,994 
1983 14,722 -7,691 -1,481 9,555 68 93,745 4,563 
1984 15,981 -8,314 1,796 10,203 -4,023 102,127 11,995 
1985 11,166 -10,452 -63 9,659 -2,997 105,171 11,608 
1986 13,232 -13,072 -613 9,327 475 111,203 6,760 
1987 11,973 -13,630 -1,147 8,792 4,613 121,188 7,458 
1988 15,470 -17,049 -456 9,832 -7,071 113,511 9,140 
1989 31,326 -34,688 -852 9,633 4,288 115,506 9,679 
1990 4,143 -8,778 -741 9,748 11,331 123,439 9,973 
1991 5,827 -7,721 -590 8,621 6,103 123,910 9,406 
1992 27,304 -8,402 -406 7,253 -13,630 135,949 23,754 
1993 12,355 -9,711 -496 8,280 5,706 145,726 32,211 
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Table C.31       
Inflows of interest-bearing capital, stock of external debts and foreign exchange 
reserves (Brazil) 
        
 LTL AK LCB NIP STL ED FXR 
 Million US$ 
1994 54,651 -46,158 -129 6,337 8,158 148,295 38,806 
1995 17,429 -10,409 -239 7,946 21,293 159,256 51,840 
1996 25,867 -13,754 -387 8,778 13,313 179,935 60,110 
1997 45,768 -25,235 -234 9,483 -21,153 199,998 52,173 
1998 61,048 -29,790 8,944 11,437 -27,463 241,644 44,556 
1999 40,557 -45,437 2,803 14,876 -5,489 241,468 36,342 
2000 37,319 -31,977 -10,434 14,649 -2,234 236,156 33,011 
2001 34,624 -35,151 6,639 14,877 310 226,067 35,866 
2002 18,594 -31,025 11,363 13,130 -4,616 227,689 37,823 
2003 23,001 -27,056 4,645 13,020 -811 235,414 49,296 
2004 20,387 -33,067 -4,494 13,364 -718 220,182 52,935 
2005 28,542 -32,694 -23,402 13,496 4,110 187,987 53,799 
2006 43,880 -43,989 -138 11,289 18,926 199,372 85,839 
2007 36,011 -37,961 -138 7,255 38,421 240,495 180,334 
 
Note: LTL = long-term loans; AK = amortizations of capital; LCB = loans to the Central Bank; NIP = net 
interest payments; STL = short-term loans; ED = external debts; FXR = foreign exchange reserves  
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Table C.32     
Inflows of capital (loans and aid), stock of external debts and foreign exchange 
reserves (Korea) 
      
 AI NB I ED FXR 
 Million US$ 
1955 240    95 
1956 298    97 
1957 355    114 
1958 319    145 
1959 229 6.7   146 
1960 256 4.8   155 
1961 207 2.6   205 
1962 200 55       0 167 
1963 208 86    160 130 
1964 141 40    180 129 
1965 135 101   210 138 
1966 122 218    390 236 
1967 135 420   650 347 
1968 121 533  1,200 388 
1969 98 499  1,800 550 
1970 82 420  2,580 584 
1971 64 395  3,331 401 
1972 52 444  4,151 481 
1973  719  5,085 829 
1974  1,171  6,599 276 
1975  555  8,411 777 
1976  1,444   492 10,347 1,962 
1977  3,314    682 14,343 2,955 
1978  1,986   972 17,301 2,736 
1979  4,120 1,465 22,886 2,910 
1980  4,003 2,591 29,480 2,912 
1981  33 3,476 32,989 2,619 
1982  405 3,936 37,330 2,744 
1983  -1,512 4,601 40,419 2,230 
1984  -2,863 4,543 42,099 2,723 
1985  867 4,167 47,133 2,829 
1986  -4,332 3,924 46,725 3,301 
1987  -10,751 3,834 39,808 3,566 
1988  -7,552 3,459 35,715 12,340 
1989  -6,468 3,551 32,798 14,978 
1990  -1,156 3,326 34,968 14,459 
1991  1,823 2,942 39,733 13,306 
1992  1,611 2,812 44,156 16,640 
1993  116 2,930 47,202 19,704 
1994  21,502 3,710 72,414 25,032 
1995  8,008 5,388 85,810 31,928 
1996  23,979 6,014 115,803 33,237 
1997  13,900 7,281 136,984 19,710 
1998  -5,826 7,939 139,097 51,963 
1999    129,784 73,700 
2000    134,417 95,855 
2001    128,687 102,487 
 
 508 
Table C.32     
Inflows of  capital (loans and aid), stock of external debts and foreign 
exchange reserves (Korea) 
      
 AI NB I ED FXR 
                                     Million US$ 
2002    141,470 120,811 
2003    157,394 154,509 
2004    172,259 198,175 
2005    187,882 209,968 
2006    263,386 238,388 
2007    380,665 261,771 
 
Note: AI = aid inflows; NB = net borrowing; I = interest payments; ED = external debts; FXR = 
foreign exchange reserves 
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Table C.33   
Rate of profit of industrial capital in the 
USA 
    
1957 20.0 1981 24.5 
1958 15.4 1982 25.7 
1959 18.9 1983 21.9 
1960 16.6 1984 21.3 
1961 15.9 1985 14.0 
1962 17.6 1986 16.4 
1963 18.4 1987 19.2 
1964 19.8 1988 22.5 
1965 22.0 1989 18.9 
1966 22.5 1990 15.1 
1967 19.3 1991 9.4 
1968 20.8 1992 3.3 
1969 20.0 1993 11.3 
1970 15.7 1994 21.9 
1971 16.3 1995 22.4 
1972 18.4 1996 23.3 
1973 21.8 1997 22.7 
1974 23.3 1998 21.2 
1975 18.9 1999 22.7 
1976 22.7 2000 20.8 
1977 23.2 2001 4.5 
1978 18.9 2002 10.8 
1979 22.7 2003 15.7 
1980 23.2 2004 20.3 
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Table C.34      
Interest rates (Brazil)    
       
 Treasury Bills Money market Loans 
 Nom Real Nom Real Nom Real 
1948   6.00    
1949   6.00 1.77   
1950   6.00 -3.38   
1951   6.00 -6.07   
1952   6.00 -11.32   
1953   6.00 -8.31   
1954   6.00 -16.51   
1955   6.00 -17.07   
1956   6.00 -15.03   
1957   6.00 -10.04   
1958   8.00 -6.78   
1959   8.00 -31.17   
1960   8.00 -21.45   
1961   8.00 -25.25   
1962   8.00 -41.52   
1963   8.00 -64.75   
1964   8.00 -83.74   
1965   12.00 -53.68   
1966   12.00 -29.31   
1967   22.00 -8.45   
1968   22.00 -0.02   
1969   21.00 -1.64   
1970   20.00 -2.40   
1971   20.00 -0.15   
1972   20.00 3.44   
1973   18.00 -8.60   
1974   18.00 -9.60   
1975   18.00 -10.96   
1976   25.33 -16.54   
1977   28.33 -15.40   
1978   31.50 -7.20   
1979   33.58 -19.11   
1980   47.33 -35.46   
1981   89.74 -15.84   
1982   120.66 22.67   
1983   203.23 61.25   
1984   257.32 60.58   
1985   281.65 54.69   
1986   105.22 -38.52   
1987   424.38 192.69   
1988   1,193 510.6   
1989   6,405 5,118   
1990   15,779 12,811   
1991   848 414   
1992   1,574 573   
1993   3,284 1,179   
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Table C.34      
Interest rates (Brazil)    
       
 Treasury Bills Money market Loans 
 Nom Real Nom Real Nom Real 
1994   4,821 2,185   
1995 49.93 -2.26 53.37 -28.82   
1996 25.73 6.32 27.45 8.05   
1997 24.79 16.88 25.00 17.09 78.19 70.29 
1998 28.57 23.12 29.50 24.05 86.36 80.91 
1999 26.39 20.87 26.26 20.75 80.44 74.93 
2000 18.51 10.56 17.59 9.64 56.83 48.88 
2001 20.06 13.13 17.47 10.54 57.62 50.69 
2002 19.43 11.22 19.11 10.90 62.88 54.66 
2003 22.11 7.32 23.37 8.58 67.08 52.29 
2004 17.14 10.79 16.24 9.89 54.93 48.57 
2005 18.76 12.72 19.12 13.09 55.38 49.35 
2006 14.38 10.81 15.28 11.71 50.81 47.24 
2007 11.50 8.07 11.98 8.55 43.72 40.28 
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Table C.35        
Interest rates (Korea)       
         
 Loans Trade Corp. bonds Curb market 
 Nom Real Nom Real Nom Real Nom Real 
1953 18.30 -27.00     60.00 14.70 
1954 18.30 -17.15     60.00 24.55 
1955 18.30 -51.12     60.00 -9.42 
1956 18.30 -4.24     50.00 27.46 
1957 18.30 -4.81     50.00 26.89 
1958 18.30 21.37     50.00 53.07 
1959 17.50 13.15     50.00 45.65 
1960 17.50 9.17     50.00 41.67 
1961 17.50 9.30 13.90 5.70   50.00 41.80 
1962 15.70 8.12 9.10 1.52   50.00 42.42 
1963 15.70 -4.02 8.00 -11.72   52.60 32.88 
1964 16.00 -13.41 8.00 -21.41   61.80 32.39 
1965 26.00 12.36 6.50 -7.14   58.70 45.06 
1966 26.00 14.74 6.50 -4.76   58.70 47.44 
1967 26.00 15.11 6.00 -4.89   56.50 45.61 
1968 25.20 14.44 6.00 -4.76   56.00 45.24 
1969 24.00 11.61 6.00 -6.39   51.40 39.01 
1970 24.00 8.04 6.00 -9.96   49.80 33.84 
1971 22.00 8.49 6.00 -7.51   46.40 32.89 
1972 15.50 3.81 6.00 -5.69   39.00 27.31 
1973 15.50 12.28 6.00 2.78   33.40 30.18 
1974 15.50 -8.80 9.00 -15.30   40.60 16.30 
1975 15.50 -9.76 7.00 -18.26   41.30 16.04 
1976 18.00 2.68     40.50 25.18 
1977 16.00 5.91     38.10 28.01 
1978 19.00 4.54     39.30 24.84 
1979 19.00 0.68     42.40 24.08 
1980 20.00 -8.70 15.00 -13.70 18.02 -10.68 44.90 16.20 
1981 17.00 -4.35 15.00 -6.35 17.39 -3.96 35.30 13.95 
1982 10.00 2.81 11.00 3.81 19.25 12.06 32.80 25.61 
1983 10.00 6.58 10.00 6.58 14.40 10.98 25.80 22.38 
1984 10-11.5 7.7-9.2 10.00 7.73 13.55 11.28 24.80 22.53 
1985 10-11.5 7.5-9.0 10.00 7.54 13.37 10.91 24.00 21.54 
1986 10-11.5 7.3-8.8 10.00 7.25 13.25 10.50 23.10 20.35 
1987 10-11.5 6.9-8.5   12.88 9.84 22.90 19.85 
1988 11-13.0 3.8-5.8   12.80 5.65 22.70 15.55 
1989 10-12.5 4.3-6.8   15.73 10.03 19.10 13.40 
1990 10-12.5 1.4-3.9   13.32 4.74 18.70 10.13 
1991 10-12.5 0.7-3.2   13.43 4.09 21.40 12.07 
1992 10-12.5 3.8-6.3   16.22 10.00 20.00 13.79 
1993 8.5-12 3.2-7.2   12.63 7.83 20.00 15.20 
1994 8.5-12 1.7-5.7   12.88 6.62 20.00 13.73 
1995 8.5-12 3.5-7.5   13.81 9.33   
1996     11.75 6.83   
1997     13.39 8.95   
1998     15.10 7.59   
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Table C.35        
Interest rates (Korea)       
         
 Loans Trade Corp. bonds Curb market 
 Nom Real Nom Real Nom Real Nom Real 
1999     8.86 8.05   
2000     9.35 7.09   
2001     7.05 2.98   
2002     6.56 3.80   
2003     5.43 1.92   
2004     4.73 1.14   
2005     4.68 1.93   
2006     5.17 2.97   
2007     5.70 3.16   
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Table C.36          
Domestic debts outstanding        
           
 Brazil Korea USA 
 Total Public sector Total Public sector Total* 
 million R$ % 
GDP 
million R$ % 
GDP 
billion 
W$ 
% 
GDP 
billion 
W$ 
% 
GDP 
billion 
US$ 
% 
GDP 
1953 6.04E-11 33.9 1.56E-11 8.8 3.4 7.0 0.9 1.9 517 135 
1954 7.56E-11 31.0 2.00E-11 8.2 8.0 12.0 5.4 8.1 542 136 
1955 8.55E-11 28.8 2.29E-11 7.7 13.0 11.3 8.4 7.3 582 142 
1956 1.09E-10 29.1 3.35E-11 8.9 25.2 16.5 16.9 11.1 611 140 
1957 1.41E-10 31.1 4.76E-11 10.5 37.1 18.6 24.7 12.4 643 140 
1958 1.72E-10 30.4 5.75E-11 10.2 42.7 20.6 24.5 11.8 682 139 
1959 2.22E-10 26.3 7.53E-11 8.9 46.1 21.0 25.1 11.4 739 146 
1960 3.17E-10 27.4 1.09E-10 9.4 22.1 8.9 7.8 3.1 780 146 
1961 4.49E-10 26.5 1.61E-10 9.5 50.4 17.0 14.1 4.7 828 148 
1962 7.24E-10 26.7 2.63E-10 9.7 71.1 19.8 24.6 6.9 888 152 
1963 1.16E-09 23.9 4.47E-10 9.2 83.4 16.4 28.7 5.6 953 152 
1964 2.05E-09 21.5 7.65E-10 8.0 90.4 12.5 25.1 3.5 1,028 154 
1965 3.07E-09 19.8 1.04E-09 6.7 118.7 14.6 33.7 4.1 1,106 155 
1966 3.90E-09 17.1 1.18E-09 5.2 153.3 14.7 34.5 3.3 1,187 154 
1967 6.14E-09 20.4 1.87E-09 6.2 260.5 20.3 39.5 3.1 1,268 151 
1968 9.46E-09 22.6 2.48E-09 5.9 468.7 28.2 37.0 2.2 1,373 152 
1969 1.82E-08 33.1 3.53E-09 6.4 751.1 34.6 44.8 2.1 1,493 151 
1970 2.60E-08 36.8 4.18E-09 5.9 962.4 34.7 43.0 1.6 1,602 152 
1971 3.64E-08 38.7 1.09E-09 1.2 1,240 36.1 38.5 1.1 1,753 154 
1972 5.89E-08 46.7 6.18E-09 4.9 1,600 37.7 137 3.2 1,938 156 
1973 8.51E-08 45.7 7.27E-09 3.9 2,074 37.7 174 3.2 2,175 156 
1974 1.29E-07 47.6 4.00E-09 1.5 3,171 40.4 309 3.9 2,413 157 
1975 2.07E-07 54.2 6.18E-09 1.6 4,201 40.1 648 6.2 2,621 161 
1976 3.43E-07 57.7 1.89E-08 3.2 5,165 35.8 712 4.9 2,908 160 
1977 5.35E-07 59.0 4.15E-08 4.6 6,395 34.6 796 4.3 3,293 159 
1978 6.00E-07 45.6 -6.29E-08 -4.8 9,295 37.3 1,035 4.1 3,779 162 
1979 1.09E-06 50.5 -1.20E-08 -0.6 12,605 39.3 1,114 3.5 4,276 165 
1980 1.94E-06 42.6 2.55E-08 0.6 17,719 45.3 1,673 4.3 4,725 167 
1981 4.10E-06 46.9 1.93E-07 2.2 23,215 47.1 2,942 6.0 5,258 169 
1982 8.90E-06 50.3 8.22E-07 4.6 29,044 51.2 3,674 6.5 5,770 168 
1983 2.44E-05 61.3 4.32E-06 10.9 33,683 50.5 3,849 5.8 6,466 177 
1984 7.13E-05 56.3 7.53E-06 6.0 38,087 49.8 4,001 5.2 7,431 183 
1985 2.56E-04 53.8 4.56E-05 9.6 44,847 52.3 4,299 5.0 8,623 189 
1986   1.94E-04 15.2 51,384 51.3 4,725 4.7 9,813 204 
1987   1.17E-03 28.9 59,767 50.7 3,833 3.3 10,825 220 
1988 0.052 177.4 0.021 70.4 66,685 47.5 2,409 1.7 11,867 228 
1989 0.906 212.9 0.351 82.5 81,732 51.5    937 0.6 12,840 233 
1990 10.120 87.6 5.083 44.0 102,194 53.4   209 0.1 13,769 234 
1991 53.015 87.9 25.020 41.5 125,074 54.0 2,569 1.1 14,453 237 
1992 831.66 129.8 282.55 44.1 139,463 52.8 2,899 1.1 15,215 241 
1993 25,381 180.0 6,272 44.5 157,358 52.7 2,659 0.9 16,184 240 
1994 301,747 86.4 56,913 16.3 186,520 53.3 1,632 0.5 17,214 243 
1995 396,019 56.1 86,213 12.2 213,687 52.2     30 0.0 18,475 243 
1996 482,172 57.1 131,317 15.6 255,240 55.4       -813 -0.2 19,813 250 
1997 558,260 59.4 165,160 17.6 314,581 62.1 5,574 1.1 21,245 253 
1998 654,013 66.8 342,314 35.0 351,179 70.1 17,748 3.5 23,338 256 
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Table C.36          
Domestic debts outstanding        
           
 Brazil Korea USA 
 Total Public sector Total Public sector Total* 
 million R$ % 
GDP 
million R$ % 
GDP 
billion 
W$ 
% 
GDP 
billion 
W$ 
% 
GDP 
billion 
US$ 
% 
GDP 
1999 754,911 70.9 415,974 39.1 412,126 75.1 15,505 2.8 25,406 267 
2000 847,533 71.9 453,567 38.5 479,780 79.5 10,955 1.8 27,157 274 
2001 958,727 73.6 543,984 41.8 546,056 83.8 13,106 2.0 29,344 277 
2002 1,119,300 75.7 643,862 43.6 645,391 89.6 7,909 1.1 31,843 290 
2003 1,275,790 75.0 766,913 45.1 705,594 92.0 12,568 1.6 34,623 304 
2004 1,427,620 73.5 844,046 43.5 722,700 87.4 20,555 2.5 37,808 316 
2005 1,653,420 77.0 921,535 42.9 790,777 91.4 36,753 4.2 41,269 324 
2006 2,018,150 85.2 1,045,185 44.1 907,957 99.9 43,396 4.8 45,325 332 
2007 2,436,530 91.6 1,108,274 41.6 993,013 101.8 21,461 2.2 49,866 344 
 
Note: * = includes external debts 
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Table C.37      
Foreign direct investments    
       
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea 
 million US$ million 2004 US$ % of GDP 
1947 55  466    
1948 67  525    
1949 44  349    
1950 39  306  0.79  
1951 63  458  1.04  
1952 94  670  1.47  
1953 60  424  0.85  
1954 51  358  0.64  
1955 79  557  0.98  
1956 139  965  1.55  
1957 178  1,197  1.71  
1958 128  837  0.98  
1959 158  1,026  1.13  
1960 138  881  0.88  
1961 147  929  0.80  
1962 132 0.6 826 4 0.68 0.04 
1963 87 2.5 537 15 0.45 0.13 
1964 86 4 524 24 0.44 0.17 
1965 154 8 924 48 0.85 0.37 
1966 159 10 927 58 0.72 0.36 
1967 115 15 650 85 0.50 0.48 
1968 137 20 744 109 0.47 0.52 
1969 219 20 1,126 103 0.62 0.40 
1970 392 30 1,907 146 0.92 0.49 
1971 449 30 2,094 140 0.92 0.42 
1972 460 50 2,078 226 0.79 0.66 
1973 1,181 80 5,023 340 1.73 0.79 
1974 1,208 100 4,628 383 1.49 0.79 
1975 1,203 150 4,223 526 1.28 1.00 
1976 1,391 150 4,618 498 1.24 0.81 
1977 1,827 104 5,696 325 1.50 0.44 
1978 2,180 101 6,317 291 1.54 0.33 
1979 2,408 126 6,265 328 1.34 0.34 
1980 1,910 96 4,379 221 0.79 0.24 
1981 2,522 102 5,241 212 1.05 0.22 
1982 3,115 69 6,098 135 1.18 0.13 
1983 1,326 69 2,515 130 0.54 0.10 
1984 1,501 110 2,729 200 0.53 0.13 
1985 1,418 234 2,490 410 0.43 0.24 
1986 317 435 547 750 0.09 0.37 
1987 1,169 601 1,944 999 0.34 0.43 
1988 2,805 871 4,479 1,391 0.86 0.51 
1989 1,130 758 1,721 1,156 0.32 0.38 
1990 989 789 1,429 1,140 0.32 0.32 
1991 1,102 1,180 1,529 1,636 0.33 0.39 
1992 2,061 728 2,775 980 0.63 0.21 
1993 1,291 586 1,688 766 0.36 0.15 
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Table C.37      
Foreign direct investments    
       
 Brazil Korea Brazil Korea Brazil Korea 
 million US$ million 2004 US$ % of GDP 
1994 2,150 809 2,740 1,031 0.62 0.17 
1995 4,405 1,776 5,460 2,201 1.11 0.31 
1996 10,792 2,325 12,993 2,800 2.40 0.36 
1997 18,993 2,844 22,354 3,347 3.80 0.39 
1998 28,856 5,143 33,441 5,959 5.61 0.75 
1999 28,578 15,500 32,404 17,576 5.20 1.91 
2000 32,779 15,700 35,958 17,221 5.54 1.74 
2001 22,457 11,800 23,954 12,587 3.63 1.21 
2002 16,590 9,100 17,420 9,556 2.70 0.81 
2003 10,144 6,500 10,414 6,674 1.67 0.54 
2004 18,146 12,800 18,146 12,800 2.75 0.96 
2005 15,066  14,573  2.25 - 
2006 18,822  17,636  2.73 - 
2007 34,585  31,507  4.71  
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Table C.38    
Trade and current account results in million U$S 
     
 Brazil Korea 
 TA CA TA CA 
1947 96.2    
1948 207.4    
1949 139.1    
1950 413.6    
1951 44.2    
1952 -302.1  -186.0  
1953 394.7  -305.0  
1954 147.1  -219.0  
1955 319.5  -323.0  
1956 407.4  -361.0  
1957 106.3  -419.0  
1958 65.8  -364.0  
1959 72.2  -284.0  
1960 -24.0  -312.0  
1961 111.1  -275.0  
1962 -89.7  -366.0  
1963 112.5  -473.0  
1964 343.4  -286.0 -26.1 
1965 654.9  -290.0 9.1 
1966 438.0  -465.0 -103.4 
1967 212.8  -675.0 -191.9 
1968 26.2  -1,006.0 -440.3 
1969 317.9  -1,200.0 -548.6 
1970 232.0  -1,148.0 -622.5 
1971 -343.5  -1,327.0 -847.5 
1972 -241.1  -897.0 -371.2 
1973 7.0  -1,019.0 -308.8 
1974 -4,690.3  -2,390.0 -2,022.7 
1975 -3,540.4 -6,968.0 -2,329.0 -1,886.9 
1976 -2,254.7 -6,520.0 -1,058.0 -313.6 
1977 96.8 -5,049.0 -763.0 12.3 
1978 -1,024.2 -6,996.0 -2,250.0 -1,085.2 
1979 -2,839.5 -10,516.0 -5,282.0 -4,151.1 
1980 -2,822.8 -12,831.0 -4,780.0 -5,312.2 
1981 1,202.5 -11,764.0 -4,863.0 -4,478.0 
1982 780.1 -16,317.0 -2,398.0 -2,550.5 
1983 6,470.4 -6,834.0 -1,746.0 -1,524.1 
1984 13,089.5 33.0 -1,386.0 -1,293.1 
1985 12,485.5 -280.0 -854.0 -795.1 
1986 8,304.3 -5,311.0 3,130.0 4,709.4 
1987 11,173.1 -1,452.0 6,261.0 10,058.4 
1988 19,184.1 4,156.0 8,885.0 14,505.4 
1989 16,119.2 1,002.0 912.0 5,344.2 
1990 10,752.4 -3,823.0 -4,828.0 -2,014.4 
1991 10,580.0 -1,450.0 -9,654.8 -8,417.4 
1992 15,238.9 6,089.0 -5,143.8 -4,095.2 
1993 13,298.8 20.0 -1,564.2 821.1 
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Table C.38    
Trade and current account results in million U$S 
     
 Brazil Korea 
 TA CA TA CA 
1994 10,466.5 -1,153.0 -6,334.8 -4,024.2 
1995 -3,465.6 -18,136.0 -10,061.0 -8,665.1 
1996 -5,599.0 -23,248.0 -20,624.0 -23,209.8 
1997 -6,752.9 -30,491.0 -8,452.0 -8,383.7 
1998 -6,574.5 -33,829.0 39,031.2 40,371.2 
1999 -1,198.9 -25,400.0 23,933.0 24,521.9 
2000 -697.7 -24,224.5 11,787.0 12,250.8 
2001 2,650.5 -23,214.5 9,341.0 8,032.6 
2002 13,121.3 -7,636.6 10,345.0 5,393.9 
2003 24,793.9 4,177.3 14,990.0 11,949.5 
2004 33,640.5 11,737.6 29,382.0 28,173.5 
2005 44,702.9 13,984.3 23,181.0 14,980.9 
2006 46,456.6 13,619.7 16,082.0 5,385.3 
2007 40,031.6 1,460.2 14,643.0 5,954.3 
 
 Note: TA = trade account; CC = current account 
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Table C.39        
Investments rate in % of GDP     
          
 Brazil Korea Korea*   Brazil Korea Korea*  
1947 14.9    1978 22.3 32.5 33.0  
1948 12.7    1979 23.4 35.8 36.8  
1949 13.0    1980 23.6 31.9 32.9  
1950 12.8    1981 24.3 29.9 30.2  
1951 15.4    1982 23.0 28.9 29.9  
1952 14.8    1983 19.9 29.4 31.0  
1953 15.1 14.7   1984 18.9 30.6 30.8  
1954 15.8 11.4   1985 18.0 30.3 30.9  
1955 13.5 11.7   1986 20.0 29.2 30.2  
1956 14.5 8.0   1987 23.2 30.0 30.8  
1957 15.0 14.0   1988 24.3 31.1 32.6  
1958 17.0 11.8   1989 26.9 33.8 35.4  
1959 18.0 10.4   1990 20.7 37.1 38.1  
1960 15.7 10.0   1991 18.1 39.1 40.1  
1961 13.1 12.0   1992 18.4 36.8 37.1  
1962 15.5 11.8   1993 19.3 35.2 36.0  
1963 17.0 17.0   1994 20.7 36.1 36.8  
1964 15.0 13.2   1995 18.3 37.2 36.9  
1965 14.7 14.1   1996 16.9 37.9 37.8  
1966 15.9 20.4   1997 17.4 34.2 35.4  
1967 16.2 20.9   1998 17.0 20.9 25.0  
1968 18.7 24.9   1999 15.7  28.9  
1969 19.1 27.9   2000 16.8  30.5  
1970 18.8 24.3   2001 17.0  29.1  
1971 19.9 24.8 26.3  2002 16.4  29.1  
1972 20.3 20.9 21.5  2003 15.3  29.9  
1973 20.4 25.2 25.5  2004 16.1  30.0  
1974 21.8 31.8 32.1  2005 15.9  29.6  
1975 23.3 28.6 28.6  2006 16.4  29.6  
1976 22.4 26.5 26.7  2007 17.4  29.3  
1977 21.3 28.3 29.7       
 
Note: * gross fixed capital formation plus inventory accumulation (from Kosis) 
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Table C.40     
Price index of public utility prices (Brazil)   
      
 Nominal Real  Nominal Real 
 August 1994=100 1944=100  August 1994=100 1944=100 
1944 0.00000000000006 100 1973 0.000000000064 138 
1945 0.00000000000007 91 1974 0.000000000076 129 
1946 0.00000000000007 80 1975 0.000000000104 136 
1947 0.00000000000007 68 1976 0.000000000139 129 
1948 0.00000000000007 67 1977 0.000000000187 120 
1949 0.00000000000008 77 1978 0.000000000267 124 
1950 0.00000000000009 71 1979 0.000000000413 126 
1951 0.00000000000009 65 1980 0.000000000839 140 
1952 0.00000000000010 63 1981 0.000000001819 147 
1953 0.00000000000011 61 1982 0.000000003499 143 
1954 0.00000000000013 59 1983 0.000000007313 123 
1955 0.00000000000018 64 1984 0.000000020621 117 
1956 0.00000000000023 68 1985 0.000000063293 110 
1957 0.00000000000029 74 1986 0.000000133157 95 
1958 0.00000000000035 79 1987 0.000000529230 114 
1959 0.00000000000047 76 1988 0.000004583351 126 
1960 0.00000000000062 78 1989 0.000054878464 109 
1961 0.00000000000082 77 1990 0.001699768400 110 
1962 0.00000000000116 73 1991 0.010410136667 126 
1963 0.00000000000221 81 1992 0.118084620833 130 
1964 0.00000000000470 90 1993 2.7308 136 
1965 0.00000000000954 110 1994 67.068 122 
1966 0.00000000001452 118 1995 110.722 111 
1967 0.00000000001924 120 1996 157.177 132 
1968 0.00000000002300 118 1997 190.981 149 
1969 0.00000000002841 119 1998 223.734 165 
1970 0.00000000003665 125 1999 244.802 171 
1971 0.00000000004542 129 2000 278.101 180 
1972 0.00000000005649 138    
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